But don’t worry what I do get is Witt thought we shouldn’t try to philosophize about these things as there is no certainty. I just think that doesn’t follow. We may be open to various systems. No system is going to give me slam dunk certainty. But I, like many others don’t need Witts language game idea and examples to understand that.

But wait, there’s more..cause there is a subgroup that tried to assign preciseness to language in such a way- early analytics like Russell and Frege. Well, that’s a small subset of philosophers that this would then be aimed at. It becomes less relevant for those who never held that view in the first place.

I’m pretty sure you’ll say this won’t mean anything to you either, however, you would interpret that as a refusal to be intelligible. That being said, your backcover, Wikipedia blurb would be: metaphysics is a fantasy created by our desire to fix the limitations of knowledge, which, epistemologically, is not our only relation to the world, and, ethically, this means it is our responsibility beyond knowledge to respond to the world and be accountable for what we do.

Before you condescend to me again, you (and I hate to say, perhaps @Banno) may want to consider your criticism that Wittgenstein is unintelligible might have more to do with your unwillingness to see it on any other terms than what you want. As he would say: your predetermined requirement makes anything that meets it empty (#107)

what I do get is Witt thought we shouldn’t try to philosophize about these things as there is no certainty… No system is going to give me slam dunk certainty. — schopenhauer1

That’s the wrong takeaway. He is “philosophizing” it’s just a different method and not driven by the desire to resolve skepticism with a”system” (rather than understanding our ongoing part), as classical philosophy was, and, frankly, as is most of today’s “philosophy”. I’m afraid none of this is going to help you. I can only suggest re-reading the book and attempt to see it as a journey of discovery about your insistence (which I would think equates with the Interlocutor at times, as does @RussellA). It might help to read the section by Cavell I attached previously at p. 56 on Wittgenstein’s method “The relevance of the appeal to everyday language” on through “The knowledge of our language” and “The style of the Investigations”. Good luck.

Not a metaphor. @schopenhauer1 apparently expects Wittgenstein to comply to the very form his approach undermines. He claims Wittgenstein doesn't address ontological concerns, while the first hundred remarks of PI do exactly that. Meanwhile @RussellA begins yet another loop around his loop of reference. @Sam26 has gone quiet again.

Of course someone who cannot see the duck for the rabbit will become frustrated when the conversation moves on to other examples of ambiguous figures. But equally, folk who can see the duck rabbit will want to move away from conversations about eyes and bills. This once promising thread is mired in the misunderstanding of a small few.

But that's how the forums work.

As for seeing Wittgenstein in different ways, there's a long overdue thread on Moyal-Sharrock's Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty that should be started. Have you read it?

I think aphorism is a misscharacterization. They are not meant as individual (independent) statements of something he is arguing is true. He does make statements, but they are speculative (like a hypothesis) with the purpose of your coming to the same conclusion on your own, — Antony Nickles

I have come across some commentators sayings on Wittgenstein's writing being aphoristic, which I agreed with after reading some of his original texts such as TLP and PI.

The first sentence of TLP starts with a declarative type of sentence "The world is all that is the case."
and then it goes on, "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." They are quite unusual writing styles for philosophical texts, which can only be described as aphoristic.

Of course Witt makes his points in his writings, and it is not all 100% aphoristic writing style which fills his books, but we cannot help, but notice the writing style throughout his main books both in TLP and PI.

He is trying to find out why we want feelings to be objects. He does not address the argument for the existence of God other than looking at the same desire of why Descartes looked to God for the purpose of having something fixed, universal, perfect, as Wittgenstein equates with purity as a goal and standard for knowledge. — Antony Nickles

Witt didn't seem deny the existence of God from this passage in TLP.

"6.432 How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world." - TLP

I am not sure which God he was referring to here, but it seems he is admitting the existence of God, and also seems saying God cannot be known by human reason or perception. Could it be the similar stance as Kant's concept of God, which belongs to Thing-In-Itself in CPR?

