:up:

But your analysis betrays you. You are inferring a cause (<Mary believes there is a chair available to sit in>) from an effect (<Mary sits in a chair>). The belief is not the effect, and our everyday language reflects this. If someone asks you, "Do you know any of Mary's beliefs?," you would not say, "Yes, one of Mary's beliefs is sitting in a chair." According to everyday language this response wouldn't make any sense. A belief can be inferred from an action, but a belief is not an action. A belief is a state of mind, or as Searle says, an intentional state.

You want to focus on this relation between beliefs and actions, but it seems that in the process you have actually conflated beliefs and actions. — Leontiskos

I'm a Wittgensteinian at least to a large extent when it comes to language. If we want to understand what a belief is, then we look at various uses of the word in our language. It's not a matter of cause and effect, it's a matter of learning the correct use of the word across a wide range of contexts.

I like the way you put words in my mouth. If someone was to ask "Do you know any of Mary's beliefs?" - I certainly wouldn't say "Yes, one of Mary's beliefs is sitting in a chair." Obviously this is nonsense. I would say that the action or act of sitting in a chair shows Mary's belief that there is a chair in the room. Just as the act of stating her belief is a reflection of what she believes. Both actions are ways of referring to beliefs in our language.

Beliefs are states of mind, but they come out in our actions, either linguistic or nonlinguistic. The only way to know a person's state of mind is by their actions.

It is legitimate to describe what belief does as a way of understanding what belief is. To describe an effect is not to describe the cause. That's the problem: ↪Sam26 says "beliefs are..." What he ought to say is, "the effects of beliefs are..." He is not talking about beliefs; he is talking about their effects. — Leontiskos

This is just a confusion as far as I can determine. The concept belief has various uses, one use is to say "Mary believes X" because Mary made the statement that she believed X. So what Mary believes is found in the expression of her statement. Another use of belief has to do with Mary's nonlinguistic actions. For example, we can conclude as Mary sits in a chair that she believes there is a chair available to sit in. So the meaning of the concept belief is tied to the various uses of the word in our everyday actions. Beliefs are tied to our actions (linguistic and nonlinguistic), which is how we determine what people believe.

There is no need to bring in any causal connection in this situation, and I haven't done so.

My hope is to fire up some conversational research. Does this OP make sense ?
Do you see errors in my reasoning ? — plaque flag

I've read this a couple of times and can make very little sense of what you're trying to say. You throw around some philosophical terms but that's about it. Why people think that have to talk like this is beyond me. When I write philosophically I try my best to keep it simple, I don't always succeed, but that's my goal.

Conditions for the possibility of critical discussion cannot be rationally challenged without performative contradiction. — plaque flag

What are you trying to say here? What does this statement even mean? It seems to be open to a variety of interpretations. I'm not going to list all of the problematic statements, but there are quite a few.

As for reasoning, I see very little clear reasoning.

It seems you're pushing me in that direction. Maybe it's that I put more importance on the mind, but that doesn't mean that meaning resides in the mind. My beliefs about consciousness might push you in that direction, I'm not sure.

Sure. It's not a product of such statements. The statement sets out an aspect of the grammar of belief, as between an agent and a proposition. — Banno

Yes, but that's not my only point. I'm pointing out that there's the agent and the proposition, but there is also those acts that show the belief. You keep reiterating that beliefs can be stated, no one is disputing this, that's obvious. And it's just as obvious that beliefs can be shown in animals, pre-linguistic man, and in modern man, apart from language. You seem to agree with this. However, then you say...

Note also the word "exist' here, and the implicit hypostatisation. When one says that a belief exists, what more is one saying, apart from that thinking the world is such-and-so accounts for this behaviour... the beetle is in this box, but you still cannot see it, yet you can talk of it existing. Nothing is brought into existence here. — Banno

I've addressed this before, and you keep trying to put my account of belief into Witt's beetle in the box. I would agree if my account was limited to the subjective, viz., pointing to the thing in the mind as if that's the belief. Nowhere do I do that, that's simply your interpretation of what I'm saying, but it's not accurate. My account of belief is based in nonlinguistic actions (showing the belief), and in the statements that an agent makes about their belief or the beliefs of others. So there's no beetle in the box. The belief exists as a function of those two kinds of acts. So minds do bring into existence the proposition and the nonlinguistic acts that show one's belief. Exists, as I'm using the concept, refers to those things we do, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, that can be said to be beliefs. Again, so the ontology of belief refers to those things minds do in the world that can be said to be beliefs.

