What about pre-linguistic perceptual meanings? Do pre-verbal infants not construct meaning from their surroundings through the use of perceptual-motor schemes? — Joshs
Private meaning is not made possible by public meaning. — RussellA
There's a book I've noticed, Jerrold Katz, The Metaphysics of Meaning. (Reviews here and here). This book, and indeed most of Katz' career, was dedicated to critiquing Wittgenstein, Quine, and 'naturalised epistemology' generally. He also studied under Chomsky, but I think the basic drift is Platonist, i.e. meaning has to be anchored in recognition of universals as constitutive elements of reason - not simply conventions or habits of speech. — Wayfarer
Obviously Av~A is true and A&~A is false. — A Realist
Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen. — Sam26
No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands. — Sam26
.The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrong — Sam26
What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context? — Sam26
Why would you ask this? — Sam26
I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion?
— Richard B
No, and this Wittgenstein's point, i.e., it's not a matter of epistemology, generally speaking. — Sam26
?We justify knowledge claims based on sensory experiences. — Sam26
One of the problems with Moore enumerating what he knows, is that it seems to amount to more of a conviction of what he believes, than a statement of what he knows. How does this happen? — Sam26
Why? Because if you add to the concept existing in reality you would still just have a concept existing in reality, not the being itself.
Finally, many find the argument dubious for other reasons, viz., trying to prove the existence of something from the concept alone, which others have pointed out in this thread, is very problematic to say the least. — Sam26
do think this relies on empirical evidence so we don't need to believe everything a person says. But our experiences keep us alive and have allowed us to rigorously manipulate the world so I do not believe our sense have a huge scope for misleading us. So I don't think occasional illusions or false beliefs are grounds to undermine some notion of truth. — Andrew4Handel
directly see the apple, and you directly see the apple, but the apple I see is different to the apple you see. My private experience of the apple is different to yours. — RussellA
What evidence do you have that external stimuli, when not being seen, are accurately described by our description of how they appear to us when seen? — Michael
Only one accurately describes the independent nature of the external stimulus. — Michael
The Indirect Realist would say that "something caused the idea of a rock". — RussellA
One could reword as "something in the external world caused an idea of a rock in the mind" — RussellA
That's precisely why the indirect realist says that there is an epistemological problem of perception. You seem to be arguing that because we don't like the conclusion we should reject the premise, which is question-begging. — Michael
I would argue that our modern scientific understanding of the world, such as that of quantum mechanics, the Standard Model, string theory etc. support that conclusion above. There's just a mass of fundamental wave-particles, bouncing around, interacting with each another, and when the right stuff interacts in the right way, there's the conscious experience of seeing a red apple. — Michael
In perception, external objects such as rocks and cats causally affect our sense organs. The sense organs in turn affect the (probably, non-material) mind, and their effect is to produce a certain type of entity in the mind, an 'idea.' These ideas, and not external objects, are what we immediately perceive when we look out at the world. The ideas may or may not resemble the objects that caused them in us, but their causal relation to the objects makes it the case that we can immediately perceive the objects by perceiving the ideas. — RussellA
Society is disapproving of animal cruelty because society accepts that animals do have the concept of pain, even if the animal has no verbal language to express it. — RussellA
Suppose there is someone who has lived their life alone on a desert island. If it is the case that "There are no private concepts.", he has never had the private concept of pain, and has been putting his hand into the fire badly burning it over the years. This is not something that has concerned him if he has no private concept of pain. — RussellA
But where did society get its concepts from if not from the members of that society ? — RussellA
I don’t usually say “I believe it’s raining”. I just say “it’s raining”. I don’t usually say “I believe I’m in pain”. I just say “I’m in pain”. — Michael
There’s a difference between me asserting “X is a fact” because I believe it to be so and me asserting “X is a fact because I believe it to be so”. — Michael
can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet. — Michael
f I refuse to answer your question then I'm blind? Or I'm not blind but the carpet is transparent? Or the carpet isn't transparent but also not coloured (and so not white or black either)?
This is clearly ridiculous. Me seeing something has nothing to do with you and nothing to do with speech.
I really don't think you're being honest with me at all. You can't actually believe these things you're saying. — Michael
If saying "what ever I believe is a fact is a fact" is not ridiculous
— Richard B
I haven't said that, so not sure the relevance of this. — Michael
No, I'm saying so because I believe it to be a fact. And because it is a fact, what I say is true. — Michael
No, I'm saying so because I believe it to be a fact. And because it is a fact, what I say is true.
— Michael
Why do you say it is a fact and it is true? — Richard B
Why do you say it is a fact and it is true?
— Richard B
Because I believe it to be so. — Michael
I can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet. — Michael
I can tell you for a fact that I can see the colour of my carpet even though I'm not describing the colour of my carpet. — Michael
Even if they don't have words to describe the colours, they nonetheless see them, just as I can distinguish between a variety of different smells despite not having words for each individual kind of smell. — Michael
I would say we don't (always). When we talk about colour we're not talking about objects but about sense data. — Michael
At first, yes. But then after a detailed scientific analysis (and assuming scientific realism is correct) we can extend it further to the cause being a collection of quarks, neutrons, and electrons, with the latter reflecting photons. — Michael
I didn’t say that I don’t know what is causing it. — Michael
1. I talk about external world objects
2. The nature of external world objects is given in my experience
Yes, both these claims require language to state, but they don’t mean the same thing. — Michael
The problem is, however, the relationship between the social group and the world external to the social group, and whether the social group have indirect or direct knowledge of this external world. — RussellA
That doesn't seem accurate. The epistemological problem of perception concerns the extent to which perception informs us about what the world is like. That doesn't seem to have anything to do with language at all. — Michael
f two people have headaches there is no way of comparing whether both of them are having the same type of pain. — Andrew4Handel
You put a red ball and a blue ball in front of me. I can see that one is red and one is blue. — Michael
No, I'm saying so because I believe it to be a fact. And because it is a fact, what I say is true. — Michael
It is either a fact that private experiences exist or they don't. — Michael