I try to look at what's foundational to our experiences, i.e., the interaction between sensory experiences and the world around us. This is how we come into contact with the world. I believe there is a causal relationship between our sensory experiences and very primitive or basic beliefs (pre-linguistic beliefs), and since they are pre-linguistic they are prior to epistemological concerns. It's in this sense that many of these beliefs are foundational or basic.

Once language enters into the picture we form linguistic concepts that are rule-based (language-games), and many of these concepts serve to describe reality - concepts such as fact, truth, knowledge, justification, objective, etc. Thus, what I've done is try to build an epistemological system that rests on foundational beliefs that are outside of any system of justification. This epistemology rests on, or is grounded in very basic kinds of beliefs, which solves the problem of an infinite regress or circularity caused by other kinds of epistemological theories.

I don't believe that any theory of knowledge can capture every possible situation in which it can be said that we know X, no more than a definition of game can capture every possible use of the term game. So my theory is more of a guide, or a general rule that's meant to give us some measure of confidence in terms of how we use the term know, and what it means to know.

I don't believe knowledge is restricted to any one area of study. For example, science provides only one way of attaining knowledge, but I also have knowledge based on sensory experiences. I have knowledge that I'm sitting at a desk typing quite apart from any experiment done in a lab. Furthermore, much of what we come to know is based on testimonial evidence, which comes to us in a variety of ways, and this also is quite apart from any deductive or inductive reasoning.

What's absurd is that you think that you can apply this idea to an amoeba. Amoeba's don't have the complexity of actions that humans have. Moreover, not all actions that lifeforms perform show beliefs. Not all of our (modern man's) actions show beliefs. If we were to watch primitive humans build things we could infer that they believe certain things by observing their actions. For example, they might go to a certain area of the forest and cut down trees and reshape them to build something, or they might measure one log by laying it alongside another, confirming that they are roughly the same size.

How does one even get to a language without having beliefs prior to having a language?

Obviously there is a difference between actions that are instinctual and one's that are not. How does one know the difference - by observation.

Both belief and doubt are conceptual, actions are inadequate to express these. An observer might infer them from the actions of one whose language is not developed, such as a child having an idea that a treat under a cup, but the belief that the treat is under the cup is not a belief in the child. — charleton

Belief and doubt are only conceptual if you believe that they're products of language. However, it's been the case generally that beliefs (I would also add doubts) are states-of-mind, and states-of-mind are not dependent on linguistic concepts. It's not as though primitive man, before the advent of language, didn't have beliefs and/or doubts. Part of what it means to have a language is to put thoughts into words, thinking is prior to language, and prior to concepts.

Doubting is a state-of-mind just as a belief is a state-of-mind, and one can show states-of-mind apart from language.

Thought and belief are prior to the ability to doubt what one is being taught during language acquisition. Thought and belief that is prior to the ability to doubt does not include the ability to doubt. All doubt is belief based, and it consists in/of doubting the truth of something or other. — creativesoul

I do believe that one can have thoughts and beliefs prior to learning language. I argued this in my Wittgenstein threads. I'd be careful in expressing the limits of these beliefs though. No doubt that sharing a belief with others in terms of statements is a necessary feature of language.

It sounds like you're saying that we cannot express doubts without language. If this is the case, I don't think it's true. One can express doubts by one's actions, just as one can express beliefs by one's actions. The act of digging in the ground, for example, shows my belief that something is there (beliefs being states-of-mind). The act of doubting can also be observed. For example, one might have buried something in the ground (primitive man for e.g.) only to find that the object isn't where one thought it was. You may see the person quit digging, for example, look pensive, trying to figure out where the thing is buried. So the expression of doubts isn't necessary to language. It does seem to be a feature that's closely related to memory, that is, the person digging might be doubting their own recollection of where they buried a particular object.

The concepts of doubt and belief are something that requires language. However, one can show one's belief or doubt by one's actions apart from the concepts or apart from language. So at a primitive level one's beliefs are shown through actions, but as we acquire language, we not only show our beliefs by our actions, but we show them by using concepts and/or statements.

What you're giving is an opinion, not an argument.

I think a point you’re missing is that there might be things that can only be known in the first person, that are true, but not necessarily ‘objective’. I mean, if you restrict the criterion for what constitutes an ‘objective fact’ to the empirical sciences, then basically you’ve fallen into some form of positivism. — Wayfarer

Actually I would acknowledge that there are truths that can be known in the first person. There are plenty of experiences that we have, that can only be known in the first person. For example, there is no way that I can demonstrate objectively, whether scientifically of otherwise, that I had certain private experiences yesterday or probably at any time in the past. These can be fit within the context of what I'm saying, that is, they're not purely subjective, they have an objective component.

