I disagree. Given a scientific understanding of the universe - there's sufficient reason to form a God hypothesis. Logically, there's first cause, and physically, there's the fine tuning argument - neither of which constitute proof, but are certainly sufficient to support a God hypothesis. If you would entertain ideas like multiple universes, or the universe as a computer simulation - ruling out the idea of an intelligent, intentional cause is a double standard. — karl stone

Perhaps we have different ideas in mind when we hear (or read) science. I was speaking strictly about science as an empirical method for making predictions about the world. Pure physics, nothing else. That is a form of "understanding" the universe, but it's not the only form.

The theories you listed belong, from my point of view, to the realm of metaphysics. They do not describe what we observe, they interpret it. There is grounds for metaphysical agnosticism (though I think the "first cause" dilemma has been solved neatly by Kant and the "fine tuning" argument is utter nonsense). But in purely physical terms, only what is part of a theory can be said to exist. The concept of God does not describe any part of the observable universe, nor does it make any predictions. Hence, physically there is no such thing.

Likewise, the multi-unvierse theory and the simulation hypothesis interpret the physical world, they do not, as such, say anything about how it works. As such, they're literally meta-physics.

The fact is we don't know. No-one knows if God exists or not. Admitting what we do and do not know is important, because the really interesting thing that follows from such an admission is that, if there is a God - then science is effectively the word of God made manifest in Creation, and through discovering and being responsible to scientific truth, we can secure a sustainable future, and survive in the universe - maybe long enough to find out. — karl stone

But it is impossible to find out, is it not? There is no way to establish the objective reality of the universe as a mere observer.

Adhering to the faith that there is a God, the human species is doomed - for faith undermines reason, denies a scientific conception of reality its rightful authority, and sets one faith group against another. As a tool of pre-scientific, religious and political ideology, science gives us the power to destroy the world, but denies us the reason to save it. — karl stone

It's not the place of empirical science to give reasons. That's the realm of morality.

yes more useful is subjective base on the goal. — hachit

But given the goal I have stated, science is the most useful method.

We have to remember it was not science that gave us gunpowder and the printing press that was alchemy. It was also not modern science that gave us modern medicine that was christianity — hachit

Are "Alchemy" and "Christianity" methods? If so, how do they work?

If the goal of science is to find the truth, how can it without excepting all the parts. — hachit

Is the goal of science to "find the truth"? What truth do you mean? Science makes predictions about observable reality. Whether or not you think these predictions are "truth" doesn't change the fact that they work, and that is all that matters for the purpose of science.

Secondly we don't know if magic is good or not because as science became more popular it led to more discoverys wich made it more popular leading to more research in it wich made it more discoverys. It then became a run away sinario. It became popular because of the cristians than people cut its ties to christianity. Again it is not using all the parts. — hachit

So science became popular because it works. Which begs then question: if there are other methods that work, why aren't they popular? You're welcome to try "magic". I am sure people will be interested if it works.

I think some constructivism, or at least fallibalism is warranted with things like perceptions/knowledge of the experiential world. I'm not sure it makes as much sense when we talk about basic math or logic. A =/= ~A is a pretty straightforward truth. — NKBJ

Well it's a truth, but it's not an objective truth, is it? Formal logic does not point towards some object somewhere, nor does maths. Though physicists like to say that "math is the language of the universe" math and logic are not imparted to us by the universe. All purely deductive systems are tautological, they are true because they are true.

but that is circular reasoning resoning. It is true that science is useful but if you going to say it's the more useful without a comparison it creates a feed back loop. — hachit

Oh, I see. But other methods, e.g. magic, do not work as well for the same purpose.

You could make a general argument that what is "more useful" is entirely subjective. But the scientific method is still what we should be using if we want to answer questions about experienced reality.

But it's all about value judgements, or that's what it boils down to anyway, however you look at it, whether we talk about mine or theirs or in relation to this or that. There's no way around that. I could only try my best to get them to see things my way. And I'm sure I could do much better than how you've envisioned the exchange! — S

If you want to do better though, you have to change the form if your argument and hence the type of value judgement you make. Your judgement on X and your judgement on someone else's judgement on X are different. If you don't make this distinction, you make every moral argument about yourself. But you certainly are not so self centered as to assume you are the ultimate moral authority.

