An illusion is an intrinsically intentional experience that is given to consciousness. So, to say that consciousness is an illusion is essentially to saw off the branch on which you're sitting. For an illusion presupposes a conscious mind that is being deceived by the illusion.

Show me a field of people without strife and I will show you field of corpses. Utopia is a pipe dream. — Book273

It's a bit difficult to discern an actual argument here, but you seem to be saying that utopia will never be achieved in the future because it has not already been achieved. But this is obviously fallacious reasoning. It would be like if someone living in the year 1968 had said "Humans walking on the moon is a pipe dream. If this were really possible, we would have already done it." Or it would be like if someone living prior to the 1950's said "A vaccine for polio is a pipe dream. If such a thing were possible, we would have discovered it already."

The mere fact that something has yet to happen does not at all demonstrate that that thing is a pipe dream.

Any attempt to implement utopia, whether technologically based or not, necessarily requires some measure of tyranny. — Merkwurdichliebe

This is almost trivially disproven. A utopia that is reached without any measure of tyranny certainly does not violate any law of logic, and it also does not violate any law of physics. So already the idea is both logically and physically possible, and I would be willing to argue that it violates no other laws of any other kind either. So I'm quite comfortable with asserting that the idea is possible in every sense of that term. Saying that utopia "necessarily" requires tyranny of some kind is surely incorrect.

It is totally absurd to merely consider the possibility of a system that perfectly fits every single individual, free of conflict and injustice. — Merkwurdichliebe

Of course it isn't, the idea is perfectly plausible. Furthermore, thinking about how we might get there can and does have very many interesting applications to current scientific research (just consider the current work being done in AI, futurology, the SENS Foundation, etc. Almost all of the work strives toward the utopian future). To say that it is "totally absurd" is obviously false and can be empirically disproven with ease.

And even to imagine such a fictitious state invokes imagery of an excruciatingly boring and meaningless existence. — Merkwurdichliebe

To you maybe, but not to me. I believe that such a state would be far more exciting than our current state.

Work towards utopia, and prevent birth, so do both. — schopenhauer1

That can't be right though; a utopis that no one can experience is not a utopia at all.

Has science become so complete that it explicitly excludes the possibility of a creator? If so, could you expound upon that? Is the credibility of the creationists worldview significantly undermined by the progression of scientific understanding and to what extent are they mutually exclusive? — Julz

If by "creationists" you're referring to the young earth creationists, then I think science has indeed undermined their worldview. But if by that word you just mean one who thinks that the universe was created, then science most definitely has not undermined that world view. Indeed, it seems inconceivable how such a world view could ever be undermined by a purely scientific investigation.

But then you are okay with using people to try to get to some technological utopia? People are thus fodder for the "aggregate utilitarian mill" of getting some advanced technology in some far off distant future? — schopenhauer1

No, I think it should be a voluntary and collective effort. But I wouldn't jump to conclusions by viewing the project as that of an "aggregate utilitarian mill". I for one am an ardent anti-consequentialist, so I have no plans to advocate for a utilitarian proposal. Nevertheless, we can still work towards a technological utopia on non-utilitarian grounds.

As I've previously stated, in Panpsychism, consciousness ( self organization ) is a property everything possesses. Including cells. — Pop

Here you've broached a subject on which I am woefully ignorant. I find panpsychism to be deeply interesting, but I can't comment on it, since I haven't read the strongest arguments for it. Sorry :sad:

I'm afraid they are, unless you can self organize unconsciously. — Pop

Notice how this relates to your definition of consciousness, viz:

The role of consciousness is primarily to self organize. — Pop

If we take this non-standard definition of consciousness on board, then your earlier statement basically amounts to "I'm afraid they are, unless you can self-organize without self-organizing." Of course, this is tautologically true.

But if we use the every day understanding of consciousness, i.e. as first-person awareness or internal experience, then I can find many examples of unconscious self-organization. The most obvious examples are cells. Cells presumably don't have conscious experience, and yet they undergo self-organization.