The meaning of the concept belief is a function of what we do in language (language-games and forms of life), it's not a function of something we can point to in the head/mind. Wittgenstein was pointing out that the meaning of a concept is not something internal to us. My account of what we mean by belief nowhere suggests that it's the thing in the mind that gives meaning to belief. Thus, the beetle in the box doesn't apply to my account. Even the way I'm using the word existence depends on the external, not the internal.

He definitely thought that religious arguments were not about facts, because facts are part of the world in which we act, whether linguistic or not. "The world is all that is the case" is not a metaphysical statement, and although he was sympathetic to the mystical, he didn't think there were any facts of the matter. No facts that language could latch onto.

In particular, Wittgenstein went to some length to point out that language is embedded in our activities, and certainly not "too distinct, too cut off from the rest of experience". And he might well have agreed with you that it is impossible to avoid metaphysics, being what is shown rather than just said. The sense of wonder is at the core of Wittgenstein's thinking. — Banno

As highly as I think of Wittgenstein, he was just wrong about what can be said about the metaphysical. Language is embedded in reality, and reality is much more expansive, in terms of what we can say, than Wittgenstein realized. Although, as you say, Wittgenstein believed that the mystical was important.

I understand this and have given the reasons why I believe it will always be an ineffective argument, It certainly affects the balance of probabilities, but as this thread shows it leaves people free to believe what they like. Perhaps I should have stopped there.but I was trying explain that there is better argument that is overwhelming. — FrancisRay

First, you never attack any of the premises of the argument. You just make very general statements, for the most part. Second, my comment that people are free to believe what they want doesn't mean that I think the argument is weak. It just means that people are free to believe what they want regardless of how strong an argument is. That just the way it is. People are free to believe the Earth is flat, but that doesn't mean that the counter-arguments are weak.

I'm astonished by your low epistemological standards. By these standards it would be easy to know that God exists. Your argument establishes that it would not be unreasonable to believe that there is an afterlife, just as long as you have a plausible theory of what you mean by 'afterlife'. It's your proof and you know you're not quite sure whether there is an afterlife or what it is like, let alone know it. Surely you can see this. If you can doubt it, even in principle. then you don't know it. — FrancisRay

Again, your statements about how you feel about the argument, or how you feel about my epistemology are worthless. And it doesn't follow that based on the argument I'm using that it would be easy to argue that God exists. You're good at throwing out statements, but not so good when it comes to making good arguments.

Most people know what is meant by afterlife, viz., that one's consciousness survives death, or that your identity as a person survives death.

If my argument is as strong as I believe it is, then I do know that there is an afterlife. Logic is one of the ways we use to justify a belief. Inductive reasoning leads me to believe, and thus know, that the conclusion follows with a high degree of certainty.

What I do say, is that beliefs are not necessarily a product of statements such as, "X believes that P." Those are only beliefs that are part of the language of statements. The fact is that beliefs can exist quite apart from any linguistic expression of that belief. You are starting with language and working backwards. I start prior to language and work forward. So, given my understanding, prior to language there were still beliefs. These beliefs were shown in the actions of those who had the belief. The act is prior to language, then comes language, where we are able to express the belief. In my estimation you and others are putting the cart before the horse.

The other point is, even where language exists, many beliefs (those expressed in our nonlinguistic acts) are never put into statements, but that doesn't mean the belief doesn't exist as part of the act that shows the belief (the act of opening a door shows my belief that a door is there, apart from whether it's stated or not). The belief doesn't pop into existence just because the belief is stated. It can, but not necessarily.

Sam26, creativesoul, Searle is not saying that beliefs are not propositional. Beliefs range over propositions. — Banno

Where did I say that?

I think we can be confident that people believe many things; beliefs which do not make themselves evident in their actions. — Janus

I'm not saying that people don't have beliefs that are not readily known to others. I'm saying that if we're to say that Mary has a belief, then for us to know that Mary believes X it must be expressed in some action (linguistic or nonlinguistic).

