Sure the intellectual component that comprises feelings of perception from memory is alive and well. Nevertheless, you can't separate the object from your feelings. As another example from inanimate objects, when someone cries over their car that they've loved and become attached to but have to sell because it keeps breaking down, (in part) why do they cry? — 3017amen

Well, we CAN separate the object from our feelings - but we are so accustomed to Cartesian dualism that we don’t know how, and often don’t want to. Attributing feelings to an inanimate object understood as property - a property of our being in the world - is how we legitimatise those feelings as ‘real’. But it is the relation to potentiality or value, not the actual object, that constitutes this sense of property. When parting with a car brings a feeling of pain and loss, it is for our relation to the car’s potentiality/value, not the car itself, that we cry. This is not a physical connection to the actual car - it is a physical connection to a metaphysical relation at the level of perceived potentiality.

I can appreciate where you are going with that. An artist first has to intellectually express themselves through a medium, and that medium is usually an object. So if you want to argue subordination between the two you can. But that would only support my argument that we cannot escape (the need for) the object itself. — 3017amen

Not really - An artist need not be successful at expressing themselves through an object/medium for the aesthetic experience to exist for the artist.

Sure, ideally romantic love should encompass both appreciation of the subject and object. But a passionate relationship must involve appreciation of aesthetics. For example, regardless whether a subject is obese or not, the other subject would love that subject's object (body) when displaying any act of physical touching, caressing, loving the object itself, etc..

And so the subject-object dynamic is merely common sense. — 3017amen

Romantic love subordinates any actual physical-physical connection. What you’re referring to here is not aesthetics - it’s desire. The origin of romantic love makes no reference at all to physical touching, caressing or desiring the object itself. It is a relation at the level of potentiality: the potential beauty and virtue of a noble lady is connected to the potential actions or expressions of a knight or poet. The knight then ‘loves’ his lady through the success of his noble quests. So, even as a subject-object dynamic, romantic love necessitates only a physical connection to a potential relation.

In the context of Eros (romantic love and passion) I just don't think that it's reasonable to project an intellectual connection onto a physical object that is considered undesirable to the subject. — 3017amen

This is where our discussion may take an interesting turn. First of all, romantic love is different to passion. Eros is meant to move our focus from physical passion to romantic love - and from desire to the noble pursuit of Beauty as an aesthetic idea. I do understand the reluctance to depart from what is the easiest path to Love. I also recognise that desire is considered a fundamental aspect of this path - but this is where it differs from the aesthetic experience and Kant’s process of aesthetic judgement.

Desire - interested pleasure - is eliminated from Kant’s aesthetic judgement at the first moment. Pure judgements of beauty in an object are distinguished from judgements of the agreeable by a disinterested character of the feeling. This has not occurred in this context.

Also missing from the context of Eros is a claim to universality. There is no claim that everyone else who perceives the object ought also to judge it to be beautiful, and share pleasure.

And yet, there is a recognition even in romantic love that Beauty is not a concept of this particular human body as object, but that any judgement of beauty (or love) rests on this particular ‘person’ as an indeterminate concept. How else is it that an aesthetic experience exists despite failing to either distinguish our pleasure from judgements of the agreeable or establish a claim to universal validity?

My argument is that the personhood of any human being is recognised as an indeterminate concept, rather than an object. So it is perfectly reasonable to connect intellectually with a physical human being considered undesirable to the subject. It is also perfectly reasonable to love another human being (even romantically) - or to judge any human being as ‘beautiful’ - with or without desire or claim to universality, to pursue human relations without purpose, and to delight in such relations as an example of how everyone ought to interact with each other. Such is the nature of Love.

So, what happens to desire - to the subjective and momentary pleasure of physical passion? It is one of many ways to love. Romantic love is considered ‘successful’ in a modern context only when it is reciprocal, resulting in a mutual instance of desire. But a loving marriage cannot be sustained on a single such instance - it relies on a complex relational structure of value/potentiality that enables an ongoing manifestation of these instances of intentional loving (including but in no way limited to physical passion), sustainable within a broader and ever-changing structure of social/conceptual relations.

Of course, but you can't deny that without the object itself, there would be no such thing as an aesthetic experience. It's logically necessary for the experience itself. For the Kantian aesthetic judgement to take place. To be apperceived. — 3017amen

I do agree that apperception is necessary for an aesthetic experience - but the aesthetic experience is not necessarily contingent upon actual existence of the concrete object. This can be difficult to acknowledge, and seems to be the main source of suffering when we lose a loved one, for example. Memory, feeling, or thought can all re-invoke an experience, long after the perceived object ceases to exist. In fact, I would argue that an illusion or simulation would be sufficient for an aesthetic experience.

An aesthetic experience is contingent upon the perception of value/potential in relation to an object - but not necessarily as a property of an actual or concrete object. In an aesthetic experience, the ‘object’ is not the thing in itself, but potentiality/value as perceived by the subject in relation to appearances. Artistic production even suggests the aesthetic experience is contingent upon the existence of an aesthetic idea in relation to one’s capacity for apperception, rather than the existence or perception of any object itself.

Consider love making (romantic love). Does it involve pleasure for both? Of course it does. As self-directed individuals (the virtues of selfishness), we seek pleasure, happiness and joy. And as a higher altruistic type of love might include; a temporary denial of oneself for the pleasure of another. That still "revolves around our own pleasures."

And so a romantic relationship that includes a mind, body, spirit connection not only has potential for the higher love for reasons beyond just the physical (aesthetic judgement/experience), it still nevertheless "revolves around our own pleasure".

Otherwise, consider when two-become-one. Part of the phenomenon is that each person wants to procreate in order to create a mini-me. It's partly based upon an aesthetic judgement to desire creating another person (the physical object). And when the baby is first born, the object is considered (Kantian aesthetic judgement) beautiful. If it wasn't, people would not feel compelled to look at other babies and say 'what a beautiful baby (or ugly baby )'.

The aesthetic judgement always begins with the object itself. We can't escape it. Sure, there are other reasons that involve the intellect, but when it comes down to it, the feelings of physical passion (Eros) is a virtue that relationship's want to maintain in all forms of Being. — 3017amen

Yes, it does involve pleasure for both, but I dispute that romantic love-making necessarily revolves around selfish pleasure - rather, it involves a deconstruction or decentering of ‘self’ such that the pleasure sought is not a property of one or the other, but of the relation. The way I see it, romantic love is not a subject-object relation.

So, too, procreation is not necessarily a desire ‘to create a mini-me’, but to express or exhibit the approximation of an aesthetic idea by attempting to give sensible form to a rational one. The beauty of a newborn child is in the success of this exhibition - a potentiality, attributed now to the physical object - but the aesthetic experience existed well before anyone had an opportunity to look at the baby.

I’m not going to pretend that we don’t seek our own physical pleasure within these relations - that we want to maintain a physical connection to pleasure - but this has nothing to do with aesthetic judgement. My argument is that the process of aesthetic judgement and its ‘disinterested pleasure’ begins with apperception - of an aesthetic object, potentiality or idea - but is not contingent upon the physical existence of, observation or interaction with, the concrete object itself.