I have been trying to take another run at On Certainty but @Sam26 is way ahead of my understanding so I’ve been reluctant to weigh in (I don’t want to get things mired in a need to clarify or a disagreement about conclusions I don’t really have enough knowledge or experience on which to have a legitimate opinion). I have read the first third of that book probably four different times. I am thinking of skipping to the last dates he addressed the topic which is a certain section of the end of the book.

I will order the Moyal. I am curious about the structure and role of the “hinge”. I have found people are under the impression that the situations put forward in On Certainty are to somehow negate the realization of the investigations, or to replace metaphysics rather than simply examining our ordinary criteria for certainty, much as Austin would flesh out a topic systematically. Of course I have nothing to base that on but what amounts to philosophical gossip.

apparently expects Wittgenstein to comply to the very form his approach undermines. He claims Wittgenstein doesn't address ontological concerns, while the first hundred remarks of PI do exactly that. — Banno

This is misleading. He talks about usage of language (apples, and brake-levers oh my). He is giving examples of various uses of language, not ontological claims about the world. And so...

apparently expects Wittgenstein to comply to the very form his approach undermines. — Banno

Well yeah and I said as much why I don't like it in my previous posts. No need for me to repeat them.

No need for me to repeat them. — schopenhauer1

Yep.

But you will.

The first sentence of TLP starts with a declarative type of sentence "The world is all that is the case."
and then it goes on, "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." They are quite unusual writing styles for philosophical texts, which can only be described as aphoristic.

Of course Witt makes his points in his writings, and it is not all 100% aphoristic writing style which fills his books, but we cannot help, but notice the writing style. — Corvus

The TLP are more “aphorisms” but I would also not try to make sense of them outside the context of the rest of the work. What he wanted in the TLP was only things that he could be absolutely sure of, so his statements are meant to move forward building on his absolute certainty of each thing. In the PI everything is more a description he is asking if you see too.

I agree that the style of the Investigations is unique and I believe it is important to his method. I would recommend reading the Cavell essay I attached above, maybe just starting on p. 56.

I don’t have anything more on his thoughts on God.

As for seeing Wittgenstein in different ways, there's a long overdue thread on Moyal-Sharrock's Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty that should be started. Have you read it? — Banno

I also ordered Moyal’s 2021 book Certainty in Action.

Yep.

But you will. — Banno

The impreciseness of language does not negate the attempt at understanding the world. It does not mean to close up shop. It certainly helps illustrate logical atomism's failing in its attempt for preciseness and its trapping itself in "what exists" and "what doesn't exist" and such.

Try the same with the word "unicorn". If the word "unicorn" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no unicorn in the world then there would be no word "unicorn" in language. Since there is the word "unicorn" in language, then there must be a unicorn in the world. This is the absurd consequence of your argument. — Luke

The word "unicorn" in language cannot refer to something in the world, as no unicorns exist in the world. But rather, the word "unicorn" refers to other words in the language, as in "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead"

It remains a fact that if the word "unicorn " in language depends on its existence on the fact of there being a unicorn in the world, then the word "unicorn" would not exist. However, this is not the case, as the word "unicorn" in language depends on its existence on other words within the language.

Wittgenstein opposes Augustine's theory of Referentialism, which he describes in in PI 2. He sets out his theory that meaning is use in language in PI 43. He proposes that Referentialism is an incomplete theory, in that whilst it may be able to explain the meaning of a word such as "slab" it is not able to explain the meaning of a word such as "slab!". His theory that meaning is use in language, he believes, can, however, explain the meaning of both "slab" and "slab!"

Within his theory that meaning is use in language, in the sentence "bring me the slab", the word "slab" is not being used, as it would be in Referentialism, in naming a slab in the world, but is being used in the sense of meaning is use in language

It would not make sense for Wittgenstein to be in opposition to Referentialism, but then use the word "slab" to name a slab in the world. His own theory that meaning is use in language is more than adequate, he believes (using "believes" as a figure of speech, as who knows what Wittgenstein really believed), to explain that the meaning of "slab" is its use in language, not as naming a slab in the world.

