Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims? — Andrew M

Some may, Some may not. Do most people have a clear idea of 'philosophical' objectivity (whatever that is)?

It seems to me that people use moral language in many different ways and senses. As you pointed out earlier "people use language in more nuanced ways than they're often given credit for"..

People use moral terms as if morality were objective. — Andrew M

People use gustatory language as if gustatory properties were objective ("the pizza is delicious").

People use language inconsistently.

Because your usage simply does not reflect how words such as like and dislike are commonly used. — ChrisH
Oh? How is that determined? — Moliere

From observing common usage.

…..sometimes that's not what we mean or have -- we have different emotions towards the same person or aspect. — Moliere

That we have mixed emotions about a person is not surprising. There are many aspects to a person, some of which give rise to negative emotional responses others positive but never both simultaneously. Do you have a simple counterexample?

Why? — Moliere

Because your usage simply does not reflect how words such as like and dislike are commonly used.

I asked you earlier for an example of an indivisible aspect of an object of evalutaion which resulted in both a 'like' and 'dislike' response. Can you come up with anything?

ChrisH -- this is still farily general, but more specific. Does this help? — Moliere

I think I understand what you're saying but I disagree (I don't think you accurately account for what's going on in a "love-hate" relationship).

The term "love-hate" is fine as a high level, poetic description of a particular relationship but I'm pretty sure that if you were to analyse what's going on you'd find that certain aspects are 'loved' and other, quite different aspects, were 'hated'. I know you don't accept this explanation and believe that the same, indivisible, aspect can be both 'loved' and 'hated'. In my view this is implausible.

I'd say it is possible to desire X, and to desire the abolition of X. — Moliere

Can you give an example?

What's the difference? I'd say that this is exactly what temptation looks like -- to object to something yet want it. — Moliere

They're different competing desires. It's simply not possible to simultaneously desire X and not desire X.

Though, one must ask, what is even the point of judging others? — Tzeentch

That's what moral discourse is all about - to encourage/influence the behaviour of others (eg peer pressure).

I'd say it serves no other purpose than masturbation of the ego. — Tzeentch

I'd say you misunderstand morality and moral discourse.

It is an immoral situation that forces me to make a pragmatic choice of evils. — Rank Amateur

I don't think situations are the kinds of things that can be 'immoral'.

All moral choices are essentially about choosing the least evil (however defined). Most moral decisions we make cause us little or no problem. Those that do, we call ethical dilemmas.

It's only when we insist that an action, devoid of context, is intrinsically immoral that we can get to the absurd situation where an action we deem immoral may in fact be the most moral choice (least of all evils). That action then becomes simultaneously immoral and moral!

Yes the lie was and immoral act. The fact that some amount of money is the reason the child can not be cured is an immoral act. Faced with these two evils - the father chose the lesser of immoral acts. — Rank Amateur

What's the difference between the least immoral act and the and the most moral act? If there's no difference then the least of all evils must surely be the most moral option (i.e. morally required) and lying in this instance must be both moral and immoral. Is that possible?

Not by Kant, he is very specific that only when you have no other option than answering yes or no that you must not lie. — Jamesk

I'm struggling to make sense of this. What you say here implies that you may lie if you do have other options! I'm sure this wasn't what you intended.


In any event I'd still be interested in seeing your response to my earlier question:

All I'm asking is if X has no 'moral worth' but it is the right thing to do, in what sense is X right? — ChrisH

That is not the point, — Jamesk

I don't understand this response.

All I'm asking is if X has no 'moral worth' but it is the right thing to do, in what sense is X right?

In my view though, and I think that Kant would probably agree with me, is that I would not open my front door to a person with bad intentions towards me or my household, so I would not open the door and I would call the police. Isn't that what most sensible people would do? — Jamesk

Of course, but I think it's normally assumed that those (evasive) options are not available and your only options are to say nothing, tell the truth or lie.

Under no condition, even such an exaggerated one as the murderer at the door can you claim that lying is of moral worth. It might be the right thing to do, — Jamesk

If it's not the the right moral thing to do, in what sense, in your view, could it be 'right'?

