Hume's guillotine is invaluable. But as great and original a philosopher as he was, all his contributions amount to is material for discrediting empiricism. Nevertheless, as much as Hume's ideas failed to be carried further, he gave us closure in regard to the system of empiricism. So I consider him one of the few philosophers who adequately solved a problem of philosophy. Because of Hume, empiricism has been rendered obsolete, and no longer a problem for philosophy.

Thanks. And when I look into the ancients or the moderns I like...it seems to me that not much has really been accomplished since. — ghost

As I see it, the moderns rehashed the ancient ideas into new terms. And in their unique cleverness, they created a bunch of fantastical problems.

Others who know more might illuminate me here, but it seems to me that obsessing over language is largely what's left over. — ghost

@Wayfarer where are you?!?

If an anti-philosopher is sufficiently exciting, he gets interpreted as a philosopher. His demystifications are repackaged so that yet again experts are needed as sage-whisperers. Heidegger played into this big time. Wittgenstein's style in Philosophical Investigations is so informal and anti-systematic that it backfired! The anti-systematic point was presented so anti-systematically that experts are called in to connect the dots into a system. — ghost

:lol: nice point. That is why I prefer the ancient spirit in which there is no mediation. They bring it to your face, and if necessary, a hammer to the back of the head.

FWIW, what I get from Wittgenstein is his disgust at the idea that the higher things can be treated scientifically. — ghost

And most modern philosophy is constructed so as to adhere to scientific facts, given this, he was right to eliminate metaphysical and mystical concerns from philosophy. But in doing so, he cut the balls off.

As far as I'm concerned, every post made on this thread so far has been respectful and relevent. I'm actually very surprised at the direction this discussion has taken so far. I would have never predicted it.

Yes, pretty much everything concerning ethics and the mystical. — Wallows

I am under the impression that he felt everything mystical and metaphical should be excluded from philosophy due to the vagaries of language they provoke.

No big deal. :wink:

I meant Epicurus, — ghost

Was Epicurus stoic, I thought he was the founder of Epicurianism? Stoicism was Roman, Epicuras was Greek.

I have read some K that I really liked. There's so much stuff by K that I think I need to find a great intro that skillfully chooses the highlights. — ghost

It's called "Provocations". You can find the pdf for free on Google.

I thought it was great. I also like the stoics, Epicurus, etc. That said, it's nice to read later philosophers who wrote in powerful English. That's something like a maximum connection. — ghost

Do you mean Epictetus? I doubt many on TPF have read 'The Discourses'.

Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Where ever they agree, you can be certain it is Fire (fire of the gods).

Because propositional attitudes have no epistemic content. Thus, philosophy is concerned with life as a practice and not a problem that can be solved. — Wallows

Nice!

So, do you think Witt. had an essential concern that transcended the great importance he placed on language?

Fair point. And I don't agree with all of Hobbes' theories. But I would stress that he was 'actually' doing philosophy by concerning himself with something other than language and far more artificial problems. — ghost

An apt assessment. I think Nietzsche is a philosophical landmark. After him, philosophy began to lose its soul. Wittgenstein had crazy soul, but did everything to kill the soul of philosophy. Like @Wayfarer points out, there is a critical need for a return to the ancients.

What do you think of Hobbes? I'd call him one of the good guys, despite some of his stuff having aged. In Hobbes the subject/object game is downplayed, and he focuses on the practical use of the mind. — ghost

I'm open to your interpretation. But I feel his notion of human nature to be a bit too pessimistic, which is not to diminish his contributions. I put him in the same category as most prevalent modern philosophers, he meant well, all while being ignorant to the detrimental consequence of his thought.

Hobbes was most interested in sociological/political philosophy, while Descartes (who was more or less his contemporary) focused more on epistemology. Both are founding fathers of modern philosophy.

I justify that by insisting that the first critics of phantasms got it right. They are just either ignored or assimilated by the phantasm industry. — ghost

I would say these were the ancients, everything preceding Descarte, and I'm open to call it even earlier. Everything deriving from Descartes has been fucked.

But what one often sees is Wittgenstein himself becoming part of the disease. The disease is a hungry Hegelian Hippo. — ghost

Hungry Hegelian Hippo...hey! That's what I was going to call the philosophical problem. Verdict: Wittgenstein, guilty.

