Not all belief statements arrived at through sensory experiences fit within an epistemological structure. This is clearly seen in Wittgenstein's treatment of Moore's claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein critiques in On Certainty. The one question that seems to separate statements that are outside our epistemological language-games, and those that fall within these language-games, is the question of whether it makes sense to doubt the statement. Note how Wittgenstein in On Certainty attacks Moore's propositions by asking if it makes sense to doubt Moore's claim to knowledge.

It seems that our doubting only goes so far, and this seems to be the case with what we know too. For example, "If [such-and-such] deceives me, what does 'deceive' mean any more? What can I rely on? I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say "can trust something"). (OC 507-509)." There seems to be something basic that we rely on, that we trust, something fundamental.

Wittgenstein also said, "If my name is not L. W., how can I rely on what is mean by "true" and "false" (OC 515)?" Again the fundamental nature of some of our statements or beliefs. More fundamental than epistemological statements.

I do not believe that one can justify a belief simply by referring to sensory experience. This is because "to justify" means to demonstrate or prove something. If I could justify a belief simply by saying I know that it's the case because I saw it, then many mistaken perceptions and lies would qualify as justification. To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, actually we justify beliefs in this way all the time. Do you mean to say that I can't claim to know that the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it? Or, I can't claim to know that a particular tree is in a specific spot in the woods because I saw it? That would be a bit bizarre.

I don't know where you come up with such a limited definition of justify. Moreover, this problem is something I see quite a bit. If you do a careful study of how we use the term justify, it doesn't just apply to logical arguments such as proofs.

There is a difference between the concept of justification, and actually being justified. One may think one is justified based on whatever method of justification one is using, but that doesn't mean you are justified. Obviously if it turns out that what you thought you saw wasn't in fact a tree for example, then you're not justified. Simply saying you're justified doesn't mean you are. Saying you're justified and being justified are quite different. That said, our sensory perceptions are generally correct, if this wasn't the case, then much of what we believe wouldn't be justified, which I assume you believe. Besides we often make claims based on strong inductive arguments that such-and-such is the case, and we are perfectly within our rights based on the rules of good inductive arguments; but that doesn't mean that we're necessarily correct.

So if you ask me how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I say I know it because I tasted it, what kind of claim am I making if it's not a knowledge claim? Is it a mere belief, an opinion?

As to your last sentence in that paragraph, "To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen." So if a botanist comes out of the woods, and makes a claim that they know they saw an oak tree, you would say to them - "You don't know it, you only believe it." That would really be strange. You're perfectly justified based on the general accuracy of your sensory perceptions.

I'm not making the claim that all sensory experiences are justified. I'm making the claim that we do generally trust our sensory experiences, and we are generally justified in believing a claim to knowledge based on sensory experiences.

It is relevant because this is how we would know that prelinguistic man has beliefs. Beliefs aren't tied down to linguistics, they are tied down to linguistics and/or actions.

Read OC 285, in which Wittgenstein talks about beliefs quite apart from language, i.e., it points out how our activity reflects what we believe.

We accept certain things as part of the ground of our experience. Like chess players accepting the chess pieces and the chess board as part of that which allows the game of chess to take place. Then there are the rules that govern how we experience the game, viz., how we interact with others within the confines of the pieces, the board, and the rules. The rules are quite separate from the pieces and the board. The pieces and the board form the backdrop, or the foundation in which to apply the rules. The language of the game of chess is described or defined by the rules. A move in chess is similar to a language-game. Apart from the rules of grammar, there are rules that govern how we use words and/or statements within a social activity. Note that a linguistic activity also has a backdrop, that backdrop is the reality in which we find ourselves, viz., the world, and facts in the world (states-of-affairs).

The point is that there is a foundation for our experiences, and for our linguistic activity. One doesn't doubt the foundation of our world any more than one doubts the pieces in a chess game. Just as the game of chess is built around the pieces and the board, so too is our language built around the reality in which we have our life. There are certain fundamentals that are generally not doubted. For example, that I live on the Earth, or that I have hands, or that I am a humans amongst other humans. These things are fundamental, and allow our linguistics to thrive.

