Without reading the IEP entry yet, just going on your description here...

I have a memory of my daughter learning to speak that comes to mind here. Aged somewhere around 18 months old, she would point out the window of the car as we drove along and say ‘bah’. It took us a number of instances of this to recognise that she was pointing to puddles and making a connection between them and her nightly bath. She was using a language concept ‘bah’ to describe instances of water. So, did a definition develop later for her, or is definition simply a summary of instances?

I think the circular nature of this process is important, but I also think the language concept is a vital piece that seems to be overlooked. It is possible for a child to correctly label an instance of ‘dog’ without a definition of what dogs are - with nothing more than a fuzzy language concept formed from a summary of previous instances. Does this mean they know instances of ‘dog’? The main difference between a child not knowing what ‘dog’ means and you not knowing what ‘parsing’ means may simply be the courage to risk being wrong in identifying an instance.

I think there’s also a distinction to be made here between the possibility of truth and the potentiality of knowledge.

So, the question presupposes a grander purpose than whatever your parents were trying to achieve. The purpose of you being here is not, then, conferred by your parents, but someone else. And so to wonder why you're here, is to acknowledge at some level that someone - someone a little grander than your parents - has put you here for some end. — Bartricks

This doesn’t follow necessarily.

Purpose:
The reason for which something is done or created, or for which something exists.
A particular requirement or consideration, particularly one that is temporary or restricted in scope or extent.

The purpose of you being here may simply be conferred by... the conditions of you being here. There need not be a particular end, nor someone who confers it on you. These are assumptions that any reason must be intentional, or pre-determined by a reasoning mind. But there’s no evidence for this.

Something that's been on my mind quite a bit lately is something some people devote their entire lives to, the question of what space is made of if anything. — Paul S

Space consists of relations and relational structures: distance, direction, shape, size, volume. Molecules consist of both directional and distance/energy relations between atoms, giving them shape. Atomic structures consist of distance/potential energy relations between sub-atomic particles - namely, between protons and electrons. And particles consist of interacting wavefunctions of valence and potentiality: a prediction of attention and effort required for a particular event to interact with it.

Space, as I understand it, can be BOTH a void and a structure - just not at the same time. It’s actually either, depending on the interacting relational structures. So a neutrino can move through space and most solid structures as if through a void, yet there are ways of detecting interaction.

Why does God have the Israelites march around the walls of Jericho once a day for six days and seven times on the seventh day before the walls fall? There doesn't appear to be any particular significance to doing this as far as I can tell, in fact there are a lot of other things that people are told by God to do in the Bible that don't appear to have any real reason or relation between them. But the people almost always seem to do the things without any apparent question even among themselves as to why doing A is supposed to lead to B.

Did people in those days simply not think so critically about these things or did they just blindly obey orders (by "God")? Because to be honest it is NOT a good thing in any case to just blindly obey orders, even by someone who you trust, because it means that you will essentially do anything that you are told and without knowing why, even if it is a bad thing to do. The Nazis were in fact trained to do just this, and to just do things that they were "supposed" to do without knowing or asking why or knowing if it was a bad thing. I would argue that some of them likely did not even know what a "bad thing" was. — BBQueue

I get the sense from the OT that most of it was written with the benefit of hindsight incorporated into the story. It’s also unclear from what perspective or how far after the event most stories were written. So, to assume the account is what actually happened, rather than a later interpretation of what happened for the purpose of imparting certain information, would be a mistake as far as I can see. What they know is that B happened, and they did A before it, therefore God had apparently told them to do A.

Perhaps the walls were simply poorly constructed, and they deduced that by simply marching en masse around the outside they could eventually unsettle the foundations enough to weaken the structure. Perhaps the only evidence they had was that there were once walls around Jericho that had since been reduced to rubble, and everything else is hearsay and hyperbole, woven into the existing cultural fabric. The message is clear: trust in what we refer to as ‘God’, here’s why.

As for thinking critically, they certainly didn’t appear to value rationality over emotion or to hold out for evidence the way we do now.

The object of the classic debate is to win the argument, not to get to the truth. However, if there was a generally accepted set of steps to demonstrate due diligence in countering bias, such as the ones I have proposed, part of the debate could be the need for each opponent to demonstrate that they have gone through them. Negligence in doing this, or refusal to do so, could automatically disqualify the debater loosing the argument by default. — EusebiusLevi

And because this is the object, it isn’t possible to eliminate bias from a debate. The way I see it, debate thrives on bias, and various strategies are employed simply to conceal or highlight it, not to eliminate it.

Discussions which aim at getting to the truth require humility, patience and introspection - none of which are features of debate. Participants in open discussion recognise that the truth is not an argument but a collaboration. To eliminate bias, we need to be prepared to understand an alternate perspective as a contribution, and then critically evaluate our own from that position - not in order to tuck our ‘weaknesses’ or biases away, but to bring these errors to light, dismantle them, and collaborate towards the truth.

In debate, to be wrong is to lose. In genuine philosophical discussion, to recognise error or bias is an opportunity to achieve through collaboration.

I didn’t detect any hostility, either. But I DID detect passive-aggressiveness - and despite denying it to me, he’s admitted as much to others. Not everyone picks this up - that’s the point. If they take offence, it’s them being overly sensitive, but it’s thinly veiled nastiness that enables one to play both the victim and the aggressor. A defence mechanism against bullying.

I realise you’re teasing, but if you genuinely want a ‘good and charitable’ discussion then I would expect you to model it.

I would disagree that you’re in the wrong place, unless what you’re looking for is agreement rather than philosophical discussion. I’ve been quietly going against the grain here for a couple of years now, and thoroughly enjoyed learning from the discussions I’ve had. I think it’s precisely when we disagree that the most fruitful discussions can be had. I’m not expecting anyone to agree with me here - I’m expecting to learn by striving to understand different philosophical positions in relation to my own.

I think your focus on materialism and neuroscience may be useful here - I’d certainly appreciate both in some of the discussions I’ve had. Are you familiar with Feldman Barrett’s work? I’m also interested in recent collaborations of science and philosophy, particularly the interaction of quantum theory with theories of consciousness.

I’m not denying your ability to play nice - but it requires someone like @Wayfarer - who is not easily antagonised, and forgiving of throwaway comments such as “But you’re still wrong haha!” - to break down your defences. There’s no negativity or condescension in Wayfarer’s posts, yet interestingly it continues to crop up in yours.

I realise it can be risky to propose a discussion, to put your thoughts out there unbidden, so I do admire your attempt. You’ll see I’m a little reluctant myself in that department. For future reference, if you had simply posted the question, without the passive-aggressive preamble, it might have garnered a more positive response.

I’m happy to enter discussions with you about philosophy - I think you may have an interesting perspective to contribute here. And there are a large number of participants on this forum who have the capacity for open-minded and charitable discussions. Most will get defensive and interpret some comments as attacks, as I’m sure you do too, but they’re just as quick to calm down when misinterpretations are respectfully pointed out.

So my question to you is: have you wondered why you resort to nastiness and condescension in your own posts? Do you believe your response should reflect the lowest level of interaction?

I've only been here for a short time, and I've already noticed the same tendency as many other open forums on the internet.

Negativity. Nastiness hiding behind anonymity. Chest-beating. Condescension, ad hominem attacks. (Note the difference between these things and a good "heated discussion.")

I'm not bemoaning it, in fact I'm used to it, but since this is a philosophy forum I'm wondering "why?" when the opposite could just as easily true. And asking for input. To make it official here's my question:

"Why do human interactions on the internet tend to skew negative, as opposed to positive? What does this say about human behaviour?" — GLEN willows

It seems clear to me that you’re used to it - there’s a defensive over-confidence to much of what you write that suggests you expect to engage in debate rather than discussion. It invites responses from those with confidence in an opposing argument, or at least in the success of their own debating tactics. Your phrasing them as questions in the end (and even your added disclaimer) does little to conceal your intentions here.

From my perspective, I felt your passive-aggressive approach is a serious deterrent to joining in your ‘discussion’. But I hadn’t heard of Patricia Churchland before, and so I am taking an opportunity to read a couple of her articles. I have an interest in the collaboration of neuroscience with psychology, and its implications for philosophy (I find Lisa Feldman Barrett’s work on a constructed theory of emotion sheds some interesting light on the mind-body relation) so I’m intrigued. I am neither a materialist nor a dualist, but I find reductionist methodology to be an important tool to keep philosophers from throwing all their weight behind theories that reduce to solipsism or nihilism. In my view, philosophy should reduce ultimately to physics - but not necessarily through strict materialism, if that makes sense. Quantum physics, I think, plays a key role in this.

When she's thirsty she goes to the place where she drinks. She knows how to get there. If she found it empty, she'd go elsewhere. — creativesoul

I won’t deny that. You did, however, say this:

The aquarium was not meaningful to the cat until the cat drew correlations between the water in the aquarium and the satisfaction of her own thirst that drinking water can provide. Now, the cat goes to the aquarium whenever she wants a drink of water. — creativesoul

So I’m curious: would you say that the aquarium water source has variable significance to your cat (ie, she attributes attention and effort relative to her state of thirst and the comparative proximity/potentiality of ‘the place where she drinks’), but is meaningful to her only in relation to that significance?

I'm suddenly reminded of being charged with using an unnecessarily complicated framework. — creativesoul

Ha ha. I find it surprisingly simple to navigate, actually. It keeps me from ‘losing sight of the ground’. I can structure in my mind where a perspective might be in relation to you, Cookie or the aquarium, at various levels of awareness.

This looks like of those times where the narrative gets meta and the authors lose sight of the ground.

The very notion of possible meaning is existentially dependent upon language use. Where there has never been language use, there could have never been anyone hedging their bets upon another's meaning. Possible meaning is only attributed within a language game. Cookie does not play such games. — creativesoul

I do regularly encounter an assumption that I’ve lost sight of the ground when I start shifting rapidly between perspectives like this. I have an overall relational structure in mind that is six-dimensional, with possibility or meaning as six-dimensional structure, value, potential or significance as five-dimensional and physical interaction, events or life as four-dimensional structures of relation. Each dimensional level allows a corresponding level of integrated awareness. So it’s quite obvious to me that I can attribute the possibility of meaning to Cookie’s vague awareness of significance, but Cookie cannot. I forget that most people need to consolidate discussions at a particular level of awareness in order to keep track.

I’m not saying that Cookie attributes possible meaning, but that possible meaning is attributable (by us) to both variable structures of significance and variable structures or patterns of attention/effort. Such attribution requires that we recognise the variability in relation as a single entity.

The cat is neither you nor I. — creativesoul

Agreed. You might have to spell out your point here...

The life sustaining role is not recognized by her for she does not have the language in order to be able to draw such complex correlations. The relation is meaningful to us, and significant to her by virtue of being life sustaining. She has no clue. — creativesoul

Fair enough - not consciously recognised as significant, but nevertheless manifest in her attention and effort towards the aquarium. That’s how you recognise the significance of the relation - because her attention and effort (her integration and manifestation of significance) is not just meaningful but significant TO you. It is not, however significant TO me, although I recognise its potential significance, and that is meaningful to me.

But your cat has a clue - she has the vague awareness of a relation to the aquarium water source that varies in significance (attention and effort) according to the state she is in. When she’s thirsty, her limited capacity for thought gravitates towards this potentiality. If you empty the tank, she would still consider it, but it may eventually drop in this significance in favour of other water sources with more recently perceived potential to satisfy an allocation of attention and effort toward the relation.

Not all things significant to her are also meaningful to her. Unless something becomes part of a correlation drawn by a candidate under consideration, it is not meaningful to them. That same something may be significant to her without her ever becoming aware of the significance that it has. — creativesoul

I agree with most of this. Your last sentence I would say that it may be significant to her without her ever recognising the significance that it has. But I think a cat may be vaguely aware of significance in the same way we can be vaguely aware of relations existing prior to becoming meaningful to us.

There is a distinction between meaningful and meaningful TO someone. We draw this distinction through our awareness of what is meaningful to us, but NOT meaningful to another. But can you give an example of something that you would say IS meaningful TO your cat?

Significance is not equivalent to meaning. — creativesoul

I concur. My point is that possible meaning is attributed where we recognise variable significance, and potential significance is attributed where we recognise variable attention and effort.

The aquarium plays a life sustaining role in my cat's life. Since water is life sustaining and the aquarium provides water, the aquarium is a significant part of my cat's life. That is never considered by the cat. The aquarium's life sustaining role in my cat's life goes completely unnoticed by my cat.

So, meaning is not that significance. — creativesoul

The cat doesn’t need to distinguish purpose or meaning in order for her interactions to be purposeful or meaningful. The relation between the cat and the aquarium may not have a particular meaning for the cat - she recognises its significance, and manifests that significance through her actions. But the relation is NOT meaningless, regardless of what the cat does or doesn’t notice or consider.

Not all things significant to the cat are meaningful to her. All things meaningful to the cat are also significant to her. — creativesoul

I think perhaps I’m still interpreting ‘things’ differently to you. Do you consider relations to be things?

There is a naturally occurring process by which all meaningful things become so. — creativesoul

Significance and meaning are distinct. — creativesoul

Yes - the detail I think we seem unable to agree on is whether meaning or significance is prior...

Some things that make significant impact upon what happens next are not at all meaningful to the creature being significantly impacted. — creativesoul

Not in the sense that meaning is distinct from significance, no. But only self-conscious creatures are even potentially aware of this distinction. I’m proposing that, for those creatures unable to distinguish between meaning and significance, meaning IS that significance.

I believe that awareness of our biases is very helpful in arriving to accurate knowledge. It informs us of the need to, as you say, ameliorate, or compensate for them. That is why I believe a process, a method, with some essential steps to go through is required. I think that the steps I proposed are the bare minimum. They don't assure that we will arrive to an accurate conclusion, especially when the evidence we have is lacking or defective, but it will surely help. — EusebiusLevi

Welcome to the forum!

I agree with this - I also think it can be difficult to remind ourselves of this process when discussion turns to debate. I’ve often looked back on discussions that have deteriorated and realised that I’ve been as guilty of building defences out of assumptions and bias as the next guy. This is easier to spot when others in the discussion have a process themselves, and we all accept that any evidence or perspective we bring to the table is more likely than not to be lacking or defective in itself. I’ve enjoyed a lot of fruitful discussions like this here. We can pool our resources and see what emerges from the interaction.

But when people start to label positions, it can be a sign that they’re closing ranks, and the temptation is to look for a wall to duck behind and gather weaponry. Having at least someone in the discussion still willing to recognise the deficiencies in their own position - like a toddler in the middle of the battlefield - can serve to keep the rest of us honest about our own uncertainties.

I think most of us just have a tendency to look for a conclusion, a solid footing, logical statement or structure of ‘accurate knowledge’ as quickly as possible. We’re uncomfortable with the uncertain state of holding multiple incongruently formed ideas in the mind simultaneously - it’s taxing on our resources, and therefore painful. But so is exercise. The more we do it, the more we find we’re able to persist in that state for longer. And we start to see variability and patterns emerge, which enable us to restructure resources in ways that improve efficiency in that state.

As I said, I have no argument with you preferring ‘thing’ to ‘object’, or indeed rejecting the object/subject dichotomy as an essential distinction. That makes sense to me.

My argument is not that you should be more specific, but that your theory is not as ‘universally applicable’ as you seem to imply by the terms ‘different’ and ‘things’. You’ve admitted as much here with regard to what is a ‘thing’: what you don’t wish to give a specific name to - a potential, if you will. However, you’re also not referring to what is merely ‘different’, but only what is significant.

So it seems to me a more accurate description of your theory to say that meaning exists by virtue of drawing correlations between significance.

That sort of comparison - if warranted - ought at least be accompanied by some real life example that somehow shows a lack of explanatory power inherent to the position I'm advocating here. Ptolemy's position failed to be able to account for observation. — creativesoul

Ptolemy’s was not the only geocentric model - it is the convoluted attempts made to account for observation within the assumptions of geocentrism that I was analogising, with regard to your theory being ‘more nuanced’, that ‘some prior meaning is a condition for some potential thought’, and that their initial emergence is essentially ‘co-dependent’. All of this suggests to me there is something limited in the perspective, leading to unpredictable variance in the structure. That’s all.

I’m certainly not assuming I have a better or more complete theory - I haven’t done anywhere near enough work to warrant such a claim, and couldn’t hope to match your grasp of the topic. I only wonder if you’ve considered a more inclusive understanding of meaning than you already propose - one that structures ALL possibility of meaning existentially prior to potential thought, regardless of consciousness. You seem resistant to the notion, which is understandable. I’m still trying to work through it myself.

I use "things" and not "objects" for good reason. I reject the subject/object dichotomy/framework as well as a few other inherently inadequate, but nonetheless commonly used ones. — creativesoul

Fair enough - I’ve no argument with you there. But it seems to me that you’re not referring simply to difference, but to significance. And that these ‘things’ are more specific than you’re implying with the term.

As far as the last statement goes, I would tentatively agree, but it's quite a bit more nuanced than that, especially after language use has begun. Along the evolutionary timeline, there are situations where some prior meaning is a precondition for some potential thought. But, as a matter of initial emergence, meaning and thought are co-dependent upon one another. — creativesoul

I can see how a ‘bottom-up’ emergence would appear logical from an evolutionary standpoint. But it just seems unnecessarily complicated, to me. A bit like a geocentric structure of the solar system.

Okay... (I’m surprised I’m making much sense to you at all, then)

So, meaning exists by virtue of a correlation between not just different things, but significant objects, as in the focus or goal of a thinking subject. The potential or capacity for thought, for you, is a precondition to the possibility of meaning, then - not the other way around.

I guess that's a possibility but it becomes complicated because answers vary with constantly changing conditions that give rise to questions. — synthesis

Yes. The idea that the answer must be a consolidated, certain and invariable knowledge went out at least with the advent of quantum physics. The relationship between answer and question is more complex and fluid than we once thought.

I would concur that the fact that an omoeba alters direction until it is traveling along a chemical gradient does not render an omoeba capable of drawing correlations between different things, the chemical gradient being one of those things... — creativesoul

So...the chemical gradient is not meaningful to the amoeba? The amoeba is incapable of drawing a correlation between the shape of the chemical gradient and the direction of motion?

Okay, I need to make this clearer:

The statement would be considered an attempt at logical rendering, as you pointed out. But we are capable of relation prior to language use, prior to any formulation into thought, even - and in this kind of relation, existence is BOTH possible and impossible. But that’s meaningless. Our potential relation renders existence NOT impossible for the purpose of our thinking about it, of structuring our perception of its potentiality in relation to our own. And in that rendering, our perspective of existence is already limited to what seems a ‘necessary’ possibility.

So any thought I might have about existence should exclude the possibility of its negation. But I am nevertheless capable of at least considering the possibility of non-existence. And that is not entirely meaningless.

Ok. But do you agree that existence, as a necessary precondition of becoming meaningful, has at least the possibility of a relational effect/affect prior to its own meaning?
— Possibility

The question makes little to no sense on my view. Not all things that exist are meaningful. Some causal and spatiotemporal relationships exist in their entirety prior to ever becoming meaningful to any individual creature capable of attributing meaning. — creativesoul

Well, let’s start from a point of agreement:

Our knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful and/or prior to our becoming aware of it is certainly limited. — creativesoul

I interpret your position - and I’m confident you’ll correct me if I’m mistaken - as saying that something is only meaningful when meaning is attributed by a creature capable of distinguishing between meaning and change, or between meaning and shape, for instance. So the fact that an amoeba alters direction until it is travelling along a chemical gradient (and I realise we may be going over very old ground here) does not render an amoeba ‘capable of attributing meaning’. Am I close, or way off?

I would also not call existence "a relation" or a relationship that exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful.
— creativesoul

What would you call it then?
— Possibility

Having an effect/affect. A necessary precondition of becoming meaningful and/or becoming part of a causal and/or spatiotemporal relation. — creativesoul

Ok. But do you agree that existence, as a necessary precondition of becoming meaningful, has at least the possibility of a relational effect/affect prior to its own meaning? That is, prior to any awareness of existence?

“Existence is a relation to the possibility of non-existence. In its entirety, and prior to becoming meaningful, the possibility of existence is inseparable from its negation.”

That looks like an attempt at a logical rendering to me.

Here's my issue with it...

When something exists in it's entirety prior to language use, there is no possibility that it does not, and there is no negation.

Considering whether or not something or another exists; parsing existence in terms of the possibility of non-existence; claiming that existence is inseparable from it's negation presupposes that negation itself exists. Negation is entirely existentially dependent upon language use. Existence is not. Hence, as above, when something exists in it's entirety prior to language use, there is no possibility that it does not, and there is no such thing as negation. — creativesoul

As a statement, this would be considered an attempt at logical rendering. As a thinking process prior to language use, prior to formulation into thought, existence is BOTH possible and impossible, and it is in our relation to this binary contradiction that renders existence NOT impossible for the purpose of our thinking about it. So any thought I have about existence excludes its possible negation in order to consolidate the thought in my mind for potential relations.

So, it’s difficult for me to express - using language - the possibility that something exists in its entirety prior to language use, without a logical rendering that approximates the expression, at best.

Interesting. It reminded me of para-consistent logic or rejecting bivalence or rejecting the LEM. Have you no issue with explosion? No use for truth? — creativesoul

Truth has use, of course - but I’m not talking about use, but about relation. Acknowledging that truth as we use it is an approximation guards against hubris, and encourages awareness, connection and collaboration with what we don’t yet understand.

This might be our main point of contention. It seems to fit fine to me, without ending in incoherency, equivocation, or self-contradiction. — creativesoul

We can make it fit, sure - by ignorance, isolation or exclusion of possibility, as impossible.

The wonderful thing about thinking is that nobody knows anything about it (although you would never ascertain that gem from reading many of the contributions on this forum). And (of course) nobody really knows anything about anything, but I would like to add my specimen to the pile by suggesting that contrary to the accepted order of things intellectual, the answer must be known before the question posited. After all, how could you possible know what to ask without this knowledge? — synthesis

I would argue that only a possible answer must be consolidated - not necessarily known - before the question posited.

I would also not call existence "a relation" or a relationship that exists in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful. — creativesoul

What would you call it then?

Existence is a relation to the possibility of non-existence. In its entirety, and prior to becoming meaningful, the possibility of existence is inseparable from its negation.

It seems that perhaps your framework will not allow us to say something about that which exists in it's entirety prior to meaning, without ending in self-contradiction, but that inevitable result is - I strongly suspect - due to the inherent flaws within that framework. — creativesoul

Well, my framework is not a logical one, but a relational structure which is founded ultimately on a binary contradiction. I’m okay with that, because I can relate to it. Relation doesn’t fit within a logical framework, no matter how hard we try.

Why the scare-quotes around the terms truth and existence? The words are part of a relation, so if that's what you're saying by calling them both relations, I would concur. However, as parts of language use, they are meaningful, so it doesn't make sense to say that both exist in their entirety prior to becoming meaningful. — creativesoul

Okay, but let’s take a look at all of what I said:

‘Truth’ is an example of this, and so is ‘existence’. Both of these relations exist in their entirety prior to becoming meaningful, and the relations that we construct within the bounds of language are more accurately understood as an incomplete perspective (an approximation) of the possible relation in its entirety. — Possibility

The relation is not meaningful in its entirety necessarily within language use, only as a partial render/construction of the entire relation. So, even as parts of language use, ‘truth’ can only grasp the meaningful aspects of a relation that possibly exists beyond our faculties of imagination, understanding and judgement. Sure, it doesn’t make sense as parts of language use, but it doesn’t really have to.

↪Possibility We have some agreement.

In my view, this ‘evil’ is more the cornerstone of institutionalised religion.
— Possibility

Kenny sets out faith in terms of adherence to "acceptance of the testimony of a sacred text or of a religious community" - top p.394.

I would drive the nail deeper and suggest that no sooner are religious notions articulated than they become false. This also follows from such talk being understood as metaphor. — Banno

‘False’ seems to advocate a dismissal of the entire testimony. I just read an article on the 150th anniversary of Darwin’s ‘Descent of Man’ that addresses the imperialistic assumptions and misunderstanding of gender in what is otherwise an important work, and the difficulties in recent moves to ‘erase’ the authority of racist ideas from history. Recognising Darwin as ‘a man of his time’ allows the falseness in his testimony surrounding and interpreting his research to at least be understood without throwing out the proverbial baby.

I think it’s not just a matter of understanding these religious notions as metaphor, but also understanding their articulation as personal testimony (rather than authority), filled with the ignorance and falsehoods of the knowledge/experience that articulated them.

——————

I guess the issue I was having with the discussion - and the reason I commented - is the denigration of faith in general for the ignorance that unwarranted assertions and claims of authority or knowledge have contributed to, under the guise of religious ‘faith’.

Faith is not a virtue in itself, but by the same token is also not a vice when acted upon as a reasonable prediction in the absence of sufficient evidence. It is, however, a vice when it attempts to conceal a lack of warrant. I think it is this lack of warrant that is difficult for the faithful to acknowledge, because it opens the door to the possibility of doubt - falsely portrayed as the enemy of faith. But if there was no doubt, then we wouldn’t need faith to guide our actions, would we? We would just know.

