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Therefore, every logical fallacy arises due to gaps in knowledge. — Posty McPostface

I can see how you might think this, but it really doesn't tell us anything. In other words, it doesn't get us anywhere. I could say this about any virtually any subject. For example, my errors in mathematics, biology, history, etc, are due to gaps in knowledge.

Thus, the best method at our disposal in discovering objective truths is science. — Posty McPostface

This is one of the biggest mistakes we make when it comes to knowledge, viz., that science is somehow superior to other methods of knowing. It really depends on what we're talking about. Is science superior to my experiential knowledge of say, the claim that yesterday I tasted orange juice and it was sweet. I don't need science to make the claim, and I don't need science to know it was true. However, science maybe superior when it comes to analyzing what it is about orange juice that makes it sweet, i.e., what is its molecular makeup, or some such thing. So whether one area of knowledge is superior depends on a variety of things.

Then, what method is the most appropriate at discovering the truth and validity of ethical claims, which philosophy is best known for? — Posty McPostface

There is no one method that works in every situation, i.e., there is no one description or method at arriving at truth that works in every context.

Supposing a Christian, Bob, associates some ineffable inner experience with the Holy Spirit, is perfectly happy, and never complains of experiencing confusion. Why would Wittgenstein, the philosophical therapist who hated substantial philosophical theses, think Bob is nevertheless making a mistake? what should be the criterion of correctness here? the opinions of the priesthood? or Bob's happiness? — sime

While happiness may be important in our overall well-being, it has nothing to do with whether Bob is making sense when he associates the Holy Spirit with some inner experience. Your question, "What should be the criterion of correctness here?" is important, and that is the issue. There are lot's of people who are perfectly happy while making statements that are senseless, but this is not the issue.

I will try to answer the question of criteria later in the post.

Supposing Bob compares his religious experiences with fellow Christian Alice, who also says that she identifies the Holy Spirit with her ineffable private sensations. — sime

Yes, this example is what actually goes on in many churches, often Christians associate an ineffable experience with that of the Holy Spirit, and herein lies the problem of senselessness. This is not only true of Christians, but it happens in many other areas of life.

Given that Neither Bob nor Alice can point to anything public playing the role of the "holy spirit", can Bob and Alice be said to be in agreement here about their ineffable experiences? or is there at most merely a delusion of agreement? — sime

I don't think they can be in agreement, since there is no way to know if my experience is the same as yours, or Bob's is the same as Alice's. How could we know that the experience is the same? This is why I believe it's the same as the beetle-in-the-box, because there is no way to confirm that what we're looking at is the same thing. Sure we're using the same words, either Holy Spirit in the Christians case, or Beetle in Wittgenstein's example.

I probably wouldn't use the word deluded, I would just say that the words have no meaning. It's like comparing "patent nonsense with disguised nonsense," as Wittgenstein noted. The confusion lies in thinking that because the grammar of the sentence is the same, i.e., the grammar is similar to, "I'm experiencing pain." So we think that the same sentence "I'm experiencing the Holy Spirit," is also referencing my inner experience in the same way. However, the difference is that pain has something that is crucial to learning how to use the word, viz., pain behavior. Imagine trying to teach a child how to use the word pain without the outward signs of pain (crying, moaning, complaining, etc.). We don't teach a child pain behavior by pointing to some inner experience apart from the outward signs. The outward signs are crucial to learning how the word is used, without which there would be no correct or incorrect use of the word.

We could ask ourselves what would be the incorrect use of the statement "I'm experiencing the Holy Spirit," especially if there were no outward signs that we could associate with correct usage, or incorrect usage. In other words, whatever you think is an experience of the Holy Spirit would be an experience of the Holy Spirit.

Well from each of their perspectives, experiential agreement might mean "The other appears to perform similar rituals to me and expresses similar sentiments as I do, and that is my criteria for them having the same ineffable experiences of the Holy-Spirit as I do". — sime

Yes, they might suppose that, but the question is, is that correct? For example, suppose that a group of people believed that their inner experiences were from aliens. They all had similar rituals and sentiments, and they all talked in similar ways, pointing to their inner experiences as a way of confirming that aliens talk to them. We could also imagine these people developing complex beliefs regarding their beliefs just as Christians do. Wouldn't we think something was amiss in these kinds of beliefs?