My criticism isn't really that your understanding fails, I know that despite my own certainty of certain aspects of life it's smart for me to acknowledge that I ultimately don't know. My reaction is to the word purpose, the purpose of a living being's varied lifespan, which I admittedly assume that the word purpose has special weight. I don't know that we have a purpose. We do create meaning; socially, culturally and subjectively, but whether or not there's a broader meaning to life, I don't know. — Antonorganizer

Thanks for pointing this out - I think it’s more purposiveness or intentionality, rather than a specific, definable purpose. This relates to Kant. We have purpose, we are purposeful in our actions, but I agree that we don’t appear to have ‘a purpose’ as such. Likewise, there is meaning to life - a meaningfulness to living - but not a definable meaning as such. Nevertheless, I should point out that by ‘conscious subject’, I’m referring to those animals whose consciousness we may reliably assume, but who lack the capacity (that we can ascertain) for self-reflection and language. We define a conscious subject by attributing purposiveness to their perceived limitations as a living being - much of evolutionary theory is an example of this, as are the judgements we make of assumed intentionality against us. A conscious subject with no concept of self is not only incapable of distinguishing between meaning and value, but distinguishes between one value-meaning (purpose) and another only by attributing them as properties of objects in the environment in relation to that subject’s own intentionality (of which it is unaware). The attribution of value-meaning without distinction to a conscious subject defines the existence of that conscious subject by an assumed (if uncertain) purpose.

You say that awareness of value/conceptual structure that have meaning indicate self-consciousness. I think I understand awareness and consciousness, though both are abstract, but self as well as meaning in the way people typically consider it are questionable to me. — Antonorganizer

A self-conscious existence has the capacity to recognise that values vary in relation to meaning. But we tend to assume that we ‘create meaning’ from our perception of value/potential - and most of our language structure is built on this assumption, including the way we define abstract concepts. The way I see it, we hypothesise and test meaning from a limited perception of value/potential in relation to a perception of our own value-meaning (self). It is only when we account for our limitations and correct for prediction errors that we will recognise our position in the dimensional relation between value and meaning (eg. a limited observation of the solar system perpetuated the geocentric model, despite unavoidable prediction errors).

I apologise if this seems confusing. The challenge I often encounter in explanations at this level is with language and logic, which assumes a subject-object relation, value/conceptual structure as the container of existence, and meaning to be subsumed under concepts. A six-dimensional metaphysics considers meaningfulness (what matters) to be the container of existence, inclusive of all possible relations, conceivable or otherwise. This has the unsettling effect of de-centring and deconstructing perception of the ‘self’ as subject, and allowing for conception of a reality in which a self-conscious existence is valid and purposive, yet ultimately unnecessary in itself - it matters in how it relates within all possible existence. Like other principles of relativity, it isn’t where we operate in day-to-day interactions, but I find it improves understanding in dealing with the bigger questions...

I understand as well as perceive my life as existence beyond my body and mind, yes it seems metaphysical. What you're about that makes sense, and though it is articulate, might be jumping to multiple conclusions about consciousness. You're using an unnecessary eloquent way of saying something that can be said in more simple language. — Antonorganizer

I’m an Arts major and marketing writer - occupational hazard. My aim here was to give a sense of the overall six-dimensional geometry, as I understand it. I’d be interested in seeing it articulated in ‘more simple’ language without losing that sense.

As for jumping to conclusions, this is simply a statement of where my speculation is at. I agree that I might very well be jumping to conclusions at this stage, but I’m open to criticism if you can point out more specifically where you think my understanding fails.

I don't see the reasoning behind it being in the quantum level, but again it's still a possibility. — Augustusea

A book I read a couple of years ago by Bruce Rosenblum and Fred Kuttner was called ‘Quantum Enigma: Physics Encounters Consciousness’. If you already have a grasp of quantum physics then you could probably skim most of it, but it sets up the possibility of applications of quantum theory outside the realm of physics, particularly in cognitive neuroscience.

Something that might not be limitly speculation, meaning guessing without much thought, is that the mind seems to be a concept. Possibly just the way we talk and think about it, but whatever it is seems elusive unless you use brain and mind interchangeably. In an earlier post you stated that everything that exists exists within space. Concepts/ideas exist, therefore they exist in space. I don't understand why you say everything that exists is within space, especially that this includes concepts/ideas. This is not to put down concepts/ideas, I often love thinking about them. — Antonorganizer

First of all, speculation is not ‘guessing without much thought’. It is theorising about possible answers to a question without sufficient information to be certain.

I agree that mind refers to a concept. The argument that everything that exists does so in space doesn’t preclude the possibility that a concept exists with no definitive location in space - only probabilistic relations. It isn’t so much that a concept doesn’t exist in space, therefore, but that its existence isn’t confined to, or defined by, particular spatial relations at any one moment.

In six-dimensional metaphysics, a body is defined by its varied shape in spacetime, but exists beyond the confines of 2D shape as a set of spatial relations that persists in time. Awareness of this temporal aspect suggests life. A living being is defined by the relative values of its varied spatial relations, but exists beyond the confines of 3D space as a set of events that persists in its value/potential. Awareness of this ‘value’ aspect suggests consciousness. A conscious subject is defined by a purpose to its varied lifespan, but exists beyond the confines of its 4D event as a set of value/conceptual structures that have meaning. Awareness of this aspect of ‘meaning’ suggests self-consciousness...

for me I wouldn't go into the quantum level for consciousness, but its still a possibility I guess. — Augustusea

Is there a specific reason why you wouldn’t?

Almost anything we say here as an answer to the question could and probably should be counted as speculation. If the geniuses don't know yet, I am going to sit around and wait for then to figure it ou — Sir2u

Yes, that’s all this discussion can be at this stage. But isn’t that what philosophy is, for the most part?

The aim is to reframe the question so that ‘geniuses’ might get closer to a more useful answer - not to have the answer already packaged up for them. If the geniuses don’t know yet, then it stands to reason that the solution lies probably outside the geometric structures and logic that limit their thinking. It will take someone looking at it differently to initiate a paradigm shift.

I would love to see any study/article about so,
in my research I've never noticed a connection to superposition. — Augustusea

That’s because it’s pure speculation. How would one even begin to test such a theory?

It exists as a property of continually changing particle relations in the variably integrated organic system, and manifests as energy events that appear to ‘occupy’ the brain and/or the nervous system depending on the measurement/observation.
— Possibility

And that is the problem being discussed, no one disagrees with the rest of it. — Sir2u

Manifest energy events appear to occupy the brain AND/OR nervous system, but that is NOT mind. I think the issue may be that we are trying to define mind by its empirical evidence in time, instead of recognising mind as the quantum-level arrangement of an integrated system in superposition.

I’m leaning towards agreement with apokrisis - measuring the physicality of mind is about potentiality, not about occupying space in time. The light we see in the night sky is not the star itself - that’s only empirical evidence of its manifest energy event at some point in spacetime. The actual star may be long gone - or at least significantly changed - by the time its light reaches our awareness. But the potential physicality of that star is theoretically calculable from what empirical data we do have.

