This is an odd and questionable use of the term 'inherit'. While it is true that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, and clouds, they are not ours to be transferred from person to person. — Fooloso4

Who in the world said this? Where did I even imply that the inherited background can be transferred from person to person? My point is exactly the same as how Wittgenstein uses it in OC 94. The inherited background is the world we find ourselves in, i.e., a world of mountains, trees, hands, etc. All of us inherit this background in virtue of the fact that we live in the same reality. Also, the inherited background is how we get our picture of the world.

There's a pinch of truth in saying language games do not reflect the facts, since the facts, being truths, are a part of the language games around truth. Better perhaps to say that the games are embedded in the world – so the builder's game inherently involves slabs and blocks and cannot be played without them. — Banno

I disagree, if I understand you, that facts are truths. They are two different things. Truths are about propositions, and what makes a proposition true is that it reflects or mirrors a fact or state of affairs. I see this as a common mistake, viz., mixing up these two concepts. One could say that the language-game of truth is about facts, and whether a proposition say, "The Earth has one moon," is reflecting a fact.

There's also the ill-informed supposition that language games only ever involve language, which even a cursory reading will evict. — Banno

I agree with this.

Did you give me the correct link? That abstract is more about intentionality than bedrock beliefs? Much of what I'm referring to is bedrock beliefs and their relationship to our inherited background.

I don't see how that has much to do with I'm saying.

What I'm saying is that our inherited background (that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, clouds, hands, feet, etc), which is not a system of beliefs, but informs what we believe, both linguistically and non-linguistically. So, there are, for example, prelinguistic beliefs (animal beliefs, bedrock beliefs, or basic beliefs), which are shown in our actions (OC 284, 285) alone, viz., digging a hole, using a hand, or even making a primitive tool. I'm not saying that the inherited background is a system of beliefs, but that the inherited background has a strong relation to what we believe, maybe it’s causal. So, if there were no hands, there would be no beliefs that correspond with the action of using our hands. The confusing part is parsing out the difference between the linguistic belief, “This is a hand,” as a statement, with an action alone that reflects a belief, they are quite different, and in many cases prior to language. This latter category of beliefs is foundational to language, which means bedrock (prelinguistic) beliefs are a prerequisite to language. Just as a chess board and pieces are a prerequisite to playing a game of chess.

The point of course is that the inherited background gives rise to bedrock beliefs, and also gives rise to language itself. This means that without the inherited background the language-games of epistemology (justification and truth) wouldn’t get off the ground. In other words, knowing and doubting are necessarily dependent on prelinguistic beliefs. This is why both Moore and the skeptics are wrong. I believe that Wittgenstein identified something that no other philosopher, that I’m aware of, has identified, viz., the foundation of epistemology. The place where justification ends. It’s something prior to any talk of epistemology, something primitive. It’s the limit of epistemology in many respects.

I want to say two final things. First, there are many kinds of bedrock beliefs, not just prelinguistic bedrock beliefs. There are bedrock beliefs that occur in language. For example, the rules of chess are bedrock beliefs, but they are linguistic.

Second, Wittgenstein never edited OC, so whatever one believes about this or that text is speculation (at least in many cases), because we have no idea what Wittgenstein would’ve removed or added to the text. Although I and other philosophers have arrived at very similar conclusions.

For me it seems misleading to refer to the background, consisting of those things which are necessarily involved in our everyday lives. like hands, feet, legs, arms, ears, eyes, mouths, hills, valleys, mountains, rivers, lakes, oceans, fish, clouds, sun, stars, moon, human technology in all its forms, architecture, music, painting, poetry, philosophy to name but a few in a list of countless numbers, as a system of beliefs. — Janus

You're completely misunderstanding what I'm saying. You're not even close.

These things are not beliefs but intimate and inevitable elements of human experience. — Janus

I'm not sure how you came to that conclusion. If you note the first sentence, it's beliefs about these things, hands, mountains, trees, etc. So we have primitive beliefs (animal beliefs) that are shown in our actions. I'm specifically referring to prelinguistic beliefs or nonlinguistic beliefs.

