Thanks for the response,
, and apologies for the late response.
Both wants and can, but doesn't?
FYI, here's an alternate layout of the opening post:
The Epicurean Problem
We observe children suffer terribly and die uselessly from cancer, while researchers work hard to prevent/relieve/cure as with "prior" (or historical)
maladies.
Researchers at
St. Jude Children's Research Hospital want to but
can't prevent/relieve/cure children suffering terribly and dying uselessly from cancer (
4 below).
(
want ⇐ benevolent)
(
can't ⇐ not (yet) capable, not (yet) knowledgable)
If Yahweh
wanted to and
could have His creation free of the terrible suffering and useless death of those children from cancer, then what do you think would be the case?
(
wanted ⇐ omnibenevolent)
(
could ⇐ omnipotent, omniscient)
1. unlike humans, Yahweh (almighty all-creator) is and wills good
2. what Yahweh wills is good, unlike humans at large
3. the children that suffer and die from cancer is good, e.g. "the greater good"
4. the will and sentiments of researchers at
St. Jude Children's Research Hospital are contrary to
3 and unlike following Yahweh's example
5. activities of researchers at
the Hospital are not good (and are without warrant)
Cease and desist? No more vaccines and whatever else medicine, prevention/relief/cure?
"The greater good" defense challenges the term "useless" above — the predicament is not useless but for an unknown greater good — to which the points
1-
5 is a response.
By assertion, Yahweh has every warrant without exception; what warrant do researchers, doctors, etc then have (
1-
3 above)?
Premises
1 and
2 are fairly typical and figure more or less as definitions in
divine command theory and
theological voluntarism.