I am exploring the phrase as completely as possible. — Pop

This is completely irrelevant for understanding Descartes' claim, since he is only using "I am" in the existential sense. Bringing in other senses of the term can only lead to confusion, as your remarks on Descartes' claim above demonstrate.

My claim can be disproven by providing an instance of consciousness which is not in some way self organization. — Pop

I don't deny that consciousness can be deeply interrelated with self-organization. Indeed, there might not be a single instance of consciousness which is not in some way self-organization, but this does not mean that they are equivalent. In just the same way that you cannot find a single instance of an american citizen who is not a human, but this does not imply that all humans are american citizens. To put it more simply, all instances of consciousness might be instances of self-organization, but this does not imply that all instances of self-organization are instances of consciousness. This is why I said earlier that it would appear that there can be many evolving processes of self-organization which do not have any first-person awareness.

The statement relates to Descartes I think therefore I am - I am what? — Pop

You are confusing 2 uses of the phrase "I am" here. You are taking Descartes to be using it in the predicative sense (i.e. when we say things like "I am green", "I am a man", etc.) But he is actually using it in the existential sense. More specifically, by saying "I am", he is just saying "I exist." Or in full form, "I think, therefore I exist."

I am consciousness — Pop

This can't be right. Consciousness is a property that certain objects have; namely the property of having experiences, or put differently, the property of first-person awareness. Individual subjects aren't properties. To say that "I am consciousness" seems to be similar to saying "I am materiality". While this might be sensibly understood in some metaphorical way, it cannot be literally true. Since individuals cannot literally be the property of being composed of matter

My definition of consciousness is: an evolving process of self organization — Pop

That doesn't seem right either. Since consciousness appears to require first-person awareness (indeed, consciousness seems to be nothing more than first-person awareness). But it would seem that there can be many evolving processes of self-organization which do not have any personal awareness at all.

So with a deadly pandemic raging, causing pain and misery to millions of people, upending society, causing fear of making wrong decisions- where to go, what is safe to do, weighing options, making potentially wrong decisions that lead to pain and possibly death. Add this to the many other and already tried and true ways we suffer, compounding the other forms. Governments imploding into their own reenactnent of Greco Roman.cycle of democracy and tyranny. Pain is easily forgetten until one actually endures it. Then what? Be thankful you are no longer being tortured by a disease ravaging your body? How does this not lend cause to abstaining from procreation? — schopenhauer1

The state of affairs you describe lends cause to one of 2 outcomes, in my view. One that is more pessimistic, and another that is more optimistic. The pessimistic outcome is essentially that of antinatalism. The optimistic outcome is the use of advanced technology to eliminate suffering and to achieve artificial immortality. In either case, suffering will be eliminated once and for all. But it is just a question of how much imagination and determination we have as a species. For my part, I fully support the optimistic outcome :smile:

— HermanS

Hello! Apologies for the late reply. Here are the places where I think you went wrong. All of these suffer from the same problem it seems:

In the 2 examples for 6.6.2, you sent both negative conditionals from world 0 to world 1. But this is incorrect: each negative conditional should bring a new world into the tableau. So, for instance, you can send (P -> Q), -0 to world 1, but now you have to send (Q -> S) -0 to a new world, say world 2). Give that a shot and see how it goes :smile:

Now for exercise 6.10.4c there's a similar problem, when you negate a negative proposition, you need to bring a new world to the tableau. But you sent both of them to the same world. Therefore, after sending -P, -0 to world 1, you need to send -Q, -0 to world 2.

Same thing with 6.10.4e. You sent both negative conditionals to world 1, but you need to send the first to world 1 and the second to world 2.

I hope this was helpful. Please let me know if you have more questions.

I view the problem of human freedom as one of contradictory human desires. One the one hand, we want to be free, because we like the idea of being in control of our destiny. On the other hand, however, we do not want to be free, because then we must take responsibility for our actions. Then the question of handing over the gift of freedom becomes more a question of handing over responsibility.

