Ah, what a wonderful paper. I like all these little read-along threads you do
@Banno. They make me go through essays I've been meaning to read but never quite got around to. Well - I've gotten around to this and I've found it perfectly agreeable. Some immediate thoughts:
(1) It's striking to me that Davidson begins from a very similar place to Chomsky (novel grammatical or semantic constructions, to state it broadly) and ends up drawing - to Davidson's infinite credit - an almost diametrically opposite conclusion to Chomsky's waste-of-space linguistics: that language can't possibly be considered in terms of some kind of "general framework of categories and rules", and can only be taken seriously when considered in connection to "wit, luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their point across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are most likely". It's nice too, to finally understand the context for that famous line about how "there is no such thing as language", which I've read a thousand times without going to the source.
(2) The paper immediately brought to mind the work of Stanley Cavell, my favourite philosopher of language (and the only post-Wittgensteinian I trust), who, in probably his most famous lines, concluded thus about language:
"We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying" (Cavell, "The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy")
The resonances with Davidson here should be obvious (notably, Cavell published this almsot 20 years before Davidson's essay!). And one of the nice things that Cavell provides - which Davidson here only opens as a question - is precisely an account of these features of language in terms of what he calls 'projection'. For Cavell, words (or phrases, in the case of malapropisms) can be "projected" into different contexts, and whether those projections take hold or not (are "acceptable", in the case of malapropisms, or "unacceptable" in those cases where we adduce that someone is just talking nonsense) depends only on our 'forms of life' - the 'whirl of organism'. Some more Cavell, for comparison:
"While it is true that we must use the same word in, project a word into, various contexts (must be willing to call some contexts the same), it is equally true that what will count as a legitimate projection is deeply controlled. You can "feed peanuts to a monkey" and "feed pennies to a meter", but you cannot feed a monkey by stuffing pennies in its mouth, and if you mash peanuts into a coin slot you won't be feeding the meter. Would you be feeding a lion if you put a bushel of carrots in his cage? That he in fact does not eat them would not be enough to show that you weren't; he may not eat his meat. But in the latter case "may not eat" means "isn't hungry then" or "refuses to eat it". And not every case of "not eating" is "refusing food".
... I might say: An object or activity or event onto or into which a concept is projected, must invite or allow that projection; in the way in which, for an object to be (called) an art object, it must allow or invite the experience and behavior which are appropriate or necessary to our concepts of the appreciation or contemplation or absorption... of an art object. What kind of object will allow or invite or be fit for that contemplation, etc., is no more accidental or arbitrary than what kind of object will be fit to serve as (what we call) a "shoe". ... You cannot use words to do what we do with them until you are initiate of the forms of life which give those words the point and shape they have in our lives." (Cavell, The Claim of Reason).
More to say, but just wanted to plonk at least these two thoughts out there for now.