I think faith is useful ONLY in the absence of sufficient evidence, and only for guiding our own thoughts, words and actions - not those of others. Faith (accompanied by doubt) is supposed to help us to interact with the world - to increase awareness, connection and collaboration with what we don’t yet understand - not to construct walls and swords against understanding.

When confidence is wielded as imposed authority over the words, thoughts or actions of others, then it’s an expression of the doubt and lack of warrant that naturally accompanies faith - in acts of ignorance, isolation and exclusion. When we read this authority into sacred texts and then attempt to bind others to it, we are no longer expressing our faith, but our doubts in denial, projected outward.

If it was completely indeterminate, we couldn't rule out horses the size of buildings. — frank

Oh, did I say completely indeterminate? Let’s just say ‘fuzzy’. Nevertheless, the idea is there; the significance, not so much - still, there was one made of wood...

How is a universal indeterminate? Do you mean because horses come in a range of sizes? Isn't that range a determinate property of the idea of a horse? — frank

A range of sizes and colours, and even variable shape - especially that cannot be determined from a hoof-print. However, it isn’t the universal sign, but the idea it points to, that’s indeterminate.

Does this argument work? — frank

Well, a universal is a possible consolidation of an indeterminate idea. Unless we acknowledge the idea as both possible and indeterminate (it looks like it might be some kind of horse), then the universal serves to conceal any uncertainty in our relation to it. In this sense the universal is a sign of possible ignorance.

But Eco, I think, might be saying that not just the universal but ALL signs conceal the possibility of missing information.

”...and signs and the signs of signs are used only when we are lacking things...”

Re "Thoughts actually exist physiologically as Patterns or Arrangements of brain cells inside of human heads. Those brain cells produce tiny electrical currents that can be detected." — Ken Edwards

This is like saying that ‘energy actually exists physically as patterns or arrangements of matter; this matter produces heat/work that can be detected.’ You’re missing something important here...

Thoughts are arrangements of neuron-firing patterns, not arrangements of brain-cells. And what is being detected is evidence of thought, but not necessarily the thought itself.

Memory is simply the mind's record of the past and these records maybe of absolutely anything one has experienced but the one I'm specifically interested in is ideas - memory of ideas.

Insight is defined as sudden breakthroughs or eureka moments that one experiences while tackling a usually difficult problem.

What got me thinking is there's no way one can distinguish insights from memories - they're both thoughts. Yes, memories are supposed to be recorded past experiences but I'd like to draw your attention to the fact that in terms of purely mental features, we can't tell apart insights from memories. Both of them have identical mental qualities. — TheMadFool

I think the distinction between memories and insights IS the temporal aspect of memories. We don’t have ‘memories of ideas’ because ideas have an indeterminate temporal aspect. Thoughts, on the other hand, are temporally located relational structures that have an indeterminate physical aspect, so it’s possible to remember a thought and locate that thought in the past - usually by an interoception of affect. But if that remembered thought was itself a remembering, then its content is atemporal, because a thought can have only one temporally located relational structure.

Insight, like ideas, have an indeterminate temporal aspect, enabling their content to be temporally located. So one can have insight into a memory, but not a memory of insight.

So, I don’t agree that memories and insight have identical mental qualities.

The million dollar question is this:

If reincarnation is not bound by time i.e. deaths and rebirths are temporally unrestricted (people who die in the future being reborn in the past, the converse scenario being a non-issue) could insights be memories? — TheMadFool

That’s a big IF that hasn’t been explained here...

Possibility So you wish to say that you are confident without warrant... Fine. It's the "without warrant" part that is salient here.

your point being...?
— Possibility
Here's the argument in the article, in less than twenty words: add warrant to belief and knowledge; faith is belief that is neither warranted nor known. No reference to tradition. — Banno

Ok, I’m with you now.

I agree with Dawkins that faith, as an irrevocable commitment, is not reasonable when given to a false proposition. But I see nothing unreasonable in believers having the degree of commitment to their church, synagogue or mosque that they might have to a political party or social community.
It is the degree of commitment involved in faith, rather than its religious object, that is what is really objectionable;

A bit more on the faith aspect...