I like to view a contradiction in terms of a blank space on a piece of paper on which you write down propositions. Imagine the blank space; (..........). I say, "God exists" and this space gets filled and becomes: (God exists). If I now say "God doesn't exist, this happens:(God exists) - basically you're, if you had an eraser at hand, erasing the words "God exists" from the blank space and we return to:(..........), the blank space we started with.

In essence then a contradiction is to say nothing at all (returning to the blank space after having written down a proposition and then erasing it). — TheMadFool

This is not the way contradictions are viewed in classical logic, but this is precisely how Aristotle and many philosophers until the rise of classical logic viewed them. The technical name for this view is "negation as cancellation", and the types of logics that use this sort of negation are known as "connexive logics". More info here

You may also be pleased to know that connexive logics are paraconsistent, meaning that EFQ is not valid in these logics. Indeed, Aristotle's syllogistic logic (one of many connexive logics) is paraconsistent, although this fact is not widely known. To convince yourself of this fact, consider the following syllogism:

1. All birds can fly.
2. Some birds cannot fly.
3. Therefore, the moon is made of green cheese.

This is not a valid syllogistic argument, since it violates all the rules of syllogistic reasoning. Now, in the sentential realm, the connexive logician avoids EFQ due to the fact that Simplification is not a valid rule of inference in connexive logic.

I think this is a fair criticism of Hobbe's reasoning. Kant makes a broadly similar point when laying out his theory of the social contract. If the state of nature was a perpetual state of war where even the concept of rights and duties doesn't exist, not only is there no reason to ever trust your fellow man, there is also no reason to band together to change the state of affairs. The latter requires you to already have some idea how a better, more cooperative soceity could operate. So the basic concepts that underlie that society must already exist.

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I agree with all this entirely. But I didn’t know that Kant made similar remarks. I am more familiar with his work on epistemology and ethics, so it looks like I will need to do some reading into his political philosophy.

I'd agree to you insofar as the supposed "perpetual state of war" is not ultimately a good argument against anarchism. All humans have the desire and ability to cooperate to reach certain goals, and will do so without coercion. I think the problem that anarchism faces is a bit more down the line: How to effectively organise large-scale social cooperation without establishing hierachies and ruler / ruled relationships.

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This is definitely a major problem. Anarchism does seem to be more fitting for small-scale social arrangements; so cooperation between communities is a delicate issue. Not to mention we have things such as nuclear power plants which need constant large-scale maintenance.

For an idea of a unicorn to "represent" a horned horse, which also doesn't "exist", then "horned horse" is just another idea. So, your idea, "unicorn" would represent another idea, "horned horse".

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When I said that a unicorn is a horned horse, I did not at all mean that it represents the idea of a horned horse. Rather, I meant that a unicorn is a physical horse with a physical horn (even though it’s nonexistent). A unicorn is a horse in exactly the same way in which existent horses are; and it has a horn in exactly the same way in which existing horned animals do.

What caused the idea of "unicorn" to exist in your mind? Probably someone else communicating that idea to you. How did "unicorn" come to exist in the first mind that imagined it if there are no unicorn organisms for them to observe?

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What caused the idea of unicorn to come into the mind of the first person who imagined it might have been a number of things. Perhaps it was an initial baptism they performed upon a characterization; that characterization being the set of properties {horse, has a horn}. Or maybe that person saw a unicorn in a dream or hallucination (I think we can perceive nonexistent objects) and performed the initial baptism that way. In either case, the idea has now reached me through a causal chain. This is basically Saul Kripke’s view on naming and reference. I am not an empiricist either, so I don’t think it is strictly necessary for someone to have already experienced the properties contained in a characterization, even though it is frequently the case that we do.

Now you're confusing the idea of causation with the process of causation. You seem to have understood the difference between an organism and the idea of an organism, but here you regressed into confusing the process of causation with the idea of causation (Frodo causing the One Ring to be destroyed).

