That's interesting because in theology relation is the only difference between persons of the Trinity. They are completely one, but a one that relates 3 ways — Gregory

A methodology with which to understand relation itself.

And in agential realism (based on quantum mechanics), which describes phenomena as ‘ontologically primitive relations - relations without pre-existing relata:

The crucial point is agential separability. It matters whether or not we are ‘looking’ inside the phenomenon (in which case the ‘instrument’ itself is excluded from the description, and it is only the marks on the ‘instrument’, indicating and correlated with the values intra-actively attributable to the ‘object’-in-the-phenomenon as described by a mixture, that are being taken account of), or viewing that particular phenomenon from the ‘outside’ (via its entanglement with a further apparatus, producing a new phenomenon, in which case the ‘inside’ phenomenon as ‘object’, including the previously defined ‘instrument’, is treated quantum mechanically). — Karen Barad, ‘Meeting the Universe Halfway’

So my question on this thread is how we can know whether we are finite or infinite and what this means. Hegel seems to develop an argument about the infinity of the mind from the simple fact that we can think of infinity itself as an object of the mind. The cause has to be proportionate to the effect. Hegel draws a distinction between the form and the content of thought. Form is abstract and logical. Content has will, emotion, and imagery involved in it. But for him, God himself can be the content of thought: "It is only in thinking, and as thinking, that this content, God himself, is in its truth." Spirituality, as for as Hegelians are concerned, is closer to us than we are to ourselves. For him when we rationalize about infinity, whether in mathematics or logic, we indicate that there is a part of ourselves which is infinite through it containing the abstract content of infinity. This seems to be an elaboration of Descartes's ontological argument (from his Meditations). — Gregory

When we rationalise about infinity we invariably run into error. That is, when we think of ‘infinity’ (or ‘God’) as an object of the mind we are reducing it as such - rendering this idea-concept finite to some extent. The way I see it, ‘God’ as an object of thought is necessarily reduced, but God as embodied thinking-about-God is in its truth - inclusive of and inseparable from our embodiment (with all of its will, emotion and imagery).

How we draw the distinction, whether between abstract, logical form and wilful, emotional content or some other agential cut, is both arbitrary and meaningful. How we describe ‘God’ or ‘infinity’ says as much about ourselves and our assumptions in what we exclude, what we embody in order to relate to God from within God.

So maybe the question is, if there is and can be something infinite, what would that be? — Gregory

Relation

There are also no hard and fast distinctions between scientific, political, economic and literary domains.
— Joshs

I’m not sure what “domain” means here, but what matters in each field leads to different criteria without any similar endgame. My point is that requiring certainty is a theoretical desire that strips away ordinary criteria which are different for each type of thing.

ascertaining the real is simultaneously an empirical, ethical and political endeavor.
— Joshs

Well if we’re saying that there are political dimensions to philosophy, or ethical considerations in science, I agree, but the process and criteria, for the identity and correctness or appropriateness or ways in which they fail for each, are different and create the category and structure of a thing or practice. — Antony Nickles

The endgame is responsible and accountable practices, or intra-action.

The categories/domains/fields are themselves apparatuses - “boundary-making practices that are formative of matter and meaning, productive of, and part of, the phenomena produced.”

The point is that more is at stake than ‘the results’; intra-actions reconfigure both what will be and what will be possible - they change the very possibilities for change and the nature of change.

Differentiating is not about othering or separating but on the contrary about making connections and commitments. The very nature of materiality is an entanglement.

. But it is just Barad’s position, or wish, that criteria should be held to one standard of “objectivity”….there is no singular standard for our criteria like “objectivity” to make them all certain.
— Antony Nickles

What would be Barad’s standard of objectivity other than the measurements determined via the criteria offered by contingent configurations of phenomena? These configurations, what Barad calls apparatuses, are entanglements between non-human matter and human conceptions, purposes and goals, which are themselves produced through cultural-linguistic-material entanglements. Thus, there is no separation between the material and the discursive. There are also no hard and fast distinctions between scientific, political, economic and literary domains. Because the engagement between the human and the non-human revolves around what matters to us in our discursive material practices, ascertaining the real is simultaneously an empirical, ethical and political endeavor. — Joshs

It’s important to note that there is also no inherent separation between the human and non-human in these material-discursive practices. This is where Barad moves beyond Bohr, seeking to resolve the residual human exceptionalism in his and other explanations of quantum theory.

Determinately bounded and propertied human subjects do not exist prior to their ‘involvement’ in natural-cultural practices…Human bodies, like all other bodies, are not entities with inherent boundaries and properties but phenomena that acquire specific boundaries and properties through the open-ended dynamics of intra-activity.

Apparatuses are the practices of mattering through which intelligibility and materiality are constituted (along with an excluded realm of what doesn’t matter).

The apparatus enacts an agential cut - a resolution of the ontological indeterminacy - within the phenomenon, and agential separability - the agentially enacted material condition of exteriority-within-phenomena - provides the condition for the possibility of objectivity.

There are certain characteristics I have that I am confident about - that are part of how I think about myself, my identity. These include that I am my three children's father, I am intelligent, I write well, I am a Clark, I think like an engineer, I see the world in ways that not many other people do, I am loyal, and I am a man. My maleness manifests as intellectual aggressiveness; an ability to deal with conflict in an honorable way; competitiveness; a strong drive to make and take responsibility for decisions that affect my life sometimes without waiting for other's agreement; a desire to protect my family, friends, and people who are more vulnerable than I am; and a desire for emotional and sexual intimacy with women. That's what being a man means to me. — T Clark

Wonderful reflection. Thank you for sharing. Responsibility, action, loyalty, aggression, providing protection to the vulnerable, and sexual attraction to women are perfect explications of a masculinity. — Moliere

This caught my attention. I’m conscious of the effort to not explain ‘maleness’ in opposition to the notion of ‘female’, and I recognise this is a personal reflection, but it’s difficult not to consider answers such as these without asking ‘as opposed to…?’ Especially when reading it as a woman.

Aggression, for instance, is traditionally considered a masculine trait - yet young women these days, freed from learned expectations of passivity as ‘feminine’, are often (not always) more openly aggressive than their mothers and grandmothers were. They no longer need to appear ‘ladylike’.

Protection to the vulnerable, too, without these learned expectations, is increasingly recognised as a human trait, rather than a particularly masculine one. As a woman, it isn’t that I have no intention to protect the vulnerable, only that in many (but by no means all) situations I recognise a lack of physical or political capacity to individually eliminate a threat. That I have and make use of other means to protect the vulnerable rarely registers as action on my part, or is dismissed as ‘underhanded’ or ‘manipulative’ because it lacks this physically or politically overt individual action. I gather the support of relationships, adjust the circumstances, lend my capacity to others…

The ‘maleness’ described here appears to prioritise individual agency and attributable action - a sense of identity and ownership found in isolating one’s self from the world as the subject. Competitiveness and conflict over collaboration - my life, my decisions, my honour, my family, my desire, as opposed to others and their (dis)agreement, vulnerability, etc.

When we use this kind of language, the frustration as a woman is that it isn’t as important for me to be recognised as the subject behind every event as it is for the event to occur. I, too, want protection for the vulnerable, I want less conflict, I want change, I want reliable and intimate relationships, and I’m willing to do what I can to achieve this - but this ‘maleness’ seems more about consolidating identity through attributable action than intentionality.

Please note - this not a criticism, but a personal reflection.

