Number 3 still causes harm to a person's character (the one trying to commit the murder), that is, even if you try and fail to do what you intended, it's still immoral as you say, but I would argue that you did harm to yourself. One could also argue that it diminishes the culture in which one lives, so in a sense it does harm to others. I also said that sometimes it's harder to discern the harm, but one could argue that the harm is present. It would take a more detailed explanation of what makes a good character, and also those things that harm one's character.

Although your 4th example is not an example of something immoral, it's is an example of a natural evil, which does cause harm. Thus, not only do all immoral acts cause harm, but all evil, immoral or natural cause harm.

I do think intent is important, but you haven't read my posts carefully if you think intent is the primary factor. My focus is on the harm done, but that's not all of the focus obviously.

These problems are essentially the reason why virtue ethics persists, even though you're focusing on intent you still have a consequentialist ethic because you're using the consequences of the perpetrators actions as a means of determining their intentions, it therefore suffers from the same problem as all other consequentialist ethics, what point in the future do we use to judge? — Inter Alia

All your examples simply change the facts of the cases. If you change the facts, then the outcomes are going to be different. Moreover, there will always be examples that are more complicated, which involve what people know, what people should have known, or even possible future outcomes.

My particular brand of ethics is definitely not a consequentialist view, that is, that it's based on some fact or facts brought about by someone's acts or intentions. My particular brand of ethics is more closely related to a deontological view, which are based on rules or principles. Thus we have a duty to act a certain way. For example, one might say we have a duty to act in a way that brings about the least amount of harm. Thus, if you were hiding Jews in your attic during WW2 and the Nazi's came to your home and asked if you were hiding Jews, your duty would be to lie. First, because the action of telling the truth would lead to murder, thus telling the lie would lead to the least amount of harm. In fact, Kant might say that the Nazi's have no right to the truth because of what they intend to do, because of the evil they will commit.

The problem with any theory, including ethical theories, is that it's difficult to find one that covers every possible scenario. All we can do is try to live as closely as we can to certain principles, and make the best decisions we can based on the information we have.

The two consequentialist theories that come to mind are utilitarianism and hedonism, which in my humble opinion are not good ethical theories. However, trying to put forth a theory of ethics in this thread would be further than I want to go, at least for now. All I will say is that for me the best possible ideas of ethics are principle, rule, or duty based.

I know it's a common thing that people say, that is, that we should be thankful, but if you don't believe there is a God (Christian God, for e.g.), then why should we be thankful? I'm not saying we should go around being depressed, but I don't see the need to be thankful, thankful to whom and for what? I don't find a need to be thankful in order to appreciate life, or what I have in relation to what others have. I do think it's important though to help others less fortunate than yourself, but thankfulness is not apart of the equation. This tends to come from a particular kind of religious view, that for example, what we have is a blessing, but I don't see it that way.

No problem Javra, good discussion.

I don't think there is any clear intention involved in the accident. You weren't even thinking, just reacting to the argument. It's not like someone says, I'm going to have this argument in spite of the fact that I might kill someone. It's just something that's happening at the moment. Again, they're not thinking, and thus not even aware of the act that's about to happen.

Sure I can give an example where intention doesn't mean much at all, in fact you could have good intentions and still commit an immoral act. You are driving and are distracted by the angry conversation you're having with your wife, and in that moment you run a red light and accidentally kill someone. It's done unintentionally, but it's something you could have avoided if you were paying attention. It's clearly your fault and you know it's your fault. Harm has clearly been done, the person was killed, and it's an accident that could have been avoided if you had been paying attention. By not paying attention you are responsible for the death of another. This is analogous to driving under the influence, that is, you might not have the intention of killing another, but the result is that by driving under the influence, which you know to be wrong, killed another. The same is true in my above example, you know that if you don't pay sufficient attention to the road you can cause bodily harm to another, but you ignored this important point.

Many of the Christian ideas of sin and original sin come from a Biblical perspective, and although I have a good understanding of some of these doctrines, I don't think they are credible. Which is to say, that they're dependent upon a certain view of reality that, at least for me, lack good evidence. Moreover, they go against the testimonial evidence, of many people who have experienced an NDE, which I believe puts them in direct contact with the other side, so to speak. However, this discussion would take us far afield.