You are actually misunderstanding me here. When I said that Frodo caused the One Ring to be destroyed, I was referring to the process of causation. A physical Frodo dropped a physical ring into a physical fire, even though none of these exist.

It's not just uninformative. It's circular. If this is how you define, "existence" then I don't understand your use of "existence" any better than when you first used the word.

It’s not circular; I just define existence as a property that some objects have and other objects lack. Magnanimity is also a property that some objects have and others lack; would you say that this too is circular?

What rules a man emotion or reason? If reason, how do the people of a society get their reasoning?

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I have absolutely no idea. This seems to me to be an empirical question; so I'm not sure that I can comment on it.

What are the circumstances that shaped Hobbes' consciousness?

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You will have to expand on this question. What do you mean by 'consciousness'? Consciousness of what?

Yes, Hobbes says an authority is the only way to suspend the war of all against all.
He is also a Monarchist who dismisses forms of the Republic that would presume to provide such authority as is needed to stop that war.
The two ideas are obviously intertwined but are not identical.
Unless you agree with Hobbes on the matter.

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This is an accurate description of Hobbes' view, but I'm trying to ascertain whether the example he provides really serves to establish this conclusion.

It seems to me that unicorns do exist. They exist as ideas, not as organisms.

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A unicorn and the idea of a unicorn are radically different kinds of objects. For one thing, a unicorn is a horned horse, while the idea of a unicorn is not a horned horse (rather, it represents a horned horse). So too, the idea of a unicorn exists in the mind, while a unicorn itself does not.

To say that something exists means that it has causal power. To say that it doesn't exist means that it doesn't have causal power.

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I understand this view, but I don't accept it. The reason why is because many nonexistent objects have causal powers. For instance, Frodo Baggins caused the One Ring to be destroyed by casting it into the fires of Mount Doom, but Frodo doesn't exist.

On my view, to say that something exists is just to say that it has the property of existence; while to say that it doesn't exist is just to say that it lacks the property of existence. This might sound somewhat uninformative, but in my view existence is a simple property, and thus cannot be analyzed into something more basic.

Separating things into concepts and objects is called the Frege-Church Ontology. I don’t accept it, but it is respectable.

In your viewpoint, are there any problems with drawing the distinction between these 2 concepts on the criteria that only objects have a spatiotemporal dimension.

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Well, my issue with drawing this distinction is that I think only some objects have a spatiotemporal dimension, many do not.

Since I tend to take an object-oriented approach in my philosophy, I consider “object” to be the most general category. Everything is an object, on my view.

You become one with absolute being, then you earn the title of "philosopher." until then, you are merely fumbling around the outskirts of knowledge because the existence of the absolute is still a presupposition for you and not a direct experience.

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Not at all. Philosophy is not a secret cult that you need to become initiated into. It is for everyone. Anyone who loves wisdom, and who is willing to critically analyze their own presuppositions and to rationally argue for their beliefs is a philosopher.

I’m not claiming that the mystical experience doesn’t exist, but if you claim that it overrides any arguments, then you are no longer doing philosophy.

To immediately disregard the possibility that an opponent might come up with a successful argument is the height of dogmatism, and it is anti-philosophical.

I should also mention that i am absolutely not a materialist in any sense. Indeed, my argument can be tweaked to attack materialism too.

You're presupposing that the subject, in its entirety, is contingent upon the brain. In idealism, it isn't. In materialism, it is (this is called reductionism).

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I'm not presupposing anything, I'm only responding to the point you made earlier, to wit:

the properties of the object, without question, are contingent upon the brain

I myself don't reduce the mind to the brain.

Most of your other remarks seem to involve it being possible that we might discover unicorns one day in reality. This is surely true, but the obvious thing to do here is to replace 'unicorn' with something we know a priori does not exist in reality. For instance, the round square that is not identical with itself, or the blind, non self-identical seeing-eye dog that doesn't exist in the actual world. The very descriptions of these 2 objects insure from the get go that they do not exist in actuality.

