Comments

  • Submit an article for publication
    Too quiet here.

    Some time ago (must be over a year) I typed "Yet another mind-body hypothesis" in.
    Not really sure if it's appropriate as an article here (might need a cleanup for one), but there is material for discussion (and it has pictures :)).
    I suppose the gist of it is that, regardless of realism idealism substance-dualism physicalism panpsychism whatever, some of these problems may be inherently intractable, and so accounting for them seems more fruitful than trying to explain them away.

    Suppose you've gotten yourself a headache. No aspirin at hand. Instead you go scan yourself, fMRI or whatever the latest may be, doesn't really matter. You now have two different angles, the experience of the ache, and a visual overview of your gray matter (need not be visual alone). If only the angles differ, in an ontological sense, then what makes them different? (Does anyone really doubt that feeling hungry (usually) means the body needs replenishment?) Understanding the scan, in this context, would converge on understanding the headache; a straight identity is not readily available, or deducible. The headache itself is part of your self-experience, or, put simpler, just part of yourself — bound by (ontological) self-identity, like self-reference, regardless of any scans or whatever else. Others cannot have your headaches (identity), but others can check out the scans (non-identity).
  • Humdrum
    :D

    h1n5iauz0nx8h6s5.png
  • Hello!
    Yeah, took ya' long enough, @Maw.
    :D
  • Liar's Paradox
    For p = this statement is false to be considered, isn't there an implicit assumption that p is true?
    Due to the self-reference (this statement), it is also the case that p = p is false.
    So, we have both p is true and p is false, which is on the form of an ordinary contradiction, p ∧ ¬p.
  • Feature requests
    Cool, sub- and super-script are supported.

    Watery stuff: H2O
    Squarey stuff: x2

    Watery stuff: H[sub]2[/sub]O
Squarey stuff: [i]x[/i][sup]2[/sup]

    Just for @Banno, add super- and subscript to the button list above the comment box. — Michael

    How do you add them?
  • Post truth
    A relevant article from yesterday, which puts some meat on the bones of my post:

    Why Have People “Had Enough of Experts”?     — jamalrob

    Cool.
    Though, where no one is obliged to automatically listen to subject matter experts, neither are anyone entitled to automatically dismiss them.
    Mere post-truth dissidentry without reason won't do.
  • What direction is the world heading in?
    Ehmm yes he commits the sophistry of looking at it in terms of percentages. Ahh only 1% of the world's population died during the World Wars! Not a big deal! It's 1% - look in the past, more than 1% died! In the tribe having 100 people as population, 10 died per year, much bigger you see? 10% - not a big deal! Just another statistic as I've said. The chance of dying violently was much greater! 10 times greater in fact! Woah, what a discovery! — Agustino

    On the same account, many (many) more people now also live on without being violently murdered.
    Of course that could change, though I sure hope not.
  • What direction is the world heading in?
    The tragedy of the commons is a fairly fundamental result of non-regulation.
    Seems like a good reason for cooperation.
    A thoroughly "back to nature" move (and similar) isn't really much of an improvement, more a kind of romanticising.
  • What direction is the world heading in?
    I voted "Other" because I honestly don't know.

    What might improve upon things...?
    Educating and informing, generally available, and throwing misinformation in the bin.
    Looking after each other, and our environments long-term.
    Those kinds of things.
  • Post truth
    On the topic:

    Richard Rorty and the Origins of Post-Truth
    ANA SANDOIU
    The Partially Examined Life
    Dec 2016


    Anyway, if we suppose that a major meteor impact was to happen, then, ex hypothesi, no manner of post-truth will save the truthers.
    Thus, discovering the world on it's own terms also matters, if you will.
    (That's assuming the truthers wish to continue post-truth'ing.) :)
  • Happy New Year's to you all.
    Happy new year everyone. May 2017 be cool.

    6gjh4oryqkiyi7ul.png
  • the limits of science.
    Spatiality is not conserved[1][2] as it were, there's literally more of it by the minute, apparently "coming from nothing" if you will.
    How does the metaphysical principle, nihil fit ex nihilo[3], account for that in this context?
    It doesn't really; the principle isn't unconditional to begin with; a task of inquirers is to delineate such principles.

