It's an interesting question. It seems to me that when we say that logic is fundamental to the universe, then we're saying something about how we talk about the universe, or how we describe and make sense of the universe. Logic is a language that's used as a tool to reason, to correctly reason.

In another sense there seems to be something built into the universe that lends itself to logic or mathematics. I would think that any possible universe is governed by rules, and by rules that have some consistency, at least generally. I would say that for any possible universe there are fundamental rules or laws that allow us to use logic to describe that universe. One could also argue that the fundamental rules or laws that govern any universe, IS the logic that's part of the reality of that universe. So maybe in that sense one could argue that logic is fundamental to any possible universe. It's hard to see how this wouldn't be the case.

The Mercedes is actually faster than the Camaro Zl1, which surprised me. I've driven all of these cars except the Mercedes. They are definitely fun if you like sports cars, if not, then buy something that suits your taste. It's an expensive hobby though.

I already have a Toyota Corolla.

The point that Wittgenstein would make (as I interpret him), and I agree, is that how we use language is not relative. There's a kind of logic of use that is generated by language users, and the word doubt like other words has correct and incorrect uses. For example, let's say that I'm teaching you the game of chess, that is, I'm explaining the rules of the game, but you are doubting everything that I tell you. Now according to you it's okay, because doubting is a relative concept, that is, one can use it any way one sees fit, but how can this be the case? Aren't there rules of correct usage, or do you apply your own rules?

Also I don't think of what's reasonable as relative either, that is, it's not a matter of opinion.

Who said anything about conversation, remember these beliefs are pre-linguistic. You're trying to stick what I'm saying into language, but it doesn't belong there, only insofar as we're talking about it. This is also why it doesn't fit PI 293.

The point is that nothing is immune to doubt. And what is rational and useful is relative. — Magnus Anderson

You left out two key words that I use in conjunction with doubt, reasonable and generally. Is it reasonable for me to doubt that I have two hands generally? Is it reasonable for me to doubt whether I'm currently sitting at my computer typing? Is it reasonable for me to doubt my own existence? These things are generally immune from ANY reasonable doubt, generally.

That quote doesn't apply to what I'm talking about. The point in that quote is that the concept belief would have no meaning for us if it referred to something internal - something in the box. However, I'm not discussing concepts.

Sorry I don't follow?

So while a belief is uniquely yours, it is not private. — Banno

The only thing that I would question is this statement. Why can't my belief be private? The language which states a belief is not private, but my belief, it would seem to me, starts out at being private before there is any showing or stating.

The point in talking about beliefs, prelinguistic and linguistic, is to point out that there are some beliefs that are foundational or basic to epistemology, that is, our epistemology rests on such beliefs. Moreover, these beliefs are outside of epistemology (outside justified true belief), which means they aren't subject to, or in need of justification. Nor should they be referred to as being true or false. As soon as you speak of these foundational or basic beliefs in reference to being justified, or as being true, or as something known, then you are bringing them into the domain of epistemology. Of course the classic example's used in this thread are Moore's proposition's that he claims to know, e.g., - "This is a hand," or "I live on the Earth."

In order for any (any that I'm aware of) epistemological theory to gain a foothold there must be some beliefs/propositions that are immune from reasonable doubt, at least generally. Even in science there must be things that are not doubted, things that are part of the nature of reality that are immune to reasonable doubt. For example, that we are humans, that we have legs and arms, that there are mountains and valleys, that the Earth has one moon, etc. - if this were not the case, then how could one conduct experiments with any assurance of gaining knowledge?

Note that I said "reasonable doubt," there are cases, although not many, where it would be reasonable to doubt foundational beliefs. Wittgenstein points these out when discussing Moore's propositions. However, we're talking about cases in which such beliefs cannot be reasonably doubted. In fact, it seems to be nonsensical to doubt them.

An important point about knowledge is its juxtaposition with doubt, and this is a point that Wittgenstein makes over and over again in OC. I think it's an important point. The point isn't that I know and doubt at the same time, but that one's knowledge is always questionable, up to a point. If I say I know X, you might naturally want to know how it is that I know. You want to see for yourself that I'm not mistaken, so your questioning my knowledge. If it's something we both know, then there is no need for me to say to you that I know, especially if we both know that we know. A doubt just wouldn't arise, at least until there is good reason to doubt that we know. A teacher may have doubts about your knowledge of algebra, but after administering a test she no longer has any doubt about your knowledge. Also note the objective criteria involved. It does no good to just say that one knows, your assurance means nothing, it must be objectively demonstrated.