Physical space is an emergent property of matter. It is a physical object just like a table or a chair. Physical spacetime has an extra dimension, time. If the physical matter in the universe evaporates back to pure energy, physical spacetime disappears and we are left with the spacetime of energy. We would no longer have a 4D space. We would have something more exotic. Scientists speculate that quantum spacetime has 11 dimensions. — EnPassant

Sure. Physical space is a ‘material object’ like a table or a chair in that it is measurable in three dimensions - but only in relation to other material objects. Physical spacetime is an ‘energy event’ in that it is calculable/perceivable in four dimensions, but only in relation to other energy events. This doesn’t preclude my suggestion that space refers to the geometric structure of three dimensions. The question may be whether time is a physical dimension, or whether the notion of physicality is dependent on consciousness as an ‘observer event’ in a system of ongoing relation with ‘matter’…

Scientists’ speculation of up to 11 dimensions is quantifiable, sure, but that doesn’t render it more likely - just more mathematical, thus attracting more time, effort and attention from theoretical physicists. Yet it relies on no physicality. That’s a big ‘IF’.

A six-dimensional structure of reality has symmetry: three dimensions of ‘matter’, and three of ‘energy’. It doesn’t rely on any hypothetical absence of physicality, but rather recognises the perceived duality of matter/energy, with consciousness as a two-way conversion system.

Space refers to the 3-dimensional geometric structure of measurable volume, regardless of whether it contains matter as such. I take up space (volume), I move through space and I leave space to be filled as I do so, but I don’t find it necessary to isolate these three ‘forms’ as if they have no axiomatic relation to each other, only separate relations to my perceptive self (I).

When I was pregnant, the volume within my ‘body’ taken up by a child was always their body. My body incorporated space for theirs to grow, but there’s a difference here between ‘body’ and ‘space’ that seems to be missing. Body refers to a perceived object within this 3D relational structure we call space.

Likewise with sex - my partner does not share occupancy. We do not take up the same space - rather, my body makes space for theirs.

Spacetime refers to the 4-dimensional geometric structure of perceivable change. To call this a geometric ‘space’ is a misnomer, and to refer to quantum and material ‘spacetimes’ as distinct ‘spaces’ just goes to show how much we rely on concretising concepts to describe our understanding of reality. Spacetime refers to a geometric structure, and ‘space’ refers to a limited aspect of that. Quantum spacetime is not ‘elsewhere’ - like ordinary spacetime, it’s merely imperceptible to us within a single observation event - in the same way that the earth’s rotation is unobservable from one physical location.

As I understand it, Einstein’s ‘block time’ refers to the four-dimensional structure of a single temporal aspect within the 5-dimensional ‘block universe’ - which is a geometric structure of meaningful potentiality. This, too, is not a ‘space’ in the sense of taking up volume ‘elsewhere’. It’s the same space, perceived differently. Space exists within spacetime, which exists within potentiality - not as entities, but as geometric relational structures.

So the space of the self, and general space are superimposed but are not equal. And that shows how truly complex the dimensions, definitions and meanings of space are. And how they relate to the things that occupy them, or don't. — Benj96

What you refer to as ‘the space of the self’ is constructed similar to ‘block time’: meaningful potentiality within a single temporal aspect. It’s a spatial perception of self as defined in one moment, relatively inaccurate in the next. Space is the geometric relational structure within which this ‘space of the self’ is mapped according to affected perception/potentiality, rather than observation.

No, this does not involve gender. Gender is a societal expectation of how a sex should behave in terms of body language, dress, and cultural expression. The ability for a man to penetrate a woman is a function of sex. It is not an expectation of how a man should act, it is the recognition of the physical potential action that a man can act on. — Philosophim

First of all, gender is not necessarily about ought - As a woman, I have learned not to make decisions based on societal expectations of how I ought to behave. In turn, and because I’m rarely in a position to enforce judgement, my interactions with men are based on how he is likely to act in any given situation, not how he should act.

This is more than recognising the potential physical action - I’m a small woman, so if I responded to physical capacity alone, I’d be living in fear with almost every encounter. I have to take into account more complex qualitative predictions as to the probability of that potential being acted on. Fortunately in most situations that’s low, and my own capacity to interact at an intelligent level is high - so overall, my fear is low. I feel I should point out that, as women, there are many occasions in our lives where we have our pants around our ankles in the presence of strange men, and need to recognise much more than ‘the physical potential action that a man can act on’ in order to interact effectively.

So, let me be clear - the mere physical ability for a man to penetrate a woman is NOT the source of fear or discomfort felt by women. Rape and sexual assault ARE an aspect of gender in relation to sex - this is not a matter of either/or. Men (or women) who use their physical potential action to oppress or manipulate the behaviour of others (male or female) as their perceived right is the problem, NOT the potential action itself.

You cannot necessarily judge the intent of someone by their behavior. Also gender does not apply to sexual assault or lewdness. Gender is very simply a subjective expected set of behaviors and cultural expressions that society and groups of individuals expect a sex to express. Men not crying is an example of a gendered expectation. This does not mean a man cannot cry. This does not mean that a man crying is a gendered expression. The gendered expression would be if a man decides not to cry purely because of the gendered expectations of himself or the group he is around. — Philosophim

Well, I can more reliably predict the intent of someone by their behaviour than by their physical appearance or dress. Gender is not simple at all - it’s a complex structure of predictions that are probabilistic at best. The discomfort felt in witnessing a man crying in public is also an example of gender expectations at work - but we’re not obliged to express that discomfort in how we respond.

In the same way, a male who walks into the female bathroom is going to cause discomfort in women based on a combination of gender AND sex, not sex alone. If they are dressed as a woman, then I’m going to watch for other behaviour indicators to assess the potential risk. It’s easy enough to do (harder to explain), and anything less than that would be ignorance on my part.

Its about the comfort of those feeling like they have a safe space for their sex. When you're in a vulnerable position with your pants down in a bathroom or needing to adjust clothing you don't want to worry about a man in the area. If a man wants to invade a bathroom and commit assault they can of course. But when there is a social pattern that's ingrained in a person its less likely to occur. — Philosophim

Perhaps we can look closer at this problem that the mere presence of the male sex is perceived as a threat to the female sex. This may be part of what I think Josh meant about the inextricable link between gender and sex. It is expectations of gendered behaviour plus male sex that leads to a perceived threat. The discomfort is not just based on sex differences, but on its combination with expectations of gendered behaviour. If a male walked into the ladies’ bathroom wearing a dress, I would look for certain gendered behaviour as an indication of possible threat. There are plenty of women who could physically overpower me if they wanted to - even sexually assault me, physically speaking. But that’s not within the realms of expected (gendered) behaviour from women. I understand the feeling that we don’t want to worry about the proximity of a penis when our pants are around our ankles, but I think if we’re honest that worry is more about gendered behaviour in relation to that penis than it is about the sex differences. Because I would think there are men who feel vulnerable walking into a men’s public bathroom, too, and would be on the lookout for certain behaviours, rather than simply the presence of a penis…

I think we’re inconvenienced by this growing awareness of the complexity of reality. We like the idea of social shortcuts: men dress as men and go to men’s toilets, and women dress as women and go to women’s toilets - then we can continue to make assumptions based on minimal data. Life is much easier that way, but it would also be easier if everything was black and white (think Pleasantville). That’s comfort, sure, but it’s not reality. We need to learn to pay more attention, and not jump to conclusions too soon. As older adults, we just don’t want to allocate limited time, attention or effort to reconstructing our predictions about the world; ie. learning, making mistakes, etc. But that’s life, not just childhood.