After Wittgenstein claimed that most of the problems of philosophy are due to the way we use language, he made the next bold claim and stated that the remainder are psychological. I pretty much agree with these assertions and think that many of the problems of philosophy, which are related to ethics are essentially about attitudes. Others might differ. — Wallows

My question is: why can't philosophical problems that are attributable to psychology be further reduced to our use of language, like everything else? It seems that Witt. is conveniently multiplying variables. Why not more variables, like sociological, historical, cultural, political, economic, &c.

If we take the phantasms too seriously, then we have to become ghostbusters who...only pay attention to the ghosts we are supposed to be busting. — ghost

:lol:

On a side, I also think this problem is analogous to the atheist who discusses God.

What in my opinion happened is that a great deal of value in Greek and ancient philosophy got incorporated into Christian theology and was often seriously mis-translated in the process. So with the turn away from Christianity in Western culture, a great deal of the original philosophical insights were lost along with it. — Wayfarer

Thanks. :up:

That is very insightful. So, by the time of copernicus, it only took a tiny nudge to flip it all on its head. And we are dealing with its consequence in the present.

Another factor is that philosophy is profoundly rooted in history, particularly, the history of consciousness. By that I mean, the ancients lived in an imaginative universe utterly different from our own. This wasn't simply because they believed the world was held up by elephants or surrounded by crystal spheres. Rather it's because their conception of the man and nature was different to ours, in ways we can barely fathom. So being able to be critically aware of that, instead of (as is most usual) dismissing the ancients as scientifically uninformed, takes considerable imagination in its own right. — Wayfarer

I don't see many philosophical problems prior to Cartesian philosophy. I am inclined to attribute all philosophical problems to modern philosophy.

I always saw a major distinction between ancient and modern philosophical thought. One example is the contrast between Socratic ignorance and Cartesian doubt. My fundamental philosophical presuppositions definitely align more closely to the ancient than the modern.

Nope, tell me more...

Can you imagine a world full of people admiring Nietzsche? Not a pleasant world I think. — Wallows

It would definitely be anarchistic. But I also admire Plato, and a world full of people admiring both Plato and Nietzsche would result in a populace with a very balanced understanding.

I could say more, but that's enough for starters. (Although I have sometimes reflected that it's impossible for the same person to at once admire Nietzsche and Plato. And I admire Plato. — Wayfarer

I understand the antithetical relation of Nietzsche to Plato, but I personally admire both for what they have to offer in themselves. The notion of perspectivism, introduced by Nietzsche, excuses Plato from his criticism by regarding them as independent conceptual schematics or systems of thought.

I want to address your point about Witt.

But first I will say Nietzsche's psychobabble is highly open to interpretation, but he does make some extremely valuable contributions when you can get past his insanity. I think of Witt. as a sane Nietzsche, although he was insane in his own right.

Thanks. :smile:

My view is that even if philosophy does indeed comprise phantasms, they are nevertheless phantasms that continue to exert considerable influence over the mind. So just saying 'boo, phantasms', might not show any insight into what those phantasms are and why they are the subject of philosophy. In fact, in our day and age, I think that is the most common reason. — Wayfarer

Absolutely. Philosophy has a unspeakable personal value for me. I might say it has saved me in a strict eschatological sense of the term saved.

So we get metaphysicks^2, metaphysicks^3, and so on. To play these 'anti-metaphysickal' games, one of course has to steeped in the lower levels of metaphysicks. — ghost

Well stated. That is getting at the heart of my position.

Quiet with that nonsense. I appreciate any input you make. I wasn't even thinking of Nietzsche until you mentioned him. And it was very relevant.

Yes, Nietzsche. I've read a ton of his work.

Nietzsche rejects the correspondence between concepts and the particulars of experience, or "nerve stimuli". I prefer to interpret his notions of Dionysian/Apollonian, will to power, and eternal return in relation to this. What he is saying, in essence, is that there is no true ground (the Dionysian) upon which to construct a conceptual scheme (the Apollonian). For him, there is only the 'will to power' in creating and imposing a conceptual scheme, and the ultimate and inevitable demise of rational truth - the 'eternal return' to an irrational dream.

The criterion you've put forth here cannot account for moral discourse because being moral according to your criterion requires moral judgment(approval/disapproval). Not all discourse about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour consists of such judgment. It is all moral discourse nonetheless. — creativesoul

The posts were made out of order, so you may not have read my earlier post. After further considerations, I've determined that moral thought/belief is not just limited to judgement. I have now identified moral principle as another type of moral thought/belief. As it stands now, principle and judgment represent two of the primary types of moral thought/belief. Perhaps there are more.