I think your critique of Moore is a bit over the top.

What are we to do with that proposition? What rests on it? — Fooloso4

(I want to be clear that there are other names associated with these beliefs. The obvious one is hinge-proposition (OC 341), but others come to mind, such as, foundational belief, basic belief, hinge certainties, and animal belief (OC 359).)

I going to answer your question @Fooloso4, but my explanation is also to others who are trying to understand these ideas, so if I say some obvious things keep that in mind.

It's not just the belief about hands, but a whole system of beliefs that falls into the same category. These beliefs make up our inherited background. Moreover, I'm concentrating on those bedrock beliefs that are prelinguistic or animal because of their importance to epistemology and to language itself. Think of these beliefs as ways of acting, i.e., the actions associated with my hands show my belief that I have hands. This is about as primitive or bedrock as you can get because some of our first actions are with our hands. These bedrock beliefs are the ungrounded underpinnings of all the language associated with epistemology. Furthermore, I don't believe they are propositions in the strict sense because they fall outside our language about true and false. This doesn't mean that they can't function as normal propositions in some contexts, it just means that from a bedrock or animal position they are not normal propositions. Loosely speaking, they are states of mind or beliefs reflected primarily in some action. For e.g., like a a dog jumping up and down as it sees its master walking toward the house. These are very primitive beliefs that are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic.

It seems to follow from this that our epistemological language, viz., justification and truth, ends, when butting up against these bedrock beliefs. Included in our epistemological language is the use of the concept doubt. For e.g., "I know X." "How do you know that?" "I don't believe you do know it." - etc. So doubt is closely associated (probably logically associated) with knowing in important ways

The one thing that makes bedrock beliefs stand out is that doubting them makes no sense or is senseless. Why? Because the framework for doubting and knowing is built upon the inherited background of our surroundings. The inherited background is prior to doubting and knowing, i.e., you wouldn't be able to doubt or know without this framework. These concepts grow out of the framework, just as the game of chess grows out of the board and pieces. It's senseless to doubt the very framework that gives rise to the concept doubt. This is why global skepticism is senseless. If you did doubt the framework you would have to doubt the very words you're using.

It seems clear to me that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is a prime example of a bedrock belief. It's definitely prelinguistic, and it generally cannot be doubted, at least in most contexts without having to doubt the whole of our inherited background.

"What do we do with [these] propositions?" It's a matter of recognizing their special place within language. They are the precursor beliefs to language, and by extension all of the language-games associated with language. So, "What rests on it?" Language rests on it.

I'll stop here for now.

I consider the claim that there are mental states of knowing as a metaphysical claim. Do we have a particular mental state because we know or do we know because we have a particular mental state. Does knowing cause the mental state or does the mental state cause us to know? Is there a different mental state for knowing I have hands that differ from the mental state of knowing I have feet or fingers?

It is not clear to me whether you are accepting or rejecting an appeal to mental states. — Fooloso4

My point about mental states is that Witt believed that Moore's statement, "I know I have hands," is more about his mental conviction or belief than an expression of what he knows. I would reject, and I believe Witt rejects any epistemological view that appeals to some mental state as a way knowing. This seems clear. Using know in this way, as I pointed out, amounts to an expression of a belief without an objective justification. I thought I was clear on this point.

From it seeming to be that there is this queer and extremely important mental state it does not follow that it is so that there is this state. It arises from the misuse of the expression "I know". — Fooloso4

It's seems clear that there are mental states that are generated by beliefs, but there are not mental states that correspond with knowing as opposed to believing. I believe there is a state of belief and that these states come out in our actions (linguistic, tone of voice, the way we gesticulate, etc). The subject of mental states can take us far afield, so I'll leave it at that unless there's a need for clarity.

I don't think Moore's claims that he had hands is a bedrock proposition and do not see how it grounds or plays a role in epistemology. It may have its place in his attempt to refute skepticism but it most contexts it is odd and out of place. It is an example of philosophers being puzzled by the puzzles they create. — Fooloso4

This seems clearly incorrect, viz., that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is not a bedrock proposition. In fact, probably all the Moorean propositions given in his two papers are paradigm cases of bedrock propositions (or hinge-propositions). I believe this is a fundamental point made by Witt and most philosophers who study OC.