If they have the same logical form, how can they be "very different?"

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A nonexistent object and the concept of a nonexistent object do not have the same logical forms; for in order to assess the structures of a golden mountain and the concept of a golden mountain, for instance, we would need to use different axioms.

The idea of a nonexistent (i.e. non-actualized) exists in mind, but you cannot prove that this object is not actualized somewhere else, and an idea came from another mind on another planet who perceived it, through a collective unconscious, and into a human mind. This a huge flaw in your argument. you would first have to prove that this is not possible as opposed to take it as a presupposition.

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Well if the nonexistent objects under question are of the same sort as the 2 I mentioned earlier, viz. the round square that is not identical with itself, or the blind, non self-identical seeing-eye dog that doesn't exist in the actual world, then I can prove that these objects do not exist at all. This is because both of these objects violate the Law of Identity, and thus they cannot possibly exist in reality (even though the concepts of them exist in the mind).

It's like saying that the computer code for the existence of a unicorn in a video game is "very different" from the unicorn in the game relative to the perspective of one of the characters.

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I would make exactly this claim. The unicorn in the video game and the computer code for the unicorn have very different properties, so they are very different

Would you mind giving me an example of a non-existent object having a property? I’m somewhat under-educated on this topic but my initial thought is that fictional entities could have properties. For example, I could make a declarative statement that “Homer Simpson has yellow skin”. Obviously, Homer Simpson doesn’t actually exist as an object but it might seem intuitive to interpret the statement as being true because the term “Homer Simpson” typically denotes the character from the cartoon and that character is portrayed with yellow skin. But, Homer Simpson seems to be a concept rather than an object. What exactly is a non-existent object then? Is there a difference between concepts and objects?

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I would say that Homer Simpson and the concept of Homer Simpson are two very different things. For one thing, the concept of Homer Simpson does not have yellow skin, while Homer Simpson himself does have yellow skin. The difference between concepts and objects is this: all concepts are objects, but not all objects are concepts. I'm not a concept, for instance, but I am still an object.

With regard to the question of just what is a nonexistent object, the answer is that a nonexistent object is just an object that lacks the property of existence. That might not sound terribly informative, but objects play such a fundamental role in my philosophy that I'm not sure I can do much better.

That’s a pretty good approach since you may find that your opponent holds an inconsistent epistemic criteria when he goes about judging other people’s bullet biting. For example, the utilitarian might think that the implications of utilitarianism provide no good reason to reject utilitarianism while also thinking that the implications of Kantian ethics such as the insistence that one ought to never lie even when there’s lives at stake is an undeniable refutation of Kantian ethics. You would want to ask that utilitarian why he is willing to bite the bullet on the utilitarian implications but not the Kantian ones. More educated utilitarians would probably appeal to some deeper axiological viewpoint that morally relevant value can only lie in state of affairs and that only one particular aspect of state of affairs such as valences felt by sentient beings or the facts about preferences of various value bearers and their satisfaction status is relevant to morality. Other utilitarians might not have a good reason to give for thinking that utilitarianism is more plausible than Kantian deontology.

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I agree with all of this completely. This isn't done very often, but I think philosophical discussions can proceed much more effectively if both parties begin by laying our their foundational beliefs, and the sort of logic that they use to derive conclusions from these beliefs. It seems that too often discussions turn into sterile exercises where each party is talking past one another. Not clearly laying out the underlying structures of the worldviews under discussion can only lead to misunderstandings down the road.

you need to define the object in terms of the subject, and this is because the properties of the object, without question, are contingent upon the brain. You must also understand that unicorns exist as images inside the mind, but do not exist in the world, so you cannot say that they absolutely do not exist, but exist as objects of imagination only. They thus have existence in some sense.