Perhaps language just evolved from scratch, like life. It's similar to asking how did we get from the absence of life to the presence of life unless there was some mystical dormant life force (where the dormant life force is analogous to your non-linguistic belief).

How are beliefs causally formed? It seems to be the case that beliefs arise causally within the mind based on the interactions between our sensory experiences and the world around us.
— Sam26

This seems to apply equally to linguistic beliefs, including those beliefs that we learn in school and which are taught to us by others. What about instincts and natural physical/bodily reflexes - do you consider these to be a kind of non-linguistic belief? Is there a way to distinguish these just by observing behaviour? — Luke

I do believe that language evolved from scratch, but not without very active and sophisticated brain phenomena. Even if you want to say they evolved together from one primitive state to another, I don't see how this hurts my position. I also don't think it's the same thing as going from the absence of life to the presence of life. I'm not saying we're going from the absence of something to the presence of something. I'm saying we're going from the presence of brain activity, to then, linguistic activity, which occurred very slowly and deliberately. Unless I'm misunderstanding you.

Causal beliefs can arise in the following manner: Mary was bitten by a snake, and as a result of the bite she now believes snakes are dangerous. This is a causal explanation of Mary's belief, namely, it shows the relationship between the bite and her belief. The bite is sufficient to cause her belief. This kind of explanation is different from beliefs that arise based on evidence, or what we deem to be evidence.

"Instincts and natural physical/bodily reflexes..." aren't beliefs, and no, I don't consider these to be non-linguistic beliefs. If these things show beliefs, then we could say that amoebas have beliefs, couldn't we?

How does it seem like this? Care to offer an example? Perhaps this is nitpicking, but in the feeble examples I can imagine, it usually seems more suitable to say "he/it thinks..." rather than "he/it believes..." That is, the "belief" seems short-term or fleeting.

Instead of there being non-linguistic beliefs, could it just be that we apply statements of belief to the non-linguistic behaviours of others in an attempt to explain those behaviours? — Luke

I have given examples in my writing, and I also have quoted Wittgenstein to you before about this very thing (OC 284, 285). Well, it's true that we can say that primitive man thinks, but thinks what? If we see primitive man building something, we can say that he thinks something, but can't we also say that he believes something. Doesn't the thinking reflect the beliefs? Isn't thinking a general term that we apply to many different ideas, whereas one's belief seems to be a subset of thinking.

It is true that we are applying statements of belief to non-linguistic man, just as I apply statements of belief about my dog. These statements do explain the behaviors, but they also tell us something about the nature of a belief. How do you explain people who have been deaf all their lives, who haven't had a language as part of their lives, who once being introduced to language talk about having a quite active thought life, and belief system apart from language? Language, it seems to me, is just a way for us to communicate what going on in the brain already. Language doesn't give life to this activity, the activity is there quite apart from language.

That leaves private concepts and notions and languages and so on. Which is an odd but interesting way for us to differ.

Because I reject the very notion of such things, and suppose myself to be following Wittgenstein in so doing. Yet you also understand Wittgenstein but apparently leave room for private mental furnishings.

How can this be? — Banno

I don't believe one can have private concepts, can they? Wouldn't that be akin to having a private language? Your use of the term "mental furnishings" isn't clear to me. All I'm saying is that there are things going on in the brain that coincide with actions quite apart from language, and that some of these actions demonstrate that primitive (prelinguistic) man had beliefs. I also think that Wittgenstein believed this to be the case, which was the reason I quoted him. These mental things (thoughts, states, etc.) are not concepts, because remember I think of them prior to language.

Even when we bring language into the picture, when I say, "I believe X," am I not referring to something that's unique to my mental thinking? It's not as though "my beliefs" only get their existence from language. The fact that it's mine shows that there is something that's unique to me, to my thinking. Don't confuse this with the idea that words get their meaning from how a community of language users, use certain words. There is nothing in me that gives concepts their meaning, no mental furnishings, if you will.

When you say, "I reject the very notion of such things," are you saying you don't believe there are mental states or thoughts going on in the brain prior to or along with one's actions? Again, I do believe these mental phenomena do reflect beliefs; and these beliefs, at least for me and my understanding of how beliefs can be shown, are a reflection of something internal.