You don't seem to understand the point of this thread. I've constructed an inductive argument based on the testimonial evidence. It's not about me presenting an opinion (if that's your point), it's about presenting a well reasoned argument. There are opinions given in the thread, but usually I try to point out where I'm speculating and where I think there is strong evidence.

What follows from the argument is an epistemological point, viz., that based on the strength of the testimonial evidence I can reasonably claim there is an afterlife. In other words, I can know there is an afterlife.

If anyone wants to argue against the argument, which I've given at various places in the thread, then you need to attack the premises of the argument. So I would suggest you familiarize yourself with the argument before you start saying things like I'm just expressing an opinion.

Thanks for the link. I've listened to Dr. Pim van Lommel before, but haven't seen this video.

Do you usually draw conclusions without seeing the arguments? It started with a thread I created years ago in another forum. The thread started as an exegesis of Wittgenstein's On Certainty? The discussion proceeded from there to bedrock beliefs or bedrock propositions and what those could be, but I'm not going to get into it in this thread. Some of the argument is in this thread... https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7230/some-remarks-on-bedrock-beliefs/p1

What you are unaware of is the ongoing discussion that some of us been having about beliefs. This discussion goes back 7 or 8 years. It started with the subject of pre-linguistic beliefs.

It's actually interesting how far back some of us have been discussing philosophy. My first philosophy forum was Ephilosopher. I became a member of that forum around 2005. My first introduction to academic philosophy was around 1975. Just a little bit of background.

How would you know if someone has a belief if there is no evidence of that belief? That's the question that interests me. How are belief states exhibited in the world, not do they exist when there is no evidence for them. It's about those things that demonstrate that one has a belief.

You should start a separate thread on the subject.

How would you explain belief where there is no action? If I take a trek into the Amazon rain forest, where I perform no actions relating to cars (don't speak about cars, don't get into cars, don't see cars, etc) I do not stop believing in cars. — PhilosophyRunner

Where did your beliefs about cars come from? You didn't develop your beliefs in a vacuum. At some point you saw a car, or were told about cars, or interacted with cars.

I find some of this discussion odd for a philosophy forum. — FrancisRay

Why? I'm giving an argument based on inductive reasoning. It's part of the study of metaphysics. You may not agree with my conclusion, but it's still a philosophical inquiry.

Obviously there are questions that can't be answered about an afterlife
— Sam26
Why do you think that is the case? It seems to me that the only question about the afterlife, you are convinced by 'overwhelming evidence,' that you can answer, is that it exists.
99.9% of all species that have existed on Earth, are extinct, but do they all still exist in an afterlife? Or is it just humans that were born after ....... BCE? CE? — universeness

Why do I think that there are many questions that we can't answer? It seems that that is the case with many subjects. Our knowledge is just incomplete, which is why knowledge keeps evolving. For example. in the past people had little knowledge about plant life, but that didn't mean that the flower didn't exist. It just meant what little knowledge they had was incomplete.

If you read my thread, then you would know that the point of my argument was to give testimonial evidence that there is an afterlife. My inductive argument was not meant to go further than that. However, in parts of the thread I do point out that there are other conclusions that one can infer.

I don't know if all species go to an afterlife, probably not. It seems that certain animals do though. This question goes beyond the scope of my conclusion, not that the question isn't interesting. The answer to this question may have a lot to do with how you view this reality. It's my belief that much of this reality isn't real, i.e., it's part of a program, created for us to have human experiences. Of course to defend this would take some explaining, but the seeds of this are in parts of this thread.

Can you offer any conclusions from your musings regarding the nature and structure of the afterlife? It seems to me that becomes your burden, based on your claims. — universeness

Why would you think that there is some burden for me to explain the nature and structure of the afterlife? My argument isn't about the nature and structure of the universe, it's about the existence of an afterlife. That said, I can give some information about the afterlife, and I have done this in different parts of this thread. My belief is that consciousness is at the bottom of reality. It's a brute fact of reality. Also, I believe that time is part of the nature of consciousness. As far as I can determine it seems contradictory for there to be consciousness without time (without change). I think that space is, at least partly, an aspect of what we experience in an afterlife, i.e., as we move from place to place. Whatever consciousness is, in terms of structure, that will tell us much about the structure of the afterlife. However, we are far from understanding the nature and structure of consciousness. Again though, this does nothing to my argument. Saying something exists doesn't mean that we understand everything about that thing. It just means that we don't have access to all the facts. You see this in science all the time.