Also, if you've read my posts, you would have seen that my epistemology includes ways of knowing that do not fit a scientific model. For example, testimonial evidence, our knowledge through sensory experience that a piece of candy is sweet, and also linguistic knowledge.

Finally, and I'm very familiar with Dr. Alexander's book, I would contend that what people are seeing in these NDEs does constitute an objective reality, so what constitutes or makes up an objective fact is not limited to our spacial temporal reality (our universe). Any possible world, reality, or universe that has a spacial component would necessarily have an objective component, that is, mind-independent things associated with that reality. Moreover, since other people have seen similar things within the NDE framework or experience, I believe it shows an objective reality apart from ours. The logical positivists would definitely disagree with my philosophical ideas in terms of NDEs.

Sam, we are closer. I haven't fully read the article myself and the only thing emerged from it to me is the weakness of testimonials. Nevertheless we don't need them, strong or weak. Yes I am subjective because I have recently found it's more important than being objective. Finally what's the most important on earth anyway? Isn't that yourself, or your - self? I referred to proofs or strongest testimonials just to let them down. — Dzung

Actually we are very far apart in terms of how we should arrive at correct beliefs or true beliefs. It may be true that our beliefs are similar, that is, that we both believe that NDEs are real. However, where we differ, and I think this is a major difference, is in how we determine whether a statement or belief is true. So in technical jargon, we have major epistemological differences, which I pointed out, somewhat, in my last post. For example, there are subjective truths, I wouldn't deny that, but when it comes to evaluating the truth of testimonial evidence, it isn't about what someone happens to believe, it's about whether these beliefs are objectively true. Just because someone believes that something is true, that doesn't make it true. Generally speaking subjective truths depend on the subject, what they think or feel is true, that is, it's minds or mind-dependent. If truth was a matter of what you or I believe is true, then anything can be true or false depending on what the subject believes. Given this idea, it would naturally follow that truth would largely have no foothold, that is, it would be meaningless.

If we compare a subjective truth to an objective truth the contrast couldn't be more stark. For example, it's objectively true that the Earth has one moon, the truth of this statement has nothing to do with your subjective belief. Your subjective belief may or may not line up with objective reality. Subjective truths, once again, depend on the subject, for example, "I like oranges" is a subjective truth. The truth of the statement is dependent on the subject "me," it's not like the statement "The Earth has one moon," which is not dependent upon a mind or minds, but is dependent upon the nature of objective reality.

I don't think pantheism is quite what I'm talking about, especially since pantheism is mostly identified as a religious idea.

Wow, sorting through all of this would be a monumental task, especially given how vague some of these words are. I'm not sure that there is any one answer that will satisfy philosophers generally, given the wide spectrum of theories and definitions. That said, you seem to looking for more modern views of Realism. It's an interesting topic, and I would be interested in hearing what others say about it.

My own view, is that consciousness, or a mind or minds is at the bottom of all reality. So whether we're talking about universals, abstract objects, particulars, etc, it all proceeds from consciousness. To be clear, I'm not coming from any religious point of view, only that consciousness is the unifying principle that unites all of reality, including the way we talk about reality. Since I haven't kept up with some of these theories myself, I'm not sure how my own ideas would fit within context of your question; and I'm not sure how modern my ideas are in terms of past ideas.

The evidence that I cite is not a proof, that is, it's not deductive but inductive. So what I'm saying is that what I claim to know is based on what's probably the case, as opposed to what's necessarily the case. I'm not claiming that we know with absolute certainty in this case.

I understand that you agree with the testimonials for NDEs, but you don't agree that we can know it to be the case, that is, know it as true (maybe subjectively in your case, I'm not sure).

I agree with much of the sentiment in the article you cited, but much of it doesn't apply to what I'm saying. If you have specific questions, I'll answer, but I'm not going to go through that complete article and cite everything I agree with or don't agree with. It would take too much time. It sounds like our disagreement is epistemological in nature.

It's a good question. It's not as though most people filter their moral choices through some moral theory. However, I think it helps us think more about these questions, and some of the problems that arise. In my own life it's helped me think more about how to act, and I believe its become part of my own thinking. For the general public this probably isn't so, but for those of us who like doing philosophy the thinking is that some of this filters down into society. How much of it is practical is a really good question, but you can ask this of most philosophical theories.

Finally, it's probably the case that even if you don't have a well thought out system of ethics, you're moral actions probably are associated with a system of rules that you learned from family, friends, and society. So in this sense it's probably a theory in a loose sense of the word.