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I do not define the object in terms of the subject, for the properties of the unicorn are not dependent upon the brain. Unicorns would still be horned horses, even if no humans had ever existed. And to say that unicorns exist as images in the mind is to make a common mistake. Surely ideas of unicorns exist in the mind, but unicorns themselves do not. A unicorn and the idea of a unicorn are two very different things, so conflating them is a mistake (indeed, I think this is one of the central errors of idealism). What I want to claim is that unicorns do not exist anywhere, and thus don't have existence in any sense.

you're not acknowledging the fact that ideas exist as objects of memory.

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I accept this point, but a nonexistent object and the idea of a nonexistent object are very different things. The idea of a nonexistent object exists in the mind, but the nonexistent object that it is an idea of does not.

You need to clarify your definition of "object" here.

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It's rather hard to define in terms of other things, because objects are the absolute baseline of my philosophy. But if I have to give it a shot, I would say that an object is anything that can possess properties and stand in relations. Some objects, like horses, exist; while other objects, like unicorns, do not. Make no mistake though, unicorns still have four legs, fur, manes, etc. in exactly the same way that horses do; they just don't exist.

it's not the case that, if a concept exists in the absolute mind, that it must become actualized in space as a sensible concept relative to sense perception. what keeps concepts in the mind of the absolute from being sensible concepts in relation to perceiving subjects is intentionality. This is a very important point in regards to your argument. All objects that exist, exist, but not all objects exist in the spatial sense; only those that are willed to exist in a spatial sense, exist.

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I'm willing to grant on your own terms that concepts can exist in the absolute mind without becoming actualized in space. But if a concept (or object, as you mentioned earlier) exists in the absolute mind, then surely it exists. I'm claiming that many objects do not exist at all, in any sense of the term. Idealism does not allow for this; hence it must be rejected.

I will be releasing the book on it soon. I have found a method that essentially makes philosophy into a science, and allows us to ascertain all the questions concerning metaphysics which have hitherto remained unanswered.

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Can you let me know when that happens please? :smile:

You need to change this to entity as opposed to object.

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An entity is just an existing object, so effecting this change would make no difference either way to the argument.

According to idealism, not all objects are spatially extended objects; meaning, that there are both spatially extended objects, and objects that are not spatially extended.

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What do you mean by spatially extended here? If it means extended in an independently subsisting spatial reality, then the object is not an idea, thus this would not be coherent with idealism. If you mean existing in the spatial faculty of the mind, then the object is indeed an idea, and thus an existing object (or an 'entity', if you prefer). Leading into your next point, viz.

According to idealism, objects are sensible concepts, some objects do not exist because contradictions can exist as concepts, or rather, objects of awareness, but they cannot become actualized as spatially extended objects.

This means that, because sensible concepts are entities (according to idealism), even if the sensible concept is not spatially extended, it still exists as a sensible concept,and thus it still exists. And since all objects are sensible concepts, as you claim, then all objects exist. But many objects do not exist. Therefore, we must reject the notion that all objects are sensible concepts.

this is true, although, this forum isn't exactly teaming with critical thinkers, so most here will probably disagree. unfortunately, today, most who have degrees in philosophy are postmodernists or empiricists and thereby have about as much knowledge about ontology as the uneducated laymen. it's almost impossible to have a conversation with them because once you ask them to give support for their presuppositions, they no longer want to discuss the topic.

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I'm no postmodernist and certainly no empiricist, and yet I roundly reject idealism. There are several reasons why, but the most fundamental can be encapsulated in the following argument:

1: If idealism is true, then everything is an idea or a mind.
2: All ideas and minds are existing objects, according to idealism.
3: Therefore, if idealism is true, everything is an existent objects. (1,2)
4: But some objects do not exist.
5: Therefore, idealism is not true. (3,4)

So, what is your approach towards having a discussion with a philosopher that doesn’t think the implication of his position is counterintuitive?