You're spot on, right, you don't know what the hell your talking about.

I explained over and over what I mean by brain states, so you can go on with your criticisms that it's nonsense or jargon, but I'm moving on.

You're taking this too far into neuroscience, which is fine, but my reference to brain states doesn't rely on a scientific understanding for it to make sense. All that's needed, is to understand that there is brain activity that precedes or coincides with our actions, and that some actions are expressions of beliefs, quite apart from statements or propositions.

Sorry but I’m more familiar with the language games of neuroscientists than your private language. — apokrisis

Well, it's not my private language, many philosophers have talked about brain states or states-of-mind in reference to beliefs. What a particular neuroscientist means by brains states may be quite different based on their particular theory. So I chose the words I chose based on the language some philosophers have used.

You can say "whatever the heck a state is" in reference to my talk about states, but one could also say the same things about "brain activity" or "neural goings on." You act as though those phrases are somehow more accurate, and not as vague. Much of this is vague because much of it is not understood precisely. Besides it wasn't meant to refer to something very precise.

There is another important point to make about actions reflecting beliefs, it may be that even if actions reflect beliefs, we may not necessarily know which belief it reflects. So, in your case Banno, you exhibit certain behaviors/actions related to tomatoes, and these behaviors/actions reflect certain beliefs. For example, your action of going to the supermarket and buying tomatoes, reflects the belief that you'll find tomatoes there. However, by simply seeing one's actions that doesn't necessarily mean I can point to a specific belief, only that they reflect beliefs in general. This we know based on our own actions of going to the supermarket. And I don't need to express a belief to know that I have a belief.

In particular, does it follow from the use of this shorthand that there must be a brain state that corresponds to Banno's belief that tomatoes are good; and further that this brain sate is distinct from and yet somehow responsible for all of those behaviours?

Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? Including that internal soliloquy that just came up with this post... — Banno

I never meant for the term brain states to be defined in a very precise manner (not that you're necessarily doing this). It's simply a term that refers to mental activity that precedes our actions, and I don't think that when philosophers and others use the term, that they had in mind some one-to-one correspondence between one's belief and a particular brain state. And as you know from other posts of mine, I tend to be careful about giving some precise definition to a particular word, especially a word like brain states. I think that words like brain states, reality, knowing, etc., refer to a wide range of uses, and don't lend themselves to very precise definitions, like the word game that Wittgenstein discusses in the PI.

So if we think of brain states as generalized brain activity that precedes one's actions, and by extension one's beliefs, then we get a picture that these actions/beliefs don't arise in a vacuum. I think you would agree with this. So when you say, "...there must be a brain state that corresponds [with] Banno's belief that tomatoes are good;" I say, yes and no, which means, it depends on what you mean by corresponds with. If you mean some one-to-one correspondence, then no, I don't think that. If you mean that there is brain activity happening prior to your actions/beliefs then yes, but there is no brain state X that one can point to that says, ahhh, Banno believes Y.

Another point about brain states, is that I'm simply pointing out that prior to the rise of language, beliefs are reflections of what's happening in the brain. The evidence is in one's behavior, and the evidence is in what we know about our own private experiences. Actions in themselves don't necessarily tell us anything about these private experiences, because even computers can be programmed to perform certain actions. Moreover, we know that computers don't have the kind of private experiences (generalized brain activity or states) that humans do. So the point, again, is that there is something private happening when we form beliefs, some brain activity (brain states as I referred to them earlier) that precede or coincide with actions, and/or coincide with statements or propositions.

I do think that brain states, as I'm using the term, are responsible for our actions or behaviors, but I'm not prepared to say all actions or behaviors. I just don't know enough about the brain to make such a claim.

Which is where Banno and Sam go astray in trying to treat the truth-makers as some uninterpreted ground of experience. — apokrisis

This interpretation is just wrong. It shows that you haven't read the posts carefully.