I don't know if you're familiar with Margaret Atwood's fiction, but one of her most famous works, The Handmaid's Tale is about the rise of a branch of the religious right which reduces the role of women to the bottom of society. Atwood claimed that all of the things depicted in her fiction reflect real world attitudes and events. I would say that's how the incel culture goes beyond being a vent for sexual frustration among some white men to connecting to social movements. The base notes are hatred and at least contemplating violence. The higher frequencies mesh with the reactionary right. — frank

Atwood wrote this in the 1980s, while stationed behind the Iron Curtain. The rapid and insidious advancement of this social change she described has similarities with what happened in Germany in the 1930s - a step-by-step abolition of rights designed to restore a sense of entitlement to the ‘unfairly’ disenfranchised at the expense of a particularly franchised minority: in this fictional case, with the capacity to bear children. For women to possess this capacity and not use it, while so many ‘righteous’ and otherwise powerful, influential married men were stuck with infertile wives through no fault of their own, was seen as an attack on the stability of society itself. The solution was to remove the means by which fertile women could make their own choices: their basic financial rights.

I don’t think the base note of the Handmaid’s Tale or even Jewish oppression was hatred - it was a sense of entitlement. They were scrambling for a solution to restore what is considered to be a right, necessary for the ‘good’ of that society as a whole. The idea was that in such a situation we could become extinct if we allowed these fertile women (as a minority) to choose what to do with their own bodies.

As far as so-called ‘incels’ are concerned, I think their online movement, while despicable and insidious, is increasingly based on a minority argument. No one with any societal influence or power is going to align themselves with a movement based on the inferiority complex of a minority - it’s why all forms of oppression persist.

‘Incel’ is a counter-culture - a reaction to the realisation that identifying with this ideology - reductively that women exist to serve their individual needs - is rapidly rendering them a disenfranchised minority. By identifying themselves as ‘incels’ - as victims - they’re attempting to protect their ideology as the ‘essence’ of who they are. If we reject the ideology, we are effectively cancelling them as human beings who are clearly suffering - which, for some of the more compassionate posters here, seems to be giving us pause.

Perhaps that’s their entire game plan - a last ditch effort to preserve a dying and ineffective ideology by claiming it as their ‘essential’ identity. It’s a bit like using children as human shields… I’m not going to open fire, but neither will I condone the behaviour. I still consider someone who self-identifies as ‘incel’ to be a human being worthy of compassion, but in order to do so I emphatically reject the term as indicative of their identity. Their celibacy is not involuntary but selective, based on a false sense of entitlement. For me, the conversation starts here.

However social constructionism is a theory and a contested theory at that, you are simply claiming without evidence that certain traits are social constructed but if you apply that to everything consistently nothing is real (It is an anti realist stance). — Andrew4Handel

Reality consists of relation. Nothing could be ‘real’ in itself, in isolation from any and all interaction - there’s no way to be certain, and it’s frankly a pointless line of inquiry. There is understanding, perception/prediction and observation/measurement of reality, with varying degrees of accuracy.

Intersex conditions I know tend to occur in either males or females. For example Klinefelter syndrome only occurs in males. Turner Syndrome only occurs in Females. Androgen insensitivity syndrome occurs in males. — Andrew4Handel

These ‘syndromes’ and other conditions you mention are named as ‘disorder’ in relation to an assumed dichotomy. They’re exceptions to the rules we impose on reality by virtue of a perceived structure that excludes them rather than understanding. We observe genetic incidents of XXY and XO, for instance, as ‘real’, yet to some extent invalid, human conditions. Something to be fixed because fertility is perceived as a norm.

You seem to be saying that gender dysphoria, having no observable/measurable evidence, should be dismissed as ‘not real’ according to these rules we impose on reality, rather than something to be fixed.

What I’m saying is that discrepancies between one’s perception and these normative rules creates human conditions that are still ‘real’ at this level of perception/prediction, and that it is their perceived invalidity and NOT their lack of evidence that excludes them, rather than challenging us to understand the broader reality from which these conditions arise. I’m saying that surgery as a solution misses the point - manufacturing observable ‘evidence’ of upholding the rules perpetuates ignorance, isolation and exclusion. As successful as it may be for some, it’s cheating the system in pursuit of social validity. So when it fails to achieve that goal, the regret is understandably devastating. But that’s NOT compelling evidence that they should have simply followed the rules as they stand, and assumed their biological sex as gender identity. Rather, I find it evidence that these rules reflect an inaccurate relational structure of perception/prediction between what we observe/measure and what we understand.

When we perceive as much value in one’s personal gender identity as in the normative rules for gender that we impose on reality, it becomes clear that there is more to understanding the complex relational structure between X and Y chromosomes, observable/measurable sex characteristics and hormones, desire, behaviour and gender identity than these rules imply. Yes, there are observable sex characteristics that are more or less indicative of biological sex, but they’re not nearly as accurate as you would hope. This imprecision, like geocentric system calculations, suggests that our existing perception/prediction structures are… well, wrong.

I’m suggesting that we put aside the rules as they currently exist, and instead seek to develop more accurate structures of perception/prediction between what we observe/measure and what we’re only recently beginning to understand about the broader reality from which all these diverse human conditions arise. Listen to and observe young people when they struggle to learn and accept the rules in relation to experience. Binary, dichotomy, spectrum - these aren’t going to cut it, to be honest. I get the sense that we’re looking at a multi-dimensional value structure, more like a qualitative wavefunction. Perhaps we’re even going to have to dispense with some of our quantitative shortcuts or assumptions and interact more honestly, one human to another...

But we are here because a male impregnated a female and that is essential for the survival of our species and a fundamental. We need to know whether someone is the opposite sex to reproduce. — Andrew4Handel

We may need to ‘know’ whether someone is the opposite sex to reproduce, but do we really need to reproduce? All of us? Fundamentally? If there’s enough babies being born for the species to ‘survive’, then why is this binary identity a fundamental necessity for everyone? Surely we don’t need to ‘know’ this every time we interact?

I get the sense this may be a personal issue for you. Prediction error and mistaken assumptions are a primary source of pain, humiliation and loss in human experience.

I understand your preference for ‘good grounds’, but what constitutes ‘good’ is socially constructed,
— Possibility
I disagree.

Having been brought up watching the Simpsons, I conclude that my skin is not yellow enough, and I have too many fingers. Can I get some medical help?

I claim the Simpsons as a society, and three fingered yellowness as its norm, and how can anyone dispute? One has to say that some social constructions are repugnant, invalid, reprehensible, ridiculous, dysfunctional. But if one says it only relative to the current fashion, it has no moral force at all. Next year it may be absolutely the thing to have a finger removed and yellow stained skin, and unpatriotic to remain encumbered with four fingers and that disgusting pasty white or brown skin. — unenlightened

Language is socially constructed, too - that’s not to say it’s a social construct, though. There’s a difference. The Simpsons and the particular ‘society’ it depicts is a social construction: an heuristic device created in relation to aspects of real and/or imagined social structure - to some extent in ignorance, isolation and/or exclusion of a broader understanding of reality. Male and female toilets, too, are a social construct.

Language, on the other hand, is an amorphous relational structure between what we observe/do and what we understand. The notion of ‘good’ is a similar structure: not so much created by society as an aspect of it. Socially constructed, but not a construct of society.

