So even as it seems to apply to linguistic artifacts, True is a somewhat odd duck. Not alone, though. Many such usages come to mind, especially 'modal' adjectives like ” probable", " likely", "impossible", and so on. — Srap Tasmaner

That's why we should look at the meanings of these concepts in terms of use (social linguistic constructs), and in terms of Wittgenstein's family resemblance idea. It gives us a much better picture of what meaning amounts to.

We could all use some caution in our views, especially since we're at the edge of what we can claim to know. Moreover, it's very difficult to know at times where Wittgenstein went wrong, since much of his philosophy is novel and prone to misinterpretation. Not all of my views align with his, and I'm sure not all of yours do either.

I'm a bit surprised to see you entertaining the notion of concepts. In. Wittgensteinian terms they are rather fraught. For some folk they consist in private mental furniture, so that they end up saying things like that my concept cannot be the same as yours, and so on; stuff with which neither of us would agree. But if a concept is instead conceived of as a public item, then is it anything more or less than the use to which a term is put? — Banno

I don't believe my views expressed with Creative leads to this conclusion. What in particular leads you to think this? I think you've expressed this before, but I think it's a misinterpretation of what I'm saying.

Notions/concepts of "tree" are existentially dependent upon language. What we pick out with those notions/concepts is not. Trees are not existentially dependent upon language. Much the same holds good for the notions of "true" and "false"... — creativesoul

I would word it slightly different, the concept tree, includes the notion of something existentially separate from language. Whereas the notion of true and false seems dependent on linguistic content in an important sense. In other words, I can imagine a dog seeing a tree apart from language, but not a dog observing true and false apart from the application of these concepts within our linguistic framework. This can be a bit confusing, because when we talk about true and false, we often refer to objects (i.e., facts) that we observe, although not always (referring to facts as abstract objects).

There is definitely much more to say, and I'm sure we're not going to see eye to eye on some of this.

Sorry I didn't respond to all of your posts. I have a difficult time sitting for hours responding. So, I tend to take long breaks (sometime hours, days, weeks at a time). I find that social media can be a bit taxing, and in some ways unhealthy.

What I'm unsure about is the implication that concepts don't have to do with the brain's relationship, as you put it, to objects. I mean, sure, "mind" is probably a much better starting point, but you went with brain, so brain it is. Is that not more or less exactly where we expect to find concepts? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm speaking about linguistic concepts, but you seem to be suggesting a broader sense (thoughts, ideas, etc, - I'm just guessing, since you didn't say). Concepts like true and false, and what we mean by true and false, develop in social contexts, not in isolation. The relationship between language and the mind/brain is something we don't fully understand. We obviously have our intuitions and opinions, but that's as far as it goes. I would say, as per the context of this thread, that true and false are necessarily not part of the conceptual framework of non-linguistic animals.

But then are we going to say that societies have concepts but individuals, even individual members of societies, don't? That sounds terribly odd. So if the social demands to be brought in, how exactly? And is the social, shall we say, aspect entirely linguistic? — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't say, "societies have concepts but individuals, even individual members of societies, don't?" - I would say individuals learn to use linguistic concepts in social contexts, so individuals have linguistic concepts only in so far as they acquire them socially. This gets back to the private language argument.

Well, this was part of my question, whether experiments were relevant to your position, or whether you understood concepts to be inherently linguistic phenomena in some sense. So are you saying that this is an empirical question after all? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm saying that there maybe some experiment that shows what part of the brain lights up while using linguistic concepts, as opposed to what happens when being shown objects apart from a linguistic context. These kinds of experiments aren't going to answer the question of what we mean by concepts like true and false. So, in the context of what I'm referring to, some experiment, at least as far as I understand, isn't going to answer a question of meaning and use. Of course it depends on what you're looking for.

Maybe you could have an experiment where you see how the brain lights up when using a concept like toy, as opposed to how the brain light up without a linguistic background. It's complicated for sure.

I'll give an example. Infants, I understand, have a sense of object permanence before they have a sense of object identity. If a toy is moved across their field of vision, passes behind a screen, and comes out as something else, that doesn't bother baby. If it doesn't come out at all, that does.

There's something in the ballpark of the conceptual going on there, I'd say, but what exactly, it's complicated. — Srap Tasmaner

How would this be about concepts, as opposed to their brain's relationship to a moving object?

But I'm a little surprised to see you say, quite definitely, no concepts here, no conceptual framework whatsoever. It sounds like you take this to be true by definition and I wonder why. Is it all about language? Or about what enables language? What's the story here? — Srap Tasmaner

First, I take it that concepts, are necessarily linguistic, unless you can demonstrate how they're not. Maybe you can have a wider definition of concept, such that it doesn't include language, but if you did that it would just be a matter of what kinds of concepts we're referring to in each of the arguments.