We might consider another type of moral thought/belief to be involved in the feeling/intuition of conviction (as in the adoption of or conformity to a set of moral principles).

Moral principle is an ethically charged intellectual assessment on acceptable/unacceptable thought/belief/behavior, and functions by introducing moral thought/belief to a preexisting framework of nonmoral thought/belief. It gives us a fundamental basis for moral learning/teaching, a precondition for moral discourse...judgement can then be considered the application of moral principle.



One thing that we need to address is prelinguistic thought/belief that is moral in kind...in other words, prelinguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. My question is how can we account for the notion of "acceptable/unacceptable" in the absence of language?

Imo, prelinguistic thought/belief is limited to nonrational and immediate corellations/associations/connections - primitive assessments. From the perspective of linguistic thought/belief, it is easy to impose the terms of acceptable/unacceptable upon the prelinguistic form, but from the perspective of prelinguistic thought/belief, the faculty of conceptualization has not yet been developed. As such, there can be no concept of acceptable/unacceptable. Prelinguistic thought/belief is incapable of the mode of thought/belief necessary to create/discover a rational worldview, and it certainly is incapable of abstraction, which is a necessary faculty for applying more complex concepts (like moral principles) onto particulars.

What is the difference between being about thought, belief, and/or behaviour and being about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour?

Perhaps that is what underwrites your invocation of "valuation"? — creativesoul

My thought exactly.

@creativesoul

In my first reboot of judgement, I begin by saying: judgement is the application of moral principle.

I find two apparent modes, which may turn out not to be judging at all. One is direct, in which I make a right/wrong decision in respect to moral principle (when I choose not to steal). The other is indirect, as in the implication of myself or another in right/wrong in respect to moral principle (when I rebuke the thief). Decision, obviously, poses more immediate consequence than implication.

I love aphoristic philosophy, I wish more members here on TPF would have the courage to philosophies with random responses, it would really air out the didactic stench on TPF...keep it up. :up: :up:

I'll wait for your response.

In the meantime I'll say that we are doing a rare thing on TPF. We are proving something. I don't mean about the source of morals, but about philosophical discourse. We are demonstrating a most effective way to conduct a philosophical thought experiment.

The one thing is that we are not dogmatic about our premise or methodology, as if methodologically building off a premise constitutes some gospel truth. A premise is just a starting point, a common ground where we unify our fundamental concepts. A methodology is just a conveyance, a consistent a way of proceeding. When we finish, we will have said nothing, but at least we will have said it, and that's something.

I hold that moral thought/belief can be prelinguistic on the basis that all things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

You disagree on the basis that all moral thought/belief is moral judgment.

Does this capture one disagreement in a nutshell? — creativesoul

I think it identifies the discrepancy close enough for our purpose here. I'm interested to see what we find out. You've already began to address the relevant points...

The difference is that I hold a minimalist criterion for what counts as being moral - in kind - whereas you hold a more complex notion of what counts as moral thought/belief. — creativesoul

We agree: "all things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour." I took the liberty to assume the terms "acceptable/unacceptable" were an inferrence to "right/wrong". Now I'm pretty sure that assumption was an error.

I think parsing out the difference between these terms will help us to better understand morality and thought/belief that is moral in kind. I also took these to be analogous. But I'm open to what their distinction may entail.

Let's continue...

We do agree regarding morality. Morality is codified moral thought/belief. Prelinguistic thought/belief that is moral - in kind - (on my view at least) is inadequate for morality. — creativesoul

I feel that we are not so far apart. Can you elaborate more on how prelinguistic thought/belief is moral in kind? I'm having trouble understanding this. Is there such thing as prelinguistic moral thought/belief? My thought was that thought/belief cannot be moral in kind unless it becomes actual moral thought/belief.

To reiterate my position, I hold all linguistic thought/belief to be predicated on pre-linguistic thought/belief. There are myriad modes of linguistic thought/belief, moral thought/belief is just one. Of the many things language acquisition brings with it, are 'conceptual' thought/belief, and 'abstract' thought/belief. Moral thought/belief is pre-conditioned and dependent on conceptualization and abstraction, and only arrives after these faculties are adequately developed.