    CAUSATION is entirely outside the realm of science. Even immediate causation can only be stated in terms of "we see this, and then we see that. it seems to always happen in this order." — taylordonbarrett

    We know lots about causation.
    Say, causation as uni-directional interaction[4], or uni-directional aspects thereof — what we find as related, temporally ordered events.
    Causes and effects are events, and events are subsets of changes (contextual) — they occur.
    Conversely, not all events are necessarily effects (exemplified by micro-chaos[5][6][7][8]).
    Eventually we get to processes (as ontologically distinct from objects, for example).

    It seems spatiotemporality is a prerequisite for mentioned micro-chaos.

    ________
    [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accelerating_expansion_of_the_universe
    [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservation_law#Exact_laws
    [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nothing_comes_from_nothing
    [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_interaction
    [5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_particle
    [6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_fluctuation
    [7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_foam
    [8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casimir_effect
  • Whole is greater than the sum of its parts
    Indeed, the whole, say a car, is an assembly of interacting parts. These parts weren't assembled by themselves, but were put together by human, who also conceive the the property, interactions, forms, and the structure of the car.
    However the same parts that wasn't put together by human remains a pile.     — miosim

    Something similar shows up in all kinds of places.
    Say, hydrogen and oxygen atoms (the parts) can combine to water molecules (the whole).
    In turn, atomic hydrogen and oxygen has protons and electrons and neutrons, ...

    Do we need to invoke emergence to understand this? — miosim

    Depends on what counts as emergence I guess.
    The car (the whole) can be used for transportation, but the pile (the parts) can't.
    Are the water phases/states emergent? The nifty-looking, symmetrical, hexagonal ice-crystals?
    The parts on their own can't be water steam/gas, liquid or ice/solid (which also depending on pressure and temperature).

    I don't buy emergence beyond it being a way of saying that properties depend on dynamic structures, but again, relations/structures/processes are parts in my opinion (a fortiori because all parts in the normal "object" sense are dynamic structures in the first place) — Terrapin Station

    Interesting.
    Do you think the structure that make a car out of the parts, is also itself an independent part thereof (approaching Platonism it seems)?
    Surely structure is contingent on parts to exist, whereas parts are not particularly dependent on other aspects of the car?
    I suppose not just any structure will make a car out of the parts, but parts may be interchangeable.
  • Existence of the objective morals & problem of moral relativism
    Going by evidence, I think it can be shown that moral realism versus moral relativism is a false dichotomy.
    Evidently we tend to dislike harm and like freedom, which clearly is subjective (or mind-dependent if you will).
    Since those are morally informative (while assuming some moral awareness), they exemplify subjective morals.
    Yet they're not moral relativism, not arbitrary, ad hoc opinion or discretionary.
    So, there's more to the story, it seems.
  • Whole is greater than the sum of its parts
    It seems "the whole" has additional structure (and interaction) that the collection of "the parts" does not.
    I suppose some emergence may be a result of the difference.
  • How things came to be this way. Share your story of the universe.
    There was never really a time when there wasn't anything. (Well, otherwise there would have been time at least, if that makes any sense.) OK, once upon every time there was something, it would seem.

    Uhh, anyway ...

    Once upon a time there were things and change and stuff, and it really moved in all it's glory, or at least that's how my imagination imagines it. And then there was life, sprawling from stardust and blazing light and such, which, in some obscure corner of it all, invented the Internet. Then one day, in this little pocket, this post came about, in all it's ordinariness.

    You'll have to wait for the rest of the story.
  • The problem of absent moral actors
    moral actions are not always decidable (the trolley problem again)

    Apropos, here's MIT's Moral Machine: http://moralmachine.mit.edu/
  • The problem of absent moral actors
    I for one agree, @Bitter Crank, a specific, practical course of action is situation dependent.
    I also agree with @Stosh, to some extent, that you can argue for a laissez-faire "none of my business" sentiment.
    If, say, a bunch of bikers are beating up a member of the rivals, then I'm less concerned, than a babysitter beating up the baby they're sitting.
    But plain, everyday moral actions are relevant here.
    I could go by evidence, if you prefer; wasn't intending to presumptuously impose my own moral standards.
  • The problem of absent moral actors
    Right, @andrewk, the greater good defense.