Yes it's ambiguous, and it's a problem (not that you're doing this) when we try to make definitions precise when they tend to be ambiguous. Many philosophical problems arise as a result. The word time is just such an example. There are just too many uses of some of these words to give a precise definition that fit every possible use of the word. The same is true of the word game, as Wittgenstein pointed out.

Your five points can't stand up with such a research.I don't need to argue about flaws here and there. It appears in your elaboration there is a mix-up between social science and natural science while the two are yet to merge.
For example, "Testimonial evidence" should be replaced by a scientific evidence I believe. At least because it comes from legislative meanings. — Dzung

The link you provide that gives an overview of different kinds of evidence isn't a very good one. What we want to know, and what I'm concerned with is the different ways in which we arrive at knowledge (justified true belief). There are many ways to justify a belief, and testimony is one of the ways we justify believing that something is true. In fact, much of what we believe is a matter of testimony. When you sit in a class room listening to a lecture you're listening to the testimony of an expert on the subject (hopefully), or at least someone who is knowledgeable. Granted testimonial evidence is not scientific evidence, and much of the time it can be very weak, but my point at the beginning of this thread was to show what kind of testimonial evidence is strong, that is, what makes for strong testimonial evidence. Furthermore, much of what makes for strong testimonial evidence is the same as what makes a strong inductive argument. So I'm applying rules that make testimonial evidence strong to NDEs, because my concern, and the concern of others is about truth, that is, is it true that people who experience an NDE are experiencing something real. No doubt they're having a real experience, just like people who have dreams have real experiences, but the question isn't whether it's a real experience, but is it an objective reality. For example, would it follow from these experiences that consciousness survives bodily existence? My contention is that there is overwhelming evidence that these experiences give strong evidence of the survival of consciousness after the death of the body, and that we retain our individuality.

Also I'm not mixing up social science with natural science, in fact, I make a distinction between scientific knowledge and the knowledge that comes in other ways, namely, knowledge that comes from testimonial evidence. And since testimonial evidence is seen in just about every subject area it is something that isn't confined to one area of study. It is seen in virtually every area of study. In fact, it's so pervasive that to doubt much of it would collapse most of what we know.

If you mean by universal that it applies absolutely, then I would respond that any moral code is dependent upon the nature of reality, and the nature of the beings it's being applied to. Thus, it may not be absolute. On the other hand, if by universal you mean that it applies equally to all humans, I'll buy into that. Moreover, a universal moral code is dependent on some objective criteria, unless you can get all of humanity to subscribe to a set of moral rules or principles, which is highly unlikely.

Many of our moral principles do come from religious ideas, but some do not, depending on the culture or society. Other moral principles or rules come from theories of morality, and there are different competing theories about what's moral and/or immoral.

For me, what's immoral or evil, and this takes into account intentional and/or accidental immoral acts, as well as natural evil, always involves some kind of harm to those involved or even those not involved. In these cases the harm done can be objectively observed, at least most of the time. Sometimes it requires a great deal of thought to understand that harm as occurred. For example, the harm done to one's character or psyche is hard to quantify, nevertheless I believe it does occur.

Moral actions are closely connected to what we value as humans, or what is intrinsically valuable. For example, kindness has intrinsic worth, and most people recognize that it does. Thus, we value it as part of a ethical code of conduct. Furthermore, I believe it can be demonstrated that kindness is not a matter of subjective beliefs, but has objective characteristics that can be demonstrated. Also moral actions are always intentional, which is why they are praiseworthy. One doesn't praise someone for a good that results from their unintentional acts. It's a good, just not one that resulted from a morally good action, that is, an intentional moral act.

Yes, I agree that the harm done is expansive, and may include others. I'm sure that it would be difficult to work out the net harm, but in courts of law they often do this in civil cases, or in other kinds of cases.

I definitely agree with the idea of cultivating virtues. There is much more to the story than what I've written, I was just having a hard time demonstrating that harm is a property of immoral acts. Moreover, in terms of harm, moral action is different altogether, so we're closer than you might think. I also agree that moral action is much more than just avoiding harm.

No, definitely not. It's closer to a duty or rule based ethic.

But you've made my point, why wouldn't you want them in your society? Why, because of the harm done to the society. How do you know it's bad, what is the reasoning that makes it bad if it's not that people are harmed? You're are simply saying we know it's bad because we have evidence it's bad, but what's the evidence other than the harm done to societies and cultures? Your argument is a bit circular.