It is too much to say that faith requires no justification: many religious people offer arguments not just for belief in God but for their particular creed. What is true is that the kinds of arguments they offer cannot be claimed to have anything like the degree of warrant that would justify the irrevocable commitment of faith. It is true that faith brooks no argument, not in the sense that the faithful are unwilling to offer responses to criticisms, but that no argument will make a true believer give up his faith, and this is something he is resolved on in advance of hearing any argument.

Faith is unshakable belief in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The saying goes "walk by faith not by sight". The key point above is the last statement. One with faith has already made up their own mind that nothing will change what they already believe, and they've done so - many times - quite deliberately, consciously, and knowingly. To do so in Christianity is held up as one of the most admirable qualities, if not perhaps the most admirable that a believer can have. — creativesoul

Again, I think this is a misunderstanding of faith as interpreted within certain (most) Christian traditions. The idea that faith is an unshakeable authority, that it is upheld in spite of evidence to the contrary, is a distortion that has emerged since the Enlightenment, as a self-preservation strategy. It reifies authority in the text and in its traditional and/or community interpretation. Prior to this, religious institutions were not above destroying evidence, testimony or traditions to the contrary - their authority upheld as ‘unquestionable’ in most social structures affording them license to do so. That they needed to resort to such actions is evidence in itself that the authority of faith is far from ‘unshakeable’.

As to the bible reference: your interpretation of this is again based on a tradition that has distorted ‘faith’ as an authority rather than a confidence. In context:

6 Therefore we are always confident and know that as long as we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord. 7 For we live by faith, not by sight. 8 We are confident, I say, and would prefer to be away from the body and at home with the Lord.

‘Sight’ (eidos) refers specifically to outward appearance, not knowledge or understanding (these are different Greek words). There is nothing here to indicate that anyone has ‘made up their mind’ - only that their mind or spirit (no distinction made) is more trustworthy than their body.

Faith is not unshakeable, not irrevocable and not authoritative. It’s only portrayed as such within most Christian traditions, institutions and officials desperate to hold onto their authority.

Clearly, he is showing tradition insufficient. — Banno

Agreed - your point being...?

Yes - but in terms of relational possibility, not just logical possibility.
— Possibility

Not in terms of what it takes in order for something to become meaningful(existing meaningfully)? — creativesoul

we can think about it, and it’s at least possible that we can relate to it prior to language use, beyond the necessity of significance or potential, perhaps even meaningfully - exploring possible distinctions and relational structures between significance and meaning. — Possibility

Some relations may never become meaningful for us, but it’s possible to relate to them nonetheless, outside the bounds of language. But to most we have attributed meaning (arbitrarily) for the purpose of re-constructing the relation as a concept, and talking about it within the bounds of language, reason, logic, etc. Even though we may be at least vaguely aware, if we’re honest and conscious of how others relate, that this relation at least possibly exists prior to (or beyond) its meaning so attributed. ‘Truth’ is an example of this, and so is ‘existence’. Both of these relations exist in their entirety prior to becoming meaningful, and the relations that we construct within the bounds of language are more accurately understood as an incomplete perspective (an approximation) of the possible relation in its entirety.

I don’t think we can say anything about ‘relations that exist in their entirety prior to meaning’ within the bounds of logic.

But if we can say something that appears contradictory...
— Possibility

More self-contradiction. — creativesoul

Contradiction positions a relation outside the bounds of logic. It doesn’t eliminate the relational possibility.

To be clear...

Are you suggesting that there ought be no rules governing human behaviour? That there ought be no such thing as an enforceable clearly written code of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour?

:worry: — creativesoul

No, of course not. I’m saying that any rules governing human behaviour must be based on a sound relational structure, not the words themselves or any particular or traditional interpretation of those words. I’m saying that a “clearly written code of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour” operates as such only with the trust and confidence (faith) of a community that lives by them, not just the authority of those who interpret or enforce them - and for any ‘authority’ to enforce blind obedience without opportunity to understand, question or challenge interpretation is unacceptable, in my book.

Why isn't that shifting the topic? No, he's referring to faith. He doesn't mention tradition. — Banno

Yes, he does:

In the Judeo-Christian tradition for instance... — Banno

He’s referring to an interpretation of faith within a particular religious tradition.

"God said 'fear', but meant 'trust'"...?

Not convincing. — Banno

From a child’s perspective, it’s fear, awe or reverence. From the parent’s perspective, it’s trust. I’m not assuming the text as written is the word of God.

No acceptable enforcement of authority in tradition, text or community alone, no.