I don't see how you cannot see that these beliefs form the backdrop that allows all epistemological language to take place. It's similar to saying I don't see how the board, pieces, and rules of chess play a role in the game of chess. There would be no language without our inherited background beliefs, animal beliefs. These bedrock beliefs are crucial to language, and especially to the language-games of epistemology. They solve the infinite regress problem and the problem of circularity. Moorean propositions (hinge-propositions) show just where justification ends, and where doubt falls apart or makes no sense.

"For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew (OC 12)."

We often use the phrase "I know" as an expression of our conviction that we know, but this is not an epistemological use of the phrase. This is where there is confusion. An epistemological use of know must have an objective justification, i.e., it must be demonstrated that you indeed do know. Whereas using the phrase "I know" as an expression of one's inner subjective state (feeling or intuition) is not epistemological. The use of "I know" as Moore is using it, is just an expression of a belief, it's not knowledge.

It's in the demonstration of one's knowledge that we often find that what we thought we knew (this is where many are confused about Gettiers e.g.s) is just false. What we believe we know doesn't guarantee anything. Much of what we claim to know is probabilistic, and it can turn out later that some new fact overturns what we believe we know. Hence, I thought I knew. The definition of knowledge as JTB is necessarily the case, but your expression of I know is not necessarily the case. So Wittgenstein's point about the expression "I thought I knew" is an important epistemological point that is also associated with the use of doubt in terms of your claims.

The use of "I know" and "I doubt" is parasitic on the reality in back of our language-games. This is why bedrock beliefs are foundational to knowing and doubting. And it's also why some bedrock beliefs are outside our epistemology. Bedrock beliefs are neither true nor justified, but they are beliefs of a certain kind. Moreover, what's bedrock can change from context to context. For e.g. "I know I have hands" in Moore's context is nonsense or senseless, but in another context it can make perfect sense. Where it does make sense is where it's appropriate to doubt.

"It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there, but rather that we should not understand him if he were to say 'Of course I may be wrong about this". We should ask "What is it like to make such a mistake as that?'--e.g. what's it like to discover that it was a mistake (OC 32)?"

The mistake and the phrase "I thought I knew" are intimately connected.

Moore must think sceptics are idiots. As if they;re going to read his argument and go 'Oh yes, I have hands, I hadn't notice that before'. — FrancisRay

Actually Moore is appealing to what seems to be obvious to all of us, viz, having knowledge of his hands. The skeptic makes the same mistake that Moore makes, viz., not only is there no knowing these Moorean propositions, but there is no doubting them either. The radical skeptic is even further out on the limb than Moore.

I interpret this differently. Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the fact that philosophers treat claims of knowledge and certainty as if they are metaphysical claims, and this leads them to confusion. Both the skeptic and those like Moore who argue against skepticism suffer from this. They put demands and requirements on these terms that do not exist outside the puzzles they create. — Fooloso4

I would agree that many philosophers do treat knowing as if it's a metaphysical claim (many people do this, not just professional philosophers), at least that's what their use of know amounts to. However, what Moore is appealing to, is a mental state of knowing (he does this without realizing it, or if he does realize it, it's an appeal to what we all take to be a self-evident truth or common sense), which is why Wittgenstein talks about Moore's propositions as an expression of a conviction. We see this from the beginning of OC; "[f]rom it seeming to me-or to everyone-to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. Moore is appealing to our common sense, i.e., if we don't know this (Here is a hand.), then what do we know? This is why Moore's argument is so appealing. How can anyone doubt that this is a hand, and that we know it's a hand? Moore's proof would be something like the following:

1) Moore knows that he has two hands.
2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands, to the conclusion that there exists an external world.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.

