I don't think it is a matter of development but of looking at things in different ways, giving different examples, reminders of what we say and do, so as to obtain an overview, an übersichtlichen darstellung, a surveyable or perspicuous representation or overview: — Fooloso4

My point is that W. never finished developing his ideas in OC. In one passage (I forget the number), he expresses some frustration that he won't have time to finish his thoughts in OC.

Hinges should be viewed in the larger context of the problem of knowledge, doubt, and certainty, which, in turn, are viewed in the context of a form of life, as a matter of practice rather than theory.
Our actions occur along a continuum from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. Hinges do not function exclusively linguistically or prelingistically.

I have not been able to find anywhere where Wittgenstein talks about bedrock beliefs. — Fooloso4

I agree with all of this. And, you're right he doesn't specifically talk about bedrock beliefs, but I think it's one way of expressing what hinges are, from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. They are just very basic kinds of beliefs within our forms of life.

Does your picture of "very basic beliefs" correspond to what prelinguistic humans believed and practiced? How do you know? Did they believe certain objects and animals possess powers? Did totems exist in prelinguistic groups? Were there prelinguistic ritual dances, such as those before the hunt? Burial practices? In each case such beliefs are foundational, but not beliefs we accept. — Fooloso4

There are many different kinds of hinges or basic beliefs, but there are those that are common to all of us, prelinguistic as well as linguistic. When primitive man or modern man interacts within his environment, they show their basic beliefs by what they do, or the way they act. So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. These kinds of hinges, for the most part don't change. On the other hand, there are other kinds of hinges that we accept as certain (not epistemologically certain, but a certainty that's reflected in our actions), and they are expressed in other ways, maybe ritual dances, praying, that the Earth is flat, etc. These kinds of hinges change over time, and they are culturally dependent, and also dependent on our current fund of knowledge.

So, yes, there are hinges that some people accept as basic, but others do not. Religious people act as though belief in God is a hinge, but others reject this idea, so it's not a hinge for them. What we can ask, is, does it make sense to doubt what others take to be a hinge? And if it makes sense to doubt what's normally considered a hinge, then that belief is no longer a hinge (e.g. the Earth is flat).

There is obviously much more to this, and I'm sure I left some important ideas out, but this is basically how I think of hinges.

In terms of behavior, we aren't blank slates. Biology would suggest that some hinge propositions are genetic in origin. — frank

No doubt we aren't blank slates, but I don't see how hinge beliefs (I don't see them as propositions. However, since OC starts out addressing Moore, and Moore's claim that they are propositions, that's how W. talks about them.) could be genetic, but genetics sure influences many of these basic or bedrock beliefs. In other words, my position is that hinge's come into existence as beliefs, based on our sensory interactions with the world around us. So, at the very least, there is some correlation between genetics and such beliefs. However, if you are saying that the belief itself is genetic, that seems very problematic.

But at this point, we turn and notice that all I've just said rests upon untestable hinge propositions. Part of the connotation of "true" is that it's something solid I can push off from. To the extent that I'm confidently pushing off from hinges as I speak, I can say they qualify as true. — frank

I think of hinges, when put into statement form, (as opposed to non-linguistic hinge beliefs) as contingent rules of reality, like a rule of chess. As such, there is no need for testability, they give testability it's very grounding. And, this grounding supports the very concepts of epistemological language (knowing, justification, and truth). The rule in chess that bishops move diagonally, gives the grounding for us to say, in some contexts, that it's true that bishops move diagonally.

What we push off of is what allows for the concept of truth to take root.

That's funny. "A dizzying intellect."

I think there is a causal or correlatory relationship between the world and our sensory experiences that produce these beliefs and/or mind states. I haven't thought much of it beyond this.