This is not “vagueness”. It is a realization that there is no general explanation of “meaning” or “solution” to skepticism. He comes at it from multiple angles to understand how the desire for purity affects different areas of our lives. — Antony Nickles

He does test hypotheses, but you may be confusing the role of the “interlocutor” who represents and expresses the embodiment of the desire for purity (what motivated the Tractatus and the picture of the world that created). — Antony Nickles

I don’t say this to imply there isn’t something clear, specific, rigorous, etc. But just that narrowing it down to positions and statements that we can tell someone misses the point that he is doing something by a certain method which you must participate in to have it become meaningful to you. — Antony Nickles

Taking a few references at random, it does not seem to be the case that it is the reader's problem that they have difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein's writings, but rather the responsibility lies with Wittgenstein himself.

As Wittgenstein himself wrote in the Preface to PI
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination

SEP - Ludwig Wittgenstein
Furthermore, a central factor in investigating Wittgenstein’s works is the multifarious nature of the project of interpreting them; this leads to untold difficulties in the ascertainment of his philosophical substance and method.

Philip Cartright's article on Philosophical Investigations
All I can say is that I’ve been studying Wittgenstein on and off for over twenty years and I still sometimes find myself falling into the same old traps. It is a comfort, however, to realise that Wittgenstein himself seems to have had a similar problem. Again and again in his later works he complains about how hard it is “to keep our heads above water” (§106) and only days before his death he commented “I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again; now her spectacles, now her keys” (On Certainty, §532).

IEP - Ludwig Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein is thus a doubly key figure in the development and history of analytic philosophy, but he has become rather unfashionable because of his anti-theoretical, anti-scientism stance, because of the difficulty of his work, and perhaps also because he has been little understood.

Masahiro Oku Osaka University, Japan
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is notoriously difficult to understand.

On the difficulty of reading Wittgenstein:

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

— Culture and Value

I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way he can put it right.

— Culture and Value

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

— Culture and Value

the word "unicorn" refers to other words in the language, as in "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead" — RussellA

The word "unicorn" refers to the definition of the word "unicorn"? Why don't all words do this?

It remains a fact that if the word "unicorn " in language depends on its existence on the fact of there being a unicorn in the world, then the word "unicorn" would not exist. — RussellA

If the existence of the word is dependent upon the existence of the object, that may be true. However, you said earlier that the existence of the word is dependent upon the word referring to the object. If that were true then we could no longer speak about any extinct animal for the names of those animals would no longer exist.

Within his theory that meaning is use in language, in the sentence "bring me the slab", the word "slab" is not being used, as it would be in Referentialism, in naming a slab in the world, but is being used in the sense of meaning is use in language — RussellA

What do you think the difference is? If meaning is use in language, then the word has to be used in some way. What other use does the word have if it is not being used to refer to an object in the world?

You say here that the word "is being used in the sense of meaning is use in language". But that is not a specific use a word can have; it's a general phrase about what gives any word its meaning. What you have said is similar to: "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use", which is circular. Wittgenstein gives various examples of different uses of language at PI 23.

It would not make sense for Wittgenstein to be in opposition to Referentialism, but then use the word "slab" to name a slab in the world. — RussellA

To repeat, Wittgenstein opposes Referentialism because it views reference as the only use that words can have. His opposition does not imply that words cannot be used to refer; only that they have more uses than this.

@Banno@Antony Nickles

I see Witt's style in PI as a sort of "confounding" affect/effect. I can't say if it is intentional, but it is the way the text is laid out. He generally starts out as the "interlocutor" in quotations, sort of like his "demon" presenting various absolute cases of language use (very Socrates-like) and then Witt goes on to prove that absolute case is not as absolute upon further reflection. This goes on and on, until the reader is to feel a sort of wary defeat at the end, that perhaps the author is correct, that word meaning and concepts can only ever be "family resemblances" and never "pinned down" to this or that theory/definition of meaning. Thus language is an ever-evolving language game. Many times meaning is at odds with its own definition, with the audience's definition, and perhaps the speaker himself is mistaken of his own definition. Witt shows various examples of this.