It follows necessarily. Especially if we do know these Moorean propositions, which is why Wittgenstein says at the very beginning of OC, "If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest (OC 1)." However, does Moore know, and can the skeptic doubt these Moorean propositions. Wittgenstein thought that Moore's papers were some of his best work, but what I think appealed to Wittgenstein was the nature of these Moorean propositions (so-called bedrock propositions) and there role in epistemology. They ground our epistemology in important ways, without them there would be no knowing and no doubting. The language-game of knowing and doubting is necessarily dependent on bedrock beliefs.

We often appeal to our convictions as if they are a form of knowing, especially if they tend to be the convictions of most people. This is one of the reasons why ideology and religious (or any group set of beliefs) beliefs have so much power. The whole group, to one degree or another, is under the spell of their subjective convictions.

[Wittgenstein refers to certainty in two important ways: First, our subjective certainty, which often refers to our convictions, and second, objective certainty, which is just a synonym for "I know."]

This isn't so much about metaphysical claims, unless you are referring to mental states, as it is about the mental state of knowing and the misuse of the concept know. Consider OC 6, "[n]ow, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.--For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed." Two things here are important to note, as already mentioned, misuse of the word know and one's mental state (consider OC 42).

Prior to language there have to be beliefs that ground us. Just as prior to playing a game of chess there are beliefs that are necessary to the game. Beliefs in the chess board, pieces, and the rules ground the game. There would be no chess game without this grounding. There would just be meaningless moves.

While he shows that Moore's use of "know" in "I know this is my hand" is problematic, I suspect Wittgenstein pretty much agreed with the argument Moore presents against idealism. "Here is a hand" shows that there is stuff around us to be dealt with, providing a foundation, a certainty. Again, there have to be slabs in order to engage in the builder's game — Banno

I would say it's more than problematic. One cannot doubt the very thing that gives rise to knowing and doubting. So, I would say in many cases (especially in Moore's case) that his use of know is senseless. Wittgenstein seems to say that Moore's use of "I know..." is more like a conviction (OC 86, 91, 103). Witt is sympathetic to Moore's argument, but he implies throughout OC that Moore's use of know is not epistemological. It's not epistemological because Moore's use goes beyond the language-game of knowing, Bedrock beliefs are what ground our epistemological language-games. Justification comes to an end with certain kinds of bedrock beliefs, i.e., animal beliefs or prelinguistic beliefs. Of course not all bedrock beliefs are prelinguistic, some are intrinsic to many of our language-games.

"The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them (OC 100 - my emphasis)," which he doesn't.

Apparently you’re not a fan of Kuhn and Feyerabend. — Joshs

I'm not sure what specifically you're referring to.

Why would you say that? There are plenty of language-games that reflect facts or states-of-affairs. Many of the language-games of science reflect facts, as do other areas of study.

You seem to think that if you view Witts work as above most philosophers that it's somehow giving him godlike power. I'm just saying that his intellect IS superior to most philosophers. For me that's an objective fact. Forget philosophy and just look at his life as a whole in terms of his capabilities. It's not a matter of worshipping Witt, it's just recognizing his amazing mind. If you think otherwise that's ok too. If studying someone who you think has important things to say is fanboying, then I guess I'm guilty.

Why are trying to make Wittgenstein fit your idea of what should or should not be said. All your doing is inserting your subjective feelings into the conversation, as though you know best what Witt should be saying and not saying. None of us can hold a candle to his ability to think through these linguistic ideas, including many professional philosophers.

Maybe it's this presumption that I have trouble with. It makes one seem "above the fray". Come into the pig pen, my dear Witty! — schopenhauer1

He's trying to get people out of the pig pen. He's trying to clarify our philosophical thinking, which is no easy task. I think Wittgenstein went off the rails a bit when it comes to what can be said, i.e., in terms of metaphysics.

s it that Wittgenstein rejects Moore’s language-game or that he is showing Moore what a language game is? Does the idea of rejecting a language-game make sense? — Joshs

We know that there are many different language-games, and some of these language-games, (e.g. religious and political language-games) don't always reflect the facts. So I think Wittgenstein is pointing out how Moore's language-game fails to give a proof of the external world (Although, to be fair, Witt doesn't speak of Moore's argument in terms of a language-game). Moreover, Moore knows what a language-game is because he sat in on many of Wittgenstein's lectures.