Yes, language is in some sense is a function of these very basic beliefs; and it's these very basic beliefs that are the hinges that W. is referring to. The concepts of knowing, and therefore, justification and truth, are later in our development or evolution. You can think of these bedrock beliefs as non-linguistic, and that removes them from the concepts of knowing, justification, and truth. It's when they are incorporated into language that the confusion starts, because we fail to see where and how they originate. They are foundational or bedrock to all the language-games of ratiocination, which is why Moore fails when using the concept of know.

I think what you're wanting to say is that hinge propositions aren't truth apt? — frank

Actually I did say that. First, I don't think hinge-propositions are propositions, so they aren't truth apt. You have to read OC as Wittgenstein working through these ideas. So, it may appear that Wittgenstein is saying one thing, but later he may change it a bit. His thinking is developing as he writes.

I think of these hinges as bedrock beliefs. In the past I've talked about them as pre-linguistic, which I think fits with Moyal-Sharrock's animal beliefs. If you think of them as pre-linguistic, especially in terms of epistemology, then, I believe, it removes them from the concepts of knowing, justification, and truth. I'm thinking of beliefs in this context, not as propositions, but as acts apart from language, or more specifically, as acts apart from the language-games of epistemology. All of our accounts of epistemology are language dependent, but animal beliefs have no such dependency. Moreover, we are not free of these animal or bedrock beliefs. They are fixed as part of the background of reality, and the way we interact with reality.
So, much of this has to do with the way you think of beliefs, and only later, truth.

By the way, I've actually talked with one of the philosophers (Prichard). I sent him a paper I wrote just to get some feedback on some of my thoughts. Nothing I was proposing was out of the ordinary, i.e., it was in line with what other philosophers were saying. This doesn't mean that I'm right, but it does go to what some are saying in here, that my proposals are absurd, or that they don't follow.

Geez, for someone who studied logic you didn't even know what a valid argument was. Yes, indeed, poor Seppo.

I could write much more, but I don't see any point. There are other philosophers who are expressing the same views or close to it, so it's not an interpretation that's absurd. Much of what I've argued for has not even been addressed.

Time for a break, at least I hope so, my mind sometimes works overtime on some of these arguments, and that gets tiring. Cheers from sunny Florida.

Another point to be made about propositions and Wittgenstein's hinge's, is that propositions, since they have the potential as claims or beliefs to be true or false, allow for doubt. The doubt arises because of the potential for the claim to be other than what we believe. This also extends to knowing, i.e., even if I'm justified in believing that x is true, there is still the possibility that I'm incorrect (W. says we often forget the phrase "I thought I knew." OC 12); and where this possibility doesn't exist, viz, where it is senseless to doubt, then we're dealing with hinge's.

Given the nature of propositions as claims or beliefs, viz., that they are truth-apt (can be true or false), this is what allows for doubt. If this possibility wasn't part of what we mean by proposition, then there would be no reason to doubt. What would the doubt be about? Other than you are wrong, the proposition isn't true, or you are wrong the proposition isn't false. This is the doorway to doubting someone's claim. There is much more to this though, because I think in some sense W. was trying to go beyond our conceptual framework. He was trying to come up with a conceptual framework that allowed him to talk about hinge's, and their role in our language-games. You can see this in his many descriptions of hinges, which gives rise to some of the disagreements about hinges. In one setting he seems to say one thing, in another setting something else. It's an unfinished and unpolished work. We need to keep this in mind.

There are hinges (bedrock beliefs) that are so fundamental to our lives that they are non-propositional arational beliefs. Why is this important? You've heard it many times from me and others, but it's important to this particular conversation, because these kinds of beliefs are outside the impetus for doubting. What does that mean? It means that the impetus for doubting, viz., that the belief can be true or false is removed, which is why hinges can't be doubted. Moreover, it's why hinges are neither true nor false. The language-game of doubting has no foothold, no grounding, nothing bedrock to support it. These kinds of bedrock beliefs are needed for our conceptual framework of knowing, doubting, true and false to even function as a part of our forms of life. To doubt such bedrock beliefs, is to doubt that which gives rise to doubting in the first place. If one doubted such beliefs, then as W. has said, one couldn't even be sure of the meaning of our words. Our conceptual framework (including the concepts of true and false) would simply fail to have meaning. The uses of our concepts are reality dependent, viz., they are dependent on the interactions, at a very basic level (in an animalistic sense), that allow for the structure of language, and the many kinds of language-games to evolve (again, the conceptual framework).