On message boards in which academic philosophers have contributed.

What intrigued me was the very weird way you were using the terms, so that "I like anchovies" is objective in your view, it's an objective fact, and its not a judgment, but "anchovies are delicious" is not objective in your view, it's subjective, and it is a judgment. — Terrapin Station

My usage is based on reading many philosophical discussions over the years where I've seen this distinction made on many occasions.

And I would say that no claims are objective, by the way. And that's the case even if you're using this definition: "expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations." It's not possible to make a claim, or to think anything, that's not subject to personal interpretations, a fortiori because you can't make (or read, or understand) a claim with no meaning associated with it, and meaning is a type of personal interpretation. — Terrapin Station

If you'd said this earlier then you could have saved us both a lot of time.

Cheers.

Well, there isn't a fact regardless of what the person who likes anchovies can know, is there? — Terrapin Station

You're making the mistake I mentioned earlier.

If you take this view then you disqualify the posibility of making any objective claim about the existence of mental states/attitudes.

So maybe you're using a shade of that colloquial idea in "there are objective facts about minds/attitudes"? In other words, if Joe likes anchovies, then everyone can know/we can all agree that it's a fact that Joe likes anchovies. — Terrapin Station

No this has nothing to do with agreement. The point is that there is a fact of the matter regardless of what anyone can know or agree upon.

You've selected the entry which deals with an "object, phenomenon, or condition" when in fact we're discussing claims. Entry 3 is the one appropriate to this context:

expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations — Merriam-Webster

and it's not a standard way to use that term. — Terrapin Station

I disagree. It's perfectly standard.

The standard way to use the term is to refer to things that are independent of anyone's mind (and not just their opinions or feelings, but their minds period). — Terrapin Station

The standard way is to say that the truth of a claim is independent of anyone's opinions/beliefs/feelings. This is sometimes interpreted, mistakenly in my view, that any claim relating to minds/attitudes must be 'subjective'. When it's quite clear that there are objective facts about minds/attitudes.

Again, re verifiability, it just depends on exactly what we're referring to as a verification of something whether verifications are necessarily mental or not. I'd say that verifications would be mental, because I don't think that "verification" makes much sense, or resembles the common usage of that term, if we're not talking about something with meaning attached. — Terrapin Station

I'm afraid you lose me here.

All I'm saying is that "I like X" is true or false independent of anyone else's opinion or feelings. This is what it means to be objective. Whether or not the veracity of the claim is actually verifiable in practice is irrelevant.

If mental states correlate with physical brain-states then they are,in principle, objectively verifiable.

If you accept that the veracity of a claim such as "I like X" can be verified objectively in principle, then you must accept that it is an objective claim.

If you insist that claims such as "X is delicious" are synonymous with "I like X" then you have to accept that such statements are objective.

The problem is that you've defined 'subjective' (in this context) out of existence.

It's a claim about how the speaker feels about x. That is indeed telling us something about the speaker. But it's a judgment--how one feels about something is a judgment. I spelled this out above. — Terrapin Station

Quite honestly I don't care if you want to call it a judgment. The fact remains that it is objectively verifiable (in principle) and is therefore not subjective.

"Anchovies are delicious," likewise, is a claim about the speaker. — Terrapin Station

No it isn't.

If it were, it would make no sense for anyone to disagree with a claim of "X is delicious". According to you, they'd be denying that the speaker actually did find X to be delicious!

You continue to miss the point.

"I like X" is a claim about the speaker. It is not a claim about 'X'. The speaker's attitudes are a feature of the universe and can (in principle) be verified.

"X is delicious" is a claim about X. No examination of 'X' will ever reveal the truth or otherwise of the claim.

You could feed me anchovies, and I could say ‘yum’, hundreds of times, whilst actually hating them. Whereas there’s no way I could lie about being 6” tall. — Wayfarer

This is a red herring. As I said, the veracity could (in principle) be determined (given a sufficiently advanced method of brain scanning).

The point being that both claims are about objective features of the universe. The fact that one may, to all intents and purposes, be practically impossible to verify is irrelevant.