The problem is not so much Witt himself. I think he does a good job demonstrating the inanity of pinning down exactly "what" a theory of meaning can even be. However, it's not his demonstration that I have a problem with. It's what he, or more importantly, his admirers do with this definition. That is to say, does this mean all theorizing stops now because, welp, it's just language games? I think the next move is to present his idea of "No wait, he gives you an out! He gives us the idea of Forms of Life!". But that then seems to indicate all we can do is study the community of language users and their use of words, and not the concepts themselves.

This then leads me to think Witt can represent a sort of "Radagast" philosophy. What do I mean by that? Well, Radagast the Brown was the wizard in Tolkien's Lord of the Rings who became enamored with the flora and fauna of Middle Earth and in being so focused on these, became disinterested in the broader doings and goings on of Middle Earth. He got caught in the "web of ecology" of the animals and such, but never paid mind to any broader mission. Well, if Witt represents being "caught in the web of ecology" of word use and not about understanding things like the "human condition, ethical implications, suffering, what is, what should, what ought, what can, by what criteria, etc." then one isn't really practicing philosophy so much anymore, but hovering around the edges of meta-philosophy about how word usage makes it impossible. Thus, I see it as a great tool against a particular set of beliefs (logical positivism / logical atomism / certain kinds of logicians in general), but if applied to philosophy as a whole, I think it becomes an excuse to not engage in understanding these broader questions or an excuse to deflate any philosophical inquiry or solution to inquiry as futile attempts.

Delete

If I asked you to show me the video game and you constantly referred me back to how you used the code to create the game OR you showed me how you interact with the game using a controller and where people sit in relation to the game, BUT YOU FAIL TO SHOW ME THE GAME ITSELF, something is missing. — schopenhauer1

In Philosophy, some questions are more important than others

Yes, it's as if I asked Wittgenstein how to get to Paris and rather than say that he didn't know, responded with innumerable questions, such as: Is my Paris better than your Lyon? Why does Paris exist? Why is it that Paris is north of Lyon? When did you first want to go to Paris? Who is the Parisian most influential in ballet? Which Parisian can make the best fruitcake?

All well and good, but what one really wants is "take the Eurostar leaving St Pancras at 10.31 tomorrow".

Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy did wrote that the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, not for any definite answer, but for the sake of the questions themselves as they open the mind to possibilities greater than we previously imagined.

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.

Yes, the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, but not asking questions for the sake of asking questions without any underlying direction. But rather it is broader than that, as in questioning theories developed by such questions. For example: What value does the theory of Referentialism have? Does Wittgenstein's theory that the meaning of words is their use in language help our understanding of the nature of language?

There is a quantitative difference between asking questions for their own sake and questioning theories.

There are similarities between Indirect Realism and the meaning of a word is its use in language

I wrote "Yes, as private sensations such as pain drop out of consideration in the language game, as with the beetle in PI 293, objects in the world also drop out of consideration in the language game, as it is the use of objects we are interested in, not the object in itself."

When someone says "bring me a slab", what is the meaning of the word "slab"? Referentialism is initially easier to understand, in that the "word "slab" corresponds with a slab in the world, and someone can literally point the slab out to you. The theory is problematic, however, with words such as unicorn or pain.

Then how does Wittgenstein's alternative theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language work?

In PI 293 is the analogy of the beetle that drops out of consideration in language. This allows us to talk about "pain" without either me knowing your pain or you knowing my pain. The word "pain" in language doesn't refer to any private sensation of pain, but does refer to pain behaviour, in that we never attribute pain to a rock because rocks never exhibit pain behaviour. If a rock did start to exhibit pain behaviour, then we would probably start to attribute pain to them.

Similarly, when we talk about "slabs" in language, the slab in the world has dropped out of consideration in the language game. This is the position of the Indirect Realist, which, according to the Wikipedia article on Direct and Indirect Realism is the view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. We can only ever perceive a picture of a slab, we can never directly perceive the slab itself.

As in language, the word "pain" directly refers to pain behaviour and only indirectly to the cause of the pain behaviour, the word "slab" directly refers to the representation of a slab and only indirectly to the cause of the representation of a slab

There are other examples of cause being conflated with effect. As regards the senses, if I see the colour green, I name its cause as being green. If I hear a grating noise, I name its cause as being grating. If I smell an acrid smell, I name its cause as being acrid. If I feel something silky, I name is cause as being silky. If I taste something bitter, I name its cause as being bitter. As regards objects and their use, a hammer hammers. A pincer pinces. Rain rains. Water waters.