Lisa Feldman Barrett describes the neuroscience of the interoceptive network in relation to an ongoing prediction of affect: arousal (effort) and valence (attention) in the organism, mapped onto the 4D universe as a distribution of energy budget (potential). Mind may then be a process of restructuring particle arrangements to improve future predictions in relation to a limited energy budget.

Does this mean that the essence of today's philosophy is free and rational debate? That's a good point... to start a philosophical debate.

The first point would be: What is rational? — David Mo

Not debate: more dialectics. The aim is not for one side or another to win or be conclusive, but to arrive at a relatively shared sense of reality. To relate to, without subsuming, an alternative perspective of truth (as distinct from a statement of what is true) enables us to speculate on the limitations of our own perspective.

Often it is our rational process itself that is challenged in relation to inter-subjective experience, and we may currently have insufficient information between us to resolve it. As modern philosophers, I think we need to work with this uncertainty and be open to inter-subjective collaboration and speculation, rather than retreat into excluding uncertain information on the grounds of its subjectivity. ‘Someone must be essentially right’ inspires far less philosophical progress than ‘somewhere between our perspectives must exist the right answer’ - or at least the right question...

Unless your philosophy is open to adjustment, you’re not doing philosophy. It’s rational process in free play with imaginative speculation.

But the cup does not care because the environment's affect on the coffee are not in its properties set. — Sir2u

The cup doesn’t care about its own properties set, either. But as humans, we do care about the environment’s effect on those aspects of the environment which we also affect - in terms of distinguishing our own impact (ie. property set) from that of the environment.

So if we take the relationship of the cup to its surroundings as a comparison to the mind and its relationship to its surroundings, the energy in the form of heat or reflected light can be projected from the cup and into or upon other objects we can do the same with the energy in the brain?

I cannot wait to hear your explanation of this, even though as far as I can see, it has nothing to do with the question of the mind taking up a space. — Sir2u

I’ve already commented earlier, but allow me to clarify for this purpose.

Mind, like energy, is potential information that manifests as an event, appearing to ‘occupy’ matter, yet taking up no space of its own. It is a property of the local quantum particle relations, attributed to ‘objects’ with an understandable degree of uncertainty.

So the relationship in question is not that of the cup, but of its energy, as a comparison to the mind and its relationship to the brain and ‘surroundings’. The energy is not solely a property of the cup or the coffee, any more than the mind is solely a property of the brain or the nervous system. It exists as a property of continually changing particle relations in the variably integrated organic system, and manifests as energy events that appear to ‘occupy’ the brain and/or the nervous system depending on the measurement/observation.

The way I see it, any possibility of increasing awareness, connection and collaboration, in relation to ignorance, isolation and exclusion, would be sufficient preconditions for the observable universe.

Everyone knows that energy exists, and no one is saying that it does not. The discussion is whether the mind occupies space.
If the mind is counted as energy, then it is part of the material of the brain.That makes it a property of the brain and it cannot exist outside of the brain so it cannot itself occupy space.

Banno's red cup has the properties of being red and keeping his coffee hot, neither can exist outside of the cup so they do not occupy any space. — Sir2u

There is no reason to assume that the mind, understood as energy, is confined to the material of the brain.

We attribute properties to conceptual ‘objects’ arbitrarily - Banno’s cup is not the only thing keeping his coffee hot, and it also keeps other items hot that exist outside of the red cup. The cup casts a reflection on the shiny white table that has the property of being red, ‘occupying’ space outside of the red cup that is contingent upon the existence and redness of the cup in relation to the table and the light...

But has not also the middle east been the site of wars and oppression for nearly all time, and even as we speak, even while other places seem to try to evolve away from that? And my personal experiences with middle-easterners is my own; but one example, the acquaintance of mine, here to become an engineer, who explained that friendship notwithstanding, were there a jihad he'd have to kill me, my not being Muslim. What do you make of that? And I should like to think that in many ways, the west is more desirably progressive than the middle east. — tim wood

To my way of thinking bigotry is an offense against thought, being an illegitimate substitute for it. So if I offended, point it out. — tim wood

Here is an illegitimate substitute for thought: discrediting the being of an entire region of individuals (“being a middle-easterner” as “a disease of intellect and spirit”) by the expressed thoughts of one person (or even a handful) from that region. We all would like to think that we are “more desirably progressive” than others, but generalisations such as these are the definition of an offence against thought, I would imagine. As an example, it has come to my attention that the US has enjoyed just 16 years of peace since its inception, and no more than a day since 1970 - a case of the pot and kettle? More desirably progressive? Not in this way, it would seem.

I for one thought you were better than this, Tim.

Now, hopefully everyone can swallow their pride long enough to return to a meaningful discussion of the topic - which I was enjoying before it descended into accusations of inciting war and oppression....

The goal of the original philosophers, according to Pierre Hadot, ‘was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing.’ — Wayfarer

‘Combat’ here may be the wrong term - not to ignore, isolate or exclude, but to increase inter-subjective awareness, connection and collaboration with a diversity of evaluative beliefs in relation to passions, habits and upbringing, such that this ‘rational comprehension’ doesn’t limit itself to avoid uncertainty.

For me, philosophy is more about the questions than the answers, more about existence than humanity, and more about awareness than exclusion. But I do recognise that it takes both approaches to render philosophy productive as such. So I will continue to challenge ignorance, anthropocentrism and claims to certainty, and expect to be challenged myself on clarity, context and purpose.

The day that everyone agrees on ‘the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos’ is the day philosophy is obsolete.

Suffering: the awareness that a system is insufficiently resourced to fulfill its predicted/expected energy (effort and attention) requirements.

Of course the concept of Love is all encompassing, but once again, you are denying the impact of Eros and the phenomenology of the aesthetic experience. Romantic Love seems like a long lost cousin (to you). The metaphysical connection is from both the aesthetical experience itself, along with the intellectual and spiritual experience. — 3017amen

The aesthetical experience itself is inclusive of ‘intellectual’ and ‘spiritual’ connection, not distinct from it. Phenomenology’s focus on the object of experience from the first person point of view is analogous to a geocentric perspective of the universe. The relative position of the thinking, feeling subject is not taken into account - rather it is not ‘relative’ at all, but central to phenomenological understanding.

De-centring the subject is a paradigm shift that appears to ‘deny’ the significance of the very aspects that ground this knowledge of our world, when in fact it enables us to broaden our understanding of the world beyond our limited experience. It was only when we let go of necessity in the subject-object relation between Earth and the Solar System that we could recognise our relative (albeit less significant) position in the universe. This broader understanding did not ‘deny’ the phenomenology of the human experience, but rather improved our interaction with reality - coming to terms with our experiences of humility, adjustment and lack in relation to a universe that does not revolve around our spatial position.