There is one point that I failed to mention in my last post. A good intention or a good will is a necessary feature of all moral acts. I can't see how one could commit a moral act unintentionally. Moral actions necessitate a good will or good intentions. However, these are separate and distinct from immoral actions which can happen regardless of intention.

In the case of the book, my contention is that it's not necessarily an immoral action. It can become an immoral act if the person who accidentally destroyed the book doesn't make reparations, that is, if they ignore the harm done. The harm in this case is the destruction of the book, which is property that belongs to someone. If the person doesn't have the means to make reparations they should do all they can to make it right. This is a more complicated situation than the other examples, but I believe it can still be fit into this moral code. Also, in this situation your idea of intention becomes very important. If for example the person doesn't have the means to correct the situation, what matters is the intent to do so, that's what corrects it to some degree.

Hmm, think of the same scenario of perceivable behavior but with a different set of imperceivable intentions: Person A violently shoves person B to the ground (this being the exact same act with an identical degree of harm upon person B in crashing to the ground) but, in this version, the act is performed with the intention of saving person B’s life from the assassination attempt of person C. The discernable outcome of harm (and of a saved life) remains the same; the sole difference now is in the private intentions with which the act of shoving person B is performed by person A. — javra

In this scenario person A has committed a moral act, remember my position is that not all harm is immoral, that is, if you have good reasons for the harm, and in this case person A does, then it's not immoral. Intention although important is not always the deciding factor. One can have good intentions and yet still commit an immoral act, as in accidental harm that should or could have been foreseen. In this case it's clear that person A committed a moral act by preventing a greater harm. There is also an important point here, that is, that all immoral acts have the property of harm, but not all moral acts lack harm, some do some don't.

Suffice to say, my general philosophy is what might be called 'pan-religious', i.e. I believe that there is a true 'domain of value' to which the moral compass is naturally drawn. Which is why such ideas as the Golden Mean, doing good to those that harm you, and so on, occur in many different cultural traditions and sources. — Wayfarer

For me much of the nature of ethics is dependent on the nature of being human, or the nature of the reality in which we live. I believe that persons have intrinsic worth, and it naturally follows that they have intrinsic value. I do agree, if I understand you correctly, that generally we do have a moral compass, but we might disagree with where this originates. At least two possibilities come to mind - first, we learn by interacting with others within a culture of value what constitutes an immoral act; or two, who we are at deeper level (metaphysical level of being) shapes our morality along with the learning that takes place within a culture. I'm not religious, so my metaphysics isn't shaped by a religious view. However, I do believe that the essence of who we are isn't confined to a body. You would have to read my thread on consciousness to get a better perspective of my view, and how it would impact morality. But in some ways, my view is even more complicated because some or all of the harm we experience in this reality isn't harm that is carried into the next.

I also don't associate immoral acts with sin, that is, sin is a religious word that carries religious connotations. In fact, I don't believe in sin in terms of an act against God, which is deserving of punishment, or that it's something we need to be saved from. In the sense that evil is equated with sin, I would disavow evil too. However, in general terms evil as I use the term is just another word for the harm done to others, whether by an agent (accidental or intentional), or that which occurs via natural disaster.

Under my ethical view, person A has harmed person B, so person A has committed an immoral act. The harm can be objectively established, the act of pushing the man to the ground. Admittedly it isn't a great harm, but harm nonetheless. Person A has no reason to take credit for saving person B regardless of the accidental outcome. Person C has committed an immoral act by intending to murder person B, the intention was carried out by the firing of the weapon in order to murder person B, and as such has harmed his/her character. Admittedly the harming of one's character takes a bit of showing, that is, if challenged one might have to explain in detail how this might be the case. I believe it can be done, but would take an involved theory of ethics to demonstrate.

For me this isn't a difficult question to answer, at least in theory.

I've often thought that this is a weird way of looking at knowledge, or what it means to know. What does it mean, do you think, for the conscience to have knowledge? And how is knowledge expressed apart from language? I know what it means, at least I think I do, to have a belief apart from language, but not knowledge.

Many Christians, I believe, have incorporated this kind of thinking into their beliefs about God. For example, some Christians believe their beliefs about God are innate, that is, they know that they know that God exists. This seems to be a perverted view of what it means to have knowledge. They'll also use terms like objective, but it's purely subjective.