Well, I personally find E=MC2 very convincing, as it demonstrably works.
Do you think such as NDE's are as robust as E=MC2? — universeness

They're two different investigations. My investigation is a metaphysical one, not a physical investigation. What's considered robust in one context may not work in another context. However, I do think the logic of my argument is very strong. So, it's not about robustness, but about the strength of the argument.

Can you help me understand what I have not so far understood about the term 'cogency' in the context you employ it? Cogency: the quality of being clear, logical, and convincing; lucidity. — universeness

I guess I don't see how I haven't been clear on this point. Whether or not an argument is convincing (cogent) to another person is dependent on what that person knows. And since knowledge varies from person to person, being convinced is partly depended on what we know. So if someone isn't familiar with the concepts of mass and energy, they're not going to understand Einstein's conclusion. So it won't be cogent for them, i.e., it won't necessarily convince them of anything.

An inductive argument is not capable of delivering a binary, true-or-false conclusion. This is because such arguments are often based on circumstantial evidence and a limited number of samples. Because of this limitation, an inductive argument can be disproven by a single negative or weak sample. — universeness

That's right, inductive arguments are supposed to provide some evidence that supports the conclusion, which is why I've said many times in this thread that the argument is either strong or weak. It's suppose to give evidence that the conclusion is probably true, not necessarily true, as in a deductive argument.

So if I argue that unicorns and fairies exist because I communicated with both, during my own NDE then they must both exist as my argument speaks for itself (you know that is a logical fallacy, right?)
I think you are overburdening the law of identity: — universeness

Just because someone claims to see this or that, that doesn't mean the thing exists, obviously. There's much more to my argument than your simplification. Moreover, to reduce my argument to your version of the argument is a strawman.

I was tempted to not respond to your questions because many of the questions I've already answered several times in this thread. But I guess, one more time won't hurt.

Obviously there are questions that can't be answered about an afterlife, just as there are many questions about quantum mechanics or consciousness that can't be answered. However, this doesn't negate what we already know. And yes, I've mused over many of these questions, and will continue to muse over many other questions.

Just because the evidence is overwhelming doesn't mean you can convince anyone or everyone of the conclusions that logically follow. If you had understood what I said about cogency this question wouldn't arise. As for my demonstrations, as you say, I've given them in the inductive argument. I guess you don't understand inductive arguments or you would've asked me this question. You can disagree with the argument, but the argument speaks for itself. If the argument is weak, then the conclusion probably doesn't follow, if it is strong (as I suppose it is), then the conclusion does follow.

There's ill will in some circles towards this sort of analysis. Think of this as setting up a basic structure or grammar for belief. A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition. — Banno

There's definitely a relation between individuals and beliefs, this seems obvious. However, I would go further, viz., beliefs are relations between individuals and certain types of actions. Individuals show their beliefs by what they do (actions). So I can express that I believe that an object X is a car by using a proposition. I can also show my belief in cars without using language, by getting into the car, working on the car, changing a tire, etc. It's the conscious individual that gives life to a belief in relation to the world.

Many intentional states come in whole propositions, and for that reason those that do are often described by philosophers as "propositional attitudes." This is a bad terminology because it suggests that my intentional state is an attitude to a proposition. In general, beliefs, desires, and so on are not attitudes to propositions. If I believe that Washington was the first president, my attitude is to Washington and not to the proposition. Very few of our intentional states are directed at propositions. Most are directed at objects and states of affairs in the world independent of any proposition. Sometimes an intentional state might be directed at a proposition. If, for example, I believe that Bernoulli's principle is trivial, then the object of my belief is a proposition, namely, Bernoulli's principle. In the sentence "John believes that Washington was the first president," it looks like the proposition that Washington was the first president is the object of the belief. But that is a grammatical illusion. The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the belief. In this case, the object of the belief is Washington. It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions. — Searle, my bolding

I agree with much of this. I never liked the phrase "propositional attitudes," it never struck me as correct. I also agree with - "Very few of our intentional states are directed at propositions. Most are directed at objects and states of affairs in the world independent of any proposition...The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the belief.(Searle)." So the proposition expresses the content of what I believe, but it's definitely not the object of my belief. The object is the world of facts.