Just as the rules of chess are built on top of and around the pieces and board, so too is language built on top of our world, and the things in the world. Thus, my approach to language, and the language-game of epistemology, is that there is foundational support for any epistemology, and this foundational support is quite separate from epistemological language generally. This can be seen if we refer back to Moore's propositions, and what Wittgenstein says about these propositions. Wittgenstein attacks Moore's use of the word know in reference to Moore's claim that he knows he has hands. Wittgenstein points out that Moore's claim to know doesn't make sense in the context of Moore's claim, and Wittgenstein illustrates this by reflecting on what it would mean to doubt that one has hands in Moore's context. Wittgenstein points out that there is something fundamental, basic, or bedrock to Moore's claim that is generally outside epistemological language-games. However, the claim is that this is generally the case, because as Wittgenstein points out, there are cases where it would makes sense to doubt that this is my hand. Thus not every statement of the form "I know this is a hand," would fall into the category of being outside of our epistemological conversations.

There are a variety of ways of justifying a belief, and the use of logic is only one way, i.e., it's more than just using inductive and deductive logic. This, it seems to me, is clearly seen in the many uses of the word know, or the many ways we justify a belief. First, we use sensory experience to justify a belief. For example, you might ask how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I may respond with, "I know it's sweet, because I tasted it." Second, we may have knowledge of something based on linguistic training. I know that's a cup, because that's what we mean by cup in English. Third, we can have knowledge based on testimony. In fact, much, if not most of what we know is arrived at in just this way. Fourth, pure reason or pure logic, which is another way of justifying what one believes. For example, "Either Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president of the U. S., or he was not the 16th president" is true due to it's logical structure, "X or not X." Fifth, as was already mentioned, we justify beliefs by inference, or in logic what's called an argument (inductive or deductive). These are just some of the ways we make claims to knowledge, there are probably more.

Since my definition of knowledge is justified true belief, I want to address the Gettier problem since many believe that Gettier demonstrated that there are inherent weaknesses with the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. I always believed that there were problems with Gettier's examples, and Lozanski illustrates these problems in the following quote:


The first example Gettier comes up with has to do with Jones and Smith applying for a job. If Smith had strong evidence that Jones will get the job (for example if the boss said Jones will get the job) and also that Jones has ten coins in his pocket (for example, Smith counted the coins in Jones’s pocket), then he might assert the following proposition:

A) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

This proposition entails that:

B) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

If Smith sees this entailment and accepts proposition B on the grounds of proposition A, then with the given evidence, Smith is justified in believing proposition B. It turns out that Smith himself will unexpectedly be offered the job, and by random chance Smith also has ten coins in his pocket. Now B is true even though A is false. Thus, proposition B is true, Smith believes that B is true, and Smith is justified in believing B is true. However, Smith does not know that proposition B is true. He doesn’t even know how many coins he has in his own pocket. He bases his belief on the number of coins in Jones’ pocket. So, says Gettier, Smith has a justified true belief in proposition B, but he doesn’t know proposition B.

Even if we allow Gettier to make proposition B (a very broad statement) on the grounds of proposition A(a very specific statement); and even if we allow Smith’s evidence to be sufficient for true knowledge (basing his beliefs on what someone says without any further proof or evidence for that claim), other problems arise which cannot be overlooked.

Gettier makes a very specific statement (Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket), and from that he deduces a very generalized statement, (The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.) However, it is not clear who ‘the man’ refers to here. If ‘the man’ refers to Jones then the statement is false, because Jones is not the man who gets the job. If ‘the man’ refers to Smith, then Smith would be making a statement without any justification, since he believes that Jones will get the job. The first possibility violates the truth requirement for justified true belief, while the second case violates the justification requirement. Gettier has tried to use semantic obscurity to trick the reader into believing that justified true belief is not enough for knowledge. However, it can be seen that in this case the ‘knowledge’ was either not justified or false, and thus never constituted knowledge in the first place.

Gettier’s second example starts with Smith having strong evidence for the following proposition:

C) Jones owns a Ford.

Then we are told that Smith has a friend, Brown, whose whereabouts he does not know. Smith then selects three locations at random to construct the following propositions:

D) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;

E) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona;

F) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk

Propositions D, E and F are all entailed by C. Smith realizes this entailment and accepts D, E and F on the basis of C. Smith is justified in believing all of these propositions because he’s justified in thinking that Jones owns a Ford, even though he has no idea where Brown is located.

It turns out that Jones no longer drives a Ford, and by coincidence Brown is in Barcelona. In this case Smith does not know that proposition E is true, even though proposition E is true, Smith believes E is true and Smith is justified in believing E is true by having strong evidence for Jones owning a Ford.