:up: :cool:

My post prior to this one begins to address how true and false belief could exist in their entirety prior to the concepts of "true" and "false". I'm curious to get your take on that. — creativesoul

Part of the problem is in separating those concepts that have an ontology that is separate from language, and yet part of language; and, those concepts that have an ontology that are strictly linguistic, viz., concepts like true and false. So, concepts like belief, moon, tree, etc., have an ontology that involves extra-linguistic things, but other concepts are strictly linguistic. Part of the problem is placing strictly linguistic concepts in a non-linguistic environment. I think this would be an interesting study.

In this world before humans, if it is possible for a mouse to be behind a tree, and it is possible for a language less creature to believe that a mouse is behind a tree, then it is possible for a language less creature to have true belief(assuming the mouse is behind the tree) and/or false belief(assuming the mouse is not). — creativesoul

The mouse is in a particular state-of-mind, but it's not equivalent to our linguistic states, in particular, our beliefs as statements. So, the mouse is not believing that there is a mouse behind the tree, as you and I might believe. How could it do that without a linguistic framework to work with. It has no concept tree and mouse. If it did, well, maybe we could also infer the concepts true and false to the mouse also. You seem to be imposing linguistic concepts where there are none.

When I refer to beliefs (pre-linguistic beliefs in animals or humans), it's completely devoid of any conceptual framework for them, but not for us, as linguistic users. So, it seems that the tendency is to impose our conceptual framework onto them.

Okay. That's the conventional view when it comes to belief as propositional attitude. I agree that propositional content is necessarily linguistic, but I see no reason to agree that all our belief amounts to an attitude towards a proposition which represents that belief. — creativesoul

Saying that talk about true and false amounts to talk about what people believe, is not the same as saying that all belief "amounts to an attitude towards a proposition which represents that belief." As you know, I do believe, along with you, that beliefs in themselves, are not necessarily linguistic. For example, if we are referring to beliefs that dogs have, those beliefs are only true and false for us, not for them. They have no concepts of true and false, their beliefs are completely devoid of propositional content.

Do you deny and/or reject language less true/false belief? — creativesoul

Yes, I do deny it. I don't see how you can have true and false apart from propositional content, which is necessarily linguistic.

When we talk about truth, we are talking about what people believe, or what they believe to be true.
— Sam26

What are we doing when we talk about belief if not referring to what people believe(to be true)?
— creativesoul — creativesoul

So, what I posted didn't clear it up for you?

When we talk about truth, we're referring to what people believe.
— Sam26

That surprises me coming from you.

What are we doing when we talk about belief if not referring to what people believe?

Seems to me that people can believe things that are not true and/or clearly and demonstrably false. Truth cannot be not true and/or demonstrably false. What people believe can. Thus, truth is not equivalent to what people believe. — creativesoul

Where did I say, "...truth is equivalent to what people believe[?]" When we talk about truth, we are talking about what people believe, or what they believe to be true. Just because someone believes something is true, doesn't make it true. It, obviously, can turn out to be false. So, what I'm saying is that you can't separate true and false from people, and their linguistic forms of life.

Hopefully, this makes it clearer.

For me to give a decent response I'd have to do a lot more reading, and give it a lot more thought. At this point though, I'm inclined to be more Wittgensteinian in my view.

Ya, I definitely find it problematic that we need some metalanguage to define truth, because of the paradoxes that arise in our everyday language.

I didn't want to reply in your thread, since it's an exegesis, so I replied here.

Banno said the following:

"Tarski took that notion and applied it to truth, and showed that, just as there are always theorems that cannot be proved, there cannot be a definition of truth within that language. Another language is needed, or at least an extension of the language.

The proof takes a first-order language with "+" and "=", and assigns a Gödel number to every deduction, as in the incompleteness proofs. It then finds a Gödel number for a definition of truth, and shows that it is not amongst the list of Gödel numbers of the deductions. Hence, that definition is not amongst the deductions of the language.

In plain language, an arithmetic system cannot define arithmetic truth, for itself.

Hence it was apparent to Tarski that in order to talk about truth, one needed an object language and a metalanguage. This is what he developed in his definition of truth."

There seems to be something amiss here, viz., applying Gödel's incompleteness theory to the definition of truth. Tarski thinks that since there are theorems that cannot be proven within a system, that he can use this idea to create a meta-language, and thereby create a definition of truth outside our ordinary language (be it English, Italian, Spanish, etc). However, the question is, is this a misunderstanding of Gödel's theory. Gödel's theories apply to statements about number theory, so any mathematical theory that doesn't include statements about number theory are excluded from Godel's theories. So, there are limits to what Gödel is proposing. It seems a bit of a stretch, to say the least, to think Gödel incompleteness theory can be applied to the meaning of truth. I think that Tarski is stretching Godel a bit too far.