Our understanding of reality isn’t based on what’s ‘good’, but on what’s accurate. What constitutes ‘good’ is continually adjusted and refined according to developments in both our observations and our understanding, with the aim of improving accuracy in the relational structures between what we observe/do and what we understand.

FWIW, I don’t support medical intervention as a solution to gender dysphoria, but I do recognise the attraction, given our fear of prediction error and uncertainty as adults. The solution, as I see it, is to deconstruct aspects of society based on our assumptions (mis-understanding) that biological sex = gendered characteristics = gender identity, and be prepared to navigate the uncertainty towards developing a more accurate relational structure (language, society, morality, etc) between observations and understanding.

I just want to illustrate what is at stake in these discussions.

My argument in summary is men and women are different, women have praiseworthy characteristics
but mens characteristics are the most celebrated.
These are all biologically based and not social constructed and cannot be opted in and out of.
The denial of this harmful.

I want people to have all the evidence and this evidence to me is to compelling to be dismissed and should shape further discussion.

I think that there needs to be good grounds in life and philosophy for denying reality or in believing in hidden identities. — Andrew4Handel

The difference between men and women is a social construct in relation to a biological foundation. Male and female biology IS different, but the fact that there are characteristics most commonly associated with one biological sex or another, and that some characteristics are celebrated regardless of biology, while others are praiseworthy in association with female biology only, IS socially constructed.

What you call ‘compelling evidence’ is reductionist methodology: colour reduced to monotone, and shades of grey reduced to black or white. We make these judgements most accurately based on the perspective for each interaction, NOT based on some popular or politically-determined binary classification of characteristics. The way I see it, denial of colour or shade variation is harmful - as is asserting that black and white are not socially constructed and cannot be opted in and out of.

I understand your preference for ‘good grounds’, but what constitutes ‘good’ is socially constructed, and you need to recognise the inaccuracy and uncertainty of this in relation to both reality and identity. There will always be someone whose perception of ‘white’ includes what most would call ‘black’, or vice versa - they’re not wrong, and should not be forced to deny their minority experiences as ‘real’ against such limiting constructs so that we can continue to act as if reality consists ONLY of either black or white.

I think what should shape further discussion is not what is considered ‘compelling evidence’ or ‘good grounds’, as if perspective is not a factor, but rather the complex relational structure between biological evidence/observation, social construct (including language, concepts, value, identity) and understanding.

I thought philosophy was The Love of Knowledge and was really concerned about the nature of truth and reality.

To me censoring or vilifying people for misgendering people and making me or others call a Male "She" or a Female "He" is undermining the quest for truth and transparency and authenticity.

It is Undermining people personal beliefs it is engaging in a reality denying exercise and trying to suck society in to it. Getting people to deny their senses when they see a male looking person enter a women toilets. Gaslighting people.
I have called people who are clearly male "she" to be kind and this was before people started chanting "Trans men are men" and demanded we view trans and biological sex as interchangeable and equivalent.

It is a major assault on the truth. It is not a trivial or solely personal issue it effects relationships between people and peoples children are being told they can be born in the wrong body and set on the course for sterilisation and becoming a life long medical patient.

My being gay does not hinge on the approval of others it is not propped up by making people have particular thoughts about me.
Telling people they are hateful for not believing a man can become a woman, opposing child transition and destructive genital surgeries
that is a major psychological exercise at undermining peoples sense of reason and strongly held reality beliefs to follow what amounts to a personal and group religious ideology of invisible gender souls. — Andrew4Handel

Philosophy is the love of wisdom - it is really concerned about how and when to judge or action an understanding of reality.

Authenticity is as much about one’s own experience of reality as it is about how we interact with others. I get that ‘misgendering’ people is an experience we’re going to have to learn to navigate somehow, but when conceptual assumptions are found not to align with experience, we either work on adjusting our methodologies to account for the experience in our understanding of reality, or we deny the experience is valid, true, or ‘normal’.

To demand that biology and identity both be viewed as valid descriptions of gender - that “trans men are men” - is not a trivial or solely personal issue, but nor is it a major assault on THE truth. Children being told they were ‘born in the wrong body’ IS, however.

Being gay is no longer considered a dysfunction, but being born biologically male yet identifying as a ‘woman’ (ie. trans) is still perceived as a medical condition that needs to be ‘fixed’. I disagree with this diagnosis - I don’t believe that ‘a man has a penis and a woman has a vagina’ should be considered anymore accurate than ‘a man is sexually attracted to a woman’, or vice versa. As with homosexuality, medical intervention is not the solution - understanding is.

The fact that most intelligent adults can now interact without assuming sexual orientation based on gender identity, leads me to believe they could also interact without assuming biological anatomy based on gender identity. Yes, we like being able to make assumptions - it simplifies our interactions. We’re unaccustomed to reading the signs at this early stage, partly because trans people are unsure how they will be received - as if something is ‘wrong’ with them. But just as it’s getting easier to recognise and unnecessary to conceal when someone is gay, I think it will eventually get easier to recognise and unnecessary to conceal when someone was born biologically male, regardless of gender identity.

Has someone posted an explanation yet of why most violence, sex offences and crime per se is committed by men throughout history.

It clearly isn't socialisation. There is no evidence it is socialisation and there is no evidence of a change in trends. I have never been in a formal situation where men have been encouraged to be antisocial outside of male banter (all male social situations) and the school playground. Men are spontaneously aggressive. Men and women want to do different jobs. Women aren't desperate to be car mechanics and plumbers.

I think there is some reality denial going on and a lack of evidence being presented over quite trite theories and wishful thinking.

Reality doesn't care about feelings and hypothesises.

Someone trying to behave like the opposite sex is futile. I am a male all my behaviour is male by dint of it being mine. I live as a male not a non binary multigendered invented woo entity. — Andrew4Handel

Males (and females, for that matter) in a formal situation are expected to keep any and all emotions in check, so it’s no surprise that ‘anti-social’ behaviour is discouraged. Both males and females are ‘spontaneously aggressive’ - females, more often than not finding themselves inexperienced and underdeveloped when it comes to physical interactions, have learned to use words more than fists, with just as much impact (although far less evident).

Girls who want to be car mechanics or plumbers have been both actively and passively discouraged from such paths from a very young age, by almost everyone and everything, and with various, often well-intentioned reasonings. Boys who want to be nurses or early childhood teachers face similar discouragement from all areas of society.

My daughter, by the age of seven, had effectively banned pink from her wardrobe, and no longer chose to wear dresses or skirts. This came about around the same time she came home and asked the loaded question “Do girls like dinosaurs?” It was a key moment that I felt required careful navigation around the language of identity and belonging. She identified as a girl, and she liked dinosaurs, and all she needed to know was that the two were not mutually exclusive.

I saw this as a conscious move on her part to question and then feel free to reject the socially-determined gender ‘traits’ traditionally expected of her as a ‘girl’, although she still identified as female in all other ways, and continues to, now twelve years later.

Someone trying to behave ‘like the opposite sex’ is not futile, but is a key component of forming identity. I think someone labelling behaviour and traits in this way is trying to enforce a binary concept where the reality of experience is far more complex.

At the private, religious school where I work, two of our high school graduates this year were identified as ‘trans’ - one male-female, the other female-male. The first was fully supported (after much discussion) by family as well as the school community, effectively transitioning their identity from one year of schooling to the next. The second lacked parental support, and so their formal identity with the school remained female, while pastorally and among their peers they were treated as a ‘boy’. As far as I could observe, they were not ‘trying to behave like the opposite sex’, but were attempting to find an identity that worked for them in the majority of their social interactions and experiences.

