I will point out right now, that we never established that prelinguistic thought/belief is moral in kind. I've considered the the entire discussion that they aren't. Based on that, everything I've said is spot on and mostly coherent. Just reread everything and you'll see.

You've lost the distinction which began this all. Thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. You've also rescinded the earlier agreement regarding what all things moral have in common. You've arrived at incoherence as a result.

Now you're just repeating conventional mistakes. I've no time at present. I can and will point them out clearly later on if you're interested. — creativesoul

I'll be interested to read it.

By the way, based on yesterday's exchange,
I thought the same thing about you: "You've lost the distinction which began this all. Thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief." That's what I was pointing out in my post.

Yes, they are different. Fdrake said enough to be considered. In, layman's terms, axiom is bound up in logic, while a priori is a monster of its own kind.

I would simply point out their similarities. These, I'll call them devices/conceptual instruments (cartesian doubt, tabulation rasa, a priori, bedrock, axiom, premise, &c.), are attempts to establish an epistemological ground of certainty upon which we can confidently assemble a framework of understanding. None of these devices actually succeed in providing that indubitable self-evident truth, and imo, I don't think anything like that exists. However, they do give us a basis from which we can methodologically conduct philosophical thought experiments (some better than others). So that's something.

Is this possibly the bandwagon fallacy? Could conformity ever be reasoned and rational? I think the answer is ''yes'' and that's what we should aim for. — TheMadFool

It is certainly an over generalization. And conformity can indeed be reasoned and rational, but the consequences of a reasoned and rational cooperation is uncertain. The Nazi's and Soviets used a heavy dose of reason and rationale to compel conformity. I'm sure it sounded like a great idea at the time, but it didn't turn out so well.

I can at least say with confidence, the best way to come together is directly, as individual to individual, without mediating authority and without group identity.

The process, even the human economic and political process, is now so complex that we arguably cannot hope to control it. What I really meant, though, is that, until you can, to some reasonable degree, sort out your own problems, you have zero hope of sorting out, or even significantly contributing towards sorting out, the larger problems of the human situation. — Janus

I agree with your assessment.

It would be miraculous if enough individuals worked out their shit sufficiently enough to effect real qualitative change in the world. That is what makes it seem so improbable.

In another aspect, it is the mass conformity to the influence of the world that makes the prospect of changing the world so unattainable.

The world will change itself, and there's nothing we can do to change that. We don't change the world, the world changes us.

The best one can do is fortify oneself against the influence of the world, and hope for the best.

Could we call humanity "the pocket change of the universe"? :grin:

@creativesoul

Valuation is something we have not clearly parsed out. Imo, valuation does not imply moral thought/belief. Valuation can be imposed on any nonmoral assessment. That a thing can be assessed as being valuable because it is, say, desirable, does not make it a moral judgement concerning the acceptable/unacceptable.

All thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour are moral - in kind. That is precisely what they all have in common that makes them what they are as opposed to other kinds of thought/belief. — creativesoul

We are doing the other kind of thought/belief in assessing the kind of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.

Some moral thought/belief is prior to language acquisition. — creativesoul

I don't think we ever agreed here.

I wouldn't call the common core of all thought/belief 'primitive morality'. Primitive thought/belief? Sure. Not all thought/belief is rightfully called "morality". Rather, morality is codified thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour(thought/belief that is moral in kind).

Morality is codified moral belief. Laws.
— creativesoul

No dispute, here. I just meant to clarify your position. I would say, if there is a primitive morality, it comes well after primitive [prelingustic] thought/belief. Hopefully we can discover approximately where that occurs. — Merkwurdichliebe

By this, I was implying that primitive morality is arrived at during some point in language acquisition.

You never disagreed. And i don't think we ever elaborated more.

Descriptive accounts of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

The example is this discussion... — creativesoul

We are speaking extemporaneously, meta-ethically. We must be careful not to confuse our descriptive assessments with the variable (in this experiment) of thought/belief that is moral in kind. Our description of morality as moral thought/belief is detached from actual moral thought/belief.

What we do in this discussion should never arrive at the point of discussing morals from a moral perspective (via moral thought/belief).

(One way, we are thinking/believing morally (judging). The other way, we are thinking/believing about moral thought/belief (assessing judgement). We wish to do the latter.)

Moral judgment - in the conventional sense - is existentially dependent upon adopting a worldview replete with morality. — creativesoul

Yes. It is adopting pre-existing principles that are based on pre-existing nonmoral assessments. The adoption of principle places one in the role of judge. Until it is appropriated as personal morality, principle is a matter of intellectual assessment. We are doing just that in this discussion.

