A brief timeline of events:
2010 Jan 17 · Ukrainian presidential election
2010 Feb 7 · election runoff (Yanukovych, Tymoshenko)
2013 Nov 21 · Euromaidan starts
2014 Feb 18 · Revolution of Dignity starts
2014 Feb 22 · Euromaidan ends
2014 Feb 23 · Revolution of Dignity ends; organized unrest in Donbas starts
2014 Feb 27 ⚔ Russian troops ("little green men") start seizing Crimea
2014 Mar 18 · Russia annexes Crimea
2014 Mar 31 · Kharkiv Pact annulled by the Kremlin
2014 Apr 6 ⚔ insurgents seize government buildings in Donbas
2014 Apr 12 ⚔ Donbas war starts; platoon under Girkin (Surkov) seizes Sloviansk
2014 May 2 · organized unrest in Donbas settles down
2014 May 25 · Ukrainian presidential election (Poroshenko)
2019 Mar 31 · Ukrainian presidential election
2019 Apr 21 · election runoff (Zelenskyy, Poroshenko)
2021 Jan 1 ⚔ ongoing scattered insurgent attacks in eastern Ukraine
2021 Nov 10 · the US reports Russian military buildup near Ukrainian border
2022 Jan 17 · increasing Russian troops in Belarus; increased separatist strife in eastern Ukraine
2022 Jan 25 · Russian military exercises in Crimea and southern Russia near Ukraine
2022 Feb 10 · Russo-Belarusian military exercises start
2022 Feb 20 · Russo-Belarusian military exercises end
2022 Feb 22 ⚔ Russian "peacekeeping" troops enter Ukraine
2022 Feb 24 ⚔ Russia invades northern, eastern, southern Ukraine
2022 Sep 30 · Russia annexes Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia
2024 Jan 1 · Russia occupies roughly a fifth of Ukraine
In retrospect, what might have been different from early on?
Some factors ...
- the Kremlin likely planned for a while, multipronged too
- democracies tend to act slowly/hesitantly, autocrats are less bound
- the Kremlin takes initiatives (attacks), others react (less proactive measures)
- divide and rule strategies have worked, and can work, well for the Kremlin
- international peacekeepers in Ukraine didn't seem appropriate/feasible
- early unrest had appearance of mere/internal domestic conflict
- tiptoeing around Russia
- Kremlin-anxiety (not the Moldovan kind here, but) nuclear in particular
- an effective (internationally implemented) Ukrainian no-fly zone would risk direct confrontation with Russia
- China has likely been supplying the Kremlin with intelligence including satellite, reliable intelligence matters all around
- western countries have already been accused of neo-colonialism/imperialism, meddling, war-mongering, you-name-it
- Russia has occasionally been promoted as all-but "invincible", though Russia was never itself threatened with invasion here
- can all defense be narrated as offense, can all defensive measures be cast as threats?
(It's worth noting that more or less all implemented measures have been met with criticism.)
▸ Crimea apparently took everyone by surprise. Hardly a fire was shot err hardly a shot was fired. In response, international supporters might have helped Ukraine with resources to counter the takeover (no secure Russia-Crimea land-bridge at the time). The Black Sea Fleet could have faced noticeable risk.
▸ The early insurgency might have seen international peacekeepers or more international involvement. Sufficient attention (and international presence), perhaps including mediation, could potentially have affected the course of events.
▸ In response to military buildup, international supporters might have quickly helped Ukraine with substantial defensive resources. Sufficient preparations·measures could have made a difference, including to the later grain and Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant situations.
▸ International military exercises (presumably not under a NATO umbrella) in Ukraine might have deterred the Kremlin from escalating aggression. NATO exercises in the neighborhood have been held with little response from the Kremlin.
▸ Perhaps more comprehensive upfront analysis·coverage·awareness of Kremlin and other story-telling from early on could have affected discussions·debates·back-and-forths·dis/agreements·re/actions etc. Ukrainian sovereignty, sentiments among non-NATO'ers (Moldova, Austria, Georgia, Ukraine, etc), NATO'ers to-be (Finland, Sweden), NATO'ers (Poland, the Baltics, Germany, etc) and NATO'ers no-longer-to-be (none as of typing), and other relevant topics could be included.
▸ Sustained, but specific, international propaganda·attention·exposé on Putin (say, at least after being named TIME Person of the Year in 2007), including directed at China, might have had some effect. Kremlin efforts (and their effects) have been seen.
Lessons learned? Not learned?