Thought/belief that is moral in kind is a judgement about right thought/belief/intention/behavior. The act of judging is where morality first appears for the individual. It arrives with the encroachment of, what we can provisionally denote as, ethical authority, who exposes him to moral principles. All moral principles prescriptions and descriptions of right/wrong. The prescriptive principle "thou shalt not murder" is inherently descriptive by inferring "murder is wrong"; conversely, the descriptive principle "murder is wrong" is inherently prescriptive by inferring "thou shalt not murder". The appropriation of moral principles into moral thought/belief is necessary for judging, but the principles as they are in themselves, do not judge, rather judging occurs when principle is applied.

After considering all this, I am willing to retract certain speculations I've been pursuing, and re-assess both "moral principle" and "judgement" as thought/belief that is moral in kind, up to and including the above. Existential quantification, bitch! :joke:

I hope you appreciate that I am not an obstinate dick.

I'm hoping your response will fill in some gaps and clean up any faulty logic.

Your welcome. And, the feeling is mutual. :up:

There's far too much that we(seem to) agree upon to abandon the discussion. — creativesoul

Yes indeed. Also, our philosophical aptitudes are too great to think we cannot work out our differences. :cool: :nerd:

@creativesoul

More on the different modes of thought/belief, and the particular quality of their valuations:

Since morality is primarily concerned with thought/belief about right/wrong intention/behavior, it seems relevant to address how prelinguistic and linguistic thought/belief pertains to intention/behavior.

In both primitive and intellectual assessment we find intention/behavior to be focused on attaining the desirable. The former attains the desirable nonrationally, we could say instinctually/habitually, whereas the latter attains the desirable rationally, by intellectual deliberation. In each mode, the desirable is of ultimate value.

From the perspective of moral thought/belief, the desirable is in view, yet its primary function,
judgement, is concerned with right intention/behavior (not intention/behavior which most effectively attains the desirable). In fact judgement of what is right/wrong can often supersede and suspend what is assessed to be desirable. The principled moral agent will always forgo all that he desires if it means seeing the victory of good in the world. In morality, we could say the only thing that is desirable is what is right, the good is all that is valued.

Nothing I have said here is a moral thought/belief, it is all simply my thought/belief about moral thought/belief.

Consider, that early in life, the infant begins to evaluate the desirable somewhere in the interplay of her nerve stimuli, and her emotional responses. As primitive as it is, this does constitute a valuation, despite the absence of any language skills. The primitive level in which value is imposed on emotional affection does not constitute a proper ethical judgement - it is more like an observation of what seems pleasing to me, rather than a moral choice about what I ought to do.

Then we can think about the toddler who has begun to acquire language. At this point, he is being linguistically conditioned (with some corporal conditioning) so that he can be assimilated into the culture to which he belongs. It is somewhere in this process that the evaluation of his primitive valuations commences; most importantly any evaluations of his primitive valuations are primarily acquired externally from culture, and not internally as a result of primitive valuation.

I hope this takes us one step closer to adequately understanding the source of morals. I could be mistaken, it's a terrible tragedy.
— Merkwurdichliebe

That's not a bad summary of pre linguistic thought/belief as it pertains to morals. — creativesoul

Here you did not object to my point. Let me slightly rephrase it for clarity: the level of prelinguistic thought/belief, at which value is imposed on primitive emotional affection, does not constitute morality - it is an observation of what seems pleasing to me, rather than a moral thought/belief concerning acceptable/unacceptable intention/behavior. You actually seemed to agree.



I consider the function of prelinguistic thought/belief to be primitive assessment; the function of linguistic thought/belief to be intellectual assessment; and, the function of moral thought/belief to be judgement (I'm using the term "judgement" in a very specific way). Each is a mode of thought/belief that we are thinking about (our universal criterion). I propose, while each mode (that we are considering here), is grounded in the former, what actually distinguishes one mode from the other, is how it primarily functions.

In this discussion, it is obvious we are using linguistic thought/belief, not moral thought/belief, to evaluate morality (thought/belief that is moral in kind). How does this not cohere with our framework?

If the above claim is true, that truth is one, shouldn't conformity, based on the oneness of truth, be the rule rather than the exception? — TheMadFool

Assuming this "one truth" actually exists, it is an immense stretch to think that a collective could uniformy apprehended the one truth, and cooperatively work toward it with no inner contention. This is called: idealism. Very improbable. Just look at TPF.

I'm not saying that some mode of unity shouldn't be attempted, I'm just saying it is much more complicated than mass conformity to the "one truth".

(Imo, I personally believe in the "one truth", and I think it exists uniquely in the heart of each and every individual. One of the main reasons for the outward difference between people is due to some cultivating that inner truth, and others not.)