Agreed. But just to clarify, the current argument is not whether or not justice is objective (it is), but whether all humans seek justice to themselves (even if they could be wrong about what true justice is). — Samuel Lacrampe

I understand, but it's an important part of my view of ethics, there are many who view ethics as subjective and/or relative. Subjectivity which is either based on one's personal view, or ethics based on a societal view, tend to reflect a view of ethics that can be subject to change without good reason. So it's my view when talking about justice that we have a view of justice that's has some objective standard.

I don't think so. All we need to do to falsify it is to find a case where a man is faced with two options with similar outcomes, but the first one is just to him, and the second one is less just; and the man picks the less just option (assume no false perceptions). But I claim no such case exists: Who in their right mind would pick the less just option when all else is equal?

But external facts aside, the question is what do you, Sam26, observe within you? Do you not find an inclination to seek justice at all times, at least for yourself? — Samuel Lacrampe

Your response to the self-sealing fallacy is not sufficient. If I make the claim that is often claimed by some people, even philosophers, that "All human action is selfish," and someone replies, that that claim is false because some people sacrifice themselves without concern for themselves, thus it's a selfless act. But the one making the argument can still reply that even that action is motivated by the selfish desire to be heroic. One can always point to a subjective X that makes their argument seem reasonable, that is, a product of the mind that can't be tested. Your argument does the same thing, some internal idea that seems reasonable (everyone seeks justice for themselves or innate knowledge), but has at its very core the same problem. The one putting forth such an argument could claim, as you do, that it's not self-sealing because of a "two option" choice. However, the problem is that whatever they choose, it can be shown to fit the outcome they want. Especially considering that you said earlier, that even if they choose the wrong answer, it's because they have made a factual mistake, that is, thinking something is just when it's really not. Thus, because of the way your argument is framed, it's self-sealing as far as I can tell. Sometimes it's very difficult to see that an argument is self-sealing. Your argument has all the hallmarks of this fallacy.

Harming oneself is not synonymous to injustice. Take martyrs, or even people who practice self-flagellation. They willingly harm themselves, but do so precisely in the name of justice. As for smokers, it is explained by one of the following three reasons: (1) addiction, (2) they don't truly believe it causes harm, (3) they may believe it causes harm, but do so because they perceive that not doing so would result in a greater harm (e.g. peer pressure). None of these reasons implies injustice done to oneself. — Samuel Lacrampe

I never said "harming oneself is synonymous with injustice." I said that all immoral actions involve harm, including injustice. However, it's not the case that all harm involves an immoral action or an injustice. So they are not equivalent.

As for the smoking example, it's true that people get addicted to nicotine, so I agree this is the primary factor which keeps people from quitting. However, this does not explain why people, even older adults, start smoking when they know it's not good for them. I don't agree that all people who start smoking, even when they know it can kill them believe there is a greater harm that would result if they don't start (peer pressure, etc.). It's hard to know what would be a greater harm than suffering with cancer and dying. So again, I disagree with your premise.

Maybe my position is not yet clear, because I agree that unjust people know they are unjust. This follows from the title of this discussion, that moral knowledge is innate. I am just arguing at the moment that they have no inclination to do injustice to themselves. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't think it's true that necessarily all unjust people know their unjust (you seem to be basing this on the idea of innate knowledge). It's only true if you argue in a circle. What is the evidence that we have innate knowledge, as opposed to knowledge gained in some other way. Your earlier examples can be explained in other ways. Besides knowledge as I understand it involves a justification, that is, good reasons or good evidence for the knowledge. How do we differentiate between what someone claims to be innate knowledge, as opposed to knowledge of mathematics. What's to keep people from making claims that their particular brand of knowledge is innate? For example, I might ask them, how do you know that you know that X is true, and thus a piece of innate knowledge? Or, how does one discover a piece of innate knowledge?

I do think the idea that there are innate beliefs may have some merit, but this only because of my study of NDEs, but I don't think we have innate knowledge. I'm not sure what counts as evidence of innate knowledge. If you point to your idea of injustice as an answer, then your in danger of arguing in a circle.

You also claimed that you're argument is only that people "have no inclination to do injustice to themselves" - this seems a bit of a departure from what you said earlier (but maybe not). I would agree that people in general want to see justice done, but that's a far cry from what your saying.

Finally, it seems to me that much of this is coming from a religious point of view, at least it seems so. I know that in the past when I was very much inclined to believe certain religious points of view, this was a belief that I heard from time-to-time, that is, the idea of innate knowledge. Even then, though, I found it questionable.

Then I would dispute that, as being too weak. There might be the ethical equivalent of victimless crimes, that is, acts which are immoral but in which no-one is obviously harmed. A moral realist might argue that such acts as illicit sexual relationships, or taking advantage of the ignorance of others in the pursuit of personal gain , and other such acts, are immoral, without there being any obvious harm.

Furthermore, in ethical systems based on karma, there might not be any concept of a lawgiver, but they would still be regarded as moral realists. In other words, an ultimate good may not necessarily require a theistic faith. — Wayfarer

A moral theory is a bit more complicated than what I stated. My main point is that all immoral acts cause harm to someone, and I'm going to stick with that. Moreover, not all crimes are immoral, so saying that there are victimless crimes doesn't do anything to weaken my point. So for a lie to be immoral it would have to cause harm to someone, if it doesn't cause any harm, then I would contend that it's not immoral. On the other hand, it's very difficult to sometimes ascertain the harm done, in such cases in may take knowledge of psychology to fully appreciate the harm to an individual. The harm that's done can be very subtle, and its affects might not be seen for months, years, or even decades.

The example you give of taking advantage of others in the pursuit of personal gain, will in the long run cause harm to a society, so I don't think that's a good example. However, to be fair, and it's a good point, it might not cause "obvious harm." In any ethical theory there are going to be actions that will be disputed in terms of whether they're immoral or not, or whether they cause harm or not. However, if we concentrate on those acts we do know to be immoral, I think we'll discover that what's common to them all is the harm done. Unless you can give me a counter-example, that is, an obvious immoral act that doesn't cause harm.

All of us can come up with examples where it's not clear that an immoral act has been committed in terms of harm, but that in itself doesn't hurt the argument. It says one of two things, either the harm is difficult to determine, or there was no harm. And if it can be determined that no harm was done, again, it's not immoral. I don't see how any act can be deemed immoral if it doesn't cause harm. I would say that it's analytic to any immoral act that it causes harm. The harm has to be done to an individual or individuals (e.g. a society).

I agree with your last paragraph.

I don't think it's that difficult generally to have a good understanding of what makes something moral or immoral. I pointed this out a few posts ago. Moreover, I don't think you need to have some ultimate good to point too, as for example, a lawgiver.

Now, in the case of people blowing themselves up, either they see the act as (1) just or (2) unjust. (1) If they see it as just, then it fits my claim, and their error is only an error in facts about the given situation. E.g., they may sincerely believe that the people they blow up are evil people, like Nazis, where as in fact, they are not. (2) If they see the act as unjust, then it is nevertheless seen as unjust in their favour, because as you said yourself, it is likely done to "win them a place in heaven". But, it cannot be that some people willingly accept a condition that they perceive to be unjust to themselves, if a more just option exists. If you disagree, then I challenge you to find one. ;) — Samuel Lacrampe

There are at least two points that I want to make. First, an action is just or not just, not because of what someone believes, but because of objective criteria that we recognize as just. For example, we recognize that if someone murders another human, then they deserve to be prosecuted. If they are declared innocent when the evidence shows otherwise, then most people would agree that justice wasn't done. So justice is not dependent upon what one believes is just, it's dependent upon the facts. This fits your statement about an error in factual information.

The second point, and I believe this is what makes your argument fallacious, is the following: Your argument is self-sealing. Why? Because it doesn't matter whether they seek justice or injustice, because both can be subsumed under what they believe is just, not what really is just. So if what they seek really is just your conclusion is correct, but note that even if your conclusion is false, that is, it can be shown that what they sought wasn't just (i.e., what they believed was factually false), then your conclusion based on the criteria you've given is still correct. Self-sealing arguments are arguments that are not falsifiable, that is, no piece of counter-evidence would qualify as evidence against the argument. Your argument is not dependent upon facts, but upon subjective beliefs, that is, it only matters what the person believes, not what is just or unjust.