Experiencing Love as ‘romance’ and Beauty as ‘art’ is not lost on me, but it is a narrow or ignorant perspective, excluding opportunity for a more universal understanding of both Love and Beauty. Sure, exploring intellectual or non-sensible aspects of the aesthetic experience risks unveiling the apparent mystery and magic of a ‘phenomenon’, and de-centring knowledge by letting go of necessity in the subject-object relation appears to deny the phenomenology itself, but it need not detract from our capacity for pleasure in an interaction. Rather it enables us to come to terms with our experiences of humility, adjustment and lack in relation to the possibility of Love or Beauty, for instance, that does not revolve around our own pleasure.

We will have to agree to disagree. The aesthetic experience is the phenomenon that relates to Eros. A Kantian aesthetic judgment is a judgment which is based on feeling, and in particular on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Noumena is not germane in our context of phenomenology and sense experience. Noumena is independent of same. — 3017amen

Your preference to ignore, isolate or exclude noumena from a metaphysical discussion of the aesthetic experience is going to limit any attempt at an objective or at least intersubjective understanding of Love or Beauty. I understand your reluctance to de-centre the subject and instead cling to a phenomenological perspective - but for me metaphysics seeks an objective understanding of reality, not an anthropocentric one. Kantian aesthetic judgement may be based on feeling, and noumena may indeed be independent of sense experience, but phenomenology and sense experience are not independent of noumena, and my argument is that ‘feeling’ is not necessary to a Kantian methodology of aesthetic judgement.

Rhetoric as qualitative information is necessary for positioning quantitative information in relation to the system. In the ancient Aristotlean sense - where all information is oratory - rhetoric can be seen to render quantitative facts or logic as secondary. Plato’s arguments against rhetoric seem to follow these lines.

Modern sources of information, while commonly sliding into sophistry, can also have the opposite effect - with empirical data rendering qualitative positioning of the measurements as secondary. An excavation of metaphysical truth - in the age of quantum mechanics - necessarily involves rhetoric, not as an ‘art of persuasion’, but as a recognition of relativity or uncertainty in interpreting undeniable quantitative information as a statement of relevant philosophical truth.

That's not what we're talking about here, sorry. Your interpretation is way off the mark. Noumena is posited by Kant as an object or event that exists independently of human sense and/or perception. The term noumenon is generally used in contrast with, or in relation to, the term phenomenon, which refers to any object of the senses.

We are talking about subjective objects of the senses, and the experience of aesthetics. Not sure where the disconnect or denial or problem seems to be, but the metaphysical component is that which is beyond logic when experiencing an aesthetic object. That object being you. — 3017amen

It is the experience of aesthetics in particular which demonstrates transcending the unity of categories that subsume phenomena. Having universally validated a feeling (of pleasure), we are free to relate to this object of the senses intellectually, understood as a representation of a universal, indeterminate concept - Beauty - which exists independently of human sense and/or perception. What we relate to hasn’t ceased to be an ‘object of the senses’ - the ‘aesthetic object’ is recognised as more than sensory information, demonstrating capacity to engage both our senses and intellect at the highest level. But what is the relative position of the thinking, feeling subject in aesthetic judgement?

Interaction with any human being can inspire the same kind of recognition. Yet an experience of physical attraction is, at the first moment, rarely a disinterested character of feeling, and at the second moment making no claim to universality. What inspires us to transcend moral or cognitive judgements from perception and reach for a communicable, indeterminate concept in our interaction with another human being seems to be not so much an aesthetic experience in the Kantian sense, then, but an awareness that interaction with any particular human being is more than an object-concept relation. The object itself is indeterminate, conceptual, metaphysical. Love, then, is not necessarily in relation to a sensory experience grounded in an object, but starts from Kant’s third moment of relation, suggesting a metaphysical interaction between indeterminate concepts. This is not to deny the subjective ‘object of the senses’ - only its perceived status as ‘essential’ to an experience of Love.

Exception taken as noted: While you are certainly getting closer to the appropriate interpretation, and there is certainly agreement relative to emotive phenomena of 'delight', Kant makes the distinction between the object viewed and the feelings (metaphysical judgements) that are experienced being something that transcends logic. — 3017amen

Transcendence is not departure from. If it is the case that Kant makes a distinction between the object viewed and the indeterminate concept on which any judgement of beauty rests, then this is where my own view departs. There seems to be a presumption here that either the object or concept is universally static, concrete. This is what I mean by a crutch: the idea that the viewed object is the essential focus of delight (and by ‘delight’ I mean more than ‘emotive’ phenomena). The way I see it, the ‘object’ is no longer consisting only of empirical qualities here, but recognised as metaphysical in itself. So there is no distinct component that is metaphysical in relation to a component that is not metaphysical.

I agree it's a simple enough process, yet complex in its response to visual stimuli. You seem stuck on the existential angst of aging. It's as if you keep projecting some sort of fear about aesthetical beauty. What if someone finds an older woman beautiful? From personal experience, I find many things beautiful in life; nature, life, truth, people, places, things, etc.. And in our context, I find women beautiful whether they are young or old. — 3017amen

My reference to aging here is not in relation to initial attraction or awareness of aesthetical beauty, but to a long-term loving relationship that may follow, and the indeterminacy of the ‘aesthetical object’ as viewed over time. It’s an example that speaks to the question of Love as a relation between ‘objects’ whose empirical qualities, validity/communicability, purpose and necessity are all fundamentally indeterminate.

When we determine what is beautiful, when we categorise appearances as phenomena, our relation and subsequent delight in an ‘object’ is relative to the transient nature of its aesthetic qualities. This is what prompts us to restore, preserve and protect aesthetical objects and their historical/cultural context from change, but also what leads to the subjective nature of valuation. The challenge is to recognise in an ‘aesthetic’ experience not a concept-object relation grounded in an empirical ‘essence’ but the necessary relation between indeterminate conceptual structures as a grounding or essence in itself.

Of course, most people get that there is a mind, body, spirit connection, but you keep denying the body aspect of that phenomenon. If I were to you use your interpretation or theory in this scenario, then when a couple is young or old, and one partner develops a brain disorder or pathology, the other person would cease and desist. You would not love your partner because their brain is not working the way you expect it to. You would effectively say to yourself, 'gee, I married that person because I really loved their mind, but not their body or spirit.' — 3017amen

I get that you want to separate this connection into ‘mind, body, and spirit’ - it makes it easier to talk about, but I find the distinction fosters misunderstanding, particularly for a metaphysical understanding of love. I don’t consider love to be a connection to these three objects. To love a person is not like saying that we love that car, that guitar, that house. A metaphysical connection comes from recognising that we are interacting with more than a body, which is not to say that this person is also a mind and a spirit, but that they are a complex metaphysical structure of relations, from which we arbitrarily conceive of body, mind, spirit or person for some presupposed purpose. So a brain disorder changes the nature of relations within that continually changing metaphysical structure, but it’s only when we isolate the concept of ‘mind’ and how we expect it to function that it becomes a challenge to relate in some way to this altered mind as an unexpected new aspect of that complex, indeterminate goal to whom we direct our actions and feelings of love.

I recognise that my philosophical view is not conventional. The relations between these concepts of body, mind and spirit are, for me, metaphysically structured in six dimensions. Love and Beauty as six-dimensional relations are inclusive of all possible existence: an absolute meaningfulness which renders all information meaningless at the ultimate level of awareness, but that’s another discussion. The ‘thing in itself’ is inclusive of appearance in my view, not distinct from it.