    Say, like, the during the time the neighbor on the left walks away, and the neighbor on the right intervenes, the victim learned an important lesson, so that they later save a refugee family, whose youngest child yet later takes political office for the good of many more, ... Or something else, as long as an unknown greater good remains a coherent possibility (while ignoring an unknown greater bad).

    The greater good defense is an appeal to ignorance, though, but it does show that the original problem does not refute omnipotence + omniscience + omnibenevolence together on a purely deductive basis.

    I was going for the simplest coherent belief, compatible with our own moral actions.
  • "UK Not Likely to Survive Brexit Article 50 Decision"
    Thanks for the info @mcdoodle; hadn't actually checked the site further, it was just casually given to me by friend that lives in London, UK.

    I'm not a UK citizen, just an observer, but it seems to me that Brexit got the votes on things not all that relevant.
    An anti-establishment, dissident, type sentiment, coming from anti-immigrant rhetoric and such.
  • The problem of absent moral actors
    Anyway, the opening post is a rendition of the problem of evil (sort of).
    Capable, knowing, willing.
    A hypothetical neighbor "above", was less benevolent than the neighbor on the right, yet could have intervened prior, and hence leaves something to be desired, as it were, or did not exist (absent actor).
  • The problem of absent moral actors
    @Stosh, oddly enough, it's almost as if you agree with the assessment in the opening post...? :)
    Call it a thought experiment (with a stacked deck), call it an event that happened in Texas, USA, 2015 (real life), doesn't really matter (when in doubt apply charity).
    Sure, morals are subjective in part or whole, yet morals are hardly arbitrary, ad hoc opinion, mere whims of the moment, random, or discretionary.
    Among actors in the scenario, it seems the neighbor on the right did best; anything to the contrary just re-stacks the deck, while still deferring to moral sentiments (they had it comin').
    Morpheus was just a bit surprised, or rather I was. :D
  • The problem of absent moral actors
    @Terrapin Station, you might be able to argue that inaction is entirely excusable, if you will.
    That said, do you disagree that the neighbor on the right did better than others...?
    I mean, would you really just look the other way, "just another day at the farm"...?

    @Stosh, sure, they may hav'a had it comin'. :)
    Uncomfortably close to victim blaming though.
    The scenario wasn't really intended as one of those.
    (Presumably you're not claiming the scenario is unrealistic, entirely hypothetical, "never happened"?)

    kksj27gjbmw25ky6.jpg

    It's a fairly basic (relative) comparison among capable and knowing neighbors, and what we think "doing the right thing"™ is (as a default).
    Or what some of us think at least.
  • The problem of absent moral actors
    @Terrapin Station, part of the argument is that inaction is no excuse, at least not morally.
    The two quotes, and the trolley problem of old, allude to that as well.
    Granted, moral actions are not always decidable (the trolley problem again), yet, this scenario seems fairly straightforward.
    The opening post is a different angle on the problem of evil (capable, knowing, willing).
  • Philosophy Encyclopedias
    This link is a good starting place to get an overview of topics and philosophers:

    http://www.philosophybasics.com/
  • Philosophy talk dot org
    (*psst*, Whenever I come across someone elsewhere that seems genuinely cool — including people I disagree with mind you — then I point them over here, but don't tell anyone *sshh*) :)
  • Non-necessity (modal logic) and God (theism)
    I suppose, then, as far as assertions go, there's a mutually exclusive choice between 1 and a,b:

    • 1. Among possible worlds some are without sentience. Sentience is not necessary.
    • a. Definition: G is necessary.
      b. Definition: G is necessarily sentient.

    The former (1) might be exemplified by some simple worlds while assuming they're non-contradictory, whereas the latter (a, b) assumes G and consistency.


    OK, let me try being a bit more concise...

    Possible worlds semantics at a glance:

    • necessarily p ⇔ for all logical worlds w, p holds for w
    • □p ⇔ ∀w∈W p

    • possibly p ⇔ for some logical world w, p holds for w
    • ◊p ⇔ ∃w∈W p

    So, a logical world is an inclusive, complement-free entirety where ordinary logic holds.