Again, ignoring the fact that we cannot be sure Smith has adequate evidence for Jones owning a Ford (in the original paper Gettier says Jones has owned a Ford his whole life – in my opinion not much evidence at all), a serious problem arises.

This second example cannot be accepted because it contains an inherent logical flaw. Gettier uses an example in the form of ‘either a or b, not a, therefore b’. However, this form of logic can ‘prove’ an infinite number of impossibilities. For example, I have reason to believe that Brown is in Barcelona, so I say “Either cows fly or Brown is in Barcelona.” It turns out Brown is now in Amsterdam, therefore, cows fly. This is obviously impossible, thus showing that the formula can’t be used to prove anything ­– or else it could be used to prove everything! You cannot claim here to know a proposition which randomly happened to be true just because its complementary proposition which you thought was true wasn’t. This is the wrong ‘justification’. Conclusions derived using this logical sleight-of-hand cannot be considered knowledge.

One problem that it isn’t necessary to look at in order to undermine Gettier’s paper still deserves to be considered; this problem being what constitutes adequate justification. In both cases, justification for Smith comes from empirical evidence. Now, if someone has 100% (irrefutable) evidence for X and believes X is true, then that person is justified in believing X and is considered to have knowledge of X. On the other hand, if the person has 25% evidence for X and the person believes that X is true, then the person is not (adequately) justified in believing X and does not have knowledge of X. Justification depends upon evidence, and where we draw the line of when something is adequately justified based upon sufficient evidence is unclear (would 51% evidence for X be sufficient justification?). Gettier makes the assumption that the evidence presented justified Smith’s beliefs. However, Gettier makes no attempt at saying how strong the evidence is, and if we can infer anything it is that the evidence is quite weak, and it could be argued that in both cases Smith was not justified in making the statements of knowledge he made.

The problem of reference-muddling in example one and the inherent logical flaw in example two show that Gettier problems are no threat to ‘knowledge as justified true belief’. The classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief doesn’t have to be changed, and no extra premises have to be added.

© Lukasz Lozanski 2007

This is found at the following link: https://philosophynow.org/issues/63/The_Gettier_Problem_No_Longer_a_Problem

I reject it also. Don't forget the rest of that sentence. :D

it could be that it is separate but extremely weak without a brain and people who claim to have these out-of-body experiences are just able to separate for only a small amount of time because of the sheer weakness of the consciousness without an intelligent brain — David Solman

Actually NDEs tell a different story, i.e., it's not a weak consciousness at all, in fact it's very expansive, and this reality seems dreamlike in comparison. People's sensory perceptions are heightened, their knowledge is expanded, their memories are expanded, and this expands consciousness itself. The body/brain limits our awareness to a kind of dumbed down version of reality.

When it comes to what we mean by words/statements that something external. But when I communicate a belief, that's my belief, and as such it's part of the internal self. When I communicate that belief using language, the language is social and completely governed by the rules of usage. It's social meaning isn't derived by something internal. It's not as though we can't talk about our internal experiences using language, but that language must be governed by something external (actions), and these actions, these doings, reflect internal experiences. They don't give meaning to language, but we can refer to them. It seems to me that what some want to do is allow the beetle to confer meaning, the meaning of mind states is shown in actions, not the thing in the box. I'm not saying that the meaning of mind states is derived from something private, on the contrary, it's something public, shown in our actions. However, this does not negate what's happening privately, apart from the social.

Every belief is a philosophical construction, that's a bit vague. I read part of that link, I couldn't disagree more. I'm closer to the later Wittgensteinian model, at least as I interpret him. It's true that language is a function of a culture, and that there are no referents in the mind that gives meaning to words, it's social. However, apart from language, we can observe what's going on in a mind/brain by observation. Thus, when we talk about brain states, we are talking about real things that have both an internal and external component. Each of us knows that we have this internal reality. For example, our internal experiences are real, and if I'm experiencing joy, or reflecting on a belief, that is something going on internally. This experience is quite apart from any linguistic representation of it. However, for me to know that others experience the same thing, I need to observe it, either in the actions of others (which can be quite apart from language), and/or through the utterances of others.

Don't you mean you believe in an afterlife? The question is whether you want to call that afterlife transcendent, i.e. supernatural, and what you would mean by that, and what you might think it would entail; or whether you want to call it a part of nature we do not, or even cannot, fully understand. — Janus

Yes, I do believe that we survive bodily existence, and yes I do believe in an afterlife; which is what I mean by transcendent. Some of what I believe is spelled out in this thread...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body#Item_225

I certainly believe in a transcendent world, if that's what you want to call it. I haven't had much hostility directed at me.