Kant’s aesthetic judgement grounds human understanding of the world in an accurate structure of appearance as indeterminate ‘objects’ of empirical intuition, but for me it lies in accurately restructuring relations as indeterminate ‘concepts’. What empirical information we acquire from any interaction is subject to our conceptual structures - formed as a result of all previous interactions - because it is our conceptual reality (inclusive of emotion and knowledge) that determines our effort and attention in the world. The idea that Kant’s noumena transcends the unity of categories, then, does not position phenomena in contrast or oppositional relation to it. Imagination in ‘free play’ with understanding enables us to continually restructure the rules, whether inspired by experiences of undeniable pleasure or inescapable pain. It is our intersubjective awareness, connection and collaboration that grounds the communicability of concepts, and their accuracy in relation to the subjective particulars of human experience.

By that I understand that participation in this act of correcting is entirely voluntarily and people should never be forced, since there exists no moral responsibility? — Tzeentch

Sure, but based on any such interaction, one identifies either with the perpetrators or with those suffering.

On another topic, what exactly determines whether one should feel this moral importance, and on the basis of what? Does it extend to all forms of injustice? — Tzeentch

Perceived potential and value in an interaction determines importance, moral or otherwise. For me, it isn’t about ‘should’ - it’s about one’s impact on awareness/ignorance, connection/isolation and collaboration/exclusion. And yes, I believe it does extend to all forms of injustice.

The moral importance of correcting past and current injustices committed against races outweigh alternatives.
— Judaka

A moral responsibility by virtue of sharing the same skin color as the perpetrators of racial injustices, historical or otherwise? Perhaps you'd care to elaborate so more on this. — Tzeentch

Moral importance, NOT responsibility - we correct past and current injustices not by standing with the perpetrators, but by standing against them, regardless of skin colour. Not by assuming culpability for the actions of others, but by assuming a share in the suffering of those unjustly treated.

Because we are subjects looking at subjects (or 'subjective objects'), which in turn are making judgements about each other's aesthetic existence. And the arbitrariness is that which we cannot escape from (AKA: Kierkegaardian subjectivity), nor as we've said, would we necessarily want to. We enjoy the freedom to make such arbitrary judgements about aesthetical existence, otherwise in our context here, we are back to pre-arranged marriages, and that sort of thing... — 3017amen

Putting aside the strawman of pre-arranged marriages...again...There seems to be a misunderstanding in relation to Kant, that aesthetic judgements are purely about appearance. Kant’s metaphysics attempts to describe the relational structure of mental processes through which we are able to understand noumena through phenomena. That’s not a denial or justification of the ‘aesthetical phenomena’, it’s a recognition that it’s not so much the appearance itself, but what we learn about the metaphysical aspects of the noumena through our limited perception, that matters. Aesthetics does not equal appearance, but rather perceives and then conceives of reality as more than it appears.

The confusion I get into with regards to Kant is this reference to everything as ‘objects’. Appearance is fundamentally undetermined, and the process of reflective judgement in aesthetics transcends even this. When we make arbitrary judgements, including categorising ‘phenomenon’ or ‘metaphysical components’, it is the indeterminacy of appearance that challenges our reference to particular ‘objects’. At the level of pure aesthetical ‘delight’, Kant shows that ‘object’, ‘phenomenon’ and ‘purpose’ are understood as indeterminate, and the ‘free play’ of imagination and understanding is inclusive of both sensible and non-sensible ‘intuition’ (mental process structures) without discrimination. A ‘pure aesthetical judgement’ can make no reference to an ‘object’ as such without limiting its capacity - at this level there is no goal external to the thinking mind or subject, to which a specific action or feeling can be directed. Both subject and object are perceivable as indeterminate - non-conceptual and unconstrained. There is no ‘judgement’ as such.

Through the process described in CofJ, the immateriality of our experience points first to the metaphysical aspect of value/potential (Kant’s first and second moments), and then beyond it to purposiveness/possibility (third and fourth moments). This is different to Kant’s description of ‘judgement’ in CofPR - he seems to be deconstructing the faculty of judgement, not describing the act of making judgements based on rules/concepts or purpose/reason. The process is one of extruding dimensional awareness towards conceiving of a metaphysics inclusive of and transcending appearance, in which we are ‘free’ to delight in Beauty without judgement - without subsuming the particular ‘object’ under rules or concepts - but without abandoning our capacity to do so, either.

The point Kant alludes to in CofJ is that we can escape this arbitrariness - we can intellectualise aesthetics without denying pleasure or delight in Beauty; and we can also interact on a number of levels with an aesthetical ‘object’ without denying or ignoring the indeterminacy of our particular judgements regarding its value, potential, purpose or meaning.

And that is the arbitrary subjectiveness of the aesthetical judgement that transcends logic. The metaphysical component is that which cannot be explained, yet has universal communicability. Much like part of the physical phenomenon (Eros) of Love ("I don't know why I love him/her I just feel connected"). — 3017amen

The ‘first moment’ is only an initial step: if you stop at this level or even the second moment and make an aesthetical judgement on the ‘phenomenon’, it cannot be a ‘pure aesthetical judgement’ according to Kant. The ‘physical’ phenomenon (Eros) of love, too, is not a matter of separating out a metaphysical component, but recognising and seeking to understand the complexity of connection as more than objective sensation, and more than universal communicability, not other than. Transcendence is not a departure from.

In my view, Kant is not advocating judgement of the ‘object’, but rather reflection on our own capacity to delight in an aspect of experience from which neither purpose nor value, neither reason nor logic, can be determined. It is a reflective judgement of our capacity to love. Attending to aesthetical phenomena challenges our perception of the world, and proceeding through all four ‘moments’ without resorting to judgement of what is an indeterminate ‘object’ frees us to imagine an experience of reality unconstrained by our limited understanding of it, let alone our perception of it, and to delight in the possibilities of this indeterminacy in full awareness of our capacity (without necessity) to reason, to know and to judge.

Practically speaking, we are limited by an inherent fear of this uncertainty, and so we regularly ignore or deny that we perceive feeling beyond objective sensation, communicable validity beyond the quantifiable, relation beyond purpose, or delight beyond understanding, in relation to the various ‘objects’ of intuition. At some level we choose to limit our own capacity to love based on given rules and concepts (“I’m not in love with you anymore”, “you’re the most beautiful girl I’ve ever known”, “she’s my soulmate”, “there’s no one else for me”) that reassure us of the apparent ‘certainty’ of reason, purpose, validity and sense in the world. The limitations we impose on these perceptions are not ‘bad’, as such - it is what we can cope with, and what we build our social and cultural reality around. But delight in the aesthetic exists beyond objects of sensible intuition, beyond ‘accordance with the unity of categories’.