If everything is determined, that is, all of our acts of free will are simply a delusion, and if we are not free to choose otherwise, then it would follow that there would be no right and wrong, moral or immoral actions. You would simply be something akin to a programmed thing doing this or that based on deterministic forces or influences. In fact, nothing you do would be worthy of praise or criticism, no more than you could praise or criticize a robot for acting the way it's programed to act. A complete removal of freedom of choice completely destroys the idea what's moral. It completely destroys the idea of any act being the right course of action. There would just be acts, that's it - finito. Even our arguments in this thread would be completely meaningless, because what you believe would also be determined, nothing would change in terms of what you believe unless it was determined to be so.

I have partially dealt with the problem of immoral acts that don't seem to cause harm in previous posts. Let's take the example of attempted murder, I plan out how I'm going to do it, say an assassination, but the rifle misfires, and other circumstances keep me from carrying out the murder. I agree, that in cases like these it's more difficult to ascertain the harm, but I would contend that there is harm done. For example, if you're caught and go to prison you have done harm to yourself, that is, your freedoms have been taken away, and your loved ones are also harmed by your removal from society and from their lives. However, let's consider an act of attempted murder where you're not caught, that is, you get away with it. In this case is there harm done? I would contend that there is harm done to your character and/or to your psyche, that is, any normal thinking human being would know and understand that since they were willing to take the life of another that that diminishes them in some way. Over time, I think any normal functioning person, would be affected by the memory of such an act.

Let's take another example, let's say that the person is incapable of feeling empathy, and as such there character and/or their psyche is not affected by this act. Moreover, there is no detectable harm done, then I would say that the act was not immoral. It's not immoral, not only because there was no detectable harm, but it's probably not immoral because this person's brain is not normal, that is, they're impaired in some way. It's still a crime, but the person may not be morally responsible (at least in theory).

Finally, it would take a lot more writing to flush this out completely, but I think my point is made.

No, I'm saying that what makes something immoral is the harm done. Here's where you go wrong, namely, you think that if I say "harm is what makes an act immoral," that that somehow equates to "harm causes immorality." That doesn't follow, all I'm saying is that in every act of immorality, there is harm done. If what you were saying were true, that is, that harm causes immorality, then if I accidentally cut my finger, then that would be immoral, but that's obviously not true.

I've tried explaining this several ways, but it doesn't seem to get through.

I've reached a point where there's not much more to say, and you don't seem to be following my point. I never said "harm causes morality," which can be seen in many of my posts. But that's okay, it was a good discussion, and it gave me a chance to flush out a bit more of my thinking.

So your position is that an immoral act is always harmful because the person that causes the immoral act always harms themselves. In your view, is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral? If the former, then how do you know they harm themselves? If the latter, then what makes the act immoral besides intention? — Samuel Lacrampe

If there is no harm done when one acts, then I don't see how an act can be called immoral, i.e., what would make it immoral other than the harm done? Also, in an earlier post I showed how intent is not necessarily a feature of an immoral act, the example being an accident where one didn't intend to cause harm, but harm happened nevertheless. Most immoral acts that people commit are intentional, but not all, is what I'm saying. This is the point of calling some immoral acts accidental, it's an accident because someone didn't intentionally set out to harm someone, as opposed to intentionally doing something to harm someone. This is clearly seen in a drunk driving example, or even in an example where someone is not paying sufficient attention to what their doing. In each example one is held accountable for their actions in spite of not intentionally harming others.

Since I believe that all immoral acts have the property of harm, that is, that harm is necessarily a property of an immoral act. Thus, both your questions, ("...is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral?") are answered in the affirmative. I've already explained how intention isn't necessarily a feature of an immoral act. The latter part of your question is essentially the same as the former. It's the same as A=B and B=A.

What's essential to a moral act is not essential to an immoral act, and it's here that people are getting confused. All moral acts have the necessary feature of intentionality, but not all immoral acts. Why? Because one cannot accidentally do what's morally correct. What makes moral actions praiseworthy are their intentionality. If one does the right thing unintentionally, then it's not a moral action, but it can be called a right action. Although it's the case that all moral actions can be called right actions, or correct actions, not all right or correct actions can be called moral actions. For example, I can choose to turn right, which is the correct choice if I want to go to Boston, but whether I go left or right is not a moral question.

It must be said that one's view of what makes an act immoral is essential to whether or not harm is a necessary property. For example, if I believe that all immoral acts proceed from what people decide is immoral, then harm is not an essential property of all immoral acts. However, if one believes that what makes something immoral is the property of harm, and that harm can be shown objectively, then it can and does follow that harm is an essential property of immorality. Calling something immoral doesn't make it immoral. Some religious people think that dancing is immoral, given their ideas about gyrating bodies leading to sexual contact.