You may be right, I just thought that her belief that stuff was in the fridge was well grounded, true, and required no further subsequent justification method. — creativesoul

It is well grounded. What more of a grounding does one need in this situation?

As I've said in many posts, there are different ways of justifying a belief (different uses), and her grounding or justification is a sensory one. She's not giving reasons (using logic), but using her sensory experiences to show or demonstrate what she believes. It's most appropriate for her age.

I don't think this is about hinge's, at least not how I interpret hinge's. However, it's a good example of justification, sensory justification. Look and see, and you too will know.

I've been reading this thread all along, so yes, I did see that. She knows.

Using IS giving an account of it, don't you think?

If anything they show what JTB is not.

You also find this in the Gettier examples, a bit different, but essentially same.

There is no fact of the matter in that sentence. Many of these kinds of paradox's don't amount to a hill of beans.

"The whole is greater than the sum of the parts" is true ≡ The whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
To what does this correspond?

"Frodo walked in to Mordor" is true ≡ Frodo walked in to Mordor.
To what does this correspond?

"Frodo walked in to Sydney" is true ≡ Frodo walked in to Sydney.
To what does this correspond?

"No bachelor is married" is true ≡ No bachelor is married.
To what does this correspond?

"All bachelors are married" is true ≡ all bachelors are married.
To what does this correspond?

"This sentence is false" is true ≡ this sentence is false
To what does this correspond? — Banno

Each of these can be answered, I don't see a problem. But to think that "p is true, if and only if p" is some kind of answer, is to say nothing meaningful, it's tautological, and that's being kind. Is this how you learned to use the concept true? I took a philosophy class by Tarski and now I know what truth is. Most of that theory is just so convoluted. I get much more out of Wittgenstein's ideas, even if there are some problems, than theories like Tarski's.

What does that tell us about truth, then? And how are we even able to compare these theories? Is it that there is no truth at all, or an undefined truth? Or is there simply a toy logic we invent in the moment which allows us to temporarily compare these theories among one another, but which ultimately results in no insight -- a formalism of truth? — Moliere

When we talk about truth, we're referring to what people believe. Some theories provide a better answer to the question of truth than other theories. I happen to think the correspondence theory works well.

Usually when people agree that a particular statement is true, they agree on some fact of the matter. In some cases we're just speculating about the truth, or we are just giving an opinion about what we think is true. In still more cases we may express a theory that X is true, as Einstein did with the general theory of relativity. It wasn't until Eddington verified Einstein's theory that we knew the truth of the matter. Here of course truth is connected with knowledge, not just an opinion or speculation.

If you want to learn what truth is, then study how the concept is used in a wide variety of situations, i.e., in our forms of life. Think about people disagreeing about political or economic views, they're disagreeing about the facts associated with these views. Most don't know enough to recognize what facts make their belief true or false, so their disagreeing over opinions, and some are willing to kill over their opinions, but I digress.

What's true can also refer to possible worlds, and to works of fiction. So, there can be facts associated with things that aren't even real. Anything we do is associated with some fact, and as such it can be associated with what we believe.

There is definitely the concept of truth, so it's not as though the concept doesn't exist, or that it doesn't have a place within our various linguistic contexts.

Insight is gained by looking carefully at the various uses of these concepts. The problem is that many people want exactness where there is none, at least not in some absolute across the board sense. There are some absolutes when it comes to truth, but those absolutes are relative to a particular context.

I suppose it's better to say that correspondence seems to work-for, but it's not something you'd consider a universal theory of truth, or something. — Moliere

No theory of truth is going to cover every use of the concept truth. It seems that most uses of the concept, though, do point to a relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs. In this sense there is a kind of correspondence or association between the propositional belief, and those states-of-affairs that make the proposition true, as opposed to false. As with the word game, we have a set of family resemblances that guide us when using the concept. There are no hard and fast definitions that work in every social context.

A twenty-seven-month-old child can know when "there's nothing in there" is false, when the speaker is talking about a fridge. I gave that real life example earlier. She demonstrated that knowledge. She has no idea whatsoever about theories of truth. The terms "truth" and "falsehood" are not even understood by her. She certainly does not understand the logic of truth. — creativesoul

Which is why use tells us much more about these concepts, i.e., tells us much more about meaning and understanding.

True.

I like to keep things as simple as possible. If someone was to read through this thread trying to understand the concept truth, they'd be confused as hell.

I think most of us would agree, maybe I'm wrong, that statements, viz., propositions expressed as beliefs, can be true or false, and these beliefs are separate from facts. A belief is an expression of what someone believes is a fact. Whether a proposition turns out to be true or false, depends on the facts of reality. So, there is a correspondence between true propositions and reality (the facts), and mostly we see this in the way we use propositions in various contexts. This is the way I explain truth to a beginner, and I think most people understand it.