What do you mean by crutch? Are you suggesting we are brains in a jar? — 3017amen

By using the ‘aesthetical object’ as a crutch - keeping it in focus as the goal to which we ultimately direct our feelings or actions - we corrupt any judgement of taste from the outset. If the object is predetermined and cannot be perceived as more than its aesthetical phenomenon, then there is no ‘free-play’: imagination remains constrained by understanding. The old adage ‘If you love something, set it free’ couldn’t be more apt.

It’s a simple enough process to love and delight in a particular appearance of an object without reservation; more complex to continue to love and delight in your partner when they no longer appear to be the slender twenty-two year old anyone in their right mind would agree was beautiful, and more complex still to love and delight in the world as it is. It’s not that we are brains in a jar - it’s that there is more to the ‘object’ of our experience - and our delight - than the particular aesthetical phenomenon, and that we have the intellectual capacity to develop our understanding and imagination through these four moments, and ultimately through life, towards the capacity for ‘pure aesthetical judgement’ of reality - such is the indeterminacy of phenomena. Alternatively, we may simply find ourselves realising, “they’re not the same person I fell in love with”, having judged them narrowly as the ‘person’ they were and felt blindsided by the impermanence.

Obviously this topic might be sensitive to some because it touches on the body/souls theme and therefore goes strait to religious beliefs.
I have still not made up my mind on the topic but I am extremely skeptical about the presence of a soul in the body. It is less complicated to imagine the brains functions being the ME. — Sir2u

I’m with you there on the skepticism. The concept of a ‘soul in the body’ need not be a case of substance dualism. We tend to conceptualise reality as ‘objects’ in space and time, even though we understand now that it’s not that simple. Objectifying structures enables us to understand localised relations between information at a conceptual level, but we need to remember that reality is more complex: ‘objects’ are ‘properties’ of ‘objects’ at another level of awareness. Our language and grammar, developed in a naive world, often struggles to give us a big picture view. Carlo Rovelli’s book ‘The Order of Time’ explores these difficulties in conceptualising a four-dimensional physical reality.

If we can alter the arrangement of electrons in a computer disk to store complex information, can we not grasp the possibility of a systematic re-arrangement of electrons in the brain, or even across the entire integrated system of an organism, which can store and transmit information without occupying its own physical space? If we understand that the formation of molecules and molecular structures occur at the level of electron re-arrangement; that a durable chemical reaction can be viewed as a system of ongoing electron re-arrangement or nuclear restructuring; that the creation, transfer and use of energy between organic systems and structures is closely related to these processes of electron re-arrangement; that our evidence of brain activity is electrical; and that quantum mechanics enables us to deliberately locate, extract and re-arrange individual particles such as electrons and photons; then the possibility of a highly-evolved, organism-wide collaborative system of particle-level re-arrangement to receive, store, extract and transmit information at varying levels of awareness is not such a stretch...

I’m not a scientist (at all), so my articulation here may not be very clear, but as far as I understand, there is a marked difference between descriptions of objects with measurable three-dimensional properties and descriptions of atomic structure. While we understand the structure of an atom to be three-dimensional, only two of those dimensions can be accurately determined in relation to spacetime. This ‘fuzziness’ is what gives the impression of atoms as billiard balls of energy in random motion.

So an atom (as a fuzzy three-dimensional object) has a ‘charge’ that is a property of that object, which refers to the two-dimensional relation (potential energy/distance and direction) between electron(s) and particles of the nucleus. While we commonly refer to these particles as if they were ‘objects’ in themselves, only one linear dimension is measurable in relation to spacetime. They exist only as a two-dimensional random structure, not three. I’m not clear on the concept of ‘charge’ attributed as a property to such a particle, but it suggests reference to a one-dimensional binary relation of quantum-entanglement with anti-matter...

Can something be referred to as an ‘object’ if its three-dimensional structure is only probabilistically determined? Does a two-dimensional structure of existence classify as an ‘object’? Is our assumption of spatial existence attributed to conceptualised ‘objects’ interfering with our understanding of space?

‘Place’ meaning its various complex relations with all of existence, rather than any privileged location of a 3D ‘object’ - otherwise, I’m afraid we’re not quite in agreement.

The uniqueness of each mind does not necessitate its preservation or survival as such - it is the differences in each five-dimensional structure of potential/value that matters, and so worth relating to with our faculties of imagination and understanding in ‘free play’. Even at the expense of the current ‘uniqueness’ of our own mind.

DO you think such an agreement needs to be explicit? — Banno

I don’t think it can be - not without reduction to a statement of definition, which kind of defeats the purpose. So, no.

To be honest, I think it’s an ongoing process, and the more inter-subjective contributions, the more complex the process can get. Why do you think so many terms have multiple dictionary definitions?

Which is why I asked at the beginning for someone to set a proper definition of "a space". I could not think of any definition that would allow the mind to have its own space. — Sir2u

Normally I have avoided referring to other dimensional relations as ‘spatial’ because of this confusion. Many qualitative chemical and temporal relations that contribute to sensory information such as hue, taste and tone for example can be understood as ‘non-spatial’ in the 3D sense: we relate to them as two-dimensional information structures in time.

The relationship of the mind to the brain is, I think, an established fact. But exactly what that relationship is, is not so well defined.
Many still refuse in this day and age to believe that the "person" is nothing more than a group of cells interacting with each other on a molecular level. — Sir2u

I think Lisa Feldman Barrett’s book How Emotions Are Made presents an intriguing body of neurological and psychological research with regards to the nature of this relationship of the mind to the brain. FWIW, I happen to believe that the ‘person’ IS “more than a group of cells interacting with each other on a molecular level” - but that may be a much bigger discussion. It depends on how we understand the various terms in this statement.

the five-dimensional structure of capacity or the six-dimensional structure of freedom.
— Possibility

Just curious, where can I find more information about this? — Sir2u

The reference to dimensional structure is part of a metaphysical theory I’ve been working on, but the examples come directly from Google’s dictionary definitions of ‘space’:

4. the portion of a text or document available or needed to write about a subject.
"there is no space to give further details"

pages in a newspaper or magazine, or time between television or radio programmes, available for advertising.
"it is the media person's job to buy the press space or the TV or radio spots"

capacity for storage of data in a computer or other digital device.
"additional disk space is required for the database operation"

5. the freedom to live, think, and develop in a way that suits one.
"a teenager needing her own space"

Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary.

Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition.

Iterate.

Given that there are a finite number of words in the dictionary, the process will eventually lead to repetition.

If one's goal were to understand a word, one might suppose that one must first understand the words in its definition. But this process is circular.

There must, therefore, be a way of understanding a word that is not given by providing its definition.

Now this seems quite obvious; and yet so many begin their discussion with "let's first define our terms". — Banno

I think it helps to begin with a dictionary definition of the term as a determined judgement, claiming the concepts or rules under which particular uses of the word supposedly fall, and from there engage in a process of reflective judgement. This involves a critical analysis of the term against inter-subjective expressions (including alternative definitions) - particularly those which transcend claims made in relation to quality, quantity, purpose and necessity. The aim is not to necessarily arrive back at a statement of definition, but an agreement on the universal communicability claims of the term.

Yes, I’ve been delving into Kant...

So now we have a problem.

Let's stay with the computer hard disk for now instead of the brain.

A hard disk can be explained in the most simplistic way as a metallic disk that has its atoms rearranged to form specific magnetic patterns.
The atoms are part of the disk, no matter what the data or lack of data does to them. Filling the disk completely full will make no difference to the space occupied by the disk nor the space of the whole computer.
If the data occupies space then it would have to be added to the total of the disk, as we know that this does not happen we are obliged to accept that data is immaterial and does not occupy space.
The only other possibility is that they both occupy the same space but one of the two would still have to be immaterial for that to happen. The data occurs through the rearrangement of the atoms, not by adding to them

When you learn that the milk you put on your cornflakes is sour or that 2+2=4, does it add atoms or anything else to your body? No extra space is added to the space occupied by you body, it stays exactly the same. What happens is that neurons get rearranged, new synapse connections can appear. But the brain is not getting bigger, it is just a different arrangement.

So, either we need a proper definition of "a space" or we accept that the mind has no physical qualities except for the sensory organs that it uses as tools. — Sir2u

I’ll start with the dictionary’s mathematical definition, because I think it covers most other definitions in some way.

Space: a mathematical concept generally regarded as a set of points having some specified structure.

The term ‘space’ has been used to refer to the one-dimensional structure of a binary system; the two-dimensional structure of distance; the three-dimensional structure of objects; the four-dimensional structure of time; the five-dimensional structure of capacity or the six-dimensional structure of freedom.

But there is a tendency to assume that by actual ‘space’ we mean the three-dimensional structure of the objects in conceptualised reality.

So the ‘space’ on a disk refers to the capacity of the disk as a five-dimensional structure of information to be ‘read’, not the three-dimensional structure of information that is the actual disk. It isn’t so much a rearrangement of atoms, but a re-structuring of particle relations. The three-dimensional structure doesn’t change because this potential for one-dimensional restructuring exists in the molecular arrangement of the disk.

When you learn that the milk you put on your cornflakes is sour, however, the restructuring of particle relations that occurs is integrated into the entire system of one, two, three, four and five dimensional relations. So your five-dimensional conceptual reality which predicted fresh milk is restructured at a one-dimensional level of synapse relations without necessarily affecting neuron arrangement or brain structure at all (depending how often you’ve been caught in this situation) - but the one-dimensional changes affect the four-dimensional event of you eating breakfast, the three-dimensional expression on your face, the two-dimensional molecular contents of your stomach and possibly your one-dimensional perspective of the day so far - to name just a few.

Agreed. If you agree to your own interpretation of the ' inclusive ' nature from the aesthetic experience, then the question becomes how do you subordinate the aesthetic object itself? Your philosophy thus far has not emphasized this phenomenon. In fact, correct me if I'm wrong, your theories de-emphasized that. — 3017amen

I think it only seems subordinate or de-emphasised in relation to the importance you appear to attribute to it. The ‘aesthetic object’ is an arbitrary division, so why would I need to emphasise it?

And so as Kant realized, the metaphysical phenomena (he calls judgment) as a result of the physical appearance(s).translate to human sentience. In other words, once the subject observes the object (or another subject/person), there is a feeling apprehended and/or apperceived through cognition and the senses. Have you accounted for that in your theory? This is fundamental to aesthetics, and in our discussion, phenomena associated with romantic love and physical appearances of each gender. — 3017amen

Where I take exception is with your apparent assumption that what Kant refers to as ‘aesthetic’ judgement can ONLY be a result of physical appearance. The way I see it, Kant’s third metaphysical faculty goes some way towards describing the creative process, particularly from a five-dimensional relation between the value/potential of different systems as perceived, to a six-dimensional relation between the meaning of different systems as understood. It may be inspired by attending to physical beauty, but relation to an ‘object’ isn’t necessary for this faculty to operate. So I would argue that the aesthetic ‘object’ is being used as a crutch.

Kant’s third metaphysical faculty begins with awareness that our experience transcends our conceptual reality. Kant’s ‘first moment’ refers to an interoception of affect that suggests an ‘indeterminate concept’ - a qualitative aspect of experience for which no conceptual structure is pre-determined. The ‘second moment’ refers to an awareness that the experience transcends our value systems, with an intensity of valence (pleasure/displeasure) that suggests a quantitative aspect of experience for which no value hierarchy is pre-determined: there is no emotion concept, or indeed any concept to determine this relation. His ‘third moment’ entails a paradigm shift into six-dimensional relation, an awareness that this non-conceptual aspect of experience also points to an indeterminate purposiveness - that relations are meaningful, they matter beyond any determination of value. And the ‘fourth moment’ refers to an awareness that the experience matters in a universal sense, even if no-one else agrees or understands - simply because it matters and has value for me; regardless of whether it falls under a given rule.

That such pure judgements of ‘taste’ in Kant’s theory require objectification, excluding not just any purpose but also any alternative value/potential, seems a limitation in my view. It is only when we acknowledge that our experience of a conceptualised ‘object’ transcends the value/potential predicted do we engage our faculty of reflective judgement to ‘find’ some universal or rule under which this indeterminate aspect of a particular may be subsumed. At that point, it is no longer the conceptualised object but a broader indeterminate existence to which we are referring, or at least the extent to which our experience of its existence relates to more than the object as such.

In relation to a subject or person, I would argue that we are already relating to an indeterminate particular, whose quality and universal validity does not rest on subsumption under a concept. I would also argue that our relation to this subject or person is universally meaningful beyond any perception of value by me or anyone else. So I don’t see aesthetics as necessary to this faculty of judgement between subjects, when recognised as such. It’s only if we fail to perceive someone as more than an object, that aesthetics seems to be important.

So the mind of a person can be outside of the body? — Sir2u

That depends on what you mean by ‘being’ outside of the body. I think it’s possible for the mind to conceptualise itself relationally outside of the body for a time, particularly in situations when internal sensory information is unavailable or blocked. Given that the information the mind uses to interact with the world comes from conceptual systems and interoceptive networks rather than directly from the external world, an interoceptive network that doesn’t have access to any internal sensory information is capable of orientating mind external to the body. The eardrum still vibrates and the skin still reacts to touch, even if the information doesn’t reach the mind via regular internal channels.

What is measured in the brain is electrical and chemical activity, is that what the mind is? — Sir2u

What is currently measured in the brain can be interpreted as potential evidence of mind, in the same way that similar measurements are also interpreted as evidence of potential energy. Hence the scare quotes. We can predict mind based on these measurements in the brain because it’s difficult to measure electrical or chemical activity anywhere else and be in any way convinced that what we are measuring is evidence of ‘mind’ and not of something else. Modern science being convinced only by quantitative probability, this is about as close as measurement can get to locating the mind.

As for what the mind is, in my view it is five-dimensional, integrated information - the atemporal, non-local aspect of our existence. It includes both quantitative and qualitative potentiality.

So basically you think your whole body contains your mind? — Sir2u

No. The body cannot contain the mind, because the spatial aspect of the mind need not be confined to the body.