Another important point of what makes something both immoral and accidental is responsibility, I'm held responsible for the act of driving drunk and causing harm to someone or myself, because of what I could have reasonably foreseen in terms of my actions. Thus it not about intention, but about what one should have known about certain actions, and thus we are responsible for actions taken that could lead to harm.

Number 3 still causes harm to a person's character (the one trying to commit the murder), that is, even if you try and fail to do what you intended, it's still immoral as you say, but I would argue that you did harm to yourself. One could also argue that it diminishes the culture in which one lives, so in a sense it does harm to others. I also said that sometimes it's harder to discern the harm, but one could argue that the harm is present. It would take a more detailed explanation of what makes a good character, and also those things that harm one's character.

Although your 4th example is not an example of something immoral, it's is an example of a natural evil, which does cause harm. Thus, not only do all immoral acts cause harm, but all evil, immoral or natural cause harm.

I do think intent is important, but you haven't read my posts carefully if you think intent is the primary factor. My focus is on the harm done, but that's not all of the focus obviously.

These problems are essentially the reason why virtue ethics persists, even though you're focusing on intent you still have a consequentialist ethic because you're using the consequences of the perpetrators actions as a means of determining their intentions, it therefore suffers from the same problem as all other consequentialist ethics, what point in the future do we use to judge? — Inter Alia

All your examples simply change the facts of the cases. If you change the facts, then the outcomes are going to be different. Moreover, there will always be examples that are more complicated, which involve what people know, what people should have known, or even possible future outcomes.

My particular brand of ethics is definitely not a consequentialist view, that is, that it's based on some fact or facts brought about by someone's acts or intentions. My particular brand of ethics is more closely related to a deontological view, which are based on rules or principles. Thus we have a duty to act a certain way. For example, one might say we have a duty to act in a way that brings about the least amount of harm. Thus, if you were hiding Jews in your attic during WW2 and the Nazi's came to your home and asked if you were hiding Jews, your duty would be to lie. First, because the action of telling the truth would lead to murder, thus telling the lie would lead to the least amount of harm. In fact, Kant might say that the Nazi's have no right to the truth because of what they intend to do, because of the evil they will commit.

The problem with any theory, including ethical theories, is that it's difficult to find one that covers every possible scenario. All we can do is try to live as closely as we can to certain principles, and make the best decisions we can based on the information we have.

The two consequentialist theories that come to mind are utilitarianism and hedonism, which in my humble opinion are not good ethical theories. However, trying to put forth a theory of ethics in this thread would be further than I want to go, at least for now. All I will say is that for me the best possible ideas of ethics are principle, rule, or duty based.

I know it's a common thing that people say, that is, that we should be thankful, but if you don't believe there is a God (Christian God, for e.g.), then why should we be thankful? I'm not saying we should go around being depressed, but I don't see the need to be thankful, thankful to whom and for what? I don't find a need to be thankful in order to appreciate life, or what I have in relation to what others have. I do think it's important though to help others less fortunate than yourself, but thankfulness is not apart of the equation. This tends to come from a particular kind of religious view, that for example, what we have is a blessing, but I don't see it that way.

No problem Javra, good discussion.

I don't think there is any clear intention involved in the accident. You weren't even thinking, just reacting to the argument. It's not like someone says, I'm going to have this argument in spite of the fact that I might kill someone. It's just something that's happening at the moment. Again, they're not thinking, and thus not even aware of the act that's about to happen.

Sure I can give an example where intention doesn't mean much at all, in fact you could have good intentions and still commit an immoral act. You are driving and are distracted by the angry conversation you're having with your wife, and in that moment you run a red light and accidentally kill someone. It's done unintentionally, but it's something you could have avoided if you were paying attention. It's clearly your fault and you know it's your fault. Harm has clearly been done, the person was killed, and it's an accident that could have been avoided if you had been paying attention. By not paying attention you are responsible for the death of another. This is analogous to driving under the influence, that is, you might not have the intention of killing another, but the result is that by driving under the influence, which you know to be wrong, killed another. The same is true in my above example, you know that if you don't pay sufficient attention to the road you can cause bodily harm to another, but you ignored this important point.

Many of the Christian ideas of sin and original sin come from a Biblical perspective, and although I have a good understanding of some of these doctrines, I don't think they are credible. Which is to say, that they're dependent upon a certain view of reality that, at least for me, lack good evidence. Moreover, they go against the testimonial evidence, of many people who have experienced an NDE, which I believe puts them in direct contact with the other side, so to speak. However, this discussion would take us far afield.