Your 2nd question is something I thought about for a long time. I think we reject certain language-games all the time because they often don't reflect facts. So yes, I think it does make sense. In fact, it's important that we recognize that certain language-games don't reflect reality. There are constant battles between competing language-games, i.e., which language-games will prevail in our systems of belief.

For me, OC provides the best foundation for understanding epistemology, and should be used as our starting point for understanding epistemology. OC also provides the grounding for knowledge, i.e., the starting points which have no epistemological grounding. Witt demonstrates where knowing ends, or where justification ends. He ends the infinite regress of reasons, and the circular nature of many epistemological theories. In other words, Witt solved these two problems. More work needs to be done on the nature of these pre-epistemological beliefs (Moore's propositions) and their place in the epistemological landscape.

We have to get away from our emphasis on the internal in relation to objective knowledge.

As I've pointed out before, Wittgenstein talks about two kinds of certainty in OC, subjective certainty and objective certainty (for e.g. OC 245). Wittgenstein believes that Moore's propositions amount to no more than a conviction of what he believes (subjective), as opposed to having objective grounds for his beliefs (referring to Moorean propositions). So Moore's language-game doesn't do what Moore thinks it does, viz., provide a proof of the external world. So Wittgenstein rejects Moore's language-game, and all such language-games that amount to a subjective knowing, i.e., the mistaken idea, common in many quarters today, that "I know..." is purely subjective (one's conviction). This idea has wrecked havoc on many belief systems. It's very destructive.

What pray tell is the error he has shown? Neither his language games argument nor his "silence" argument (from Tractatus), necessarily precludes providing context, connecting with other ideas, etc. — schopenhauer1

First, I should've responded like I did. Second, I'm not sure that my disagreements are the same as @Banno's. - some probably are. Third, I'm responding to passages like the following, which seems a clear misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. I think most people who study Wittgenstein, even many who disagree with some of Witt's remarks, would find @RussellA's remarks in the following quote just wrong.

Wittgenstein asks questions, but avoids trying to answer them
There are two parts to my understanding of language: i) words have a use in the language game and ii) the language game has a use in the world. Wittgenstein deals with the first part, but ignores the second. Wittgenstein is like a mountaineer who buys all the ropes, crampons, thermal weatherproof clothes and tents but then never goes to the mountain, justifying himself by saying that the actual climbing of the mountain is a meaningless pursuit. — RussellA

.

The idea that Wittgenstein ignores how language-games have a use in the world seems way off the mark, since he constantly talks about meaning (use) in reference to the world (including our forms of life in the world). I don't see how anyone who has read Wittgenstein can make such a statement. This isn't about some subtle disagreement, but about the meat and potatoes of the Investigations.

I commend anyone who spends time trying to understand Witt, even when I disagree. His writing style doesn't lend itself to easy interpretations. I think the problem lies in reading too many secondary sources. Secondary sources can be a great help, but you have to read many different sources to get a good balanced understanding, and even this doesn't always help.

One of the reasons why Witt doesn't always answer a question is that he's trying to make us think. He's not trying to avoid answering the question. I can't imagine Witt shying away from answering questions. And finally, if you understand that Witt is giving us a method of doing philosophy and not a linguistic theory, this will help steer you in the right direction. Our tendency is to look for a theory and miss the method. It's the method that is most important. This is Wittgenstein's legacy I believe.

What twaddle. — Banno

What shit is more like it.

It will be interesting to see what Sam26 has to say. — Banno

I just don't have the motivation to give much of a response. I haven't read many of the responses given in the recent pages. I've read yours and Luke's, and there maybe be some disagreements, but that's to be expected when parsing Wittgenstein. If I do any writing in the future it will probably be on On Certainty.

If I haven't read what you wrote it's not necessarily because I disagree, but rather that I just haven't set aside the time to do so. Hopefully I'll get more motivated in the coming weeks, and do some more writing on W's final notes.