Personally, I don’t believe either should pursue surgery - I don’t think it should be considered ‘wrong’ for someone biologically male (ie. with a penis) to be referred to as ‘she’, if that’s the identity they’re most comfortable with, and I think that eventually we can get used to this level of uncertainty with regards to gender biology/identity, and conceptual labels such as ‘man’ and ‘woman’ could gradually fall out of use. But it won’t happen overnight, and I think the resistance will continue for a couple of decades yet.

Socialisation is strongest prior to the age of 17, and spending a few years in a predominantly male environment, with little to no interaction with females, does little to increase one’s awareness of their own or their peers’ attitudes towards females. Single-sex education is a perfect example of this - I emerged from five years of girls’ school education with an underdeveloped understanding of gender-based interaction, and could say the same for my sisters and most of my school peers.

It is generally more simplistic. If you invest in ‘training’/‘educating’ then the pay off comes literally decade/s down the line. It is understandable why - in an economy based on profit - many people prefer to invest in what pays off next year/month/week rather than what pays off in 20 years or so … people have to eat and sustain themselves so the majority of what they have will be invested in tomorrow, next month/year rather than further down the line. — I like sushi

It’s not a question of IF you invest in teaching/education, but HOW MUCH to invest, how much to pay those who teach - an entirely different question. We all understand that education pays off long term, but it’s much more difficult to quantify that ROI, for instance, on the basis of an individual teacher’s salary. Government funding is based on student numbers, and student numbers for each school and each classroom teacher are based on optimum numbers for demonstrated control and influence, NOT on optimum teaching-learning environments.

But I digress… the point I want to make is that teachers and nurses are not paid less because we value women less, but because we’re unable to accurately quantify the benefits of nurturing and caring roles that increase or restore the capacity of others.

I think that more females tend to take on these roles because our traditional, socially-determined interactions still focus on experiences of these unquantifiable benefits more often than they do for male socially-determined experiences, and there is less social expectation for us to demonstrate control and influence in everything we do, as a function of our individual identity.

It’s not that males have less capacity for nurturing and caring, but that they still grow up largely exposed to far less personal experiences of its intrinsic social and emotional value, and so they determine value from external measurements, observations, and demonstrations of control and influence, which are still the foundation of business, economic and government decision-making. Those doing it right are those who direct resources anyway towards the unquantifiable social and emotional value experienced in increasing or restoring human capacity.

In society womens’ ‘traits’ (if we can call them that?) are generally not rewarded because they are good for roles/jobs that tend to see long term benefits rather than short term benefits - hence the pay of teaching and nursing. — I like sushi

The value of roles such as nursing and teaching stems from an understanding of when and where to relinquish or hand over control/power to another. A quality teacher or nurse is someone who doesn’t derive professional value from demonstrations of their own capacity or control, but from increasing/restoring the capacity of others.

The structures that govern teaching and nursing roles, their decision-making and rates of pay, however, are still determined according to demonstrations of control. It was once believed (and in many cases still is) that a ‘good’ teacher should be able to demonstrate control over their students and influence on their thinking with regurgitated facts, etc. Schools remain, for the most part, focused on maximising control and accountability (ie. minimising uncertainty), and in doing so they can stifle or damage the valuable nurturing aspect of the teaching-learning relationship for many students and teachers.

It’s far from a perfect system (wherever you are) and I’ve personally found that the most effective healing, teaching and learning actually occurs in those ‘grey area’ moments with low control and high uncertainty. But it’s never really clear who can take the credit for what took place…patient or nurse, teacher or student…

We can discuss all of this in terms of primarily men’s or women’s ‘traits’, but at the end of the day devaluing the ‘traits’ associated with roles that increase or restore capacity in others has less to do with gender, and more to do with ego.

By saying females I am including women and girls and even females of other species animal mothers and so on.

These thoughts came to me watching Wonder Woman and contrasting the treatment of Male and female super heroes.

It seems to me that male traits are seen in a more positive light than female ones still and that traits like nurturing, caring and kindness and forgiveness are seen as weaknesses.

There is evidence such as in the fact that the majority of people in the caring professions are female that these traits are not just stereotypes and even if they were they would be positive stereotypes.

Male traits also can be viewed as negative however I think they still lead to more success and influence in certain areas of life.

So where should we go from here in regards to responding to and analysing these kind of traits. I feel we need to celebrate the female traits and encourage them to be aspirations whilst not degrading useful male assets. Maybe not rankling traits at all unless they are anti social ones. — Andrew4Handel

When we try to associate two dichotomies - in this case positive/negative and male/female - we’re never going to generate ‘true’ statements or conclusions from the language.

In the context of superheroes, I would agree that physical, violent capacity and invincibility to such aggressions are portrayed as valued traits - regardless of gender. But modern superhero mythology also explores the question of whether it is demonstrations of this capacity (perceived value) or how/why we choose to act/not act that makes a superhero: compassion, self-sacrifice, forbearance, gentleness, self-control, introspection and collaboration are less about a ‘show of strength’ and more about a willingness to interconnect regardless of perceived power.

As a female, I think female characters such as Wonder Woman, Black Widow, etc show (in different ways) how our experiences as women (ie. being underestimated based on demonstrations/perception of capacity) contribute to an overall understanding of human capacity. It isn’t in our actions that we are powerful, but also in the choices we make to not attack, to not show strength, to show restraint, thoughtfulness and care - not instead, but as part of a more rounded, less quantifiable understanding of power/capacity.

Weakness refers to the relative lack of a particular, assumed strength, not an overall incapacity.

Liebniz described his monism in terms of immaterial entities of being. Carlo Rovelli explored the physics of this in The Order of Time: that our physical reality consists not of objects in time, but of interrelated events, four-dimensional entities/patterns. Material existence, then, is relative to the position of the observer as an interacting event.

Rovelli explains that our language system is ill-equipped to distinguish between ‘now’ for me and ‘now’ for an observer on Jupiter, for instance. Fortunately, we rarely have to make such a distinction at this stage. But we do run into a similar problem when we talk about the difference between real and fictional characters.

Here within language, I exist in the same way that a fictional character exists: potentially, a pattern of interrelatable values. But existence irl implies interaction with an observer/measurement device - ie. with an event, not with a mind. It’s not so much a material instantiation of the pattern as an observation of it that verifies existence irl.

That I assume you are a real person is a choice I make based on observing patterns of language similar to real people whose material instantiation I have observed. In reality I have no definitive proof either way, no material instantiation of your existence irl nor reason to doubt it. I simply prefer to assume a real person than to entertain alternative scenarios at this point.

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Well, this seems to be a critique to basically every ontological system, and one that's easily fixable by including "absence" in whatever ontological system is missing it, so I don't believe it's exactly a problem with mine specifically or that it's a hard problem to fix.

I think this needs a separate op talking about whether "absence exists". — khaled

We’re always so quick to isolate and exclude absence from the discussion, as if it can simply be tacked onto the system as an afterthought, and doesn’t impact on what exists. I’m not arguing that ‘absence exists’, but rather that it subsists as essentially as pattern or arrangement - a third aspect of the system.

Absence is not a problem to ‘fix’ unless you’re trying to ignore it. It is as essential to identifying pattern and structure as matter - whether elementary or virtual particles or water and rocks.