:up:

I just want to add a little more to what I said in my last post, and I apologize for interrupting the ongoing discussion.

One of the main differences between Davidson and Wittgenstein is over the idea of social convention, Davidson doesn’t believe social conventionalism is a necessary ingredient to successful communication. (And, to be fair this is the way he interprets Wittgenstein, so he believes he is expanding the notion of what it means to communicate. I happen to think this is incorrect, but of course we can go around and around on how Wittgenstein should be interpreted.) Davidson uses intention, and again, this is where he thinks Wittgenstein leads, it’s a wider form of social agreement for Davidson, which includes what the speaker intends by their utterances. This is Davidson’s interpretation of a form of life. However, what do we mean by conventions, if not the very activity derived from social activity, including the idea of rule-following, and the social practices that follow. This, in my opinion, guts Wittgenstein’s ideas of forms of life.

One of the differences between Wittgenstein and Davidson, it seems, is Davidson’s idea that rule-following and convention is not essential to “language communication.” Davidson’s view is that communication doesn’t require “rule-governed repetition (this is taken from Davidson’s paper Communication and Convention 1984).” Davidson points out that a speaker may use words differently from those around them, and it seems that the interpreter usually understands what the speaker is intending to mean apart from convention. It seems, in Davidson’s view, the intention of the speaker is more important than the rule-governed activity of language-games within a community. I’m not saying that Davidson eliminates language conventions. He just believes that what the speaker intends by their words has a more prominent role. This seems to fly in the face of Wittgenstein’s view that the inner self plays no role in the meaning of words. Or, more precisely, that the role of the subjective doesn’t play the role that Davidson seems to emphasize. Wittgenstein emphasizes the community much more than Davidson does. My current belief is that this idea, at first glance, flies in the face of Wittgenstein’s ideas, or what many believe to be Wittgensteinian ideas.

A thread on Davidson would be as absurd as a single thread on Wittgenstein. But it might be interesting to start a thread on one of his essays - say Truth and Meaning, since it sets out his early views. — Banno

Well, I wasn't suggesting that the thread would cover all of Davidson's ideas.

We will disagree as to whether Davidson's ideas flow parallel with Wittgenstein, if you mean by parallel, there is agreement. Just from the little I read in the SEP, I don't get that idea. There are other philosophers who do a much better job of extending Wittgenstein's ideas.

And, of course, there is more to philosophy than Wittgenstein, who would think otherwise, certainly not me.

I've a keen interest in reconciling Wittgenstein and Davidson. Been at it since I were a lad. In a way Davidson's semantic theory might be a more recent and sophisticated version of the formalisation of language found in the Tractatus, an attempt to explicate what is important in our natural languages by setting out the conditions under which our utterances are true. — Banno

I've already started reading about Davidson in the SEP, so yes, that's where I've started. I'd rather start with primary sources, but that's a lot to wade through, so this will have to do. Generally speaking I'm not a fan of Davidson, so I'm already starting with a certain bias, but that's because I think Wittgenstein, even with his faults, is a far better philosopher in my opinion. I don't think that the early or later Wittgenstein would agree with Davidson's semantic theory. However, Wittgenstein's early philosophy is much more in line with the kind of analytic philosophy that Davidson is doing, but in saying that, I'm not saying that there is much overlap, although some.

If you want to understand Wittgenstein, don't look at him through the eyes of others, which is difficult, because we usually start by reading what others have written as a guide to get a general feel for a philosophers thinking. Moreover, this is all I'm bringing to the table in terms of Davidson, a general feel for his philosophy, because I haven't read much Davidson.

My impression so far, is that Davidson went his own way in developing a theory of semantics. And, I don't believe that your going to be able to reconcile Wittgenstein with Davidson unless you do some fancy interpretative moves (aka spin). These kinds of interpretative moves will probably lead you away from Wittgenstein's thinking, not closer to it. This isn't to say that there isn't some overlap, because there is, but Wittgenstein is one thing, and Davidson is quite another.

My suggestion, for those of you who have a background in philosophy, and of course are interested, is that you concentrate on Wittgenstein (except for background information, for e.g., vis a vis Frege and Russell), if you want to understand Wittgenstein.

I was thinking about starting a thread on Davidson, but I don't know if I'm mentally up for it. :yikes:

Banno, before I respond further I'm going to do some reading on Davidson. I'm not that familiar with his work. All I have to go on is what's being said in here about him, and that's not enough for me to respond intelligently. It seems I disagree with some of the things he's proposed, but I want to make sure.

It seems the further we look at W. the further apart our disagreements become. I'm not really a fan of Davidson's ideas.

:up: