That's what I'm asking. I've often heard it said that psychedelics provide empirical evidence for the no-self view, because when you ingest them you lose your sense of self. But if this is the case, then something must be losing the sense of self. What else could it be but the self?

What is the thing that loses the sense of self when in a deep meditative state? Is it not the self that loses the sense of self?

I think the idea that the self is an illusion does not make sense. The obvious first complaint is who is having this illusion?

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I could not agree with this more. I really think the only way we can make sense of the 'no-self' doctrine is to take a Meinongian approach, viz. if we understand it to be saying that the self is a non-existent object. The 'illusion' comes in when we erroneously assume that the self exists.

Consider now paraconsistent logic as a system that mustn't descend into triviality which it would be if all propositions are provable as true within it. That means you don't want paraconsistent logic to prove the opposite of ~D, which is D, to be true. Doesn't this amount to saying you don't want (D & ~D) to be true, which it would be if ~D is true (you're not in Indonesia) and D (you're in Indonesia) is also true? Isn't not wanting (D & ~D) to be true just another way of affirming the LNC? In other words the non-triviality of paraconsistent logic is dependent on affirming the LNC.

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I don't agree with your characterization of what's going on here. Surely I think that some (actually most) contradictions should not be provable. But suppose that L is the Liar Sentence. Since I think the Liar Sentence is both true and false, I want both L and ~L, and thus L & ~L, to be in my theory. So, while there are some contradictions I want to avoid (such as D & ~D), there are some that I want to include in my theory.

Also, the LNC cannot be the ground for avoiding triviality, because as I mentioned in my OP, a number of Dialectical Logics do not have the LNC as a theorem. To be sure, I do think that the LNC should be a theorem, but this is not why I want to avoid triviality.

Of course, liar paradoxes are only contradictions if their truth is considered to be atemporal; otherwise these contradiction are avoidable using a tensed logic in which every sentence of a proof is temporally indexed according to the moment of it's creation, wherein the only distinction between premises and conclusions is that the latter is constructed after the former.

In such a tensed logic, liar paradoxes of the form P(t) => ~P(t+1) are consistent and only the simultaneous derivation P(t) and ~P(t) is inconsistent.

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These are very interesting remarks. Sadly, my knowledge of dynamic logics is sorely lacking at this point in time, but I think dynamic logics at best can only have partial applications; for there are many cases where we need to use a static logic. And it is in these scenarios that the Liar Sentence arises.

Or perhaps, contradiction only appears unresolved within logic. Reason, however, can rise above and incorporate the contradiction into a unity (like building a pyramid). Logic could be likened to a prison for the mind (or like stabilisers on a bike). Reason could be likened to a free mind.

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I understand this view, but I don't think anything is off-limits to logic. Of course, the ordinary logic that we learn from the textbooks is woefully limited, but if we turn to a suitable non-standard logic, then there is nowhere we can't go with it.

I just want to throw this out there: maybe you reading this are where yo u think you are and in Indonesia at the same time. Maybe it's not about nothing being true, but everything being true. But you experience what you experience. It seems like all the truths should be experienced at once but it's not because if everything is true, than even your experience now is too

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This is essentially the view of Paul Kabay. If you aren't aware of him, he is a philosopher who defends Trivialism, i.e. the view that all propositions are true. While I don't agree with this view, it is very interesting indeed.

How would you demonstrate that not all propositions are true?

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In order to demonstrate that not all propositions are true, I need only demonstrate that one proposition is false, cf. my Indonesia example. It is like if someone were to say “All dogs are white.” To demonstrate that this is not true, I need only demonstrate that at least one dog is not white.

Anyway why did you say:

The reason that I personally want to block ex falso quodlibet is because I think that some contradictions are true. Therefore, I don’t want my theories to explode into triviality
— Alvin Capello

I said this because I in fact think that some contradictions are true. However, I still accept the LNC (in fact, I think the LNC is both true and false).

If P is false, then ~P is true and P & ~P is false.

But if P is both true and false, then ~P is both true and false, and P & ~P is both true and false as well.

Now, while I do accept the LNC, it is not the basis for my thinking that not all propositions are true. The reason I think this is simply because it is demonstrable that not all propositions are true. For example, we can demonstrate right now that I am not currently in Indonesia. So it is false that I am currently in Indonesia.

What do you mean here by triviality? Does a theory become trivial if, with it, one can prove any and all propositions? What if every proposition is true? If not, then doesn't it mean that we don't want contradictions? And doesn't that indicate affirming the LNC? In short, that one wants theories to be non-trivial means one affirms the LNC.

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Precisely; triviality just means that every proposition is true. But I don’t want to avoid this just because I want to avoid contradictions. In fact, I don’t want to avoid contradictions because I think some of them are true. But I don’t think every proposition is true. So I will need a theory in which only some contradictions are true.

That achieves the same purpose doesn't it?

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Yes indeed. Blocking disjunctive syllogism achieves the same goal as does blocking disjunction introduction.

:lol:

I've tried, but nothing is working :cry:

I should mention as a point of clarification that you don’t need to believe that there are true contradictions in order to use a Paraconsistent or even a Dialectical Logic. Indeed, if you know that a certain philosophical theory is inconsistent, then it would be most reasonable to use a Dialectical Logic when analyzing it.

Surely some seeming contradictions can be resolved, but I don’t think this is true of all of them. For instance, I don’t think the Liar Sentence and other similar semantic paradoxes have any consistent solutions, so these are radically contradictory objects on my view.

Now as for whether nothing is impossible, I am somewhat undecided on this viewpoint; so I don’t think I can give any meaningful comments on it just yet.

Let’s see what this means through 2 examples. Suppose we have an object that is round on the front side, but not round on the back side. We can understand that, while the object is both round and not round at the same time, it is not both round and not round in the same respect. This is because it is the front side that is round, but the back side that is not round. So this object is not contradictory.

Now suppose we have another object that is both round all over and it is not the case that it is round all over. This new object is both round and not round at the same time and in the same respect. This is because it is the entire object that is both round and not round. Therefore, this second object is truly contradictory.

A contradiction is just a true sentence with a true negation. Or, in other words, a sentence that is both true and false at the same time and in the same respect.

Is there anything within that Plato and Aristotle did not cover?

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Well sure. For one thing, Plato and Aristotle never seriously considered dialectical responses to this problem. Moreover, Priest connects his Gluon Theory to interesting themes in Buddhist philosophy, such as nothingness, impermanence, etc.

LP in particular deals with contradictions by inferring only those propositions that have interconnections with them; thereby allowing us to reason about them. Classical logic, and all other non-paraconsistent logics, infer everything from a contradiction. Thus, we cannot reason when we come across a contradiction using these logics.

If you want a recent example of how LP has been applied in metaphysics, Graham Priest in his recent book “One” has used it to formulate his Gluon Theory, which is a new way of answering the Problem of the One and the Many.

But I should say that not all Paraconsistent Logics block disjunction introduction. Some of them block Disjunctive Syllogism. These are the ones I favor, since I don’t think DS is a valid rule of inference.

The reason that I personally want to block ex falso quodlibet is because I think that some contradictions are true. Therefore, I don’t want my theories to explode into triviality.

I will be posting a full review of the book on my blog at alvincapello.com soon. I will be sure to dm you as soon as that happens.

But for some idea of the ground it covers, Miravalle suggests that Meinongianism provides a neat solution to the main problem areas of philosophy of religion. For instance, he suggests that Meinongianism provides the right interpretation for the Cosmological and Ontological Arguments (I agree with this).

The chapters I have not yet reached concern how Meinongianism can provide solutions to the Problem of Evil and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge.

I also have been profoundly influenced by Meinong. Indeed, I am a full-fledged Meinongian, and it is a fundamental away that I approach philosophical problems.

Well, one good reason to use it is that LP can deal with contradictory theories. Classical and other non-paraconsistent logics cannot do this.

I don’t think LP is the right logic myself (I was just using it as an easy example), but I do think that the actual world is contradictory. So whatever system of DL is the correct one, its conclusions will find a home in the ordinary world.

I don’t think it’s correct to say that a logic is either valid or sound. To be sure, most logics do have valid arguments in them, but the logic itself is not valid.

1. what does negation mean in paraconsistent logic?

2. If negation has an altogether different meaning than its meaning in classical logic then (A & ~A) in paraconsistent logic is NOT a violation of the law of noncontradiction.

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It depends on the type of paraconsistent logic. Some of them understand negation to be a subcontrary-forming operator (subcontraries, recall, are pairs of propositions that cannot both be false, but can both be true). Other paraconsistent logics understand negation to be a contradictory-forming operator (contradictories are pairs of propositions that cannot both be true or both be false).

Now if we understand negation to be a subcontrary-forming operator, then I agree with you that A & ~A is not a violation of the LNC. But if we understand it as a contradictory-forming operator, then A & ~A is a violation of the LNC.

I personally do think that some sentences violate the LNC, but I accept the LNC too :smile:

No, not truth-values to the arguments. Just validity, invalidity, soundness, etc.

As in classical logic.

Yep, looks good to me :smile:

I’m actually claiming that about you. Abraham is a prophet of Islam. Therefore, Allah is the god of abraham.

Allah does not instruct his followers to hate the followers of the god of abraham. In fact, there are numerous verses where he says the opposite.

The verses about killing infidels mainly refer to the arabic polytheists of the time.

The term ‘People of the Book’ in the Koran refers to Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

:lol:

Sure thing. Until next time :smile:

As I have said numerous times, nothing is tastier in the quantificational sense, but not the ontological sense.

Since we keep going in circles and you won’t answer my questions, it would not be productive to continue down this line of discussion.

Abraham is a prophet of Islam, so why would Allah hate the followers of the god of Abraham? He would have to hate his own followers

Nothing tastes better than fettuccine alfredo doesn't imply that nothing has a taste but the issue is not that nothing has a taste or not but if taste could be extended in terms of a measured value beyond that of fettuccine alfredo, what would lie in that region? Nothing, of course.

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This makes it amply clear that you are indeed conflating the two senses of the term. As before, no object lies in the region, but it is not the case that the state of nonexistence lies in the region.

I’m not exactly sure if there is much more I can say on this issue, but I guess I can ask your opinion of the ham-sandwich argument from earlier. Do you not see how that argument equivocates the two senses of nothing, and how you are doing the exact same thing?

Perhaps the question is, if you're going to be both consistent and inconsistent, then how is that decided?

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That is partly what I am trying to get at with this discussion.

I'll show you how it works in LP. In LP, we have 3 truth-values: T, P, F. 2 of these values, i.e. T and P, are designated, while F is undesignated. T and F are the normal values of truth and falsity, while P represents a new value, viz. 'paradoxical'. Essentially, sentences with the value P are both true and false at the same time and in the same respect. In LP, an argument is considered valid if and only if there is no semantic interpretation wherein all the premises are designated an the conclusion is undesignated.

Now, let's see how negation and conjunction work in LP. If a sentence A has the value T, then ~A has the value F, and vice-versa (as in Classical Logic). But if a sentence A has the value P, then ~A also has the value P. A conjunction will be designated just so long as each of its conjuncts are designated.

Say we have a sentence A with the value P. Since ~A will also have the value P, it follows that A & ~A has the value P too. Now say we have a sentence B with the value F. This being the case, is the following argument valid in LP?:

1. A & ~A
2. Therefore, B

No. It is invalid because the premise is designated, but the conclusion is undesignated.

If that's the case, then as I explained above, premises 3 and 4 are false. Because they both assert that the state of nonexistence has a length which can be compared to a given measure. Therefore, your argument cannot even get off the ground.

By the way, do you think that when people say things like "Nothing tastes better than fettuccine alfredo", they are really saying something like "The state of nonexistence tastes better than fettuccine alfredo?" Because it seems quite clear to me that what we actually mean when we say this is something like "There exists no object which tastes better than fettuccine alfredo."

Working my way through God, Existence, and Fictional Objects: The Case for Meinongian Theism John-Mark L. Miravalle. A very interesting little book which deals with some quite fundamental issues in philosophy of religion.

Also re-reading Heraclitus' Fragments. Always good to revisit these mysterious aphorisms.

Again, you are assigning these lengths to nothing in the quantificational sense, but not in the ontological sense.

To ask again, do you not recognize the distinction between these 2 senses of the term?

For instance, Graham Priest's Logic of Paradox is logic in which sentences can be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect. Priest likes to use the Liar Sentence as an example of one such, viz. "This sentence is false."

As for your second question, I specified in the OP that DL must be Paraconsistent. Paraconsistent Logics are ones in which contradictions do not imply everything. Thus, in a Paraconsistent Logic, you can have a sentence of the form A & ~A, but it will not follow that some arbitrary sentence B can be proved from this.

Again, I would assign these to nothing in the quantificational sense, i.e. in the sense that I would not assign them to anything. But I would not assign them to nothing in the ontological sense, i.e. nothingness considered as a state of nonexistence. Your argument crucially depends upon an equivocation of these senses.

I will repeat the question from above: Do you, or do you not, recognize these 2 very distinct senses of the term?

You are still equivocating on the term 'nothing'. All I can do in response is to emphasize that I can only assign these to nothing in the quantificational sense, but not the ontological sense. Your argument conflates these 2 quite different meanings of the term.

These are interesting remarks. While I do recognize that you are describing one traditional way of characterizing Dialectical Logic, I am coming at it from another angle. I should have been clearer about this in my OP, but I am referring to DL in the specific sense of a logic in which some sentences are both True and False at the same time and in the same respect.

Now, with that being said, should the LNC be a theorem of that sort of logic?

If it's mandatory that each length be matched, the most logical option is to match both 0.5 cm and 9 cm to nothing. If you disagree then it is required of you to find something that matches these lengths and, of course, none exist.

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As I explained above, you are equivocating on the use of the term ‘nothing.’ We can correctly say that these lengths match up to nothing in the quantificational sense, i.e. in the sense that no object possesses these lengths. But we cannot say that they match up to nothing in the ontological sense, i.e. in the sense that they match up to the state of nonexistence,

Do you not recognize these 2 very distinct senses of the word ‘nothing’?