It’s the reason for positing ‘a mind-independent world’ in this discussion - where the notion of ‘mind’ is whatever is NOT ‘matter’. This absent notion of ‘mind’ is then embodied in the use of language, which becomes an important aspect in the discussion about the nature of ‘pattern’. And all of a sudden we’re bogged down in arguing over the structure of what is absent from the world we were attempting to describe…

The Tao Te Ching interestingly incorporates the structure of traditional Chinese language as a metaphor for its ontological system. Recognising that something will always be absent from any description of reality, the TTC posits that absence as chi or a directional flow of energy, which we identify in ourselves as affect/desire, and bring subjectively to the written text.

Well I wouldn't say "absence of matter" is a "thing that exists" so I didn't include it in the system, but that's not to say I don't believe there are no places where there is no matter.

Maybe it's hypocritical of me to believe that a pattern is a "thing that exists" but an absence isn't. Hmm... — khaled

I would say the main issue is that it needs to be ‘a thing that exists’ in order to feature in the system. Ontology doesn’t preclude being sans ‘thing’ness. If pattern or arrangement subsists (which relates to your earlier discussion with RussellA), then so too does absence - of matter and of pattern.

Whether ‘matter’ is given its traditional primacy or not, I would argue that any ontological system would need these three aspects at minimum: existence, absence and relation. There can be no accurate description of reality without a notable absence: no existence without relation to absence, no absence without relation to existence, no relation without a binary, and vice versa.

As for the question of whether patterns are mind dependent, I think we need to get away from the notion that we’re talking about patterns as things. What we seem to be referring to here is not a pattern, but arrangement, structure or relation as an aspect of reality. This is not simply about points in space, but is inclusive of space itself, and its relation to time, value and meaning as structures of reality.

I would say that any pattern we identify as such is mind dependent, or at least structurally determined, but ‘pattern’ as an aspect of reality is not. Pattern - independent of existence/absence of mind or anything else - refers to structure: the underlying logic of the system.

My initial response to this would be to ask: how do we recognise and distinguish patterns of matter without acknowledging the absence of matter? Indeed, how do we distinguish matter? Or material ‘things’ with the same pattern?

Binary consists of three aspects: 1s, 0s and patterns (relational structures) of 1s and 0s. You can’t just ignore the 0s. Negation is an essential and frequently overlooked aspect of ontology.

But I’ll read the rest of the discussion now, before I comment further…

You probably noticed by now that I don’t subscribe to pragmatism or utilitarianism in ethics. I do get the attraction, however. It does seem easier. But I don’t think it can achieve anything more than assessing or justifying the rationality of behaviour AFTER the fact.
— Possibility

Actually, pragmatism and utilitarianism are very consequentialist, so I don't see how else to asses the moral worth of an action rather than after the fact with those two rationale's. — Shawn

Not with those two rationales, of course. I think my highlighting ‘after’ may have confused things. This focus on assessing the moral worth of an action is where the inaccuracy in terms of ethics lies, precisely because an action or behaviour can only be morally evaluated in its social and emotional context. The moral worth of a future action will always be relative.

I think the question of ‘should I become something I am not?’ cannot be answered by consequentialism, because it isn’t about an action, nor an evaluation, but rather an overall perception of potentiality. We’re not really asking about the moral worth of an action here, but how one perceives the value of change itself. The reality is that I will become something I am not regardless - ethics being more than merely action. Ethics is about understanding and refining our conceptual structures of value and potential, which direct all our changes in effort and attention, regardless of whether or not we act. In this context, pragmatism or utilitarianism as reductionist methodologies are only one aspect of a much broader understanding of change.

The question might be rephrased as: what is the best use of my limited resources of effort and attention in terms of change? It won’t produce eternal statements of law and order, but I think it may gradually help to determine a more ethical life, regardless of whether we agree on values, or what our individual capacity may be.

You probably noticed by now that I don’t subscribe to pragmatism or utilitarianism in ethics. I do get the attraction, however. It does seem easier. But I don’t think it can achieve anything more than assessing or justifying the rationality of behaviour AFTER the fact.
— Possibility
In other words, "anything more than" learning (developing more adaptive habits) – a feature in my book, not a bug. — 180 Proof

I didn’t say it was a bug - my point is that it lacks accuracy, but I get that may not be a value for you. Justifying past behaviour offers little learning by way of developing more adaptive habits. All behaviour occurs within a social and emotional context, rendering the mere rationality of past behaviour an inaccurate account of the reasoning behind it.

It rare for me to do this but I hope in faith that Hanover would like to address this. What I would say from my side would be something like, we work with an imperfect model and we do the best we can with it. It sounds pragmatic, to say so, but we aren't all behind a veil of ignorance to asses these issues, only judges are. — Shawn

Well, I’m not sure that we always do the best we can with it. We often do what best suits us at the time. Recognising the fallibility of the model, and the resulting uncertainty in our judgements, should give us pause. Yet it rarely does - and we invariably cite/blame the model, even though we always knew it would be inaccurate. There are repeated calls for an overhaul of these statements of law and order, even though no amount of rewrite will render them sufficiently accurate to stand alone in determining ethical ways of behaving.

Well, are you talking about society or the application of law itself? Please clarify. — Shawn

I’m talking about society, although the application of law is susceptible. Hence the level of intelligence (rational, social and emotional) required to practice it with any competence.

It seems that pragmatically we address the issue in terms of the benefit conferred to the total, that is society. We can only be as intelligent as the conduct that is expected of us. — Shawn

We can be more intelligent than what is expected of us, there’s just no individual incentive/benefit to do so. And so this claim that pragmatism confers benefit to the total is not entirely accurate, is it? Pragmatism confers the minimum expected benefit to society.

You probably noticed by now that I don’t subscribe to pragmatism or utilitarianism in ethics. I do get the attraction, however. It does seem easier. But I don’t think it can achieve anything more than assessing or justifying the rationality of behaviour AFTER the fact.

The ‘most efficient outcome’ from what perspective?
— Possibility

I think efficiency in decision making is called utility or intelligence.

It's hard to classify someone as intelligent nowadays without metrics swarming around you with advertisements and pixel tracking on a phone. Does that make sense? — Shawn

I wasn’t really asking for clarification on what you meant - it was a comment on the ambiguity of the term. We use it as if it means something specific on its own, but utility is very different to intelligence.

As you point out, utility can be reductively determined (albeit narrowly and after the fact), whereas intelligence refers to a perceived capacity for reasoning, incorporating rational as well as emotional and social intelligence, much of which remains largely unquantifiable (or at least dimensionally complex and variable).

I think that isolating utility from conceptual perspective or interoception of affect leads to impaired and distorted moral judgement. Statements of law and order alone cannot accurately determine ethical ways of behaving without reducing our perception of human capacity, and yet we continue to reformulate and enforce them as if they could. And in doing so, we judge others’ utility by their disobedience rather than their diverse situational capacities for reasoning. Because it’s easier.

Just a thought: what if we strived for ‘efficiency’ in terms of ‘more accurate’ instead of ‘easier’?

180 Proof kinda explained it. But, yes, we're all taxed on what's the most efficient outcome and seem to believe that rational self interest is possibly representative of our true selves. — Shawn

True self - as in essence - is a reductionist methodology. Any statement about who we are is inaccurate from the moment it is made. It immediately becomes past tense. To be human is to continually progress beyond who we are at any point in time.

That’s not to say that recognising or determining who we are is pointless - it’s necessary to at least some extent in order for us to act, to be. But when we outsource reasoning - when we function with a set determinate way of behaving according to law and order - then we fail to be our ‘true selves’ and are instead being according to a ‘rational’ common denominator, whether self or societal interest.