The spatial location of the mind is a ‘fuzzy’ concept. The highest probability of ‘measuring’ it at any one time would locate the mind in the brain, but neither the brain nor the body appears to necessarily contain it.

For me, the concept of ‘mind’ refers to the fifth and sixth dimensional aspects of existence in relation to my interoceptive network. In that sense, it ‘occupies’ all of the spacetime that I do - although all of this spacetime that I consist of need not occupy all of this mind.

What if this asymmetry is only assumed, rather than ‘built in’? If equal quantities of matter and anti-matter are produced, it only takes an initial entanglement between matter and matter (manifest as quantum spin), as opposed to matter interacting with anti-matter and cancelling out, to tip a ‘localised’ balance of potentiality towards matter.

I'm not referring to Cartesian dualism. I referring to Kant's theory of aesthetics, which is metaphysical. Hopefully you will stay on-board with that. This takes Eros to yet another level. — 3017amen

Kant’s argument is against Cartesian dualism - I get that, which is why I referred to it as a hurdle. Both theories are forms of metaphysical dualism, so I’m not sure what you’re trying to defend. My point was that ‘metaphysical’ is often mistaken to mean ‘other than physical’, but I would argue that it’s inclusive of ‘physical’. Kant’s theory struggles with the dualism of material and immaterial substances - many of his arguments come dangerously close to collapsing this distinction (that’s not such a bad thing), but something stops him from taking that leap. Essentialism seems a likely culprit, but I’m still reading...

For me, what Kant refers to as the ‘soul’ is an arbitrary distinction from the ‘body’: where he says they are in tight community, I would argue that they both refer to the same substance: existence. Kant recognised that it’s not just a case of subsuming particular instances under universals, but also finding those universals under which each instance falls. Yet (prior to quantum theory) he won’t entertain the possibility that all concepts or universals (including those we employ in reason and knowledge) are not as ‘given’ or a priori as we assume, and that indeterminacy (and relativity) is a feature of them all - space and time being handy examples.

It is our perspective - our capacity to perceive this same substance both inward and outwardly (so to speak) with critical disinterest - that leads us to view it as object and subject, one material and the other immaterial. In my view, our capacity to relate to existence as one substance across multiple dimensional levels (six), is limited by the effort and attention we assign to awareness, connection or collaboration between these relational structures. So we divide existence arbitrarily as it suits us, and then struggle, as Kant does, to bring it all together without collapsing all distinctions into pure, non-purposive imagination.

In reference to our discussion, a ‘pure aesthetic judgement’ of a human being excludes their purposiveness, and also their capacity as a subject to participate in this judgement themselves. As human beings we engage in reflective judgement: we ‘find’ our own universals and continually ‘produce’ instances in ourselves about which such aesthetic judgements may be made. But more importantly, we also engage in determining judgement - we distinguish the universals under which these instances fall, as well as the ends and purposes which characterise us. To exclude this aspect of human existence from any interaction or judgement made with regards to a human being brings us back to the problem of objectification.

How does a subject whose faculties of imagination and understanding are in ‘free play’ - with a state of mind that is non-conceptual - relate perceptually to another subject presumed to be in a similar state of mind? How does Kant’s three forms of ‘judgement’ operate here? And what does it mean to relate to such a subject with ‘pure aesthetic judgement’?

Give me some time to get my head around Kant’s Critique of the Faculty of Judgement, and I’ll get back to you.

But a couple of very quick points about what you’ve added here:

In my view, distinguishing a ‘metaphysical component’ is a misunderstanding of metaphysics. Cartesian dualism is a difficult hurdle. Subject-object fails to recognise either the experiential relation of the ‘object’, or the material relation of the ‘subject’. It’s based on an incorrect assumption of dominance: that the ‘power’ in any relation is possessed by one and categorically NOT the other. The idea of ‘material agency’ is an attempt to explain this (without rejecting the distinction), but for me it doesn’t go far enough, and only in one direction.

In the meantime, before you reject current neuroscience in favour of Kant’s metaphysics, I recommend you take a look at Barrett’s theory of constructed emotion, and the evidence she presents against the essentialism of the classical view of emotion as inherent and universal. ‘Universal communicability’ doesn’t preclude patterns of experience, and neither does ‘universal validity’ for that matter - especially in relation to what Kant refers to as “indeterminate concepts”.

And that leads to one of many questions concerning physical chemistry. While non-physical chemistry exists as mentioned (an intellectual connection), why should one discount the power behind aesthetical beauty. In other words, both men and women are attracted to each other physically, and appreciate each other's physical attributes, yet can we objectively explain why that is? For example, we use terms such as ; passion, chemistry, the love for the object itself, etc.. which implies a inseparable connection between mind and matter. — 3017amen

This, as far as I can see, was the first use of the term ‘power’ in our discussion (emphasis mine).

Feelings of attraction are not always chemistry, and chemistry is not always love.
— Possibility

Possibility!

Have we then, ruled out 'chemistry' as a 'virtuous phenomena' between the sexes? Chemistry may not be love (do we know what love is?), but the love for objects seems to exist. Accordingly, thanks for the anecdote form LFB, but I'm wondering what her point was...was she trying to link the phenomena of the aesthetic reaction viz emotion? If so, why was that a bad thing? — 3017amen

Not always love. Love is meaningful relations regardless of value, time, object, connection or distance - so, no, most of us don’t really know what love is.

I’m not sure what you mean by your question: ‘why was that a bad thing?’. Barrett’s point was that the brain, locked inside the skull, has no idea what’s really going on, except what is predicted from the sensory information it seeks in relation to past patterns of experience. So it’s prone to error. Emotions are constructed in the same way as attraction and every other concept - they’re neither inherent nor universal, but instead refer to patterns of experience. When we give a name to what we’re feeling, it’s an educated guess. When we recognise this uncertainty and are open to being mistaken about how we think we feel, then we can refine our accuracy by following scientific method in our process.

When you say 'power' do you really mean 'energy' or 'material agency'? The reason I ask is that it seems more appropriate or synonymous with a phenomenal based approach to one's theory of aesthetical judgements.

With respect to our subjectivity, sure. We cannot escape the subject-object sensory perception(s). In part, that's what I'm getting at. In other words, we are not brains in a jar. — 3017amen

‘Power’ was your word, which in my view is a misunderstanding of agency, potential, value. In human organisms, ‘energy’ is a distribution of agency - the ‘material’ distinction is arbitrary. I think we can ‘escape’ the subject-object sensory perceptions, when we understand how sensory perceptions interact with perceptions of potential. Barrett’s work in neuroscience and psychology explores this. In a metaphorical sense, we are brains in a jar.

The questions have been how are we to best navigate this energy (sexual energy), material agency, etc.. — 3017amen

Well, I’d say the first step is to understand how our perception of potential and value is converted into energy distribution (effort and attention) throughout the body.

Kindle has ‘The Essential Peirce, Volume 1: Selected Philosophical Writings (1867-1893) for AUS $9
ISBN: 0253207215 if you want to go hard copy. This volume includes The Monist essays.

His later writings - on signs and Pragmatism in particular - are in Volume 2 (ISBN: B005DI95GO)