You said, "...it cannot be that some people willingly accept a condition that they perceive to be unjust to themselves, if a more just option exists. If you disagree, then I challenge you to find one. ;)" Really, all you're saying is that people don't willingly harm themselves. After all when an injustice is done, whether it's an injustice to oneself or to another, then one is harming oneself or the person to whom the injustice is done. Thus, the real question is "Do people do harm to themselves intentionally?" The answer is quite obviously yes. People smoke knowing full well that they are harming themselves, not only do they smoke knowing this, but they do a myriad of things knowing that they're harming themselves. If they do these kinds of things, why wouldn't they do things to themselves that they perceive to be unjust? All your doing is making the claim that they believe they're seeking justice for themselves, but the error of this thinking can be seen if we understand that being unjust is the same as any wrongdoing. We know that people make all kinds of immoral decisions, knowing that that their actions are immoral, and knowing that it will cause harm to themselves, or harm to others.

I agree Hanover, as I pointed out earlier, one can observe the objective nature of morality apart from any innate knowledge. Besides how does one separate innate knowledge from any other kind of knowledge? In other words, what is the criteria by which we understand that a piece of knowledge is innate?

So you object to the Golden Rule being the absolute criteria to determine morality, on the grounds that individuals may have different ways of how they want to be treated. I dispute the underlined point. It is inherent to human nature that all humans seek justice and avoid injustice, at least to themselves. I doubt that the victims of the sacrifices to the sun god ever did this willingly, or that the priests picking the victims ever picked themselves; because how can one willingly choose a condition for themselves if they think the condition is unjust? Same for suicidal people; they do not see suicide as a good thing in itself, but as a last resort to minimize the injustice that would otherwise happen to them if they kept on living.

Thus, if everyone inherently seeks justice and avoids injustice to them, then the golden rule is fitting because it results in seeking justice and avoiding injustice for all; and justice is another term for the moral good. — Samuel Lacrampe

"It's inherent to human nature that all humans seek justice and avoid injustice, at least to themselves." Excuse me, but have you been living on planet Earth? People believe all kinds of crazy things, even when it comes to how they treat themselves. Just look at those who believe that blowing themselves up will win them a place in heaven. As for the example I gave, why would you doubt that people would do this willingly, people do all kinds of things willingly in the name of religion. I agree that there were some, maybe even a majority who probably didn't sacrifice willingly, but even a cursory examination of how people have behaved in the past, toward themselves and towards others leads me to conclude you are as wrong about this as you can get. Besides you doubting that something is the case is not reason enough to believe it's true.

"The Golden Rule itself is dependent on a particular view of morality, so it can't be the test of what's moral or immoral."
— Sam26

This statement begs the question: If the Golden Rule is truly the test for what is moral, then it is not itself dependant on any moral views; and if it is dependant on a moral view, then it cannot be the test for what is moral. To escape the circle, you would need to back up the claim that the Golden Rule is dependant on a particular moral view. What view would that be? — Samuel Lacrampe

That's MY point, that's exactly what you're doing? Thus, it's your argument that's circular. You didn't read my point carefully enough.

So for the purposes of my suggested grammar, a fact is not a statement, and we ought reject the idea that a fact has a truth-value. — Banno

So are you saying that statements/propositions reflect facts, describe facts, mirror facts, etc? However, the statement itself is not "the fact?" "The fact" itself exists as a state-of-affairs represented by the arrangement of things in reality (at least generally). Moreover, when we say a statement is true, we are specifically referring to what the grammar itself reflects, that is, when we say a statement is true, we are talking about the statement itself.

It seems to me though that the way we use the word fact can be more expansive than you might suggest. Philosophers try to be more exact, and that might be part of the problem. For example, you might say to me, "Mary put the cat on the mat," and I might respond, "That's a fact," and in this case I'm simply responding to your statement, not the philosophers state-of-affairs definition. So what I'm saying is that there are times when we use the term fact, that it's simply a reflection of the statement itself. We see this in courts of law when we consider the statements people put forth as evidence or as statements of truth. So there are times when we use the word fact and the word true as synonyms. It's very difficult to pull oneself away from the philosophers idea of facts, which I believe, doesn't reflect the many uses of the term.

It's difficult to pull oneself away from the definition, as thought the definition is the be all and end all in terms of answering the question "What is a fact?" or "What is truth?" The tendency, for all of us, is to look for the thing, the object (definition or otherwise) that we can point too. I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you, but merely pointing out something important to add to this confusing topic.