And, @Banno, this is a realist position, a pragmatic look at language from the framework of reality being "...all that is the case." There is no need to point to some ideal to understand what W. is saying, no need for the anti-realist position, in terms of understanding these points. However, one needs to be careful not to put W. into some particular theoretical box, be it realist or anti-realist, there are bits of both in his thinking, but W. does lean heavily in the realist direction, as do I, by the way.

Do you agree with
Wittgenstein is arguing that Moore uses the word "Know" in "I know I have a hand" incorrectly; that what he might instead have said is "I am certain act I have a hand". — Banno

Here is a quote from one of Moore's papers, A Defense of Common Sense (second paragraph of first page).

"The method I am going to use for stating it is this. I am going to begin by enunciating, under the heading (1), a whole long list of propositions, which may seem, at first sight, such obvious truisms as not to be worth stating: they are, in fact, a set of propositions, every one of which (in my own opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true."

He's arguing against Moore's use of the word know, as an epistemological use, and all that entails. For me, that entails justification and truth. Moreover, Moore is stating above, what he knows, viz., he knows these truisms are true with certainty. And, he does use the word certain, as you can see, but certainty has different uses. It can be used as a synonym for knowing as W. points out in OC 8. It can also be used to emphasize my subjective certainty, i.e., as an expression of my conviction. The use of the word know is often used like this too. Of course the use of the word know and certain when used to express the subjective, is not an epistemological use, or an objective use (that I have evidence or good reasons), it's akin to a feeling or maybe an intuition. One often confuses an expression of conviction (e.g., someone might say with emphasis, "I know I'm right." - this is just an expression of a subjective conviction) with actual knowledge, but knowledge, as you know, is established objectively (OC 14, 15).

There is a kind of certainty that is expressed in our actions, i.e., as we act within the world, our actions show our certainty. However, this use is similar to subjective certainty above, but without the use of language. I act with certainty as I open the door. My actions show that I'm certain there is a door, that I have hands, etc.

So, again, what is it that Moore knows? He's claiming to know, and also that he has the proper justification (a proof) for, the truth of his propositional claims.

"I know I have a hand" is incorrect because knowledge requires justification. — Banno

I agree, knowledge necessarily requires some justification. Again, ask yourself, what are we trying to justify if not the truth of Moore's claims? Note in OC 21 W. says that Moore's assertions are more like the concepts of a belief, a surmise, or be convinced of "...in that the statement "I know... can't be a mistake. And if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion." This is the point of Moore's claims, their truth. However, W. argues, it's as if Moore's claims, that aren't justified, force us to the truth, but how in the world do they do that if they aren't justified, i.e., how do we know their truth without justification? Moore's supposed propositions are akin to mere beliefs or mere claims, which maybe true, or they maybe false. The truth of the claims have not been established without justification, which is why they cannot be true or false, neither has been established. Moore's propositions have the potential to be true, but they also have the potential to be false; and without justification one way or the other, we just don't know, which is why they aren't truths. Moore claims they are truisms, but W. argues against this whole view of Moore's. Any claim without justification, is a claim that only has the potential to be true or false. It cannot be said to be true unless there is a justification for that truth.

There is much more to this, but I'd have to do more exegetical work.

I don't recognize my thoughts as you repeat them back to me. This isn't going anywhere, so ya, we should move on.

I don't give two shits about anti-realists. My reading has nothing to do with anti-realists. Good God, have you lost your mind. Go talk to MU, maybe you'll get you mind back.