There is one point that I failed to mention in my last post. A good intention or a good will is a necessary feature of all moral acts. I can't see how one could commit a moral act unintentionally. Moral actions necessitate a good will or good intentions. However, these are separate and distinct from immoral actions which can happen regardless of intention.

In the case of the book, my contention is that it's not necessarily an immoral action. It can become an immoral act if the person who accidentally destroyed the book doesn't make reparations, that is, if they ignore the harm done. The harm in this case is the destruction of the book, which is property that belongs to someone. If the person doesn't have the means to make reparations they should do all they can to make it right. This is a more complicated situation than the other examples, but I believe it can still be fit into this moral code. Also, in this situation your idea of intention becomes very important. If for example the person doesn't have the means to correct the situation, what matters is the intent to do so, that's what corrects it to some degree.

Hmm, think of the same scenario of perceivable behavior but with a different set of imperceivable intentions: Person A violently shoves person B to the ground (this being the exact same act with an identical degree of harm upon person B in crashing to the ground) but, in this version, the act is performed with the intention of saving person B’s life from the assassination attempt of person C. The discernable outcome of harm (and of a saved life) remains the same; the sole difference now is in the private intentions with which the act of shoving person B is performed by person A. — javra

In this scenario person A has committed a moral act, remember my position is that not all harm is immoral, that is, if you have good reasons for the harm, and in this case person A does, then it's not immoral. Intention although important is not always the deciding factor. One can have good intentions and yet still commit an immoral act, as in accidental harm that should or could have been foreseen. In this case it's clear that person A committed a moral act by preventing a greater harm. There is also an important point here, that is, that all immoral acts have the property of harm, but not all moral acts lack harm, some do some don't.

Suffice to say, my general philosophy is what might be called 'pan-religious', i.e. I believe that there is a true 'domain of value' to which the moral compass is naturally drawn. Which is why such ideas as the Golden Mean, doing good to those that harm you, and so on, occur in many different cultural traditions and sources. — Wayfarer

For me much of the nature of ethics is dependent on the nature of being human, or the nature of the reality in which we live. I believe that persons have intrinsic worth, and it naturally follows that they have intrinsic value. I do agree, if I understand you correctly, that generally we do have a moral compass, but we might disagree with where this originates. At least two possibilities come to mind - first, we learn by interacting with others within a culture of value what constitutes an immoral act; or two, who we are at deeper level (metaphysical level of being) shapes our morality along with the learning that takes place within a culture. I'm not religious, so my metaphysics isn't shaped by a religious view. However, I do believe that the essence of who we are isn't confined to a body. You would have to read my thread on consciousness to get a better perspective of my view, and how it would impact morality. But in some ways, my view is even more complicated because some or all of the harm we experience in this reality isn't harm that is carried into the next.

I also don't associate immoral acts with sin, that is, sin is a religious word that carries religious connotations. In fact, I don't believe in sin in terms of an act against God, which is deserving of punishment, or that it's something we need to be saved from. In the sense that evil is equated with sin, I would disavow evil too. However, in general terms evil as I use the term is just another word for the harm done to others, whether by an agent (accidental or intentional), or that which occurs via natural disaster.

Under my ethical view, person A has harmed person B, so person A has committed an immoral act. The harm can be objectively established, the act of pushing the man to the ground. Admittedly it isn't a great harm, but harm nonetheless. Person A has no reason to take credit for saving person B regardless of the accidental outcome. Person C has committed an immoral act by intending to murder person B, the intention was carried out by the firing of the weapon in order to murder person B, and as such has harmed his/her character. Admittedly the harming of one's character takes a bit of showing, that is, if challenged one might have to explain in detail how this might be the case. I believe it can be done, but would take an involved theory of ethics to demonstrate.

For me this isn't a difficult question to answer, at least in theory.

I've often thought that this is a weird way of looking at knowledge, or what it means to know. What does it mean, do you think, for the conscience to have knowledge? And how is knowledge expressed apart from language? I know what it means, at least I think I do, to have a belief apart from language, but not knowledge.

Many Christians, I believe, have incorporated this kind of thinking into their beliefs about God. For example, some Christians believe their beliefs about God are innate, that is, they know that they know that God exists. This seems to be a perverted view of what it means to have knowledge. They'll also use terms like objective, but it's purely subjective.