But liberalism has its limits, wouldn't you agree? I'm very socially liberal, but you ought to have some red lines. Don't shout "Fire!" in a crowded theatre. Don't have unprotected sex if you're not willing to accept the possible consequences or if you have an uncaring or blasé attitude about abortion. The former is immoral and against the law. The latter is immoral, but not against the law. That seems right to me. — S

Sure it has limits. But how are those limits established? Not by simply deciding what *I* would do and applying that to everyone else.

The scientifically correct position on the God hypothesis is agnosticism, not atheism. — karl stone

If we are taking about empirical science then I think the scientifically correct position on God is atheism. God is not part of any scientific theory of the universe, so it doesn't exist.

how if i may ask. — hachit

The answer seems rather self-evident, given that you are asking the question via an Internet forum.

But the answer is because the scientific method provides functional predictions. It allows us to, to an extent, see the future.

Where do you take that argument from?

The argument I know is that you can divide a quantity up infinitely. That is, an arbitrarily high amount of times, but never infinite times.

So science is just as logically valid as magic. It just has more approval. — hachit

Science does not just randomly have more approval though. It is more useful.

What is science? — bogdan9310

A method that generates functional predictions about the relations between events

But what questions does science answer? — bogdan9310

The questions "how should I expect this to behave", "what should I expect to happen if I do X" and "what should I do to arrive at Y".

Science only analyzes existing concepts, and there is no scientific research before a concept is created. — bogdan9310

Science arguably relies on theories in order to then compare them to experience, buy it's not analytical.

Does science rely on philosophy to exist? — bogdan9310

Yes, insofar as science, the method, is philosophy.

Science is nothing more than the gradual progress and discoveries based on previous work, and we can describe the source of our current understanding of science as the product of a collective mind of scientists working together, but in different timelines. Albert Einstein did not come up with relativity from scratch, the concept of time was already there. Isaac Newton based his absolute space and time theory on top of Johannes Kepler’s work, and so on.

My point is that we mostly make up knowledge, then build it up, rather than discovering it. — bogdan9310

That is essentially the argument of constructivism. The notion of "discovering" knowledge is certainly at least skewed. But where do you want to go from here?

What if you start from the wrong idea? You would be just building a structure, and it will make sense to you because that how structures function. How would you know if you are wrong? — bogdan9310

You would know if the structure did not do what you expected it to do. When you learn to walk, you make it up as you go along. You can organize your limbs any way you like, but not all ways get you anywhere.

Science is generally good, but people treat it as a religion nowadays — bogdan9310

I think you may be confusing science and metaphysical realism. Anyways how people treat something tells us about the people. Is this a thread about science or about people?

But science isn't "just built up." Science proceeds by tearing down what's proven wrong, to rebuild what's right. It's a method of doubt, as opposed - I suspect, to your method of faith — karl stone

That's a nice way to put it!

An example is the idea, the presupposition, that every event has a cause (which apparently was Kant's presupposition, and was not held by Newton or by modern science). — tim wood

Did Kant presuppose that? I suppose he might, but his argument had the form "if there is only natural causation, then". And the experience of causality exists.

I am probably just repeating points I already made in your other thread, but I'd like to answer anyways.

The biggest obstacle to libertarian free will, it seems to me, is not physicalism, but the metaphysics behind causation. An intuitive belief about causation is that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence; thus, if there is a lightning strike, one expects that there is a cause for that lightning strike. However, if that metaphysical intuition is true, then whenever we have a thought, there must have been a cause to bring that thought about and this seems to deny libertarian free will. — Walter Pound

If thoughts came about without causes, how would we experience that? Would these thoughts be unconnected to our previous thoughts, randomly popping up?

If you make a decision, that decision will be based on who you are. If it weren't, it wouldn't be your decision. But that obviously means the decision is not "uncaused", because whatever reasoning is behind the decision is determined by your personality, circumstances etc. Whatever a "free" will is, it's not based on making decisions that are uncaused.