The ‘most efficient outcome’ from what perspective?

homo sapiens has done well even without conceptual frameworks allowing a person to make decisions based off of the ethical framework. Yet, modern day man finds it easier to function with a set determinate way of behaving according to law and order. Just my two cents. — Shawn

Easier? You mean without engaging their own intellect?

Will - the faculty by which an act or event is determined and initiated - is essentially a perceived relation between potential and actuality. As humans, we have the capacity and awareness to craft will, but it is not a property we possess, if we’re honest. Having said that, it is language that presents the illusion of will as a property, attributing it arbitrarily to a subject as agency. This is an heuristic device that brings moral significance to an act, and enables us to judge a person wholly accountable for events that occur.

To say that will is linked to choice is an oversimplification. Yes, the choices we make help to determine and initiate events, but many aspects of these events are pre-determined, and the part our choice plays is much smaller than we like to think. It is only in language that we conceptualise an event as an act between subject and object, assuming will to be solely a property of the subject, in determining and initiating their choice.

It’s an inaccurate description - one that informs us adequately in the moment, to help determine and initiate subsequent actions. But it was never the only way to describe or to perceive the event.

Here are some of the many issues I think are relevant in decision making.

1. Upbringing influences the kind of choices we can or do make.
2. Religious belief or atheism guides decision making
3. Physical disability effects decision making
4. Cognitive issues like Autism and ADHD, OCD, brain damage etc impact decisions
5. Decision often effect others from mild to major effects
6. Ignorance of the law is not an excuse. Consequences of actions don't care about motive.
7. there is a vast amount of information for sentient humans to process and that our brains do process.
8. Decisions are made at the level of consciousness and also with unconscious influences
9. Defence mechanism will influence choice justification.
10. At least one or more persons will disagree with your choices
11. We may or may not have free will and may never know.
123. Inaction and stoicism has consequences. — Andrew4Handel

All of these CAN influence decision making, sure. But they also don’t have to be as limiting as we tend to think. The thing about human adaptability is that we can find ways around most of our perceived limitations, and most readily by working together. When we get past the assumptions that all decisions are to be made as individuals and are somehow cemented into who or what we become, we can recognise that many of our decisions are made and then revised from moment to moment, based on how we allocate and perceive access to attention and effort over time. Our decisions or choices are rarely the conceptual ‘event’ we wish them to be.

I’ve found that there are people who perceive decisions like particles, and others who perceive them as wave-like. This can make it difficult to understand each other. Those of us who perceive a wave can miss the most opportune moment trying to map the whole terrain. Those who perceive a particle can fail to recognise alternative routes to the same destination.

I think your view of inaction and particularly stoicism - as stifling dissent and rational criticism - suggests a particle-like perception of wave-like decision-making. The Tao Te Ching suggests that the best course of action may not be mine to make, and that what is observed as inaction or stoicism on the part of an individual may simply be their understanding of a more efficient and mutually beneficial flow of energy within the world. There is a difference between criticising the status quo, effecting change and being seen to be accomplishing something. The most effective leaders are often those who appear to achieve nothing themselves.

The observability of my actions don’t encapsulate the full extent of the decisions I make. Patience, self-control and gentleness - the in-actualisation of perceived capacity - can be as much about understanding consequences as action.

There are studies that show babies as young as three months old, long before they have language, are already judging other people's behavior and making value judgements. Karen Wynn, who conducted the studies, suggests this does show there are innate rules for behavior. — T Clark

I would say there is reason here to suggest a human preference/desire for rules, but not necessarily that any innate ‘rules for behaviour’ exist as such.

I would argue that our preference relates to innate qualitative structures that are inherently unquantifiable. These are not ‘rules for behaviour’, but rather underlying logical relation (Tao), from our limited understanding of which behaviour, language and then ‘rules’ are formed, re-formed and refined as reductionist and scientific methodologies, tested back through our conceptual systems (mathematics, language, culture, values, etc) to our behaviour. I wouldn’t say the ‘rules’ themselves are innate.

There are no innate rules for behaviour and any value judgements and ought's are completely fabricated.

Every decision we make we don't know if we are doing the right thing and what the consequences are going to be. — Andrew4Handel

Sure - we can’t be certain we are doing the ‘right’ thing in perpetuity. We can’t be certain what all the consequences are going to be. There is always room for improvement in the accuracy of our judgements and behaviour. That only amounts to an ‘existential crisis’ if we equate existence with certainty and accuracy. I could be wrong, but it seems to me there’s no life, no consciousness, no relation to the world, in that kind of existence.

Now consider the difference between kinetic energy and potential energy. The former would be actually having the capacity to do work, and the latter would be having the potential to have the capacity to do work. The concept of "potential enrgy" really doesn't make any sense logically, but the use of it is what gives rise to the issue↪kudos points us toward, where energy is seen as an entity in itself, rather than the property of an active object. When a thing has potential energy, that energy can only be understood as the property of something else. But it's easier just to ignore the requirement of something else, allowing the energy to exist as an abstract entity. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is where language fails us in terms of clarity. The terms ‘kinetic’ and ‘potential’ refer to particular qualitative relations. Kinetic is a quality of the work (movement), whereas potential is a quality of the capacity (unrealised).

The way I see it, ‘energy’ is the relation between capacity and work. We often attribute it to objects or events as property or possession, but that just helps us make useful sense of the relational structure.

You said the potential energy is in the spring (or at least you seemed to.). Strictly speaking, potential energy doesn't have a location. You could think of it as a sophisticated prediction.
— frank

I don't understand this. If it exists nowhere, it doesn't exist.

A battery has stored energy and you can move it from one thing to the next. I get that the total energy equals the potential energy plus the kinetic energy and the amount of energy that is demanded will increase based upon the resistance, but I don't see how we can suggest the energy is being expressed or being held in a potential state at some location away from the event.

That is, when I drop a penny, the energy event isn't occurring down the street. — Hanover

‘Doesn’t have a location’ doesn’t necessarily mean ‘exists nowhere’, it could mean the location is undefined. An electron, for instance, doesn’t have a single location as such - it is attributable to an atomic structure, sometimes several at once, and its location is relative. And when you drop a penny, the resulting energy event isn’t confined to the penny (an echo may be occurring down the street). The location is probabilistic, fuzzy, undefined - a predictive relation. You could attribute the energy event to you, to the penny, the sidewalk, etc. Most importantly, it exists relative to an observation/measurement event.

Potential energy as a sophisticated prediction makes sense to me.

It's sort of important that they are real since it affects how we treat and regard them. A lot of bad has been done by those who have a habit of making others appear to be less than.

Real does determine existence and I don't know where you got this notion that it is outdated. Never heard anyone suggest that. I'm not even sure how you're dragging energy into this. What is real is what can be determined to exist, that's how we know dreams are not real and can safely dismiss a nightmare (well usually). — Darkneos

Who said anything about less than? I keep bringing up energy because it exists at the same level you are trying to dismiss as ‘less than’. You can try to ‘dismiss’ a nightmare, but it still exists as part of your experiences. What you’d be doing is trying to exclude, isolate or ignore the experience by devaluing the information it offers.

The way I see it, ‘not real’ doesn’t mean ‘less than’. Real is a quality of existence, but not necessarily a value judgement. Treating the information we have about other people as ‘not necessarily real as such’, in this world of online forums, social media and AI, is arguably more accurate than being dismissive of any interaction unconfirmed as ‘real’. You can’t be certain that anything you read or observe here about me is ‘real’. I am a ‘useful fiction’ to you, whether you recognise that or not, as you are to me. For me, that means I treat you as MORE than the information I have about you, not less.