Agreed. But just to clarify, the current argument is not whether or not justice is objective (it is), but whether all humans seek justice to themselves (even if they could be wrong about what true justice is). — Samuel Lacrampe

I understand, but it's an important part of my view of ethics, there are many who view ethics as subjective and/or relative. Subjectivity which is either based on one's personal view, or ethics based on a societal view, tend to reflect a view of ethics that can be subject to change without good reason. So it's my view when talking about justice that we have a view of justice that's has some objective standard.

I don't think so. All we need to do to falsify it is to find a case where a man is faced with two options with similar outcomes, but the first one is just to him, and the second one is less just; and the man picks the less just option (assume no false perceptions). But I claim no such case exists: Who in their right mind would pick the less just option when all else is equal?

But external facts aside, the question is what do you, Sam26, observe within you? Do you not find an inclination to seek justice at all times, at least for yourself? — Samuel Lacrampe

Your response to the self-sealing fallacy is not sufficient. If I make the claim that is often claimed by some people, even philosophers, that "All human action is selfish," and someone replies, that that claim is false because some people sacrifice themselves without concern for themselves, thus it's a selfless act. But the one making the argument can still reply that even that action is motivated by the selfish desire to be heroic. One can always point to a subjective X that makes their argument seem reasonable, that is, a product of the mind that can't be tested. Your argument does the same thing, some internal idea that seems reasonable (everyone seeks justice for themselves or innate knowledge), but has at its very core the same problem. The one putting forth such an argument could claim, as you do, that it's not self-sealing because of a "two option" choice. However, the problem is that whatever they choose, it can be shown to fit the outcome they want. Especially considering that you said earlier, that even if they choose the wrong answer, it's because they have made a factual mistake, that is, thinking something is just when it's really not. Thus, because of the way your argument is framed, it's self-sealing as far as I can tell. Sometimes it's very difficult to see that an argument is self-sealing. Your argument has all the hallmarks of this fallacy.

Harming oneself is not synonymous to injustice. Take martyrs, or even people who practice self-flagellation. They willingly harm themselves, but do so precisely in the name of justice. As for smokers, it is explained by one of the following three reasons: (1) addiction, (2) they don't truly believe it causes harm, (3) they may believe it causes harm, but do so because they perceive that not doing so would result in a greater harm (e.g. peer pressure). None of these reasons implies injustice done to oneself. — Samuel Lacrampe

I never said "harming oneself is synonymous with injustice." I said that all immoral actions involve harm, including injustice. However, it's not the case that all harm involves an immoral action or an injustice. So they are not equivalent.

As for the smoking example, it's true that people get addicted to nicotine, so I agree this is the primary factor which keeps people from quitting. However, this does not explain why people, even older adults, start smoking when they know it's not good for them. I don't agree that all people who start smoking, even when they know it can kill them believe there is a greater harm that would result if they don't start (peer pressure, etc.). It's hard to know what would be a greater harm than suffering with cancer and dying. So again, I disagree with your premise.

Maybe my position is not yet clear, because I agree that unjust people know they are unjust. This follows from the title of this discussion, that moral knowledge is innate. I am just arguing at the moment that they have no inclination to do injustice to themselves. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't think it's true that necessarily all unjust people know their unjust (you seem to be basing this on the idea of innate knowledge). It's only true if you argue in a circle. What is the evidence that we have innate knowledge, as opposed to knowledge gained in some other way. Your earlier examples can be explained in other ways. Besides knowledge as I understand it involves a justification, that is, good reasons or good evidence for the knowledge. How do we differentiate between what someone claims to be innate knowledge, as opposed to knowledge of mathematics. What's to keep people from making claims that their particular brand of knowledge is innate? For example, I might ask them, how do you know that you know that X is true, and thus a piece of innate knowledge? Or, how does one discover a piece of innate knowledge?

I do think the idea that there are innate beliefs may have some merit, but this only because of my study of NDEs, but I don't think we have innate knowledge. I'm not sure what counts as evidence of innate knowledge. If you point to your idea of injustice as an answer, then your in danger of arguing in a circle.

You also claimed that you're argument is only that people "have no inclination to do injustice to themselves" - this seems a bit of a departure from what you said earlier (but maybe not). I would agree that people in general want to see justice done, but that's a far cry from what your saying.

Finally, it seems to me that much of this is coming from a religious point of view, at least it seems so. I know that in the past when I was very much inclined to believe certain religious points of view, this was a belief that I heard from time-to-time, that is, the idea of innate knowledge. Even then, though, I found it questionable.

Then I would dispute that, as being too weak. There might be the ethical equivalent of victimless crimes, that is, acts which are immoral but in which no-one is obviously harmed. A moral realist might argue that such acts as illicit sexual relationships, or taking advantage of the ignorance of others in the pursuit of personal gain , and other such acts, are immoral, without there being any obvious harm.