But that's not what happens when I lose consciousness. I experience a blow to the head, immediately followed by waking up in hospital; there is no gap in experience, because I do not experience unconsciousness. Rather, a gap is proposed or imagined to explain the discontinuity.

I go to bed at night, and the game fast forwards to morning, or if it doesn't, I complain that I haven't slept a wink. One can even imagine the 'player' pausing the game for ten minutes or ten centuries for whatever reason, and returning to it with no loss of continuity. I, as the character being played, notice nothing. — unenlightened

I think there is something to this, and it has to do with the relativity of time. In my studies of NDEs people often claim that their NDE lasted forever, or for a very long time. So if we assume that time moves at a faster rate there, i.e., let's say that change is happening at T+1000 there, but it happens only at T+1 here, there would hardly be any gap between our unconscious states. This assumes that the brain is simply a receiver, and that our consciousness lies somewhere outside the body.

When people experience an OBE, i.e., one that is near their bodies, time seems to pass at the same rate that is experienced when in the body. However, as people move further away from their bodies, the speed at which change takes place seems to change. This rate of change can be accounted for on multiple levels of consciousness. We also experience these changes when we dream, viz., different rates of change.

For Wittgenstein the most important things lie outside the world of our sensory experiences, outside "...all that is the case." Everything that can be said, i.e., what has sense, falls within the world. Then there is the senseless, i.e., the things that are said about the limit of language, which occurs at the boundary between the world and the metaphysical. Finally, there are those things that are nonsense, which are attempts to say what's beyond the limit, viz., beyond the boundary. What's beyond the limit for Wittgenstein can only be shown (ethics, religion, all that is mystical). Of course some things changed for Wittgenstein in his later philosophy, but some things for him remained the same.

There are some very interesting ideas contained in Wittgenstein's thinking. I don't agree with some of it, but it has expanded my thinking. No matter how much I read his writings I always seem to learn more.

One has to be careful trying to fit Wittgenstein's thinking into some neat philosophical theory.

I don't believe he was a transcendental idealist either, far from it, i.e., if I'm understanding the post. I would have to hear more about what this amounts to.

First, it must be said that to understand what point Wittgenstein is making, one must understand a much larger picture than these quotes you're referencing. This picture includes what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in the Tractatus, the background of the Tractatus, which includes Russell, Frege, The Notebooks, Hume (his argument against the impression of the self), and Schopenhauer, and that's just for starters. The Tractatus is one of the most difficult works of philosophy, and as such, there have been numerous misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's thoughts in this early work of his. This is said not to discourage you, but to put all of this in perspective.

First, it's not the case that Wittgenstein was a solipsist in the sense that you may be ascribing to him (keeping in mind that there are variations of solipsism, including linguistic solipsism), but he is sympathetic to the view that there is a metaphysical I that represents a kind of privileged view of things. The self that is associated with this privileged view is not part of the world, i.e., it's at the very boundary of the world peering in. It's also important to point out that for Wittgenstein what's beyond the boundary is what's mystical, and as such can only be shown or reflected in our actions. Remember his illustration of the eye, and the visual field of the eye. One cannot see the eye itself, the eye is behind the visual field, not in the visual field. Think of the self in this way, the metaphysical self is not part of the world, one doesn't see it in the world, although one experiences the world through the self, as one sees the world through one's eyes.

So to partly answer your question about the compatibility of realism with this kind of solipsistic view; Wittgenstein did not deny realism (if anything he affirmed realism, as I understand him), but he also did not deny a kind of privileged view of the world, which is a kind of solipsistic view, but not in the vain that you may be thinking.

There is so much more to this, but it would take much more analysis to spell it out, and it needs, again, to be seen from Wittgenstein's goal of the Tractatus.

When I get some time Posty. I've been distracted with New Years.

I'm not sure I follow your point. I understand that you don't believe that beliefs are states-of-mind, but I'm not sure how the rest of what you're arguing supports the idea that beliefs are not states.

I do believe that animals can express beliefs, so I think we agree on this point. I also believe animals can express doubts. A doubt can be a state reflected in one's action.

So you don't think that a mind is in any particular belief state, and that that state is reflected in action? What about the mind reflecting a state of happiness, or the state of being in pain, all of these states have a public and a private side. Wittgenstein dealt mainly with the public side of this in terms of language.