When we read about a character, we treat them as MORE than the description we have. When we interact with a fictional character, we flesh out the limited information we have AS IF they were a living, thinking, feeling human being.

By no definition of the word fiction is your interpretation supported. It's tacking on too many things that aren't supported by it. — Darkneos

You’re oversimplifying. If I write a biography based on limited information I have about someone long dead, gleaned from multiple second and third-hand sources, we would call it ‘non-fiction’, but is it therefore ‘real’?

You're making it more complex than it needs to be. To refer to something as fiction is by definition to say it's not real. So when he's saying that the notion of other people is a useful fiction is implying that they aren't real. Read what he said. — Darkneos

I’m not arguing against the implication that ‘other people’ aren’t ‘real’ as such, because I don’t think it’s as important as you might think. I’m arguing that what IS ‘real’ with regard to the notion of ‘other people’ is merely evidence or measurements of their existence in potentiality: ‘other people’ exist and are useful (different to convenient) in this non-real, non-verifiable, conceptual or fictional structure in terms of how we interact with the world.

Real does not necessarily determine existence. This is outdated thinking. Energy and other people are far more complex than mere measurement/observation would suggest. Recognising this enables us to manage our uncertainty and prediction error.

I don't know if you think of what you've written as metaphysics. Whether or not you do, I think you have described the fundamental relationship between we humans and whatever constitutes reality. — T Clark

You will notice that I’ve referred to the level as both ‘metaphysical’ and ‘quantum’ - the difference as I see it is only in how energy, logic and quality are attributed along an arbitrary subject-object divide. Quantum physics ‘brackets out’ the qualitative aspect of experience, while most other metaphysics bracket out either energy (affect, eg. TTC) or logic (eg. spirituality). Essentially, it is the perceived embodiment of self that is bracketed out.

As for the "useful fiction" designation, this is nothing new. 2,500 years ago they might have called it the illusion of the self. It's true it's a bit cold, but a lot of eastern religions and philosophies observe humanity from a distance. — T Clark

I think it needs to be ‘cold’ in order to understand others without judgement either of ourselves or others. When we act, we do so necessarily from a position of affect, and judgement is implied. But in truth our intentions stem from a pre-judgemental understanding of humanity in a broader context, with all of its limitations and potential, and inclusive of both self and others. We’re simply presenting the most probabilistically useful of many possible responses - errors and inaccuracies are to be expected, and how one responds in turn (inclusive of timing, effort and attention) could aim to improve the accuracy of understanding overall (regardless of self), or to focus on maximising their own perceived, current and relative position. Both could be considered ‘cold’ if you’re evaluating based only on affect.

Most empiricism stuff and deductive knowledge through logic can be certain. 2+2 = 4 — Deus

‘Can’ being the operative word.

Logic relies on value structures within language/mathematics for its appearance of certainty, in useful relation to the Cartesian assumption of positive quality in life experiences and knowledge - ie. consciousness.

Certainty exists as a relation between logic, energy and quality. It is necessarily inclusive of self, and so any statement made cannot be certain in itself, but only in one’s positive and practical relation to its meaning - which is, at best, intersubjective.

Certainty is a scientific methodology, and can be seen as an attempt to limit philosophical discussion - to exclude, isolate or ignore. Whether the intention is to appear certain or to eliminate alternative perspectives, the result is to detract from the accuracy of understanding achieved by the discussion, which should be the aim of philosophy, I think.

↪Janus No not at all. It's just regarding other people as not real rubs me the wrong way. — Darkneos

That’s an affected response, based on an assumption that ‘fiction’ = ‘not real’ = non-existent. To refer to someone as a ‘useful fiction’ is to put aside as irrelevant the question of a definitive reality. Who or what I am is much more complex than my observable reality, and so I would expect nothing less from others. To assume that what I know of others is definitive of who they are would be inaccurate. It is therefore a ‘useful fiction’ in relation to the complexity of who they are, allowing for the uncertainty with which I would approach them.

A ‘useful fiction’ is like an heuristic device - at this metaphysical or quantum level it doesn’t matter whether or not something is ‘real’, but whether it is useful for accurate understanding and interacting with the world. This useful fiction is merely the story we know so far: subject to misinterpretation, distorted perspective and our own ignorance, affect or intentions.

‘Energy’ is another useful fiction. It’s a word we use to describe a relational structure that isn’t ‘real’ in the definitive sense. It’s calculable with an arbitrarily assigned value, which we can then apply to our interactions with the world, so long as we understand or are agreed on its value, or its useful relational structure of quality and logic. We understand there is more to it, but no amount of words can fully describe that understanding, and ‘the math works’ refers to the interaction with our world, not to the logic alone.

Well no. Color doesn't exist even though it is an "experience" in our heads. Phantom limb isn't a real experience and neither are hallucinations either. Which is why the terror from such things can be dismissed. What looks like an apple isn't an experience of an apple, especially if it's wax. — Darkneos

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Colour does exist as a relative value. And ‘phantom limb’ refers to an experience of pain - although any resultant terror can be dismissed as unjustifiable, the pain nevertheless exists. I’m not arguing that an experience is ‘real’, only that it exists. The qualifier of ‘real’ refers to a mode or level of existence that enables one to ignore, isolate or exclude uncertainty and prediction error as meaningful aspects of experience.

These words are not ‘real’ either, and yet they exist. ‘Phantom limb’ refers to an experience we agree is almost or nearly as described, but not completely or according to strict definition. This is the definition of VIRTUAL. It isn’t the limb that exists, but an incomplete experience of pain, almost as if a limb exists. You could use ‘virtual limb’, and it would make more sense in this discussion, but ‘phantom’ certainly lends it a quality of terror.

But it's not a matter of what you accept, these things can be tested. That's how dreams can be known to not be real. Just because it's an experience doesn't make it real and if there is nothing behind the experience creating it then solipsism would have to be true.

You keep trying to get around it but Kant's logic flows there every time. — Darkneos

It IS a matter of what you accept, if you want to have a discussion about what is ‘virtual’. Just because an experience isn’t real, doesn’t preclude its existence. The thing about phenomenology is that the discussion occurs at a different level to what you’re probably used to. Experience is not just what really happens, but is inclusive of variability in perception, reasoning and intentionality - our internal process structures. Kant points out the limitations of pure reason or logic as a means to accurately understand the world based on experience. But it seems most won’t venture beyond his first critique, preferring to limit understanding to only what ‘can be tested’. This leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of what he was trying to do, and of our capacity to more accurately understand the world as consisting of reason (logic), quality/ideal and energy/affect.

I think I started a thread in regards to whether Quantum mechanics has any affect on this, maybe that might have some insight. — Darkneos

Personally, I think quantum mechanics is relevant here, but most would disagree - or at least are dubious about discussing the quantum realm in relation to conscious experience. The language use is very different - like the difference between ‘phantom’ and ‘virtual’ - but we really need to be more charitable about language use at this level, as it, too, is a construct of perception, reasoning and intentionality. Why do you think there are so many different interpretations of what is essentially indisputable?

It is the value or quality of existence that is missing or indeterminate in quantum physics, the logical basis or reason that is missing from hallucinations and other ‘virtual’ experiences, and it is energy or affect that is missing from any explanation or interpretation of either using language. This judgement of ‘solipsism’ seems to be just a way of clambering for certainty where there is none.