Furthermore, in ethical systems based on karma, there might not be any concept of a lawgiver, but they would still be regarded as moral realists. In other words, an ultimate good may not necessarily require a theistic faith. — Wayfarer

A moral theory is a bit more complicated than what I stated. My main point is that all immoral acts cause harm to someone, and I'm going to stick with that. Moreover, not all crimes are immoral, so saying that there are victimless crimes doesn't do anything to weaken my point. So for a lie to be immoral it would have to cause harm to someone, if it doesn't cause any harm, then I would contend that it's not immoral. On the other hand, it's very difficult to sometimes ascertain the harm done, in such cases in may take knowledge of psychology to fully appreciate the harm to an individual. The harm that's done can be very subtle, and its affects might not be seen for months, years, or even decades.

The example you give of taking advantage of others in the pursuit of personal gain, will in the long run cause harm to a society, so I don't think that's a good example. However, to be fair, and it's a good point, it might not cause "obvious harm." In any ethical theory there are going to be actions that will be disputed in terms of whether they're immoral or not, or whether they cause harm or not. However, if we concentrate on those acts we do know to be immoral, I think we'll discover that what's common to them all is the harm done. Unless you can give me a counter-example, that is, an obvious immoral act that doesn't cause harm.

All of us can come up with examples where it's not clear that an immoral act has been committed in terms of harm, but that in itself doesn't hurt the argument. It says one of two things, either the harm is difficult to determine, or there was no harm. And if it can be determined that no harm was done, again, it's not immoral. I don't see how any act can be deemed immoral if it doesn't cause harm. I would say that it's analytic to any immoral act that it causes harm. The harm has to be done to an individual or individuals (e.g. a society).

I agree with your last paragraph.

I don't think it's that difficult generally to have a good understanding of what makes something moral or immoral. I pointed this out a few posts ago. Moreover, I don't think you need to have some ultimate good to point too, as for example, a lawgiver.

Now, in the case of people blowing themselves up, either they see the act as (1) just or (2) unjust. (1) If they see it as just, then it fits my claim, and their error is only an error in facts about the given situation. E.g., they may sincerely believe that the people they blow up are evil people, like Nazis, where as in fact, they are not. (2) If they see the act as unjust, then it is nevertheless seen as unjust in their favour, because as you said yourself, it is likely done to "win them a place in heaven". But, it cannot be that some people willingly accept a condition that they perceive to be unjust to themselves, if a more just option exists. If you disagree, then I challenge you to find one. ;) — Samuel Lacrampe

There are at least two points that I want to make. First, an action is just or not just, not because of what someone believes, but because of objective criteria that we recognize as just. For example, we recognize that if someone murders another human, then they deserve to be prosecuted. If they are declared innocent when the evidence shows otherwise, then most people would agree that justice wasn't done. So justice is not dependent upon what one believes is just, it's dependent upon the facts. This fits your statement about an error in factual information.

The second point, and I believe this is what makes your argument fallacious, is the following: Your argument is self-sealing. Why? Because it doesn't matter whether they seek justice or injustice, because both can be subsumed under what they believe is just, not what really is just. So if what they seek really is just your conclusion is correct, but note that even if your conclusion is false, that is, it can be shown that what they sought wasn't just (i.e., what they believed was factually false), then your conclusion based on the criteria you've given is still correct. Self-sealing arguments are arguments that are not falsifiable, that is, no piece of counter-evidence would qualify as evidence against the argument. Your argument is not dependent upon facts, but upon subjective beliefs, that is, it only matters what the person believes, not what is just or unjust.

You said, "...it cannot be that some people willingly accept a condition that they perceive to be unjust to themselves, if a more just option exists. If you disagree, then I challenge you to find one. ;)" Really, all you're saying is that people don't willingly harm themselves. After all when an injustice is done, whether it's an injustice to oneself or to another, then one is harming oneself or the person to whom the injustice is done. Thus, the real question is "Do people do harm to themselves intentionally?" The answer is quite obviously yes. People smoke knowing full well that they are harming themselves, not only do they smoke knowing this, but they do a myriad of things knowing that they're harming themselves. If they do these kinds of things, why wouldn't they do things to themselves that they perceive to be unjust? All your doing is making the claim that they believe they're seeking justice for themselves, but the error of this thinking can be seen if we understand that being unjust is the same as any wrongdoing. We know that people make all kinds of immoral decisions, knowing that that their actions are immoral, and knowing that it will cause harm to themselves, or harm to others.