Is it necessary for uncaused causes to be possible for libertarian free will to be possible? — Walter Pound

If you use a restrictive definition of libertarian free will then yes.

Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will? — Walter Pound

I can present a theory of free will that allows for determinism. Causality is a human perception. Free will is a human experience. Neither can be said to be more real than the other.

When we look at the outside world, we organize it so that all future states are fully consistent with all past states. This is necessary for us to make predictions, which we need in order to be able to act. When we do act, though, we consider that action to be guided by the future goal, not the past state of our mind. This is also necessary to be able to act.

We simply use two different ordering principles for different functions.

Thanks for the interesting essay. Not much that I would fundamentally disagree with.

I wonder whether radical constructivism holds that there are a priori principles built into the human mind? Are e.g. time and space, as ordering principles, built from comparing experiences?

According to hard determinism, the universe as it is, down to its most minute and trivial events (like my decision to drink tea rather than coffee) is the result - and the ONLY possible result - of an inevitable chain of a causational event originating at the Big Bang. To my thinking, that implies that somehow the shape of our universe with all its incredible complexity was inherent in the structure of the infinitesimal small sized primaeval atom. — Jacob-B

Well it implies that all information was always present in some form, yes. Conservation of energy and conservation of information. I don't think the big bang theory assumes a "very small atom", it assumes that space itself was created. It's not a small particle, it's a state without spatial dimensions.

That, in turn, implies some sort of DNA- like plan. That, in turn, makes hard determinism uncomfortably resembles ‘creationism’. If the shape of our universe was indeed inherent in the primaeval atom, the determinists need to provide a physics theory of supporting that assumption. — Jacob-B

All the laws of physics are based on that assumption.

I tend to think that the causal chain of the primaeval atom did break down at a certain level of complexity and was replaced by a not strictly causal evolutionary process that doesn't rule out Free Will. — Jacob-B

How does this not strictly causal process interact with the strictly causal processes we observe?

Oh and I think that, if one is going to ignore large parts of a post and only reply to a single point, it's nice to at least note why one is only interested in that one point. Particularily if it's in a discussion that has been going on for a while. Not necessary, but nice, I think.

Overusage of the quote function can also be bad though. One should avoid to take posts apart sentence by sentence, because that can cause you to miss the forest for the trees.

Sure, responsibility is only an issue if there is value in the first place. But I find it almost incomprehensible to see either no value or such little value in the foetus to warrant little-to-no responsibility when it comes to terminating it, which means killing it, ending its life. It's human, it's alive, it has the potential of becoming a baby, infant, child, teenager, and adult. In fact, on that point, it's common to refer to a foetus as a baby, or by a gender specific pronoun, or by its given name, or by an endearing term. The terms being used in this discussion are technical and impersonal. Each and every one of us was a foetus at one point. It resembles us and shares features with us, such as eyes, arms, legs, and a beating heart. — S

We can call it a child, if you want. I am not squeamish about the terms. But I think the reason to use technical terms in a discussion such as this one is to avoid the connotations that come with the more common terms, which can distort an argument.

People can judge value differently, but I find some of those judgements repulsive and abhorrent, such as judging it to be acceptable to drown kittens in a river or at an even more extreme end, exterminating Jews. There's a scale, and for me at least, irresponsible abortion is on there somewhere. — S

But the feelings you have when confronted with a certain judgement only tell us about you, not about the judgement. You may well not drown the kittens, or kill the child, when it is your decision to make. But when it's someone else's decision to make, you presumably want to also tell them "you should not drown those kittens, you should not kill that child". If you then tell them "because it would cause me negative feeling" or "Because I would not do it", whether or not they listen will depend entirely on whether they value you as a person. Which is to say they're going to make a decision about you, not about kittens or children.

Since we all live in a society, and usually have some say about where that society is headed, we need to differentiate between what we would like to do and what we would like other people to do. "I would do X, so everyone should do X" is the attitude of either a god or a petty tyrant.