Where did you conflate truth and belief? Right there. A proposition standing alone can have a value of true or false; but it is not a claim or a belief until it enters into relation with the person claiming our believing. — Banno

I don't mean by "stand alone"' that it's not connected to a person. Why do you think I said it's a claim or belief? A claim or belief, is by definition, connected to a person. Claims and beliefs don't pop into thin air without people. What I mean by alone, is without justification. A mere belief without justification can be either true or false. It's not true, until there is some kind of justification involved. Otherwise it's just a simple claim or belief - an opinion.

Do you really wish to claim that when Moore held up his hand and said "Here is a hand", that what he said was neither true nor false? That strikes me as absurd. — Banno

Yes! Because that is what Moore is claiming, that he knows his statements are true. And, that is what W. is arguing against. What is it that Moore is claiming to know, if not the truth of his claims, and that he's justified in claiming they're true. The only thing that's absurd is keeping truth in Moore's statements while W. is saying he doesn't know what he thinks he knows. If he doesn't know that he has hands, then it necessarily follows that he doesn't know that they're true.

You have completely gutted Wittgenstein's arguments. Moreover, it is supported by the text. In fact, the quotes you took from OC don't support your position.

If my argument doesn't follow, then you have to demonstrate which of my premises are false, which you haven't done. Simply saying it doesn't follow, doesn't suffice.

I think the distinction he makes is not between hinges and propositions, but between propositions that function as hinges and propositions that do not. That is not to say that all hinges are propositions, but to say that the statement "the earth revolves around the sun" is not a proposition because it is a hinge is to make restrictive demands on its usage. — Fooloso4

I have no problem with that view. It's probably a better way to say it.

I think there are different kinds of hinges too. I believe that non-linguistic actions, like the action of opening a door, shows my belief in the door, my hands, objects, etc. It's the certainty of the background that is the springboard to epistemology and doubt.

Yep, hinges can become propositions and propositions can become hinges — Luke

This is an important point I tried to make earlier in the thread, and it's where a lot of confusion happens. Moore's propositions (not really propositions if they are hinges) for the most part are hinges, but W. gave e.g.s, where in some contexts, they are not hinges, and therefore propositions. It's this back and forth that causes many interpretative errors in my view.

If Wittgenstein did indeed understand 'true' to mean something such that ""I've never been to the moon" is true iff I've never been to the moon", then you're right, but I've never read anything to that effect so I'd be grateful for a pointer in the right direction. — Isaac

Wittgenstein had a more pragmatic idea of truth. It was never outlined as some are doing in this thread. It was never, something is true, iff such and such (unless you're thinking in terms of the Tratatus), at least as a general rule. This would be anathema to W.'s later philosophy. For W. one looks at a variety of uses within the context of our everyday lives.

The argument is invalid, its conclusion doesn't follow (as has already been pointed out to you) and the "force" of an invalid argument can't really "end the discussion", obviously. If you want to end the discussion, you could venture a reply to my post here. — Seppo

You apparently haven't studied logic. The argument is a hypothetical syllogism, which means that it's valid. What you have to demonstrate is that one of the premises is false, i.e., that it's not sound. So, the valid form of the argument is...

If p, then q.
If q, then r.
Therefore, if p, then r.

And, since you apparently don't know the difference between a valid deductive argument and an invalid one, I'm not even sure you're qualified to say whether the argument is good or not. And, by the way, your statement that the conclusion doesn't follow is also false, because given the premises, and the validity of the form of the argument, the conclusion follows necessarily. Again, the only way to defeat the argument is to show that at least one of the premises is false.

So, maybe you should rephrase your statements.

As I understand it, Wittgenstein's concern is not with a theory of knowledge banno @Seppo @Sam26. He is examining how ordinary (non-philosophical) claims of knowledge function in our language games and with one of his ongoing concerns, how philosophers confuse themselves: — Fooloso4

I agree with you on this point. Wittgenstein is not concerned with a theory of knowledge. And, he definitely believes that ordinary use (not to be confused with every utterance the ordinary man on the street makes), viz., a kind of general picture of how language is used in our ordinary forms of life, can keep us from philosophical (I'm using philosophical in a very broad sense, because even the man on the street is subject to these confusions) confusion.

No, it doesn't, unless one also adopts an anti-realist view that is not found in Wittgenstein. Hence ↪Seppo is correct. Conflating knowledge and truth is an error. Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's knowledge claimed are not incorrect because they are not true, but because they are unjustified. — Banno

Where did I conflate knowledge with truth? The problem is in how you're interpreting what I'm saying, not that I'm conflating knowledge with truth.

A proposition standing alone, i.e., without justification, can have a value of either being true or false, it's a simple claim or belief. Thus, we say propositions are truth-apt. Knowledge on the other hand, refers to propositional claims that have been justified in some way (evidence or good reasons, for e.g.). In my argument I make this clear. At least it should be clear with a little thought.

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.
(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.
(3) Hence, if knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions. (Hypothetical Syllogism) — Sam26

The first premise in my argument says, "knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth." The process of arriving at truth, is any process (I use the word process because there are many different ways of justifying a claim) that justifies that claim, belief, statement, or proposition. I've said this plenty of times, so to say I'm conflating the two, isn't so.

The force of this argument ends the discussion as far as I'm concerned. To deny that Wittgenstein's attack on knowing isn't an attack on justification and truth, fails, in my opinion, to understand the gist of what W. is arguing. Moreover, it fails to understand the implications of W. attack on Moore's claims to know.

Happy Hunting!

Don't spin my argument into what it isn't, since it's about justification and truth. Justification and truth are necessarily intertwined. What in the world do you think I mean by the process of arriving at truth if not justification? The process of arriving at truth, is the process of giving evidence or reasons, for example, to support the truth of the claim.

Or about justification claims. Truth is only one aspect of knowledge claims. Knowledge claims are also claims about justification. — Seppo

Of course there about justification. Why do you think I say there about the process of arriving at truth. That is the justification process.

Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's claim to know such propositions is incorrect, not because the claims aren't truth-apt, but because they are not justified. — Seppo

It's not that justification stands alone in this process, apart from truth, the very act of justification is supposed to lead to the the goal of knowledge, viz. truth. You're stuck in a contradictory place. The goal of knowledge and the justification process, is, again, the truth of the claim; and here it's Moorean claims.

Knowledge claims are logically intertwined with justification and truth claims.

Knowledge is a success word, it refers to a process that achieves its goal. What is that goal? The goal is simply the truth. So, an attack on knowledge is necessarily an attack on truth, and the process of arriving at truth. It follows by extension that W.'s attack on Moore's propositions, viz., that he doesn't know what he claims to know, is an attack on the process Moore uses to determine the truth. Therefore, if you agree that W. is correct in his assessment of Moore's propositions, i.e., that they are not knowledge claims, then it follows by necessity that they are not truth claims either.

Put in argument form it looks like the following:

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.
(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.
(3) Hence, if knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions. (Hypothetical Syllogism)

It also follows from the above argument that Moorean propositions are not propositions at all, since they have no truth value (they are not truth-apt either) in Moore's context, i.e., they have no epistemological status. They are simply contingent arational bedrock beliefs based on our interactions between mind, body, and the world.

I would further make the claim that this argument is definitive. A denial is contradictory, and strips from W. anything of value, in terms of his attack on what Moore is claiming.

"Here is a floor, here is a broom" - this statement is an act that expresses the same certainty as sweeping the floor. Sweeping and stating are both acts that are grounded on hinges.

I don't think you would disagree with this. I'm just making it explicit. — Banno

It depends on what you mean by grounded? Are you using grounded as a synonym for justification?