Conventionally, the "Golden Rule: Will (or intend) unto others as you want them to will unto you" is the absolute criteria to determine if an act is moral or not (between humans). As you will try to defend that harm is an essential property of an immoral act, I will defend the test of the Golden Rule. — Samuel Lacrampe

I definitely wouldn't characterize the Golden Rule as an absolute. Some people really don't care what happens to themselves, for whatever reason or cause. This rule also depends on what someone's moral code is, it assumes that we all think alike in terms of what's moral or not. For example, what if I grew up in a culture that believed that one should sacrifice children to the Sun god? One could imagine someone thinking this is a good thing, thus, not only wishing it upon themselves as the ultimate sacrifice for the good of all, but also wishing it upon others. Appeasing the gods for whatever good one thinks might come of it.

The Golden Rule itself is dependent on a particular view of morality, so it can't be the test of what's moral or immoral. Therefore, I would suggest to you that it can be very subjective. I'm not saying that it has no value, because generally it's a good rule to apply, but it can be dependent on cultural or subjective beliefs, making it vulnerable to a kind of relativistic view of what's moral or not.

Given what I've just argued, the argument in favor of your position would seem to be circular. It's as if you're saying the Golden Rule is moral because it's moral. We want to know why it's moral, or what's makes something moral or not moral. What is the essential objective property (if there is one), objective being the operative word, that makes all immoral acts wrong, whatever your intention or motive. I'm making the claim that all immoral acts cause harm, even if we can't always see the harm, which is why it's not always easy to determine if a particular act is wrong or not. However, generally we are able to see the harm, as in my example above. Moreover, my example (cutting the arm off e.g.) shows that morality is objective in most cases, that is, in most cases we are able to ascertain the objective nature of the harm.

I didn't address everything, but I think this is a good place to start.

But you said in your previous post that the three factors you mentioned served to judge if an act was immoral. My point is that if these three factors are present in both cases when the act is moral and immoral, then they cannot serve to judge if the act is moral or not. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sorry I didn't get back to you sooner. The three factors I pointed out are what make an immoral act objective, and not subjective. There is probably no definition that will fit every single case of what constitutes an immoral act. However, one thing that seems to be a property of all immoral acts is the harm done, that is, harm without good reason. Of course here I'm talking about moral agents, as opposed to the harm of natural disasters, or accidental harm which also involves a moral agent.

It's true that the three objective factors are also present in cases of some moral actions. What distinguishes the two is having good reasons for one as opposed to not having good reasons for the other.

So what makes it immoral is the lack of justification, the harm done, and the objective nature of the act. And even in natural disasters or in the case of an accident there is also harm done. So the defining property of all immoral acts or evil (natural or otherwise) is harm. This is not to say that all harm is immoral, it's only to say that wherever you find immorality or an evil of a sort, you'll find harm.

You pointed out, and rightly so, that if a spouse cheats on you and you never find out, then where's the harm. Now as I pointed out, sometimes is very difficult to discover the harm, which is why in courts of law people bring forth evidence to show the harm done. So sometimes we will disagree about whether there was harm done; and if it can be demonstrated that there was no harm, then it would seem to follow that there was no immoral act on the part of the agent.

In your example I do believe that there is harm done to the relationship, even if the one spouse doesn't know about the harm. I also said that in any immoral act there is harm done either to the one committing the immoral act, or to the one on the receiving end, or to both (it's probably both in most if not all cases). It's my belief that anyone who commits an immoral act does harm to himself or herself. Sometimes the harm isn't clear as in the case you cited, but I believe there is psychological harm done to the person who committed the infidelity.

Yes, I know, but that's not the point. The point is that when we say that people arrived simultaneously, we generally are not saying that it's an exact measurement. Like when we say "Stand here," it's generally used in a rough sense. We don't take precise measurements.

There are at least two ways in which we use the word simultaneous. I'll see two events happen and say that it occurred simultaneously, however, we know it's not true given very precise measurements. So in terms of the language-game in which we use the word simultaneous, that is, in everyday usage, it's quite correct for us to say that some event occurred simultaneously. The precision of science is just not that important when saying "John and Mary arrived simultaneously." We have two different language-games, and we should point out that the use of the word has very different functions in each. If you were to argue with someone, and point out that John and Mary didn't arrive simultaneously, they would probably wonder what you were smoking - especially if they came in the door at the same time. And even if you were doing very precise measurements, an event X can seem to occur simultaneously from one point of view, and not from another.