The issue is if one can say that x caused y in eternalism and it seems like one must argue that x and y eternally coexist, but are not the cause of each other. Supposed one looked at two locations of space, that eternally exist, it wouldn't make much sense to say that one location caused the other. — Walter Pound

Not if you saw them as points in a multidimensional space you can travel in several directions. But if you imagine being on a train that travels a single track, ever forward, would it not make sense that one sign on the track, or different colors of the track, cause each other? Presumably, to other travelers on that train, this statement would make sense.

If the metaphysics behind the b theory of time is correct, then any thought that exists eternally and never came into being or goes out of being. This is why it is so hard to see how one could argue that free will exists. I don't even think one can use the word determinism to describe such a state of affairs. — Walter Pound

How is that different from a world where all thoughts that will ever be are already determined at the beginning of creation?

I do think I made a mistake in my previous argument. Depending on what you mean by the "metaphysic behind the theory are true". If that means that the block universe is the actual, objective reality that causes our being and our experience, then I suppose that would make determinism objectively real too. We will never know though.

When it's more dissimilar or not understood is when you get the "bad reasoning" judgment. — Terrapin Station

I don't think that this is accurate. Not understanding that you are even dealing with an argument is not a judgement of the content of that argument. It's a failure to communicate. There is a difference between "I do not understand this because it is Chinese" and "I do not understand this because the argument confuses me".

Re validity, there are different species of logic and different definitions of validity. For example, validity is different in relevance logics than in traditional logic. (And quirks with the traditional definition of validity was really the whole initial motivation for relevance logics.) — Terrapin Station

But does this impact my argument? If I can reason about logic and try to iron out "quirks" could this not also apply to morality? Do the proponents of relevance logic merely feel that traditional logic has quirks or is this more than just a personal impression? If it is just a personal impression, is their work useless?

Statement two: Science has shown remarkable capability of verification, prediction and use.
How is is this possible if it is only the appearance of external reality (phenomena), not the external reality itself (noumena)? — Arthur Rupel

It's possible because phenomena are still related to noumena. The phenomena are in some way related to the noumena. So, if we establish a relation between phenomena, we have also established a relation between whatever parts of the noumena created them. This relationships is "true" even if it's not the objective relation.

I like to think of it as an encrypted message. Objective reality is the original text, your mind the encryption machine, empirical reality is the encrypted message. You can analyze the encrypted message and find relations between different parts. These are "real", they represent information that was in the original message, but they are not that information.

People compare it to how they reason, what makes sense to them. — Terrapin Station

But in order for that to work, they need to have a similar ability to reason. They need to understand at least how the other's reasoning works in order to compare it. Their mind needs to be able to "run" the sequence of reasoning.

That's how we can establish things like logical validity. Doesn't that mean it's possible to also establish other kinds of validity or "truth" between subjects?

Can you explain what you mean? — Walter Pound

Well for a being moving through time in one direction, the connections between events would appear as cause and effect.

Or perhaps more accurately: For a being that perceived time as a one-dimensional flow, events would look like that. It might also be the other way around and the fact that one perceives events as causes and effects would lead one to perceive time as flowing. And this would be valid, in the sense that it accurately represents the connections between events.

How does that affect the possibility of either determinism, indeterminacy, libertarian free will and compatiblism if all events exist senselessly? — Walter Pound

Well if the mind is not physical, then the perception of free will exists outside the physical universe. As such, it could then be "true" irrespective of the nature of the physical world.

Think of it this way: the world you see is a picture in your mind, a thought. Why would this thought, with it's notions of causality and determinism, be more important than the thoughts which include decisions and thus free will?

Definitely people do that all the time, because people judge good and bad reasoning very frequently where they're not even familiar with a concept of logical validity. — Terrapin Station

So, what is it they, or we, compare statements, or an argument against when we make that judgement? It seems to be more than just the question whether the argument has changed our feelings on the matter.