As if anyone wrote anything resembling "Those are the same claim." — Terrapin Station

It seemed to be implied by this:

So if liking something isn't a judgment about it in your view, I have to wonder what the heck definition you're using of "judgment," and re something like "Anchovies are delicious," it's not a fact that the person who stated that thinks that anchovies are delicious? — Terrapin Station

"I like anchovies" isn't a judgment any more than "I am 6 feet tall" is a judgment. They're both straightforward factual claims which are (in principle) objectively verifiable.

But okay, how about this one?

Sally: "Casablanca is the best movie ever made".
Fred, "Nope, it's clearly the Godfather." — Marchesk

Both subjective.

Peter: "I did not like the Godfather. It insists upon itself." — Marchesk

Objective (2nd part subjective).

Millenial: "Second and third Matrix movies were better than the first." — Marchesk

Subjective.

I don't know if you're trolling or if you're really that confused. — Terrapin Station

If you genuinely don't understand that "I like X" is not the same claim as " X is likeable", then I'm afraid it's you that's confused.

Ok. This is going nowhere.

"I like x" is a judgment. — Terrapin Station

No. "X is likeable" is a judgment.

"I like x" is a factual claim. Either I do (sincere) or I don't (I'm lying)

So it's not a fact that the speaker has made a judgment that he/she likes anchovies? — Terrapin Station

It's a fact that the speaker has made two statements (everything is a 'fact' in this trivial sense). Only one is an evaluative claim (judgment).

It seems to me that they're facts — Terrapin Station

They're not "facts", they're statements which make either judgmental or factual claims.

Sure, so help me out. "I like" seems like an estimation of the quality or worth of something. "I like" versus "I dislike" seems to be a judgment. — Terrapin Station

Both are factual (non-judgmental) statements about the speaker.

You're clearly struggling with the distinction between the following:

"I like anchovies"
and
"Anchovies are delicious"

One is a factual statement about the speaker, the other is a judgment of ("an estimation of the quality or worth of") anchovies.

"I like anchovies" isn't an opinion, because presumably it's not a view or judgment formed about something? — Terrapin Station

That's right. It's a straightforward factual claim.

Did you notice above where I asked "how about giving a definition" of subjective/objective? — Terrapin Station

You just asked for a definition (you didn't say "of subjective/objective").

In any event, if a claim expresses an opinion (an estimation of the quality or worth of someone or something) it's subjective.

If it's a factual claim (non-evaluative) it's objective (it's definitively true or false).

I assumed you were aware of this.

and an archetype of a subjective statement:
Fred believes that common salt is composed of chlorine and sodium. — Banno
Or, Fred feels like it's hot in the car, Jill thinks it's cold, but Raymond feels just right.

Or, Fred believes the salt is poison from his partner, who is an alien doppleganger.

Or, Fred dreams the salt is a bunch of tiny elves cranking his taste buds.

Or, Fred is convinced that salt is no more than how it appears to him. — Marchesk

These are all objectively true or false. They're all claims about an individuals belief's (their brain states) and can all be determined (in principle) as true or false

You've been insisting that claims such as "I like anchovies" are opinions (and therefore subjective). The standard definition of 'opinion' does not support this view:

1. A view or judgement formed about something, not necessarily based on fact or knowledge.

1.1 The beliefs or views of a group or majority of people.

1.2 An estimation of the quality or worth of someone or something.

An opinion is an evaluative claim.

"I like anchovies" is a factual claim about ones own brain state (it's not an evaluative claim). It's not the expression of an opinion.

"Anchovies are delicious", on the other hand, is an evaluative claim about anchovies and is an opinion.

What definition of subjective/objective were you using? If mental states are objective in your view, what phenomena is subjective? — Terrapin Station

It's claims (propositions), not "phenomena", that are subjective or objective. I gave an example of the distinction between subjective and objective claims in my last but one post.

Here it is again:

1) "I like anchovies." (Objective factual claim)

2) "Anchovies are delicious." (Subjective opinion) — ChrisH