If I utter, "Here is a broom," to someone familiar with English they would probably say, "Ya, what's your point?" So, one way of seeing a context where such a statement would be useful, is in the context of teaching the word broom to someone who doesn't know English. We are justified or grounded in calling the object a broom, because that is part of the language-game associated with the concept. In other words, it's justification or grounding lies in linguistic training, or in its grammar.

All linguistics are depended on hinges or basic/bedrock beliefs, i.e., they grow out of these beliefs necessarily, so in this sense they are grounded in hinge's. However, I'm not sure if I would say that the hinge's justify their use, so, grounding here is a bit different than justification. This would get into the development of language against the backdrop of these basic beliefs. This relationship has to be seen as a kind of evolutionary process, which eventually leads to very sophisticated language-games, including the language-game of epistemology.

I wouldn't agree that sweeping the floor and the statement "Here is a floor," have the same certainty. They both express a certainty, that's true, but in different senses. My act of sweeping the floor shows a kind of certainty that's grounded in the world itself, so any act of knowing, and by extension justification and truth claims, is dependent on this backdrop. Moreover, any act of doubting is also dependent on this backdrop (contingent states-of-affairs). One can see the difference, as a function of certainty, in these two acts, if one compares the doubting of one (the act of sweeping) with the doubting of the other "Here is a floor." I don't see the language-game of doubting getting any footing as I sweep the floor, but I can see in certain contexts how I could doubt "This is a broom," viz., in contexts where I'm unsure of how to use the English word broom.

The act of sweeping the floor shows my certainty. It's not the kind of certainty that is justified in some sense, it's a certainty has it's footing in the very act itself. One could say they are almost one and the same thing.

So, would I disagree with your statements? It depends on a more careful assessment of what you mean.

Finally, as a side note, we must keep in mind that W. never finalized OC, so almost any dogmatic assessment of what he's saying is problematic. We don't know what would have been left in or out once edited. Although we can compare OC with his other writings and get a clearer picture of some passages.

Then best to stop referring to them as such. Better to call them just "hinges". Moyal-Sharrock uses "Hinge certainties", a small improvement over "Hinge propositions", although to my eye a certainty is propositional. — Banno

I've referred to them in multiple ways, especially as bedrock beliefs.

For me, the language-game of certainty is wider in its scope. In particular, one's certainty expressed in acts apart from language. When I sweep the floor my actions show my certainty (the certainty of the existence of a broom and floor for e.g.), apart from any expression of that certainty. Language is something I add on to that basic certainty, it's a further linguistic action.

For myself I don't think of hinge-propositions as propositions, which is why they're referred to in a number of ways (bedrock propositions, basic beliefs, foundational beliefs, hinge certainties, etc). For me, and I believe for W. they are just very basic certainties or beliefs that lack a truth value or justification.

You seem to be confusing the mathematical propositions with their application. It is because the mathematical propositions 1+1=2, 100+100=200, 12x12=144 an so on are true that we can calculate a bank balance correctly. — Fooloso4

I don't learn to calculate because 1+1=2 is true, no more than I learn to move a bishop because it's true that bishops move diagonally. I act in accord with how others act when they calculate or move bishops. It has nothing to do with truth or falsity. Sure, in some language-games I can say that it's true that 1+1=2 or that it's true that bishops move diagonally, or that it's true that a given statement, which at times doesn't have a truth value (Moorean propositions), can at other times have a truth value. When we learn to calculate we simply learn a skill, like learning any language, i.e., we apply the grammatical rules that others use, and we learn to use them in ways that accord with particular language-games.

There is a certainty to mathematical propositions, but that certainty is a way of acting, not a certainty based on truth or falsity. What are the truths that language sits on? There are no prior linguistic truths, no more than there is something prior to the rule that bishops move diagonally. In a sense it's just an arbitrary grammatical move that we choose to use as part of the language-game of mathematics. It's a useful tool like any of our concepts.