It's as though you're removing the mind from the picture altogether. I don't follow your thinking. What do you think a state-of-mind is?

I've spent years studying Wittgenstein, in fact, my thread in the other philosophy forum went on for years, and I still don't consider myself an expert. Still a novice.

It will take much more than quoting a couple of passages, such an argument would be long and involved, which is why I say start a thread. Understanding the Tractatus is a daunting task, it's not easy, and it's easily misinterpreted.

Start a thread on the Tractatus and spell out the argument.

In my studies of Wittgenstein, both early and late, I never got the idea that Wittgenstein believed in a solipsist view of the self. However, there are many interpretations of Wittgenstein, so I'm sure there are people putting forth such ideas. I believe it's erroneous, but that's my view after studying and reading his primary works, and after reading some of the most regarded works on Wittgenstein.

Solipsism implies that the self is the only thing that can be known. I would disagree with this idea. However, I do not deny the mysteries of the self, which is probably one of the great mysteries of the universe.

The belief is made up of two distinct things, the private nature of the mind state, coupled with the public acts. The belief is not private, without the public part we would not know that there was a belief. So don't separate the two.

Yes, a belief as reflected in one's actions, apart from any linguistic response. They exist, as any belief does, as a state-of-mind, but the belief presents itself publicly in the actions of those who have the belief.

Thanks Banno, I enjoy it too.

You're going wrong by isolating this statement apart from my other statements, that point to actions that reflect these beliefs.

Whether it's irrelevant depends on many factors. I'm not saying that it's relevant to Wittgenstein's ideas, even though there is overlap. I'm talking prelinguistics, at least partly, and Wittgenstein is staying within language. Relevant in explaining Wittgenstein's ideas in On Certainty, obviously not. However, it's relevant to the explanation of what I mean by prelinguistic beliefs. Moreover, I don't think any of this contradicts or hurts Wittgenstein's thinking.

Banno you are the master when it comes to giving the shortest possible responses to complex questions. roflol

Are you saying that Wittgenstein thought that the mind was somehow empty, that nothing is going on in the mind as we express a belief? And yes he did reject the notion of private objects, I agree. The key here is private. I'm not saying the belief is simply a state-of-mind that is privately held. The only way to know if one has a prelinguistic belief is by observation, thus it's not private, it's public. You seem to be hung up on the idea that it's only a state, but that's not the complete story. It's a state that can be observed by all, in the actions of the person with the belief. The beetle in the box scenario can only be accessed by you, you are the only who can see your particular beetle, i.e., it's not public.

Obviously there is language, and as such they are stateable, but this misses my point.

Wittgenstein never denied that there was something private going on in the mind, he believed that it was much more though, the actions reflect the belief, i.e., that there is something objective going on in the world. He did not deny our states-of-mind. What's primary in terms of belief, is one's actions, i.e., there would be no way to infer that one has a prelinguistic belief other than to point to the actions of the person or animal, but this doesn't take away from the fact these beliefs are mind states. If I were simply pointing to mind states, I would agree that you have a point, but I'm not.

I'll respond to this first. What I mean by unstateable is that there is no linguistic forum to state the belief. It's certainly possible that no language would have ever developed, thus all prelinguistic beliefs would be unstateable. You're projecting linguistics into the argument, whereas, I'm talking about a scenario in which there are no linguistics. Your saying that a belief can be stated, which assumes there are linguistics. How does a belief get stated apart from linguistics?

There's something about beliefs arising non-linguisticaly that resembles beetles in boxes. You rescue yourself later in saying that any belief can be stated. But that leaves hanging the nature of non-linguistic beliefs. Are they more than beliefs that have not been stated? If so, don't they exemplify the sort of private mental furniture Wittgenstein cleared out? — Banno

Even Wittgenstein held to the idea that beliefs can be nonlinguistic, as in my earlier post in which I quoted him. Remember the belief is not dependent simply upon being something in the mind, it has to be shown within the context of life. Also there is no way to objectively verify what's in the box, they're referring to some thing, but that thing could be any X one wants it to be. If prelinguistic man has a belief, the only way to know if he has it, is by observation, what he does that reflects that belief. I'm not simply pointing to something in the mind, although it's that too.

An unstateable belief is nonsense, are you sure about that? Prior to language there were plenty of beliefs that were unstateable. One needs language to state a belief. What about the beliefs of animals?