I've always questioned why the cat isn't dead or alive just because we don't know if it is. Just because we don't know a true/false value doesn't mean one doesn't exist. We have no evidence that the universe doesn't exist without an observer. I think that in our mind the variable is unknown, but there is a correct answer, us knowing it or not doesn't change that. — TogetherTurtle

You may think that, but there is no evidence for it. And when we talk about the physical reality, evidence is all that ultimately matters. Schrödinger's Cat is a thought experiment, but there have been plenty of experiments that all confirm the notion. Including experiments that specifically tested whether you can trick photons to reveal the hidden variable that determines their state, but you can't. Either the universe looks into the future and sabotages our attempts to find this hidden truth by telling the particles to act differently, or it really is a probability distribution.

And by "it really is" I of course mean "in reality as observed by humans".

I think since probability exists hard determinism is incorrect. Current physics uses the Schrodinger cat experiment to make this apparent. The cat is either alive or dead, there is no certainty, no hard determinism, no omnipresent observer making all things certain and predetermined. This of course is just theory too. — Josh Alfred

Just because there is a range of possible outcomes with certain probabilities, the outcome is not indeterminate. You can still fully describe the state of the universe in quantum mechanics, and hence also future states (in theory, anyways).

Oh god no. Parents can be extremely irresponsible. They shouldn't get free rein in every case. — S

Their responsibility isn't the issue though, is it? They just need to make a value judgement. If you're going to say their judgement is wrong you are going to have to say why.

I understood your point to be that a couple shouldn't be held anywhere near as morally responsible for creating a pregnancy if they took the right the precautions, like the guy wearing a condom. I agree with that. But in response to that, my point is that they're still very much morally responsible for what they do regarding the pregnancy going forward. — S

Ah, okay. No disagreement here.

Well, your poking doesn't seem to have done much, at least not in relation to my position on the relevance of responsibility. There are some clearcut cases where they're very much morally responsible for the results of their actions, and there are some clearcut cases - as you've pointed out - where they're not anywhere near as morally responsible for the results of their actions, and either way, they're very much responsible for what they do going forward, which is what ultimately matters. — S

This whole line of argument is only really relevant if you want to base the morality of the decision for or against abortion on previous choices the mother made. The way I understand your argument, you do not concern yourself with any such construction. To you (and please correct me if I am wrong here), the foetus has value, and that value is sufficient to warrant it's protection over the interests of the mother.

The answer that comes to mind regarding that position is that, if anyone is to judge the value of the foetus, it's the parents. You are welcome to have your own opinion, but if you're going to judge their judgement your reasons must be applicable in general.

Suppose that the metaphysics behind the b theory of time is true, and all events exist tenselessly, then what does that mean for causation? — Walter Pound

Causation would still be a valid way to determine the relation of events.

What does that mean for the debate over determinism, compatibilism, libertarian free will, and indeterminacy? — Walter Pound

I don't think the nature of time impacts the debate much. Events are connected regardless of whether you think they all exist tenselessly or continuously "happen". The real question isn't whether the physical world is deterministic, because it has to be for us to know anything about it. The question is whether the self is also physical.

That's not succinctly summarizable, because it relates to feelings in so many ways, but the important thing is that reason isn't objective. Reason is a mental function. — Terrapin Station

Would you say that there a way to judge "good" reasoning and "bad" reasoning that is distinct from just determining wether the statement is logically valid?

Yes, but that would change if it resulted in pregnancy. — S

Huh? I don't understand what you mean.

And I don't really get why you'd switch the focus to protected sex. Isn't the point to consider the arguable counterexamples, and to focus on those which seem the strongest? A stronger counterexample against someone who is either rejecting or trying to underplay the responsibility involved would be a couple who don't really care that much about protection or the possible consequences of having unprotected sex. If that ends up resulting in an abortion, then I'd say that they're sure as hell responsible. — S

Arguable counterexamples to what? My theory of responsibility? I am not rejecting the responsibility involved, I just argue that the circumstances matter.

I haven't yet formed a full argument on the morality of abortion. I take the easy way out and just poke at other people's arguments. One of the things I am poking at is that "they are responsible for the results of their actions" is not a sufficient argument. Not all results of an action carry responsibility, and just establishing responsibility does not allow one to attach any consequence.

Atoms are just another model. In quantum physics there are even smaller building blocks. Or rather the blocks disappear and turn into wave forms.