It's really about learning, about accumulating knowledge, and not being afraid to think outside the box. If you think this reality is all there is, fine, I'm surely not begrudging you that belief. A lot of brilliant people, smarter than either of us, have concluded that consciousness survives death.

I think the evidence is overwhelming, so for me I know there is an afterlife. It's an epistemological answer. I'm not guessing, surmising, giving an opinion, speculating, or expressing an intuition. Moreover, if after looking at the evidence, you still can't draw the conclusion, then I think you're to wedded to a particular worldview, and not wedded to facts. You're giving to much weight to the materialist view. The materialist view fails on so many fronts it's difficult for me to understand how anyone with an ounce of intellect can seriously believe that what we are observing is the end of the story. We're constantly discovering new things about the universe, so in my mind it doesn't pay to be as dogmatic as you are. What you're espousing sounds more like religious dogma. Could I be wrong in my conclusion, sure, but it's quite unlikely.

You're welcome.

Thanks for the response.

I'm going to make some final comments about the argument presented in this thread. Those of you who have studied propositional logic are familiar with the criteria of a good deductive argument and the criteria of a good inductive argument. The criteria of a good deductive argument are the following:

1) validity
2) soundness
3) cogency

The criteria of a good inductive argument are the following:

1) number
2) variety
3) scope of the conclusion
4) truth of the premises
5) cogency

The argument in this thread was inductive and followed the criteria of a good inductive argument, i.e., except one. The argument isn't going to be cogent for everyone. Cogency simply means the argument is known to be true to the person or persons that hear the argument. In other words, just because an argument follows logically and you know the premises are true, it doesn't follow that everyone who hears the argument is going to know what you know. So, it won't be cogent for them.

A friend of mine gives the following example (Dr. Byron I. Bitar):

Premise 1: The base of a souffle is a roux.
Premise 2: This salmon dish is a souffle.
Conclusion: Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux.

Here's the problem in a nutshell. Even though the deductive argument above is sound and the conclusion follows, that doesn't mean that everyone who hears the argument will understand that the conclusion follows. You have to know what a roux and a souffle is in order for the argument to be compelling for you. If you don't know the concepts (or enough about the concepts), then you won't know if the argument is a good argument. The person who hears the argument has to know the premises are true, but how can they know that if they don't understand the premises.

What each of us knows varies from person to person, which is why even arguments that are perfectly sound can fail to convince people. A good argument takes into account what people may or may not know. For e.g., a scientist may know X because they've done the appropriate experiments, but you aren't necessarily going to know what he knows because you haven't studied what he's studied. So even a good argument given by a scientist may not convince you. This happens all the time. Most of us when presenting an argument fail to understand the importance of cogency in the arguments we give. Thus the argument fails.

My point is that even though I know the conclusion of my argument follows from the evidence, others who have not studied the appropriate data aren't necessarily going to know that the conclusion follows or that the premises are true. So the argument won't be cogent for them. There will be people who do understand the premises, and still disagree, but that's a different problem. The point I'm making here is about cogency.

So if my argument is not good or is weak it's because it's not cogent for many people. For e.g., they may not understand that the argument is more than anecdotal evidence, or they may not understand enough about hallucinations to rule them out as a criticism. I've tried to make the argument cogent for everyone by giving as much information as I could, but often this is not enough.

See you in the afterlife. :grin:

I've been skeptical of these sightings for years until recently. The Navy has been tracking these off the east coast and also off the west coast, and Navy pilots have seen these UAPs up close (within 50'). They're definitely not anything we have. The technology is just to advanced. These things fly at enormous speeds and their maneuvering is beyond anything we can do, and they can fly equally well in water. If there is some other country that has these vehicles, then they are way ahead technologically. It's not even close. They could pretty much do what they want. These same vehicles were sighted decades ago, so the technology, if us, would have been around for over 50 years. It doesn't make sense.