Thanks for chiming in Banno.

It doesn't matter if it's rhetorical or if he's pretending, it's nonsense. Descartes was just confused on this point. Moreover, Wittgenstein's ideas go directly to much of what Descartes was trying to say. That's my take. I'm not a fan of Descartes. :smile:

Although it makes no sense to say that I am in pain but I do not know it or I am not conscious that I am in pain, that I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim. I think you are reaching into the wrong issue. — Fooloso4

The use of the words, doubt, know, believe, being conscious, all have correct and incorrect grammatical uses within certain contexts or forms of life; so they provide certain constraints on what can be said reasonable or rationally. And of course "...I do not know that I am in pain is a grammatical claim," so I'm not sure of your point.

Something that does not think cannot be deceived, and only something that can think can doubt. I cannot be deceived about or doubt that I exist unless I am a thing that thinks. — Fooloso4

Why would you think that my point conflicts with these obvious ideas? My point is that in terms of what I can know, it doesn't make sense (and you seem to agree) that I know that I am in pain, and in a similar vain, it also doesn't make sense to claim "I think, therefore I am." which is also a knowledge claim of a similar type. It's not as though I can arrive at these conclusions outside the grammar of the language-games in which they occur. There is no internal language-game (as per the private language argument) that allows me to do this. Descartes, I would contend is doing just this. He starts by doubting everything, which is nonsense from the start. He creates his own private conceptual scheme and proceeds from there.

That I am in pain can be talked about in the language game. That I am in pain can also be known by others. It is just something that I cannot know. I don't learn of, or doubt, or know my pains. I have them. — Luke

This is important to understand. It reaches into the issue of consciousness itself, and it's why Descartes is wrong about "I think, therefore I am." There is no such conclusion to be drawn. I simply think. Others know that I'm conscious, just as they know I'm in pain, but we as individuals have no such knowledge. It doesn't make sense to doubt one's consciousness or to doubt that one is in pain, at least as an epistemological issue because it's outside the scope of epistemology. Many language-games fall apart when using them to point to these inner conscious experiences. Even the idea that consciousness is an illusion is nonsense. It would be akin to saying that pain is an illusion.

Logic, i.e., propositional logic is about correct reasoning. It's about the process of collecting reasons (i.e., propositions) and drawing conclusions based on those reasons/evidence. Logic sets out the rules for doing just this. So logic is concerned with the justifications used to support conclusions. It's not about laws of thought or thinking processes, that's a matter for psychology.

To be clear, the "something" in question at §304 is not a meaning or anything linguistic, but a private sensation; a feeling. However, I assume this is what you meant. — Luke

As I read through these paragraphs, I find that I'm not actually disagreeing with Witt, so my wording is not as accurate as it should be.

As Wittgenstein pointed out in PI 258, there is a problem talking about the accuracy of private sensations, he says towards the end, “But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’. — Richard B

The quote from PI 258 is about the so-called private language argument. I have no problem with the PLA. I think it's clear that rule-following in a private language degenerates into "what seems right is right." However, this is much different from what I was referring to above. My point wasn't about a private language, it was about the public use of words and what we mean by those words (generally speaking). I was addressing the public use of color words, and what it would mean to accurately describe certain colors. The point was that we can and do generally describe colors accurately, so that what I mean by the color blue is generally what we all mean by the color blue. It's not as though we're all confused about what we're seeing or experiencing, unless, for e.g., we talking about very subtle shading or nuanced color differences which may take some training to accurately describe.

What goes wrong with some much talk of private sensations is it borrows so much from the language of the public shared reality that words begin to loose their sense, like “right” “accurate”, “judgment”, “remember”, “something” etc… How much do you cut off a tree where it is no longer a tree but a stump? — Richard B

Yes, these words do borrow (borrow is not a good word for what I'm talking about - words get their meanings from public discourse period - they don't borrow from the public) from public language because if they didn't it would degenerate into purely subjective meanings. Hence, the PLA. I disagree that Wittgenstein would agree that words, such as, right, accurate, judgment, etc lose their sense, if that's what you're indeed saying. It's important when using words like accurate to spell out what qualifies as accurate. In one case of measuring, for e.g., we might say that a measurement within a certain range is accurate, but in another case it may not be. So again how we use words in one language-game might not work in another, but that doesn't mean that the words lose their sense. It just means that sense is dependent upon the language-game you're using at the moment. These language-games are dependent on a wide range of public discourse.