It is the case that in cognition the unknown cause is named after the known effect. Rather than saying "I see your pain behaviour", this is replaced by the figure of speech "I see your pain", conflating the unknown cause "pain" with the known effect "pain behaviour". Similarly, rather than saying "I see a representation of a slab", this is replaced by the figure of speech "I see a slab", conflating the unknown cause slab with the known effect of a representation of a slab.

We directly perceive representations, which have been caused by unknown things in the world. We can give a particular perception a name, such as "slab". By conflating cause with effect, we can then say that the unknown cause in the world is also a slab. The word "slab" gets its meaning from naming a particular perception in the mind, not from naming an unknown thing in the world.

In this sense, the meaning of a word does not come from naming an object in the world, but does come from naming our perception of an unknown something in the world.

I'll respond to this too, but see my above post too as I think you might find it interesting:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/839480

Yes, it's as if I asked Wittgenstein how to get to Paris and rather than say that he didn't know, responded with innumerable questions, such as: Is my Paris better than your Lyon? Why does Paris exist? Why is it that Paris is north of Lyon? When did you first want to go to Paris? Who is the Parisian most influential in ballet? Which Parisian can make the best fruitcake?

All well and good, but what one really wants is "take the Eurostar leaving St Pancras at 10.31 tomorrow". — RussellA

:lol: :up: Exactly. I will now dub this "Radagasting" (see my post above for why).

Yes, the role of Philosophy is to ask questions, but not asking questions for the sake of asking questions without any underlying direction. But rather it is broader than that, as in questioning theories developed by such questions. For example: What value does the theory of Referentialism have? Does Wittgenstein's theory that the meaning of words is their use in language help our understanding of the nature of language?

There is a quantitative difference between asking questions for their own sake and questioning theories. — RussellA

:100: :fire: . Yes, you hit the nail here. Demonstration without any exposition is impotent. And if you say, "my demonstration is all that I have", then you deem yourself a prophet and others have to "augur" the implications for broader use. I am generally repulsed by such an approach because it deigns of as "above the fray of having to explain". And to then go back and say, "well, my philosophy can never truly be explained because it's all about how things can't truly be explained.. see how clever that is!" is about as eye rolling as a hipster in a coffee shop trying to convince you of some hidden meaning in some inane obscure band.

That reminds of a joke:

"How many hipsters does it take to screw in a lightbulb?"

The word "unicorn" refers to the definition of the word "unicorn"? Why don't all words do this? — Luke

As @Banno wrote a while ago: I haven't paid this thread much attention, because definitions are not all that helpful, but further, any definition of art will immediately encourage any sensible artist to produce something that does not meet that definition.

If that were true then we could no longer speak about any extinct animal for the names of those animals would no longer exist. — Luke

We only know the "unicorn" by description, not acquaintance. Apart from a few people who have directly seen the fossil of a Tyrannosaurus Rex, most people only know about dinosaurs by description, not acquaintance, as "one of the most ferocious predators to ever walk the Earth. With a massive body, sharp teeth, and jaws so powerful they could crush a car, this famous carnivore dominated the forested river valleys in western North America during the late Cretaceous period, 68 million years ago."

What you have said is similar to: "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use", which is circular. — Luke

Totally agree. I have been trying to get across the idea for weeks that Wittgenstein's theory that meaning is use in language is circular, as I wrote before:
If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world.

To repeat, Wittgenstein opposes Referentialism because it views reference as the only use that words can have. His opposition does not imply that words cannot be used to refer; only that they have more uses than this. — Luke

His theory that the meaning of a word is its use in language requires that words cannot refer to objects in the world.

As in language, the word "pain" directly refers to pain behaviour and only indirectly to the cause of the pain behaviour, the word "slab" directly refers to the representation of a slab and only indirectly to the cause of the representation of a slab — RussellA

All good stuff there, but I'm just going to pick this out. So my question is, do you think that Witt cares so much about behavior or context within a community? This idea you have might be conflating the two. Pain loses meaning not necessarily when due to an undefined behavior, so much as an undefined context perhaps, according to Witt.