As to whether "you" are a collection of atoms, I think the answer is no. You are not your body. You are a mind, or the awareness inside a mind. You are not a physical object, though you are represented by physical processes (brain activity) in the physical world.

Is your body still the same even though the atoms change? That is the "ship of Theseus" problem. The answer is that your question is incomplete. In order to answer the question "is X the same as Y", the context needs to be established. The same with respect to what?

Is it the same with respect to the physical identity of it's particles (cells, molecules, atoms)? No. Is it the same with respect to it's quality as a body? Yes.

"Democracy Now" is a left-leaning news channel, and Richard Wolff from "Democracy at Work" is a left-wing economist who makes YouTube videos about the current economic situation and criticized capitalism. They're not well known, as far as I know, and I cannot judge whether their arguments are particularly good.

Excuse me for jumping in here, but you aren't actually suggesting that the possible consequences of unprotected sex are a big mystery, are you? — S

No, I was only establishing the boundaries of responsibility in general. Which, thinking about it, might have been confusing.

I think a case can be made that a pregnancy resulting from protected sex is sufficiently unlikely that the responsibility is too minor to base significant consequences on it.

Practical rules that are objective in their intention of the well-being of all humans (and maybe beyond). — Christoffer

What does it mean for a rule to be 'objective in it's intention"?

I think you have a point when you say:

This means you can create a foundation of morals that are based on a moral method of thinking, not specific acts to do in certain situations that are contextual. — Christoffer

Making moral decisions is about using moral reasoning. Trying to find rules which can be applied consistently to all cases, like the scientific theory looks for theories that are consistent with all observations.

For example, maybe you enjoy stealing things, but you think it's morally wrong in general for people to steal, It would be an equivocation in that case to say that you don't personally dislike stealing, but you think it's morally wrong for people in general to steal, because maybe you think the economy wouldn't be workable in that case, or whatever. That's an equivocation because you'd not be thinking that exactly the same thing, in the same respect, for the same reasons, etc. is something that both you don't dislike and that you think is morally wrong. — Terrapin Station

Sure, but if I need to think exactly the same thing, in the same respect, for the same reasons, the difference between "dislike" and "immoral" disappears. Which of course is your point. But I don't think using the word "dislike" in this manner helps to make the point very clear.

Anyways as to the topic of "objective morality", I think it's just a misnomer. Or perhaps a case of asking the wrong question. The point of morality is, after all, not to provide information on some object. It's to provide practical rules.

I don't quite understand this response. What, exactly, are you saying you don't dislike but feel is morally wrong? — Terrapin Station

I am saying that I can dislike things and not consider then morally wrong (e.g. abortion).

And I can certainly like doing things that I consider immoral. But that might not be exactly what you mean.

So you think it would make sense for someone to say, "I don't dislike rape representations in pornography, but I feel that rape representations in pornography are morally wrong"? — Terrapin Station

I think this is a possible brain state to have. It might just be cognitive dissonance but I feel (heh) that at least the inverse of your statement applies to some of my views.

For example, in the abortion debate, I asked whether being responsible for an injury means one should donate blood or even organs to alleviate it. While I feel that as a matter of personal conscience, I should donate blood in that case, I am at least sceptical whether it can be a moral obligation. And on the topic of abortion itself, I consider abortion a tragedy but do not consider it morally wrong.

This is really hard to continue with — Rank Amateur

Agreed. And since we do not seem to be getting anywhere, I think it's time to quit for the time being. I cannot seem to get my point across to you, and your responses often don't make sense to me.

Perhaps some other participant will be able to make a better case.

So we are NOT responsible for the direct and predictable results of our act of free will because a butterfly flapped it wings in Argentina? — Rank Amateur

If the results are direct and predictable, there is no problem with responsibility. If they are neither - like a butterfly effect - then there is a problem..

and you just say

No. — Rank Amateur

Well, what else am I going to respond if you rephrase my statement to say something entirely different? I was talking about consent. You talked about responsibility. Different words with different meanings.

I understand that is your belief, and that is 100 pct fine. But that is not argument.