Judgment is moral thought/belief. Not all moral thought/belief is judgment. — creativesoul

I disagree. But, if you can present an example of moral thought/belief that does not involve a judgement, I might better understand.

All things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. — creativesoul

I'm not moving the goalposts. I keep them in view with every comment I make.

I would say: "All things moral are about thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Hence, judgement.

That conclusion is at odds with our criterion for what counts as being "moral", which was arrived at by virtue of what all things moral, and/or called "moral" have in common. — creativesoul

And what is that? A common mode of thought/belief, that I say has a common function: judgement.

What I'm prying into is whether or not the story is worthy of assent. — creativesoul

I don't know if we've established the plot firmly enough to even begin considering its worthiness for assent.

Anyway, I see it as:
Assessment is a primary function of nonmoral thought/belief. Primitive/nonrational assessment is associated with prelinguistic thought/belief, and intellectual/rational assessment is associated with linguistic thought/belief.

Moral thought/belief is an entirely different mode than nonmoral thought/belief. Its primary function is judgement. Moral thought/belief requires the faculties of conceptualization and abstraction, which only comes after language acquisition and linguistic thought/belief.

Judgment begins with determining right and wrong principles. It moves further to apply moral principles to particulars. This is the essence of moral thought/belief.

There are also new criterion being employed that are not quite up to snuff. Our foundation for drawing conclusions is supposed to be based upon a universal criterion. New claims are being levied that are not based upon the same solid ground. — creativesoul

Yes, we are exploring all potentially relevant variables. Only when we measure a variable against the constant can we determined its value.
In such an experiment, misfiring is bound to occur.

One can know that they do not accept another's behaviour without judging their behaviour in any robust sense of moral judgment. — creativesoul

That is prejudice - prejudgement. I would attribute that to moral feeling/intuition. Is robustness of sense a requirement?

It is time to review our previous talk on morality and prelinguistic thought/belief. I thought we had come to enough agreement to move on to sociological factors, but apparently not.

Not all moral thought/belief is judgment. And, that didn't answer the question... — creativesoul

If all moral thought/belief is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour, then it necessarily is about judgement, about ought. Assessment would refer to nonmoral thought/belief about what is, what might be, what is desirable, &c.

So then you agree that not all adoption of moral principle is founded upon intellectual assessment? — creativesoul

If intellectual assessment is a primary function of linguistic thought/belief, I don't see how moral thought/belief cannot be founded upon it.

There seems to be some preconceived notion at work in your reporting. What is a moral principle if not thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour? — creativesoul

I'm making a distinction between thought/belief that is moral in kind (moral judgement about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour and thought belief), and thought/belief that is not (nonmoral assessments about the world).

The adoption of moral principle can happen during language acquisition. Intellectual assessment cannot. — creativesoul

I would go so far as to say the adoption of moral principle depends upon language acquisition, whereas assessment does not. All language that is acquired contains preexisting assessments of the world.

We need this new reporting to dovetail with the previously established groundwork. — creativesoul

Not yet... but we are examining internalization and ethical authority, which are variables of societal conditioning.

How would you define "ethical existence"? — Terrapin Station

I was referring to the existing individual who is directly concerned with the ethical.

If both pupil and teacher are moral agents, and it is impossible to be both ethical authority and ethical pupil at the same time, then moral agents can be both. The ethical pupil can be a moral agent. The ethical teacher can be a moral agent. — creativesoul

Are you suggesting a hierarchy of ethical authority, or is it more complex?

@creativesoul

Right now we are pursuing two threads: ethical authority and internalization. Judging by our overall framework, we are mostly on the right track, we just gotta keep the wheels spinning, and separate the wheat from the chaff. :grin:

Whatever happens next, we have at least discovered that societal conditioning is an immensely relevant source of morals. I'm still interested in exploring the historical aspect. But one thing at a time.

However, while internalization requires it sensory perception alone is not enough for internalization as I suspect it is being used here. — creativesoul

That's why I compared it to appropriation. The adoption of moral principle is founded on intellectual assessment. Appropriation implies that moral thought/belief is founded upon a pre-existing framework of thought/belief about the world. How one appropriates morality is uniquely affected by one's world view.

Internalizing a pre-existing morality results in one's moral 'feelings'.
These are involuntarily experienced during certain situations that are morally relevant to that particular person's worldview(morality). — creativesoul

Internalizing morality means appropriating it in thought/belief as one's personal morality. It results in moral thought/belief not feeling/intuition. I would say moral feeling/intuition only comes into play when one witnesses an ethically charged situation. And, feeling/intuition becomes most pertinent in certain ethically charged situations that directly involve me - when I become the decisive factor.
(speaking extemporaneously)

As a side, what does it mean when moral feeling/intuition results in behavior that contradicts one's moral thought/belief?