So if we split it up we have:

1) Pain as felt (the sensation of pain)

2) Pain as behavior (the behaviors associated with pain)

3) Pain in context (the associated uses of pain in the context of a community)

It is 3 that Witt seems to attribute the source of meaning. So I see where you are coming from, but perhaps change 2 to 3. That is to say, meaning can never be attributed to some direct correlation to pain itself, but to how it is used in a community or in a context of a certain language game within a community. You can only understand this by understanding the community's use of the word. But even then, if you wrote a definition down, you'd have to realize it's "fuzzy" and could change with its usage.

It's quite isolating though. You are left with your private sensation of pain, and the word pain just becomes this epiphenomenal construction. Also a problem I see here, is that it's hard to see if there is any criteria for anything here. I would normally say the closest epistemology for criteria of meaning would be pragmaticism. In other words, did the usage "get something done in a particular way", but I don't think Witt is saying that either because that has sort of a telos to it (did this usage get this thing accomplished). I don't think he is saying that either necessarily.

it does not seem to be the case that it is the reader's problem that they have difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein's writings, but rather the responsibility lies with Wittgenstein himself. — RussellA

I can relate that it is hard to see why it is written this way. First, it is a realization so only you can come to it on your own; understanding is not possible without inner change. Also, yes, skepticism is not a matter to be solved and understood; it is an ongoing threat which recurres in the moral realm, and so each situation can require seeing the temptation to abstract and working through it by explicating our ordinary criteria and the context in a situation. Even Hume and Descartes struggled.

But this undertaking is arduous, and a certain indolence insensibly leads me back to my ordinary course of life; and just as the captive, who, perchance, was enjoying in his dreams an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that it is but a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires with the agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged; so I, of my own accord, fall back into the train of my former beliefs, and fear to arouse myself from my slumber, lest the time of laborious wakefulness that would succeed this quiet rest, in place of bringing any light of day, should prove inadequate to dispel the darkness that will arise from the difficulties that have now been raised. — Descartes, end of 1st meditation

I hope not being able to have it straightforward won’t deter you from humbly doing the work first before passing judgment. Did you read the Cavell I suggested (attached above starting at p 56?)

We only know the "unicorn" by description, not acquaintance. Apart from a few people who have directly seen the fossil of a Tyrannosaurus Rex, most people only know about dinosaurs by description, not acquaintance — RussellA

Technically, you should say that most people only know about dinosaur fossils by description, not by acquaintance. I don't believe anyone knows about dinosaurs by acquaintance; not the extinct ones anyway. You claimed earlier that if a word did not refer to an object then the word would not exist. That's clearly not true in the case of (extinct) dinosaurs.

Totally agree. I have been trying to get across the idea for weeks that Wittgenstein's theory that meaning is use in language is circular, as I wrote before: — RussellA

I know you have, but you're mistaken. As I mentioned, Wittgenstein cites examples of different uses of language at PI 23. He is not saying "the use of a word is meaning is use", as you seem to think. He offers some examples of the different types of uses of language. To quote one of these several examples, a word or sentence could be used for "Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting," to name just a few. These alternative uses of language alone falsify the assertion that language is only used to refer to objects.

That is to say, does this mean all theorizing stops now because, welp, it's just language games? I think the next move is to present his idea of "No wait, he gives you an out! He gives us the idea of Forms of Life!". But that then seems to indicate all we can do is study the community of language users and their use of words, and not the concepts themselves. — schopenhauer1

Not sure if you are familiar with the book "Words and Things" by Ernest Gellner, but he provides similar arguments you are suggesting in your post. For Gellner, there is a great desire/importance to theorizing, and so he takes great offense that he needs Wittgenstein's therapy. Take for example,

"If these principles(linguistic philosophy) come to be generally respected, the result would be inhibition of all interesting thought.”

or

“It(linguistic philiosophy) is an attempt to undermine and paralyze one of the most important kinds of thinking, and one of the main agents of progress, namely intellectual advance through consistency and unification, through attainment of coherence, the elimination of exceptions, arbitrariness, and unnecessary idiosyncrasies.”