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Whenever this happens, it usually seems to be because there is a more fundamental disagreement regarding principles at work here . For instance, if your opponent bites the bullet on the unintuitive utilitarian implications, then most likely the real issue here is more structural than ethical theory. So what I normally do is take a step back and try to get at the fundamental tenets of my opponents worldview.

Also, what implications are you willing to accept that most philosophers are not willing to accept?

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I think that true statements can be made about nonexistent objects. I also believe that the naive semantic account of truth, i.e. the truth of declarative sentences is dependent upon objects having properties, is the correct view. Therefore, I am forced to conclude that nonexistent objects can really have properties (this is sometimes called "Meinongianism").

I however don't find this to be very counterintuitive, and I also think it brings forth many theoretical benefits in philosophy.

First let me comment that your OP does not distinguish properly between anarchy and anarchism- two different things. Anarchy is a state of chaotic affairs- truly no order. That is what Hobbes was postulating. Anarchism as a relatively modern 19th century idea that we live in collectives, like the end state of communism.

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That's surely true, but the distinction between anarchy as chaos is not salient to the issue at hand. I'm just wondering whether Hobbes' example might not lead to an unintended conclusion for him.

Also, the government taking control does not entail that people rebel against it.

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I agree with this observation, but just because the people don't rebel against the government does not mean that there does not exist a state of war between the two parties.

I am the center of the universe, and everything else moves around me."

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I should also mention that this seems more like Solipsism, than Idealism.

The point is replicating a person is replicating social conventions. It is also replicating the assumptions of the parents, that people SHOULD be born, and that it is good FOR them.

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That's probably true. A fascinating discussion no doubt, but surely outside the scope of this thread.

Enculturation of individuals into a way-of-life, creates the epiphonemona of politico-economic institutions. People become points to be manipulated to keep the institutions going. Each person thinks it is for them, but they are for the systems in place, rather. There is no way out of this.

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This is empirically false. Political institutions are an extremely recent development. Indeed, for the vast majority of human existence there have not been any states or governments at all. Indeed, we even see stateless societies in our own time, cf. Zomia.

idealism, or the role of the mental in constructing (our?) reality, seems inevitable once you spend enough time philosophizing.

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Really? I have spent a decent amount of time philosophizing and I have not been lead to idealism. Also many philosophers have spent whole careers philosophizing and have not been lead to idealism.

To understand the root of political nature, you have to understand the root of being born in the first place.

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Well, could you kindly explain that to me please?

Why is activity even better than passivity in any system?

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I think the reasoning behind this thought is that potentiality already presupposes that the being is not something which it could be; and thus potentiality always carries with it the idea of negation.

Pure actuality, on the other hand, is also a pure positivity. Because a being that is purely actual does not lack anything; and therefore it is said to be superior than the potentiality which does lack.

One might also say that potentiality is necessarily finite, because it lacks something; whilst pure actuality is necessarily infinite.

I think you’re looking way too deeply into this. The problem with all propositions being true is that it is demonstrable that not all propositions are true. If we are using a classical logic, and we accept that the Liar Sentence is both true and false, then it follows that lions have 700 tongues. But it is empirically verifiable that lions do not have 700 tongues. So we must reject classical logic.

That is really how far the reasoning extends. No need to bring in any complicated machinery.

Indeed the construction of all proofs is a dynamic process over time. In the case of the liar sentence, a typical verbal explanation of the paradox involves alternatively saying "I am telling the truth about my lying, therefore I am lying about my lying, therefore i am telling the truth about my lying...etc". What is static in the construction of this paradox? Isn't the insistence that the liar sentence must be understood statically, the source of the contradiction?

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These comments are fascinating. We will definitely need to discuss this further in a new thread, I am headed to bed soon, but I should have plenty of time tomorrow and over the weekend :smile:



You’re welcome. The book is amazing, but you can find the dissertation that he based his book on here. Enjoy!

I see. Well I would think that is different from the no-self view; because, as I understand it, the no-self view affirms that the self is never present at all.

Then what was experiencing the sense of self before this transformation occurred?