They've yet to have been breached. Perhaps it is time. For robustness' sake. — creativesoul

You lead. :grin:

I would say that the morality of the relativist is self defeating , and a bad omen for the ethical authority. That is not to say, I don't believe morals are relative, from a meta-ethical perspective.

The moral relativist cannot commit to principle, he has to view all principles as simultaneously right and wrong. The moment he commits to a principle, he becomes absolutist. The morality of the relativist is a phantasm.
(See what I did there? :grin: )

For the ethical authority to teach moral relativism to the ethical pupil is to hand over the keys to the car.

It is, however, possible that one can be absolutist regarding some principles, and relativist regarding others. This complicates things...

What do the notions of relative morality and absolute morality add to the discussion? — creativesoul

I was just positing the authority of the ethical authority to be absolute in relation to the pupil. That is due to the fact that he judges the ethical pupil, not the other way around. It's not a democracy :party: .

We could say, that early on in the development process of ethical indoctrination the roles are distinct. But as the ethical pupil matures, the roles become equivocal.

The question becomes, when does the individual cease to respond to the judgement of the ethical authority, and come to rely on his own judgement of himself?

A general rule of behavioural thumb. — creativesoul

We should probably parse out what role principle plays in determining ethical authority.

Some ethical authorities do not frame ethics in terms of absolute right/wrong. — creativesoul

Wouldn't the ethical authority, who believed in relative morality, talk to the ethical pupil about the relativism of morality as though it were absolute? Or, would they say that relative morality is relative, and just as viable as absolute morality?

I'm hypothesizing that, in a given relation, it is impossible to be both ethical authority and ethical pupil at the same time. Or am I overlooking the possibility that we are both ethical pupil and ethical authority at all times?

What sense doe it make then to differentiate between pupil and teacher based upon calling only the one assigned an ethical task the "moral agent" when they can both be. — creativesoul

Because I feel there is an unequivocal distinction between ethical authority ethical pupil.

The ethical authority has a specific role of exposing the pupil to moral thought/belief. Other than indoctrinating, and then judging the pupil, the work of ethical authority is done. Ethical authority represents absolute right - it has nothing else to prove. On the other hand, the ethical pupil is always under examination in regard to the ethical task, if not by the authority, by himself, that is why I call it the "moral agent".

With that said, I also hold the role of ethical authority and ethical pupil to be relativistic, in that they depend upon the particular relation in question. In relation to one player I can be the authority, in relation to another I can be pupil.

Unnecessarily multiplying entities again. I cannot see the good in what this adds. — creativesoul

You gotta separate the wheat from the chaff. All you did was pick out the chaff.

It's actually funny, I added that shit about delusion against my better judgment.

Deception is possible for a moral principle. — creativesoul

How do you define moral principle?

The task is in forming right thought/belief, and then integrating that right understanding into one's behavior - responsibility. — Merkwurdichliebe

I meant the ethical task for the ethical pupil. Sorry if I was unclear. I would never use the terms true/false to describe ethical judgment.

I would agree that our task is aimed at well grounded true thought/belief.

The term "moral agent" has not been used to differentiate between different kinds of moral agents; those beset with an ethical task and those not. — creativesoul

I don't understand.. What would constitute a different kind of moral agent, for example, one not beset with the ethical task?

utilityrannyist ethics — Janus

:rofl:

The prescriptions are way too definite, and based on the delusion that the good can be quantified. — Janus

Ahhh yes...the utopian fantasy. :grimace:

Practicality, Schmackticality! Practical considerations, lifted out of their proper context and deified, as UTILITY, both lead to, and grow out of, the monetization of life. A vicious feedback loop! — Janus

Sounds like the worst kind of tyranny. :fear:

@creativesoul
Is it appropriate to say the the ethical authority stands in relation to the ethical pupil? Can we call it the "moral agent", as in the one beset with the ethical task? The task is in forming right thought/belief, and then integrating that right understanding into one's behavior - responsibility.

Deception is possible in respect to ethical authority, but not with moral principle (excluding self-delusion, moral dumbfounding?). In relation to ethical authority, the moral agent is only right/wrong insofar as he appears to be. But as he is to himself, his morality depends upon his commitment to principle.

Referring to Gautama we could say that we lay down the raft after crossing the river because there would be no need to carry it further. Some might say that we should continue to carry it just in case we are mistaken in thinking there are no more rivers to cross, but I say that we might find that each river requires a certain kind of raft, and we are better off not to worry about what lies ahead of us, but rather to trust in our ability to improvise when the need arises. — Janus

You are beginning to touch on "faith". I prefer buddha, to leave the raft, and rely upon spontaneous improvisation. Of course, it isn't always the most practical way to do it.