Additionally, Jerrold Katz, in "Metaphysics of Meaning", presents a theory of meaning that tries to resist the many criticism of Wittgenstein. He believe that Wittgenstein criticism mainly addresses those theories proposed by Frege, Russel, and those presented in Tractatus,

"For Wittgenstein to be successful in his radical critical purpose, he has to show how to eliminate all theories of meaning on which metaphysical questions are meaningful.”

For those interested in comprehensive criticisms on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, these two books I would recommend.

To theorize or not to theorize, that is the question....

Not sure if you are familiar with the book "Words and Things" by Ernest Gellner, but he provides similar arguments you are suggesting in your post. For Gellner, there is a great desire/importance to theorizing, and so he takes great offense that he needs Wittgenstein's therapy. Take for example,

"If these principles(linguistic philosophy) come to be generally respected, the result would be inhibition of all interesting thought.” — Richard B

I have not, but it looks like we independently have the same conclusion.

“It(linguistic philiosophy) is an attempt to undermine and paralyze one of the most important kinds of thinking, and one of the main agents of progress, namely intellectual advance through consistency and unification, through attainment of coherence, the elimination of exceptions, arbitrariness, and unnecessary idiosyncrasies.” — Richard B

:fire: :100: Yes! This is what I have been saying. He explains the issue well.

Additionally, Jerrold Katz, in "Metaphysics of Meaning", presents a theory of meaning that tries to resist the many criticism of Wittgenstein. He believe that Wittgenstein criticism mainly addresses those theories proposed by Frege, Russel, and those presented in Tractatus,

"For Wittgenstein to be successful in his radical critical purpose, he has to show how to eliminate all theories of meaning on which metaphysical questions are meaningful.” — Richard B

Yes that's what I have been saying. It seems he trying to show the flaws in his former belief (Tractatus) and people like Russell and Frege (logicl positivists and logical atomicists specifically). And I think he did make his point, but that's because they straightjacketed themselves in the first place. He is showing the "fly out of the bottle" because they created a self-imposed bottle that doesn't necessarily apply to other philosophers/philosophies. That is to say, yeah if you look for things like a "definite description" as a way to solve metaphysical problems, that is going to cause problems as you try to tie language in some corresponding way to metaphysics. There is a difference between a "description" of a metaphysical thing and a "definite description"- a specific device/idea used by some analytics and logical atomists like Russell..

@RussellA @Banno

I see Witt's style in PI as a sort of "confounding" affect/effect. I can't say if it is intentional, but it is the way the text is laid out. He generally starts out as the "interlocutor" in quotations, sort of like his "demon" presenting various absolute cases of language use (very Socrates-like) and then Witt goes on to prove that absolute case is not as absolute upon further reflection. — schopenhauer1

The style of the Investigations is extremely intentional and necessary for what he is doing--the method he uses is part of the realizations he is able to reach, that the reader is asked to see; it is like Socrates' except Socrates (as with most of analytic philosophy) insisted on a particular type of answer: One that only met a predetermined standard (which Wittgenstein refers to as purity), thus necessitating the idea of "Forms", his inability to come to the conclusion he wants in the Meno, the Theatetus; what @Richard B is calling "consistency and unification, through attainment of coherence, the elimination of exceptions, arbitrariness, and unnecessary idiosyncrasies."--say, making philosophy's findings meet the same standard as science.

does this mean all theorizing stops now because, welp, it's just language games? I think the next move is to present his idea of "No wait, he gives you an out! He gives us the idea of Forms of Life!". But that then seems to indicate all we can do is study the community of language users and their use of words, and not the concepts themselves. — schopenhauer1

This is a common misconception of the Investigations. He is not trying to end philosophy (to avoid addressing the concerns which led to metaphysics); it is just an investigation into the desire that has driven philosophy to certain conclusions, frameworks. The difference between Description and Explanation is also confusing--the description leads to an "explanation" (though the explanation is speculative and simply to see his larger point); it is only that he is not looking for an explanation that satisfies the desire for purity, to generalize, before investigating what is actually the case, what our ordinary criteria are, and why we want to avoid those.