I also did not say anything about causal knowledge, in fact, I said just the opposite. Knowledge is based on certain causal beliefs. I do not even think there is such a thing as causal knowledge.
— Sam26

That's another quibble so far as I'm concerned. — apokrisis

This is not a quibble. It goes to the heart of what I am saying. And I do hold to the definition of knowledge, that it is justified true belief.

There are two ways of reading this.

In the first, I could read it as setting out in some absolute sense what belief is.

In the second, I could take it as setting out how you intend to make use of the word belief in the discussion.

Given your Wittgensteinian disposition, I'll take the second.

In which case I think it worth pointing out that we could make a distinction between a belief and, say, a disposition. In this account a belief would be a statement that is the subject of a statement of belief, and hence subject to whatever grammatical rules might be deemed appropriate. So in "Banno believes that Moore had two hands", the belief is that Moore had two hands.

And a disposition would be some preceding metal state. — Banno

I do believe, that beliefs acquired by humans and animals are all states-of-mind, and also this is how I intend to make use of the word belief throughout the discussion. However, the expression of beliefs, whether through one's actions, or those expressed linguistically, simply reflect a particular kind of state. So it's not either 1 or 2, but both reading are correct.

I think a disposition has a broader reach than simply a belief. A disposition may reflect various kinds of states, whereas, a belief state reflects a particular state, that of being Mary's belief; and if it is reflected in a proposition, of course it would involve the subject of the proposition as put forth by Mary.

I'm not sure of the purpose of pointing this out, maybe you could explain how it differs from what I'm proposing.

"And the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the language-game (OC 560)."

This is something important, and it is something that is crucial to understand in relation to bedrock beliefs (hinge-propositions). Why? Because some bedrock beliefs are formed prior to language, or along side of language; and as such, knowing or knowledge is quite a separate endeavor, which only occurs in language or in language-games. Prelinguistically there are only beliefs, so while beliefs do occur at this level (bedrock) as a state-of-mind, knowledge does not occur at the prelinguistic level. Knowledge is supported by the foundation, as well as a host of other concepts used in language-games.

Not only is, "This is my hand" - "I live on the earth" - "That is a tree" bedrock, but other states like "I am in pain" - "I am happy" - "I am sad," are also bedrock. This is not to say that there cannot be examples of these propositions not being bedrock, and in need of justification - it is only to say that for the most part, and in conjunction with the way Moore is using these propositions, they are bedrock and do not need a justification.

The problem is that when we use language to talk about bedrock beliefs, it makes it difficult to see them as separate and distinct from language. A belief does not need language (the concept belief does) it is merely a state, but knowledge and all it entails (truth and justification in particular) does require a language, and a language-game. We do not need a language to act, but we do need a language to convey thoughts. The way we act apart from language allows us to observe bedrock beliefs.

"People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bones etc. etc. for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

"They have always learnt from experience ; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not... (OC 284)"

"If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there (OC 285)."

These passages from On Certainty indicate to me that beliefs are not necessarily rooted in language. In fact, actions tell us more about one's beliefs than mere statements.

Of course it all depends on how you define thinking. As you say, animals can reason in a causal fashion. Brains are evolved for that kind of Bayesian inference. Certain bodily actions will predict certain experienced outcomes. — apokrisis

There is much here to respond to, but I'll only point out some things that I did not say. First, I did not say that animals reason, but of course I'm using reason as something that takes place in language. Also, I'm not going to pretend that I know all of the nuanced things that go on in the brain of a prelinguistic human, because I just don't. The only conclusion that I want to make is that there are prelinguistic beliefs, and that much of our linguistic based epistemological system rests on these beliefs. You're going much further than my conclusions.

I think this makes a big problem for your desire to secure epistemology in bedrock causal knowledge. — apokrisis

I also did not say anything about causal knowledge, in fact, I said just the opposite. Knowledge is based on certain causal beliefs. I do not even think there is such a thing as causal knowledge.

Biology and evolution sorted out the epistemic rules for an animal level of cognition. The epistemic rules for linguistically-structured thought could be another whole ball-game. I would certainly argue that their bedrock seems "mathematico-logical" for a good reason. — apokrisis

I do not understand this. I would not say that evolution sorted out epistemic rules, what does that mean? It sounds like you are giving evolution an intellectual basis. Maybe there are certain causal laws that dictate certain outcomes, but rules imply something else for me.

Thanks for the response Apokrisis, that took time to write out.