I found an interesting video here http://highexistence.com/this-will-mindfuck-you-simultaneity-is-relative/

Sorry Harry, maybe I didn't make myself clear. My point would be that you can experience change without any kind of measurement of change. For example, I could be sitting on my back porch watching the sunset, completely unaware of how much time has passed (in terms of measurement), yet I do know that change has happened and that time has passed. There is no standard as to how much time has passed, it's completely arbitrary. It's true that you don't know exactly how much time has passed while sitting on the porch, but that's a moot point.

I think where I disagree is with your definition of time. Time can exist without any measurement, that is, we can imagine a universe in which there is no intelligent life; and as such, we know that there would be no measuring of time, and yet time would still exist, and as the primary property of time, change would also exist. Moreover, for us to be able to measure change, change would have to exist prior to the measuring. Change doesn't co-exist with the measurement, that is, you wouldn't say that you have no change until you measure it - of course not, we observe the change, and then we produce an arbitrary form of measurement to account for change within our everyday lives.

Ya, I can agree with you on that, it seems reasonable enough. I wonder though if simultaneity is a necessary feature of time? My guess is that it's not a logically necessary feature of time, as is change. However, I'm not sure.

As in change of thought, viz., moving from one thought to another.

Thanks, but can you have change apart from space?

Experiencing change is experiencing time - that's what it means to experience time. That's why I said earlier that change is analytic to time - you can't separate the two.

I didn't say, you said "...you can't experience change without measurement." I was simply adding to what you said.

There is no doubt that we do measure change, but there is also a sense where we don't measure anything, and yet we experience change. For example, I might say, "Time is moving slowly," that is, my experience of time is affected by my mental perception of it. The same with duration, it could be just an experience without any way to measure anything. I might be waiting for you to show up at a particular place, so I'm experiencing duration without any specific measurement. That's not to say that it couldn't be measured, but measurement is not necessary for the experience of change. I might also know that there are changes occurring without having a precise way of measuring those changes.

You said "...if we did not perceive change in the world then we wouldn't have come up with this notion of a flow of time." My only point would be that there would be no "perceiving" without change. Thus, even the concept of "perceive" is temporal. Not necessarily a disagreement, more of a point of interest.

What I'm saying is that the meaning of the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the subject. For example, "All bachelors are unmarried," or "All bodies are extended in space," which are instances of the meaning of the predicate being a function of the meaning of the subject. You can't have one without the other.

Although the physics of time includes the idea of space, that is, time is a dimension of space, I don't think space is a necessary feature of time. For example, we experience time or change in dreams, but there is no spacial component. One could also imagine a mind or minds existing quite apart from space, and yet we could still experience a change in thoughts or experiences within the mind.

I said just the opposite, namely, that change isn't isolated from time. Change is analytic to time.

Even if we existed as pure minds without physicality there would have to be change in some sense. For example, moving from one thought to another (past thoughts, present thoughts, etc.).
Change can exist as purely mental events without space it seems to me, that is, it's certainly logically possible.

Yes, we do perceive it, but there would be no perceiving without it.

Ya, it seems that time, at least to me, is logically impossible without change. Even to say that a universe would be empty without change is meaningless, because a universe implies change by definition.

If you're new to philosophy you need to learn how to analyze arguments. If not, how will you know what arguments are any good? Also, you'll need to know some basic epistemology, that is, what it means to have knowledge. After all it's knowledge that we're after, not someone's opinion. Opinions are a dime a dozen, and you'll find lots of them on these forums. It's going to take a lot of work if you want to make any progress. Good Luck.

Well, I mean you can keep repeating yourself, but that doesn't mean you're correct.

I'm not talking about one mind. I'm talking about minds (plural) sharing a reality, as in the thought experiment above. By the way, thinking or thought does not require language. Are you saying that primitive man before the advent of language couldn't think, or didn't have thoughts? Wittgenstein also mentions this in On Certainty. Animals show their beliefs, by what they do, and so do we. You can observe someone's belief through the way they act, so beliefs aren't dependent on language.