You're right, there is a sense where they are incontestable, but that's not because they are true, it's because we choose to act with these propositions in ways that are incontestable - not because there is some intrinsic sense of truth. They have a bedrock function that's completely devoid of truth. They are arational beliefs, so they function apart from ratiocination in their bedrock role.

The mathematical propositions you're referring to are not bedrock. Their use in terms of your bank account have nothing to do with what I'm am talking about, and definitely nothing to do with what W. is trying to communicate in OC.

Not all hinges should be regarded as the same. The hinge proposition that 12x12=144 is true. How could such propositions not be true? — Fooloso4

Because the basic propositions of mathematics function like rules, grammatical rules, it's not a matter of them being true or false, generally speaking, no more than a rule of chess is true or false in it's background setting. Can they function as truths, yes, in certain settings/contexts language-games they can. You're failing to see the dual function of these bedrock statements.

Take care and get well.

I'm just going to do a general post because I just don't have the energy to respond to all of you.

Much of the problem probably stems from the different ways we view beliefs. My contention is that beliefs can function quite apart from language (Wittgenstein's showing), i.e., we can observe beliefs in non-linguistic actions (even in animals). And, epistemological language-games (knowing, justification and truth), in terms of hinge's or bedrock beliefs, come later as language develops.

If we think of very primitive language-games (for e.g. W.'s example at the beginning of the PI), I think it follows, again, necessarily, that epistemology, and all the concepts involved (even truth), will not, and cannot obtain, until the conceptual framework develops. So, bedrock or hinge beliefs at their core, i.e., because of how they come about as part of the framework or backdrop of reality, have a status that excludes them from all epistemological talk (including truth - OC 204, 205, 206).

All epistemological talk (as arguments against my position), even truth, is always after the fact, we tend to bring it into the conversation as though its always been there. Even in young children, who learn what it means to know only later in their language talk, have these primitive beliefs long before they develop the concepts involved in epistemology.

Now some of you might argue that it doesn't matter that the concepts of justification and truth come later, that doesn't, in itself, negate the truth of these bedrock beliefs. If this, however, was true, then it would seem to follow that it wouldn't negate our use of justification either, or it wouldn't negate Moore's use of the concept know within the the context Moore is using the word.

One of the key features W. points out about Moorean propositions is that when seen against their negation (e.g. "I don't know this is a hand.") it's not clear what their sense is (OC 4). After all if we're not sure of the very backdrop of reality, then how can you be sure of the very words used to talk about such things (W.). It also seems clear to me that truth (as an epistemological function) has the same problem, viz., if Moore had said, as he held up his hand, "It's true that I have a hand," it would have the identical problem that Moore's use of know has, especially since knowing entails truth. Again, consider the negation, "It's not true that I have hands," this proposition also lacks sense in the same way.

One last point, W. pointed out through examples that Moore's use of "I know..." can have a sense in other settings or language-games, but this use is different from the use as a hinge, which is the use Moore is being criticized for. The same is true when speaking of bedrock or hinge beliefs when it comes to truth, in a bedrock setting, they are neither true nor false. However, in other settings or language-game, they can be true or false. I think to fail to acknowledge this is to fail to understand W. point about hinges, or as I like to refer to them, bedrock beliefs.

Sorry, I haven't been feeling well, so it's difficult to post.

Do I have to "kindly wait?" :wink:

Well, then we just disagree.

First, I want to say that my view, although much the same as Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, was arrived at quite independent of her. I gave the link because @jamalrob wanted to know what other philosophers thought that hinge's were neither true nor false.

You seem to think that hinge propositions are neither true nor false...

How can you validly make a deduction from a proposition that is neither true nor false? — Banno

It's not that hinge's can't be used in deductive logic (@Cuthbert @Banno), it's that hinge's, in the language-game of being a hinge (think of Moore's propositions), isn't a proposition in the normal sense. However, there are language-games, deductive and inductive logic, where the hinge, can be used as a normal proposition. So, hinge's are not stuck in one particular role, no more than our use of game is stuck in one role, say, only chess games or board games.