There are only a few possible answers to what they could be. First, it's something that we've had for decades and it's remained hidden. Second, they are hallucinations, which doesn't make sense since many of them are tracked on multiple radar systems. Third, it's an intelligence that's been here on Earth but has remained hidden, which would be really weird. Fourth, their from some other place in our galaxy or some other place in another galaxy. This would mean that they've found some way to traverse space beyond anything we could imagine. Maybe they can bend space, but that would take enormous power. Fifth, they're from another dimension. Take your pick. No one really knows. All I know is that there has been some really weird shit happening, and it's not just in America, it's around the world. The Russians have been having many of the same sightings.

That’s all very nice. It’s not philosophy in the sense I mean. I don’t agree with your particular characterization. So my former point stands. — Mikie

What kind of argument is that? You're basically saying, "I don't agree with you so I'm right and you're wrong. That's not an argument, and it's not doing philosophy.

Then we define philosophy very differently. Anyone can argue in favor of their beliefs. That doesn’t mean it’s philosophy … or science. — Mikie

Part of what philosophy does is to examine various beliefs and belief systems in relation to reality (physical or metaphysical). Some of the philosophical tools used to examine these beliefs are logic (correct reasoning), epistemology, and linguistic analysis. To the extent that people use these three tools they are doing philosophy. They may not be trained in the use of these tools, but they're using these tools nonetheless. I think it's a mistake to think that the only people who can do philosophy are those trained in philosophy. If anyone has beliefs about ethics, metaphysics, religious arguments, political beliefs, even beliefs about certain games, they are doing philosophy. If you make an argument about your beliefs in defense of why you believe something is morally wrong, then you are doing moral philosophy, even if you haven't studied moral philosophy. In fact, if you're a thinking person then you do philosophy on some level.

There are other uses of the concept absolute, but it seems pretty clear to me what is meant by absolute certainty. We're referring to an epistemological concept, not some use apart from epistemology. Although, given the many theories of epistemology I'm sure that there are other uses. I'm defining absolute certainty as something that necessarily follows, i.e., we know with 100% certainty as opposed to some probability based piece of knowledge (inductive reasoning).

Who decides what the standard is? Language users decide what the meaning of our concepts are based on how we use the concept in a variety of contexts. There is no committee or person that decides unless there is a new discovery that requires a new concept. It's not just a matter of perspective, i.e., I can't just use words any way I want, although today people think they can.

In logic there are two kinds of arguments (inductive and deductive), an inductive argument means the argument is either strong or weak based on the strength of the evidence. So the conclusion of an inductive argument is more or less likely (probable) based on the strength of the evidence/reasons. The point being, is that the conclusion doesn't follow with absolute certainty. However, the conclusion may follow with a very high degree of certainty. So, again the conclusion isn't absolute but it's still considered knowledge if the evidence is strong enough. Most of what we know falls into this category, including science.

Deductive arguments, on the other hand, follow with absolute certainty if the argument is sound (i.e., it has true premises and it's valid). Deductive arguments are proofs in the strict sense, i.e., they follow with absolute necessity if they are sound. So yes we can know things with absolute certainty.

Finally, it's not a matter of knowing that we exist (Descartes cogito). It's a brute fact that's not in need of justification. What would it mean to even doubt one's existence? Explaining this would take us into Wittgenstein.

You were taught these stories as a child. Anyone who thinks them through, if they’re strong enough, will just let them go as cultural fairytales — on par with Santa Klaus and caring about the National Football League. Others don’t — and that’s fine, but that’s religion and theology, not philosophy. Just as creationism is religion, not science. — Mikie

Any system of beliefs, to the extent that they use reason (logic) or some other epistemological method of justification to support their ideas, is doing philosophy on some level. It overlaps with theology in many instances, but it doesn't have to. It's called philosophy of religion. You may disagree with that philosophy, but it's still philosophy.

Anytime someone gives an argument in support of their beliefs, even if it's in defense of the Earth being flat, their applying reason to defend their belief. The only questions should be, is their argument a good one, or are they doing good philosophy? Hell, many philosophical views are just as bad, and just as dogmatic as many religious beliefs.

It was quite interesting to me, probably as a direct result of my strong methodological naturalist bent! — creativesoul

Ya, and my disagreement is because of my strong metaphysical leanings. :grin:

Ya, I disagree with him. I'm not a fan of Dennett.

I'm doing fine Creative. How about yourself?