Even I feel I understand what Bob is saying, and I'm an atheist who never practices religion. So am I under a delusion of understanding Bob? According to Alice's opinion and her criteria, the answer is probably yes. Relative to my own criteria? no. — sime

Yes, I think many people feel they understand what Bob is saying. The reason that you feel you understand is that we all have inner experiences, and we experience private experiences, at least we think we do. But even the words inner experience wouldn't make sense apart from shared outward signs. If it was true that nothing outward was required, then we could suppose that rocks have inner experiences too. There has to be some outward manifestation that connects up with language and the use of words that are associated with such behavior in particular contexts. In other words, language has to have a social context where rules of use are observed, and where right and wrong can be delineated.

Note that private experiences that are described using language, that have no way of determining whether one is using the words (Holy Spirit or Beetle) correctly, is the same as trying to devise your own private language. The problem of course, is that there is no way to know if you are following your own rules correctly. As Wittgenstein pointed out, whatever will seem right to you, will be right. Rules of usage don't happen privately. They happen as language develops within social settings where rules of use can be observed.

Wittgenstein's private language metaphors seem to provoke their own misunderstanding, namely that to understand a language is to have absolute criteria of correctness. — sime

Wittgenstein would never say that there is some absolute criteria of correctness. In fact, just the opposite. Consider his example of the use of the word game, there is no absolute criteria of correctness, there are just a variety of uses in a variety of contexts. There is nothing absolute about it.

Assertions must only be judged relative to independent criteria if they are to be interpreted as conveying truth-by-correspondence. That is all. And in my opinion, this is all Wittgenstein was pointing out. — sime

Actually this is closer to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and is not something that Wittgenstein would have said in his later analysis of language.

I would suggest reading PI 243-326.

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Many Christians fall into the mistake of associating meaning with private sensation or private experiences. For example, many will often associate some inner experience with that of the Holy Spirit, or the idea of the soul as something private to each of us. Each of these examples are very similar to the beetle-in-the-box.

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I think the best way to understand much of what's been said in this thread, and in other threads is to have a good understanding of Wittgenstein's PI. The only way to do this is to start a thread on the PI, but the problem is, it takes a lot of work. Then once you have a clear understanding of the PI, whether you agree or not, it will put you in a better position to understand these kinds of linguistic arguments. The PI doesn't solve everything, obviously, but it does make things a bit clearer.

I'm assuming when I say certain things that you understand some of the Philosophical Investigations, but maybe I shouldn't assume that.

I think that's it's less a misunderstanding on my part of your position than it is a knowing rejection of it. That is to say, I could argue your side if I wanted to, meaning I get it, I just reject it. — Hanover

That's fine, but I think this idea of meaning that you have has been thoroughly debunked by Wittgenstein. It's not even close Hanover.

That is to say, we have 3 options:

1. Phenomenal state --> Behavior ---> Language
2. Behavior --> Language
3. Phenomenal state --> Language/behavior

I take it that you accept #2, where behavior alone is what yields language (begging the question of what yielded the behavior). — Hanover

No, I'm not saying that behavior alone is what yields language. In fact, I don't accept any of these conditions as necessary for meaning. I'm saying that certain words/concepts, not all, get their meaning based on certain behaviors. In particular, the concept pain gets its meaning from pain behavior, otherwise there would be nothing for the word pain to latch on to, in terms of sharing what we mean by pain. How would we know if someone was using the word correctly?

It seems to me that you're saying that our internal states, however you might want to describe them, are a necessary condition for meaning. After all, you might say, how can we mean anything without this internal thing expressing itself (rhetorical)? This is the way I see the confusion. There is the internal me, the subjective me and my experiences, I don't deny this, and neither does Wittgenstein. What is denied is that meaning is dependent upon this internal self, and since one cannot have a private language, one cannot have private meaning.

If you want to say that language is dependent upon minds, then of course that follows, but you're saying that meaning is dependent upon minds, which is much different. Meaning is developed amongst people, i.e., two or more people working together to share concepts. It's an agreement to go on in a certain way, to proceed based on rules of use. This doesn't deny our subjective experiences, it denies how the internal mind is expressed via language, and to our point, how meaning is derived.

This is just wrong. The noumenal realm is unknowable period. I cannot speak of the rock outside of my experience of the rock because it is incoherent to reference a rock with none of the subjectively imposed properties of a rock. No matter how I look at the rock, it will be from my perspective, and since there is no such thing as a perspectiveless perspective (the noumenal realm), I can't know the rock.

On the other hand, my phenomenal state of the rock is knowable to me. I can speak of it. You can't. You can't speak of it because you can't see inside my head and see and feel my thoughts. The noumenal perspective is God's perspective, which no one can have. The phenomenal view is my personal view, which only I can have.

I can see my own beetle. You can't. No one can see the beetle as what it is as the thing in itself. — Hanover

For me Hanover this is where so many people go wrong. I see this error being made in a variety of contexts, especially religious contexts. It also arises in talk about consciousness, so I don't want to make it seem that it's just a religious error.

Much of this has to do with how it is that we mean something by a word or statement, i.e., how does meaning arise in language. I've talked about this before, but it's very important if we are to get clear on some of these problems.

If it's true that language derives it's meaning in social contexts, then it follows that meaning is not a private endeavor. If I make it a private endeavor, then it loses its sense. This of course gets back to Wittgenstein's example of the beetle in a box. If we use the term beetle to describe something that only I can experience, then it necessarily follows that what each of us means by beetle is senseless. The thing in the box has no way of gaining a foothold in an objective reality, i.e., there is no way for anyone to objectively know what each of us are referring to. Note how this compares to our use of the word pain in reference to our pain. The concept pain has something to latch onto, viz., pain behavior. It's the pain behavior that gives meaning to the word pain, it's not my particular pain, it's not my subjective experience. This is not to deny that there are subjective experiences, but it denies that subjective experiences give meaning to words or concepts.

You said, "...it is incoherent to reference a rock with none of the subjectively imposed properties of a rock." Actually this is backwards, i.e., it's incoherent to talk about a rock in strictly subjective terms. You seem to think that your private experiences govern meaning, but that's impossible given how language forms. Language is governed by rules, and rules only make sense in social contexts. Social contexts not only show us when we are following a rule, but also show us when we are making a mistake. There is no such thing as having a completely private rule, because there would be no way to tell when you're making a mistake.

You also said, "my phenomenal state of the rock is knowable to me," but this is also an incorrect use of what it means to know. Knowing is not a completely private matter. It would not make sense to answer the question of how you know, by pointing to some internal state, or noumenal experience. The term or concept know would lose all its meaning, again it would be senseless. One can see this is so by looking at what follows from such a statement. Anything that I deem as knowledge, would be by definition knowledge. It's as if I have some privileged point of view.

I find it quite problematic to look at every conception of the term belief as a means for 'understanding the concept'(scare-quoted intentionally). It's almost as if you're planting the seeds of equivocation. Sure, all the different uses need to be looked at in order to understand all the different accepted usages(sensible conceptions; language games; linguistic constructs; conceptual schemes). — creativesoul

All I'm saying is that the concept belief should be looked at in terms of how it's used in language, which include language-games, and in turn gives us a clearer picture of where we might be going wrong in our analysis of the word belief. In terms of equivocation, one could also say that of Wittgenstein's many examples of how words are used in various contexts. Some words are even used in contradictory ways, i.e., in one context they mean one thing, and in another context something quite the opposite.

Some words are used to refer to objects, but not all words, and since many words refer to objects, the tendency is for us to look for something that corresponds to all words. For many words (exists, two, nothing, time, consciousness, etc) there are no corresponding objects. To get clear on these words one must look at the many ways they are used. The same is true of the word belief, if we want to understand the concept belief, we must look at it in the many contexts of use. However, we must be careful not to conclude that context drives meaning, it's only part of what drives meaning.

Where does the distinction between what can be shared and what cannot be shared come from? Is there any way to tell if a thing can be shared other than sharing it? — fdrake

From my perspective, unraveling the confusion, my own as well, has to do with understanding the Philosophical Investigations. The problem is that sometimes what we share, say, communicate is senseless. What confuses us is the grammar of what's said, i.e., the grammar is similar to statements that do make sense. So I say, for example, "I understand what pain is, based on my own pain," i.e., by looking at something internal, or focusing on something internal, and we think we've said something meaningful. In terms of this thread, we might be tempted to think that to understand what a belief is, we need to examine the internal mechanism of belief, i.e., what's going on in the mind when we say, "I believe..."

These same issues arise in reference to consciousness, soul, time, thinking, etc. To get clear on these problems one needs to have a good understanding of how language works, i.e., how we learn language. There are many examples that Wittgenstein gives to try to clear up some of the muddle. First, it's important to understand some of his ideas in reference to having a private language. Second, Wittgenstein uses the beetle in the box to show how nonsensical it is to talk about meaning in reference to something private. Third, and this is connected to the idea of private language, viz., the logical connection of rule-following and making mistakes in a social linguistic context, as opposed to something private.

That's definitely an in depth article on the nature of a proposition. Most of my time is devoted to reading and trying to understand Wittgenstein. I have a few threads going already. Why don't you read the article and study it, and start the thread up yourself. I'm sure you'll get plenty of responses.

Sure Frank I can always use help.

We run into this kind of thing on the internet all the time. People who tell you are wrong, when they know little about the subject matter. It would be like me sitting down with a biologist and arguing with them, when I clearly know very little about biology. It's the height of arrogance.

Now if you want to translate my confidence as arrogance, that's your choice. I stop talking to people when I can't make headway, or I'll take a break from the subject matter, or from them for a while. There are people on this forum that I've argued with for years. Some of them I can't even make sense of what they're saying. Moreover, they would never admit they're wrong.

I've made plenty of mistakes, with typos, and also I've misunderstood facts. Hell, even the greatest of philosophers have done that, and considering the fact that I'm not near their level, I should also expect to make mistakes, even grave ones.

How's that for moaning. :groan:

I would just rather you wouldn't moan about how uninformed people are on this forum and how sometimes you just have to abandon trying to explain anything to them. — frank

Oh no, definitely not, and you're one of those who definitely fits that description. I'll continue moaning about people who think they know something, and act as though they do, when they clearly are ignorant. Especially if they want to press the point.

I've got plenty written on epistemology, all you have to do is look it up.

I'm not going to play your silly game. If you don't want to read what I write that's your prerogative.

Let me think Janus, I'm not sure.

So Frank, you think I don't know what I'm talking about, because you find some error in wording. If that was the case none of us could make a claim to knowledge.

Propositions are statements that can be true or false.

Why, should I fight harder. :lol:

No, my wording was wrong, I know what propositions are.

No, it wasn't a questioning. I corrected him. — Sapientia

Congratulations, you want a star. :razz: If you look, I'm sure you can find others, I've been known to make others too.

None of this would be a concern to me if it weren't for your history of raising the smug quotient on this forum. Just say it. You were wrong. — frank

Yes, yes, the wording was wrong. I often make mistakes. I've made plenty of them, believe me. Besides I love raising the smug quotient it's fun, and just for you I'll continue.

Yes, it's a sentence but not a statement/proposition. I should have said these are sentences, but not propositions.

A statement can be defined as a declarative sentence, or part of a sentence, that is capable of having a truth-value, — IEP on propositional logic

Yes, that's another way to word it.

The this portion is a proposition. A proposition contains that special verb to be. — frank

Ya, this seemed inaccurate to me.

The following gets to the point I'm making Banno...

"'But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.' - What gives the impression that we want to deny anything [important point]? When one says 'Still, an inner process does take place here' - one want to go on: 'After all, you see it.' And it is this inner process that one means by the word 'remembering'. - The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember". We say that this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is (PI 305).'"

So the point again is not that there is no inner process, is that the use of words are not objects in the mind. As Banno likes to say, "They're not mental furniture."

Also keep in mind the Tractatus, which associated words with things or objects, and here Wittgenstein is showing us that it's not the case, especially in reference to the mental.

The use of the word statement is much broader in scope than the use of the word proposition. A statement can be a proposition, for example, "The earth has one moon," is a statement, but it's also a proposition, in that the statement/proposition can be said to be true or false. However, statements also include the following, which are not propositions.

A command: Stand there!
A question: What is that?

These are statements, but not propositions.

Just a note: Questions aren't statements or propositions. This was an error.

The following is something I want to put in my thread A Wittgenstein Commentary, but it has important implications for what's being said here too.

In PI 304 Wittgenstein replies to the following: "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain" - Admit it? What greater difference could there be? "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is nothing." Here is Wittgenstein's response that I think is important - he continues with..."Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.

"The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please."

Note that Wittgenstein does not deny the mental goings on, but denies how our grammar forces us to think about the mental goings on, in the same way as thinking the word chair applies to the object we are pointing at. It's not the same, but the grammar fools us into thinking it is.

The this portion is a proposition. A proposition contains that special verb to be. — frank

I'm not sure what your background is, but when philosophers use the term proposition, they're referring to a particular kind of statement, viz., one that can be said to be true or false. You seem to be using this term differently.

It's hard to argue that there can be belief without some accompanying mental state. Its the object of belief: the proposition that is the same across believers, not the experience of believing. — frank

I wouldn't deny that there is mental activity going on in all language users, what I would deny is that how we use words in language, and the associated rules of use, is done in the open (socially); and there is nothing in your head, i.e., any mental activity that's going to give the word it's meaning other than how we use it in different statements. Correct usage is not mental, but linguistic, so as you express what's going on in your mind, it's governed by the correct usage of words within a rule governed activity.

Think of playing a game of chess, you think about the moves in your head, but what governs those moves (brings them into the open) is not some internal mental activity, but the rules of chess as it's played with others. What's going on in the head is governed by rules so that we can share our private mental activity. Without language, and the rules of use, you wouldn't be able to share your thoughts. So language has a use quite separate from what's going on in the mind/brain, there is nothing in the head, that gives meaning to the words you use. You simply use language to get the mental activity out in the open.

A bit wordy, but I think you get the idea.

But that is just plain utterly inadequate for any in depth discourse about that belief. — creativesoul

It's not inadequate, inadequate to whom? And what is inadequate here? You seem to want to get to the essence of the belief. Here's how I see what we're talking about: Let's again use Wittgenstein's example of a game. I'm looking at baseball, chess, patience, monopoly, children playing catch, etc., as examples of games, which is the same as looking at people and animals doing a variety of things apart from language that are examples of beliefs. One can say, but there's much more to the game than these examples, the intentions of people, the correlations being made, the poor gamesmanship, the coach, but, I don't need to know all of this to properly use the word game. It seems to me that you are over-analyzing the word as if you're trying to find some precise definition that gives the word belief some final meaning, or some meaning that is special to your idea of belief. It doesn't exist. You also seem to be making the mistake that Wittgenstein said was one of the cardinal problems of philosophical analysis (viz., definitions and theories), i.e., that there is some final analysis that explains these concepts, but that's like looking at a family and thinking that there's some final analysis that will explain the many family resemblances there are between family members.

So your response that my use of the word belief is inadequate as I use it to say this or that example IS an example of a belief, is like saying that the word game is inadequate as I use it to say this or that IS an example of a game. Moreover, even your use of the word inadequate is improper. All you're saying is that it's inadequate to you. Can I use the word chair, without completely analyzing what the chair is composed of, or what examples of things we sit on are really examples of chairs? And how is the statement "That's a chair," as simplistic in it's use as it is, inadequate? It's not. The same is true of my contentions about beliefs.

As Wittgenstein pointed out in PI 66, "And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." And in PI 67, "But if someone wished to say: 'There is something common to all these constructions - I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: 'Something runs through the whole thread - namely the continuous overlapping of those fibers'.

I'm tempted to say that while the brain might be in the head, the mind isn't - at least not entirely.

In a way that is an (extreme?) outcome of Wittgenstein's view. — Banno

I don't understand your points here. Banno, one or two sentences aren't going to explain these ideas. :nerd:

I don't think you're denying that nothing is going on in the head, only that when it comes to language, it's not dependent on what's going in the head. Is that correct? — Sam26

This isn't as precise as I would like it to be, viz., the phrase "...it's not dependent on what's going on in the head." This may be where Banno and I disagree, I'm not sure. There is a sense where language is dependent on minds, i.e., without minds/brains there would be no language. This however, has to be separated from the mistaken idea that language points to something internal, or that the concepts, words, and statements, are internal. So there is a dependence on the internal nature of one's mind/brain to get the ball rolling, but once language starts to roll it's nature is almost entirely social.

It's difficult for people to get away from the idea that a concept represents something in the head/mind. It's even difficult for those of us who have studied Wittgenstein to do it, let alone those who don't understand Wittgenstein. Most of the confusions on this forum are the result of not understanding the nature of language, which is why I bring it up in almost every discussion.

The problem, and it's something that Wittgenstein only dealt with on the periphery, is that we know that something is going on in the mind/brain, i.e., we have conscious awareness. However, this has to be separated from how language (concepts, words, statements, etc.) are learned. The learning of a language is a social thing, and it follows that the rules of grammar, etc., are also social. I learn pain behavior by using it correctly within a linguistic setting. I don't learn pain behavior from my own pains, or by somehow pointing to some internal thing that is associated with the pain. This is hard for some people to grasp, and it has to do with several of Wittgenstein's ideas, viz., the problem of a private language, and the idea of rule-following and making a mistake.

To tackle the problem and the confusions that result is a monumental task, unraveling linguistic confusions is not easy to do. Even if you explain it, which I've done many times, people will not see it; and even those of us who claim to have insight are subject to the same problems. We are also subject to taking some of Wittgenstein's ideas and carrying them too far.

There's only so much you can say Banno, which is why I tend to disengage with some people. What happens is that you end up just repeating yourself over and over. It's not personal, it's just sometimes a waste of time.

But I am not claiming that nothing is going on in people's brains. Some people, anyway. — Banno

:up:

So based on your last reply, I'm not sure if you agree or disagree?