Hinge's, however, in there most basic form have quite a different role, especially if you look at them as non-propositional or non-linguistic, they have no connection with language (logic is a language obviously) in this role. However, they do have an important function as Wittgenstein points out in OC.

So, yes, @Banno I do believe that hinge's, basic beliefs, bedrock beliefs, foundational beliefs, have the role of not being true or false. So, it's not that I seem to think this, it can be correctly applied to my thinking. In fact, if you remember there was another thread where I said that 2+2=4 was a hinge, i.e., that it's not true or false. I hadn't paid particular attention to certain mathematical propositions, so I began to doubt whether I was correct about this, but after considering my position again, I'm returning to that belief, with the caveat that, it depends on the language-game the proposition (mathematical or not) is being used in.

So, just as we shouldn't confuse language-games in terms of presenting the same use, i.e., as having the same meaning or function, we shouldn't confuse the language-games of hinge's. Again, in some language-games they do function as normal propositions, but generally I would say, they do not. In cases where they do not, then they are by definition, not true or false, as per basic belief status.

I already explained it above.

To understand what hinge-propositions are, one needs to understand what beliefs are; and if you don't agree or understand this, then you won't fully grasp the nature of hinge-propositions.

Beliefs fall into two categories of actions, those that are non-linguistic, and those that are linguistic. Those that are non-linguistic, as the name implies, are acts that are quite separate from language. For example, the act of opening a door, shows that you believe that there is a door, a hand, a body, and all the surrounding things enabling you to perform the act within the world. Specifically, we're referring to contingent states-of-affairs that make up the world (this idea has it's roots in the Tractatus). These kinds of beliefs are not limited to humans, but can also be seen in animals, i.e., in their actions too.

The second category of belief is the one most of us are familiar with, viz., beliefs that are a function of language (statements/propositions). These are necessarily dependent on the first category of non-linguistic beliefs, without which, there would be no linguistic acts of believing. So, linguistic beliefs are born out of non-linguistic beliefs, and all the contingent surroundings that enable such beliefs. Non-linguistic acts (beliefs) are necessarily prior to linguistic acts and all that amounts to language.

Hinge-propositions, which Wittgenstein identified in OC, are not propositions in the strict sense, although in certain language-games they can function as propositions. I identify them, as do other philosophers, as basic beliefs, or foundational beliefs. However, one must be careful not to think of them in terms of the traditional ideas of foundationalism (for e.g. Plantinga's epistemology).

Once we see these non-linguistic basic beliefs (hinge-beliefs) in this way it follows that they are outside any talk of epistemology. This means that any reference to these beliefs in terms of knowledge, true or false, is meaningless. The problem of course, is that as soon as you start talking of these beliefs, you bring them into the linguistic arena and change their nature in some respects. You change their nature because now they have different functions depending on the language-game. Also, there is no precise way of defining these basic beliefs within language because they have so many different functions. It's like trying to define the essence of a game (as per Wittgenstein). There are just a group of family resemblances tying together the many uses that define hinge-propositions or basic beliefs.

What has intrigued me about hinge-propositions is that they usher in, I believe, a new kind of foundational epistemology. One that answers many questions about the nature of epistemology, and solves, for example, the infinite regress problem, and the problems of how to refer to such foundational beliefs. My epistemology now revolves around the ideas presented here, and gives epistemology a more solid footing.

Another similar paper in line with my own thinking of this subject, at least generally.

https://www.academia.edu/61206520/Wittgensteins_Hinge_Certainty

Pay close attention to how she talks about hinge-propositions and truth.

I find that I agree with much of her interpretation.

Can you point me in the direction of the relevant philosophers and their work? — jamalrob

There is much being written on this subject, but here is some of what I'm talking about. Sorry I didn't get back to you sooner.

https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2299/17388/Moyal_Sharrock_Animal_in_Epistemology_pre_imp_PdF.pdf?sequence=3