Again, yes, many people misunderstand the reason of pointing out various examples of our lives. The examples are not meant to be foundational (solve skepticism the same way as metaphysics, or facts, or general explanations; the examples are not used, as you say, as a "tool against a particular set of beliefs" emphasis added), they are explicitly meant to lead to the realization that our ordinary criteria for our lives (the "concepts themselves") embody our interests in our lives, what matters to us about a practice, how something counts to be that practice (as I explained above to RussellA, my saying practice here is in place of what he groups and terms "concepts"--to avoid the confusion with the sense of "concept" as in: "idea). These criteria (not the sole criteria that our relation be ensured, "pure") are the "Grammar" meant when Wittgenstein says "Essence is expressed by grammar" #371. Grammar is not "language use" or "use of words" or "rules"; they are the ordinary criteria for judgment that reflect what is essential about an activity for us, rather than a singular "essence" that is constructed from the sole interest for a fixed relation, one that can't go wrong.

And, again, he is not restricting himself to "language" or "language use" (and not the world); his method is to examine what we say in a certain situation (and the associated context) as a means of, as a method to, learn about ourselves and our world, why we overlook these in our desire for purity. As I said above, this misunderstanding leads to the misreading of "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." (Emphasis added) Here "by means of language" is in the sense we battle against our bewitchment (desire for purity) through the process of (the "means of" as method or instrument of) looking at what we say in a situation (what he means by "language" here, though Wittgenstein will, confusingly, talk of "cleaning up language", by which he means bringing words back from their philosophical use (#116), bringing us back from our desire for that purity, not being a language police or that this is just about language).

Well, if Witt represents being "caught in the web of ecology" of word use and not about understanding things like the "human condition, ethical implications, suffering, what is, what should, what ought, what can, by what criteria, etc." then one isn't really practicing philosophy so much anymore. — schopenhauer1

The Investigations is specifically about our "human condition" as it is a realization about the limitations of knowledge, for instance regarding other minds and the "ethical implications" of that (including their suffering, their pain), along with the ethical implications for how we handle moral situations when we don't know what to do (what people "come to blows over" #240), for how to think ethically; the pitfalls of "what should, what ought", etc. You will say he doesn't explicitly address these issues, but I continue to suggest it is only a matter of working to place him in (yet in critique of) the analytical tradition, e.g., matching up a moral situation with the "extension of a concept". He is not spelling all this out to a layperson that has no familiarity with the history of philosophy.

I don't think any of this really answers my critiques about Radagasting and that this is aimed more a particular kind of philosophies that try to make things like "definite descriptions", for example whereby words correspond to reality in some way. I don't think other philosophies need those kind of critiques (of certainty). That is to say, concepts that are not tied to a correspondence theory of words to metaphysics, are simply describing their theory. And it is implicit in their descriptions of reality that they are mere descriptions- a way of relating their ideas about reality. However, unless they are committed to a strict correspondence of words to metaphysics, they have always implicitly been "loose" understandings of metaphysics and epistemology. They are using "forms of life" if you will, to convey their message, and there is no error had with any above and beyond demand for "certainty".

Is Schopenhauer's Will answering questions of "certainty"? Perhaps reality, but that is certainly not certainty.

At first glance, one may think Kant is answering questions of "certainty" when responding to Hume's ideas. But really, it is a theory of how we understand the world by empirical and a apriori means.

Plato is not necessarily talking about "certainty" when he is discussing Forms. He is providing a theory for how there are universals, or things that remain constant amidst change.

I just think that this implies to me there is a "certain" set of philosophies that this idea of "certainty" applies to (analytics- Moore, Russell, Frege, etc.).

Linguistic analysis is an aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but there are other aspects, such as the seeing of aspects and more generally seeing as opposed saying that are of central importance.

As to theorizing, I take his main point to be that our theories can stand in the way of seeing.

When he says at PI 66:

... don’t think, but look!

He is not telling us not to think, but rather, in this case, if we think that all games must have something in common we will fail to see that they do not.