A very good question, one that overlaps a conversation I am having with Sam26 in PM. Beliefs are not discrete pieces of mental furniture, despite our tendency to treat them as such. — Banno

I've been referring to beliefs as states of mind reflected in our actions (linguistic and non-linguistic), but the one thing that I should also emphasize is the transient nature of these states. For example, when I open a door, that action is partly a reflection of my belief that a door is there, but it's fleeting.

This state of mind, reflected in our actions, is also a reflection of what it means to be conscious. However, the meaning of belief or the meaning of consciousness is not something contained in the mind, but something reflected in our actions (again linguistic and nonlinguistic actions). Hence, my agreement with you, that the meaning of a concept is not something we can point to in the mind, i.e., there is no mental thing that gives meaning to the concept.

I believe there is a confusion about mind/consciousness in relation to all of this. For e.g., the belief that some philosophers (and others) who deny consciousness or deny our subjective experiences as an illusion. I think this is a grave error.

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance

(My Philosophic View of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty)

Post 3


Wittgenstein points out that Moorean propositions (hinge-propositions) do not have a clear sense when trying to fit them within an epistemological framework. Consider the following quote:

“’I know that I am a human being.’ In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation (OC 4).”

Why does Wittgenstein ask us in OC 4 to consider the negation of the knowledge claim? Because a knowledge claim always stands in contrast to a counterclaim. They are claims or beliefs that have the proper justification for their conclusion. However, if the sense of your claim (your justification) to know is not clear, then it would follow that the claim to not know would be equally unclear. For example, knowing how to play the game of chess is logically connected with what it means to not know how to play the game. Knowing and not knowing necessarily play off each other. This is why Moore’s propositions lack sense. He claims to know “This is a hand,” but exactly what would it mean in his context to not know? This seems to be Wittgenstein’s point in OC 4. If you want to know what a hinge-proposition is, one need only look at the relation between the claim to know and not know (questioning whether one knows brings in the doubt) and whether both lack sense in relation to the belief. This is exactly the problem with Moore’s propositions, which is why the use of these beliefs (hinge-propositions) is not generally epistemological. What makes it difficult to understand Wittgenstein’s point is that hinge-propositions often have a use within our epistemological language-games, which seems to be why he still refers to them as propositions. They have a special role in our language. They are not propositions in the normal sense. They have a dual role, functioning mostly as bedrock beliefs, but sometimes taking on the role of standard propositions.


The epistemological use of “I know…” presumes a justificatory foundation for one’s conclusion. The nature of giving a justification is supposed to nullify a counterclaim, alleviate or remove the skeptic’s doubt, or demonstrate the objective certainty of your claim. A knowledge claim stands in contrast to its negation, and if the negation is not clear, then neither is the justification. This fits Wittgenstein’s point that “I know…” is very specialized (OC 11).

What does it mean that a knowledge claim stands in contrast to its negation? It means that any epistemological claim to knowledge must be demonstrated, and if the claim does not stand up to one of the language-games of justification, then your claim to know is not valid. Hence, the response “You do not know,” or “I thought I knew,” or any other negation of the claim. Again, any claim to know stands in contrast to what it means to not know.

The tendency is to use the phrase “I know…” as a sort of guarantee that you indeed know (a kind of inner state), does not guarantee anything. The epistemological use of “I know…” is not a reflection of one’s inner certainty or conviction. It reflects objective certainty based on a proper justificatory foundation. The correct epistemological use of “I know…” is often met with the questions, “How do you know (the doubt)?” What is your justification?

Confusion often arises when using the phrase “I know…,” and Moore’s use of know reflects this confusion. It is a paradigm case. In Moore’s case, the confusion is more challenging because of our strong convictions about such beliefs. After all, Moore believes he is justified (at the very least, it is a sensory justification), and most would agree with Moore’s argument because it seems so evident that we know we have hands in Moore’s context.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not against prayer, I just don't know what to make of it.

There are all kinds of motives or reasons why people pray, some good, some not. I wonder about the efficacy of prayer. People pray, for e.g., for safety while traveling, and if they arrive safely, then they believe their prayer was answered. What's bizarre is that any answer can fit within their beliefs about prayer. Even if they don't get a desired outcome, it's still an answer. It's like the self-sealing argument, any outcome can fit within their belief. There is no counter-evidence. The truth is there is no way to know if a particular outcome is from God, it could simply be chance or even deterministic.