Likewise Sam is imagining that the brain has "states". At some instant in time, you can take that instantaneous snapshot view which gives you a timeless representation of how the brain was, in a way that will forever after be recorded as such. — apokrisis

This just isn't the case, where did I ever define brain states in such a way? This is simply your interpretation of what I said, not what I actually said. As I said in another post, the term brain states is simply a term used to refer to whatever is happening in the brain prior to a particular action. I don't think there is any way one can point to activity X (some one-to-one correspondence) in the brain that is associated with a state, which is then correlated with a belief. There is a multitude of overlapping activity (frequencies and chemical reactions) that take place in the brain. I'm using the term brain states in a very generalized way to point to mental activity. I'm sure that most of you agree that there is mental activity taking place that is associated with our actions. I'm also saying that these actions show our beliefs, regardless of the existence of language.

Much of what I said is getting distorted. These are just a couple of distortions, but there are many, and I don't have time to address each and every one. The problem seems to be that people aren't reading all the posts I've written, or they're reading it quickly and simply responding with their take, and that's fine, but unfortunately it's not accurate.

Do we agree that propositions cannot exist without language? — creativesoul

Not really, because what you mean by contingent and dependent is a bit different, especially if you reject modal logic. If you reject modal logic why didn't you say that several posts ago? We'll just move on like you say.

No. When something is existentially contingent upon X, it cannot exist without X. — creativesoul

This is a point about modal logic, and it's important. When something is contingent upon X, it means that it's possible for it to be otherwise. Thus, it's a subset of possibilities. If you say that X cannot exist apart from Y, then it's necessarily dependent on Y, i.e., there is no possible way for it to exist apart from Y. For example, contingent truths are truths that can be otherwise. It's true that the glass is sitting on the table is a contingent truth, but not a necessary truth. Contingent truths can be otherwise, necessary truths cannot be other than what they are "Triangles have three sides."

Sorry I made a typo.

Rather, when I say that propositions are existentially contingent upon language, it means that propositions require language, depend upon language... for their very existence. No language. No propositions. — creativesoul

I know what it means, and this is a disagreement still. Contingent means that something could be otherwise, correct? But propositions cannot not be part of language, they're a necessary feature of language. So this is not a misunderstanding, since you have just reiterated the very thing I was arguing against. Do you follow? By the way, I'm not angry, just so you know.

I'm calm, why would you think I'm not. The bold is for emphasis, not for yelling, if that's what you're referring too. Although it can be frustrating when people continually misunderstand what I'm writing. This happened a lot in my thread on Wittgenstein, so I'm use to it.

Finally, someone who understood what I said. Yes, you have captured the essence of some of what I said. I don't find any disagreement, and only one point of clarification, which I'll get to after I think a bit about it.

We agree here Sam, particularly regarding whether or not propositions are existentially contingent upon language. We both hold that propositions are existentially contingent upon language. — creativesoul

That's not what I said, I was arguing that propositions are necessarily a feature of language, not arguing that propositions are a contingent feature of language. Why would you say this, when I explicitly said, "...propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language." Are you following the difference between propositions being existentially contingent on language, as opposed to their existence being necessarily dependent on language?

So God can make square triangles?

What makes a circular argument viciously circular? I see philosophers doing this thing where they claim that such-and-such argument is circular, yes, but it's not viciously circular. But I haven't been able to find any work on the difference between the two. What is it about a viciously circular argument that makes it vicious, and what makes a virtuous circle virtuous? I've seen philosophers appeal to this, but I don't know what the basis is.

Let's say I claim that P is true. Let's say you claim that P is false. Neither of us can justify our argument without it being circular. What does that mean?

Another one: let's pretend that some philosopher offered you a really convincing argument that all arguments are ultimately circular. How would you pick out the vicious ones? — Pneumenon

Some of this, not all, probably points to the differences between deductive arguments and inductive arguments.

One could also give the example of A proving B, then later one might argue that B proves A. This can be seen in some mathematical proofs, which aren't necessarily seen as circular or fallacious.

One could also argue that some statements are just so foundational that they need no justification, thus the argument may be seen by some as circular, but because the of the nature of these basic propositions, they fall outside the parameters of justification.

If someone makes the claim that all arguments are circular, then I would claim that they don't understand circularity as presented in most logic courses. However, some people try to define circularity in a peculiar way.

This is the second post of my continuing summary of the theory of epistemology as presented in this thread.

Post #2

Third, it's the contention of this theory that not only are actions reflections of a thought life, but that language is also a reflection of a thought life. Therefore, it's a twofold reflection of what's happening in our mind. However, there is a difference in these two reflections. Actions are a necessary feature of minds (thought life), but language isn't. Prelinguistic man can be said to have a mind similar to our own because their actions reflect these similarities. But note that although actions are a necessary byproduct of a mind, language isn't. In fact, it's easy to imagine the existence of only one person (one mind), and the actions that reflect the kind of mind states we see in ourselves, and this is imagined quite easily apart from any language.

Language is primarily used to communicate with other minds, and the rules of usage are developed within a community of language users. The rules of correct usage are not dependent upon any one person, but are dependent on how the users use the words, statements, or propositions. And when one speaks of the logic of correct usage, one is speaking of the agreed upon (implicit or explicit rules) rules of language within a community.

It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. Note that our actions are completely private (actions as reflected in OC 284 and 285), they reflect private thoughts, and can be directly traced to private thoughts. There is a one-to-one correspondence between these actions and one's thoughts.

Statements can and do reflect beliefs (what's happening in our minds, viz., private thoughts), but statements themselves are not private things, and moreover, statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language. So unlike actions, statements serve a duel purpose. However, where actions are used to communicate, then these actions would be similar in kind to statements, so not all actions have the requisite privacy I'm referring to, i.e., they too can serve a duel purpose.

So the third presupposition of this theory is noting the difference between statements and actions and their corresponding differences in demonstrating or showing a belief.

I'm going to summarize my theory of epistemology again to make things as clear as possible. I'll do this in a series of numbered posts.

Post #1

First, since my theory starts at states of mind or mind states, whichever you prefer, let me say something briefly about what's meant by this phrase. A state of mind is only meant to point out that there is something going on in the mind that is prelinguistic. This, it seems, is undeniable; you may want to call it something else, you may say that states of mind is not an accurate way of portraying what's happening in the mind, but that something is occurring is undeniable. Moreover, that something is happening in the mind, is also a precursor to linguistics or to language development. This subjective reality is indubitable, i.e., it cannot be doubted sensibly. So this is the first presupposition to this theory.

Second, how do we know that anyone else has a private thought life, we know it by what they do, i.e., it's reflected in their actions. How can it be otherwise? We know, because we are familiar with how we act, and how our actions are associated with our own thought lives. Thus, when we see others acting in similar ways, therefore, we reasonably infer their private thought life too. In fact, this is how we can reasonable say that there are other minds. If there were no acts associated with a thing, how in the world could we say that that thing has a mind, or that the thing can think or have thoughts associated with thoughts/beliefs. After all, how do we know that rocks don't have minds? We know because there is nothing associated with rocks (no acts, as it were) that can be reasonably said to point to the rocks mind or thinking. Thus, there is a kind of correspondence between a mind and the products of minds. This correspondence is a necessary ingredient to the inference that something has a mind/brain. This is not to say that all acts of living things reflect the same level of consciousness, or that all actions are associated with beliefs. Some actions are instinctual. So the second presupposition to this theory is that acts are reflections of mind states, thoughts, beliefs, self-awareness, consciousness, etc.

I've been busy with other things lately, so I haven't had much time to respond. Hopefully I'll get back to this soon.

I'm not a fan of Searle, so I don't know what to tell you.

I've been using the term "brain states" to generally talk about brain/mind phenomena, because there seems to be some correlation between beliefs and brain states. I'm not sure that one can associate a brain state with, say, belief in God, because there are probably overlapping frequencies and chemical reaction taking place in the brain. So in my limited understanding of brain physiology, I'm simply saying that brain states happen or take place within a physically (this assumes of course that consciousness is limited to the brain, which I don't believe) defined area. I'm not sure if we can assume that if someone has belief X, that that belief is associated with some function Y, i.e., that there is a one-to-one correspondence. It's most definitely more complicated.

Thanks for the information Mcdoodle, I appreciate it.

Yes, I think what you're expressing is close to what I'm saying.

Being stateable doesn't require that the believer do the stating. If the content of belief is propositional, then it only follows that it can be stated. Earlier I address the linguistic aspect when talking about the coherency aspect of JTB(epistemologists). If propositions are not existentially contingent upon language, then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic. — creativesoul

I understand that "being stateable" doesn't imply that someone actually state the belief. Yes, it seems quite obvious that if a belief is in the form of a proposition, then necessarily it can be stated.

Contingency, being a subset of possibility, implies that things could happen differently, but how is it that propositions are only contingent upon language? Can propositions arise apart from language? I think not, unless you can provide an example. I would say that propositions are necessarily a feature of language. Thus, propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language.

Your final statement "...then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic," seems strange, since if it is linguistic (definition - relating to language), then a proposition is necessarily linguistic. To say that a proposition is stateable, is also to say that a proposition is linguistic. Stating something is a linguistic endeavor, is it not? It seems to me that being stateable is a subset of linguistics.

I do not hold such a view. However, it is consistent with the notion that belief content is propositional. I say that Witt worked from that tenet because ihe talked about hinge "propositions" as beliefs that need no justification. I've read nothing of his, early or late, that would suggest that he did not hold that the content of belief is propositional. The limits of my language is the limit of my world. Whereof one cannot speak. All doubt is belief based. When one doubts a proposition, let's call it 'X', upon what grounds does the doubter of 'X' rest their disbelief upon? Doubting 'X' is to doubt that 'X' is true; is the case; is the way things are/were, etc. — creativesoul

For me it's quite clear that beliefs can be shown in what we do apart from what is sayable. I can't make any sense out of the idea that pre-linguistic man did not have beliefs apart from language. If pre-linguistic man was observed building something, then necessarily his actions of gathering material shows his belief that the materials are in a certain spot, and that the materials are used for a specific purpose. Thus, he shows his beliefs quite apart from any statements or propositions. Moreover, it seems to me that one of the functions of language is to convey my thoughts and/or beliefs to someone else.

I also can't make sense of animals having beliefs, if beliefs are necessary to language. Animals also show what they believe apart from saying something. For example, a dog may express its belief that its master is home by jumping up and down and barking - thus, the dog also shows what it believes based on its actions.

Thoughts/beliefs are pre-existent necessarily, if not then language would develop in a vacuum.

"William James, in order to show that thought is possible without speech, quotes the reminiscences of a deaf-mute, Mr Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had had thoughts about God and the world. -What could that mean!- Ballard writes: 'It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: how came the world into being?" - Are you sure - one would like to ask - that this is the correct translation of your wordless thoughts into words?...... (PI 342)."

Also you can't just dismiss OC 284 and 285 by saying that Wittgenstein just didn't have time to edit his remarks, as though he would have edited this out of the final draft. If this is your position, then any of Wittgenstein's remarks could be dismissed based on this criteria.

I'm not going to argue with you anymore. First, because it's not going to solve anything. Second, we've argued these points before, several years ago, and I just don't see any point in going over the same issues over and over again. Others have also tried to point out where you thinking goes astray, but you're in your own philosophical world. If you want to argue these points further start up your own thread. At some point, there isn't any reason to keep arguing, and I think we have reached that point.

Ever consider that your capacity to distinguish between "good philosophy" and "blowing smoke" isn't as objective as you think? Perhaps you are swayed more by what "agrees" with you, than you think you are. Consider your reference to LR Hubbard. Clearly what he has written is not as you say, gibberish, because he has millions of followers. I suggest that you simply do not agree with him, like you do not agree with me. And, since I need to repeatedly point to the same weakness in your belief, over and over again, because you refuse to acknowledge this weakness, this irritates you. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of us are probably as objective as we think; and we are all probably swayed more by arguments we tend to agree with, so nothing new there. Now just consider the statement you just made, viz., "Clearly what he has written is not as you say, gibberish, because he has millions of followers." I would not associate good thinking or good arguments in terms of having millions of followers. There are millions of followers of astrology, but I surely don't think there is any logic to astrology, or any way one can coherently justify such a belief. So having millions of followers doesn't do anything to lend support to your criticism of my remark. This is an example of the kind of basic mistake that a beginner would make.

What irritates me is not that you supposedly point out some weakness in my argument. It's your constant misunderstanding of basic things; and it's not just what your saying to me, but this is a hallmark of many of your posts with others. Your remarks with Michael in another thread show an inability to understand basic things. People have to continuously correct what your saying, and you seem to change the meanings of words based on private interpretations.

Ahhh, I feel much better now that I got that off my chest.

What exactly is your background in philosophy MU? The reason I ask is that you talk using philosophical jargon, but it's as though it's generally not connected with what I would call good philosophy. And this has nothing to do with agreeing with me, because there are members that I don't agree with, but I respect their arguments. You can tell by the way they write that they aren't just blowing smoke.