I think we have been back and forth enough on this - — Rank Amateur

Sure, it's not an argument. I am not sure on the exact outcome of the question given the premises.

That said, it is my impression that a complete argument in favor of a moral obligation towards carring a child to term faces significant problems.

First, the moral standing of the foetus is questionable, particularly in early pregnancy.

Second, in order to establish a responsibility for the well being of that foetus, we need to somehow connect it's dependence on the mother to an act of her. But the only act that is apparently available is the act of conception, and at that point the person that is supposedly impacted by that act does not exist. That is unless we assume they already existed as some kind of spirit waiting to be incarnated.

And third, even if we ignore these points, as we have done so far, it's still not clear just how much we can demand from the mother based on her responsibility, and it seems we need to examine specific cases.

So while I cannot argue that it's impossible to construct a sound argument, I haven't seen one, either. But perhaps I have not looked enough.

So we are NOT responsible for the direct and predictable results of our act of free will because a butterfly flapped it wings in Argentina? — Rank Amateur

If the consequences are direct and predictable, then one is responsible. It's when the consequences are neither that there is a problem.

and you just say

No.

it is like "who's on first " ( hope you get the reference ) — Rank Amateur

Well what else am I supposed to answer if I talk about consent and you talk about responsibility? I can see no connection between what I wrote and your interpretation.

I understand that is your belief, and that is 100 pct fine. But that is not argument. — Rank Amateur

Sure, it's not an argument. But I don't claim I can easily resolve the issue. As it stands, I see several problems for the stance that, barring special circumstances, carrying a child to term is a moral obligation.

First, the moral position of the foetus is questionable, particularly in early pregnancy.

Second the notion that the act of having sex entails responsibility for the dependency of the resulting foetus treats sex like a wrongful act towards that foetus. It seems to suppose that the person the foetus will eventually turn into already existed in an abstract form, waiting to be born. And now that you have put this person into the sorry state of dependence on a womb, you must help them out. Needless to say, this is odd.

And third even if the responsibility is established, we need to establish that it's actually significant enough, in the specific case, to warrant the imposition of an unwanted pregnancy.

So yes, I don't have an ironclad argument against a moral obligation against abortion. But on the other hand, I haven't seen an ironclad argument in favor, either. Given that there are significant hurdles such an argument would have to take, I think my position is somewhat reasonable.

So, are we relieved of the responsibility of our acts of free will, simply by them not being intended? I didn't want to hit that car as I ran the red light, my intention was only to save a few minutes. — Rank Amateur

No.

Yet, you have agreed already that the father has to pay child support, after he has said he had no intention of having the child. Can you bridge that for me? — Rank Amateur

I already tried, including in the very post you are quoting from. Without further input, I have nothing to add to that.

You realize that is a blatant contradiction in terms — Rank Amateur

I don't realize. I suspect you find the combination of intentional pregnancy and implied consent contradictory? I don't know how many women explicitly state their consent to carry a child to term during sex, but I somehow doubt it's very many.

So we are responsible for the direct and predictable results of our act of free will because a butterfly flapped it wings in Argentina? — Rank Amateur

This is just weird. Is there a "not" missing somewhere?

I would agree, for sure that their is a continuum of responsibility of degree with not having sex at one end, and unprotected sex, during ovulation at the other end.

And in a practical sense, if an effective method of contraception is used effectively, well over 95 or more percent of this issue is moot. And, while effectively trying to limit the possible results of your actions is the right thing to do, I still would argue the mere change in the probability of the result does not relieve you of the responsibility — Rank Amateur

But if there are degrees of responsibility that correspond (possibly among other factors) to the degree of certainty of a risk, it seems to follow that there is a level of risk that corresponds to practically zero responsibility. That is the responsibility is so ephemeral that it cannot support any moral obligation.

I am having trouble attaching a consequence as significant as several months of unwanted pregnancy, and then giving birth, to sex, even unprotected sex. Of course small errors can have life-changing consequences under various circumstances. But these consequences are usually the result of having to alleviate damage done, not to create some desirable state of affairs.

So is the basic premise here that psychology is not an empirical science? Because if it is, it seems to me that this is just the problem of induction.