What could “accurately” mean in such a case of private experiences/sensations. — Richard B

What accurately means depends on context. So if we give people the same color patches and they describe them using the same words I use, then what more is needed to say they've described the colors accurately, and that they are seeing what I see? For all practical purposed their descriptions are accurate. There's no good reason to think they are seeing different colors. It's a problem without a difference.

However, I'm not sure whether there is much left to say if W is correct in saying that the private sensation is "not a Nothing", but "a Something about which nothing could be said." — Luke

This is where I disagree with Wittgenstein. I agree that meaning doesn't reside as a thing in the mind/brain, but I disagree that it's a "something about which nothing can be said." At the very least I can say they are private experiences/sensations, and we often do describe such sensations accurately. Moreover, when talking about, for e.g., the taste of wine, some people who are in the business of describing such tastes, can do it in a way that others can clearly understand. They understand because they too are able to recognize the descriptions.

Wherever you have systems of belief and the analysis of those beliefs, you'll have philosophy. In this sense philosophy will always be relevant. What will change is the refinement of the methods. Wittgenstein's method of linguistic analysis brought this into sharp focus.

Why don't you start up your own thread. This isn't what I had in mind when I started the thread, although I haven't posted in a while.

I understand now that language categories are listed for searching similarities instead of differences. — javi2541997

Well, that's not quite true, Wittgenstein's analysis looked at both differences and similarities. Both are important in linguistic analysis.

:up:

But your analysis betrays you. You are inferring a cause (<Mary believes there is a chair available to sit in>) from an effect (<Mary sits in a chair>). The belief is not the effect, and our everyday language reflects this. If someone asks you, "Do you know any of Mary's beliefs?," you would not say, "Yes, one of Mary's beliefs is sitting in a chair." According to everyday language this response wouldn't make any sense. A belief can be inferred from an action, but a belief is not an action. A belief is a state of mind, or as Searle says, an intentional state.

You want to focus on this relation between beliefs and actions, but it seems that in the process you have actually conflated beliefs and actions. — Leontiskos

I'm a Wittgensteinian at least to a large extent when it comes to language. If we want to understand what a belief is, then we look at various uses of the word in our language. It's not a matter of cause and effect, it's a matter of learning the correct use of the word across a wide range of contexts.

I like the way you put words in my mouth. If someone was to ask "Do you know any of Mary's beliefs?" - I certainly wouldn't say "Yes, one of Mary's beliefs is sitting in a chair." Obviously this is nonsense. I would say that the action or act of sitting in a chair shows Mary's belief that there is a chair in the room. Just as the act of stating her belief is a reflection of what she believes. Both actions are ways of referring to beliefs in our language.

Beliefs are states of mind, but they come out in our actions, either linguistic or nonlinguistic. The only way to know a person's state of mind is by their actions.

It is legitimate to describe what belief does as a way of understanding what belief is. To describe an effect is not to describe the cause. That's the problem: ↪Sam26 says "beliefs are..." What he ought to say is, "the effects of beliefs are..." He is not talking about beliefs; he is talking about their effects. — Leontiskos

This is just a confusion as far as I can determine. The concept belief has various uses, one use is to say "Mary believes X" because Mary made the statement that she believed X. So what Mary believes is found in the expression of her statement. Another use of belief has to do with Mary's nonlinguistic actions. For example, we can conclude as Mary sits in a chair that she believes there is a chair available to sit in. So the meaning of the concept belief is tied to the various uses of the word in our everyday actions. Beliefs are tied to our actions (linguistic and nonlinguistic), which is how we determine what people believe.

There is no need to bring in any causal connection in this situation, and I haven't done so.