    Let's just say this is ordinary logic (catering for intuitionist/constructive logic), the three first in particular:

    1. identity, x = x, p ⇔ p
    2. non-contradiction, ¬(p ∧ ¬p)
    3. the excluded middle, p ∨ ¬p

    4. double negation introduction, p ⇒ ¬¬p
    5. modus ponens
    6. modus tollens

    Ontology and logic tend to meet at identity.
  • Non-necessity (modal logic) and God (theism)
    @Terrapin Station, I just meant that obviously you can deny 1 as follows:

    a. definition: G is necessary
    b. definition: G is necessarily sentient
    c. ... sentience is present for all logically possible worlds ...
    d. 1 is wrong

    And some do just that, albeit contrary to Swinburne.
    My line of thinking was that it seems rather odd to assert G, and deny 1 on that account, when much simpler worlds come through as non-contradictory.


    @unenlightened, I think @Terrapin Station has the notion of "possible world" well illustrated.
    A logical world is an all-inclusive, complement-free entirety (all, "everything") where ordinary logic holds.
    Like in the illustration, the whole deism column is a suggestion of a possible world (God and Universe).
  • Non-necessity (modal logic) and God (theism)
    If one believes that God's existence is necessary for any possible world [one] would think that a world that consists solely of a single simple that's not God is impossible. — Terrapin Station

    Right, yet that's just a definitional petitio principii.
    By assertion a world without sentience is impossible because G is absent therefrom, because G is necessary (by definition), which, by the way, holds for any G.

    I actually think that a world with a single "zero-dimensional thing" is incoherent, by the way, and I'm an atheist. That's simply because I don't believe that there can be zero-dimensional things. — Terrapin Station

    For worlds like ours, by a physical/epistemic/nomological assessment, I tend to agree (no two-dimensional superstrings either per se).
    Metaphysically, maybe, maybe not.
    Logically it seems non-contradictory to me.
    (It was just a (very) simple example that came to mind; not the best.) :)
  • Non-necessity (modal logic) and God (theism)
    Claiming God's existence and solipsism is such a strange combination. — Emptyheady

    Good point (I suppose, unless the solipsist consider themselves God).
    Perhaps subjective idealism, à la Berkeley or something similar, is a better example.
    Or panpsychism of some sort, one that starts from a particular sentiment already contrary to 1.

    Come to think of it, if the argument above is sound, then it would seem contrary to Plantinga's modal ontological argument.

    Anyway, in this context, I'd say 1 (the zero-dimensional "thing", for example) is significantly more plausible than the contrary.
  • Non-necessity (modal logic) and God (theism)
    What does it mean to say that God is sentient? If it has any meaning at all it clearly cannot be sentience as we know it. And even if it were it seems an awfully big leap from every possible world has a sentient being involved in some kind of a relationship with it to all possible worlds have sentience and further still to all possible worlds are sentient. — Barry Etheridge

    Well, defining sentience in terms of something else is perhaps somewhat futile.
    I'm thinking it's part of mind, where mind is an umbrella term for self-awareness, consciousness, thinking, feelings, phenomenological experiences, qualia, the usual.
    Let's just say "sentience" as we know it, since, what else would we be talking about...?

    I suppose we might come up with some special kind of "sentience", but then we're already starting to move into the thick fog of London on a dark night, a bit like inventing things for the occasion. :)
    (Sometimes I've seen sentience referring to an awareness of one's own sentiments, feelings, reactions and such, as distinct characteristics of oneself, quite close to self-awareness, something along those lines, but that may not be spot on.)
  • Non-necessity (modal logic) and God (theism)
    Anyway, someone who believed that God's existence is necessary would think that the first premise is false. — Terrapin Station

    Sure, but that's a tad bit presumptuous, implausibly strong, unjustified, especially in comparison to any number of alternatives.
    Consider a rather simple world consisting in one zero-dimensional "thing", that's indivisible, and changeless, and that's about it. Can you derive a contradiction from that? Not particularly interesting, but seemingly consistent nonetheless.

    I'm finding this one hard to make sense of. Why should God 'carry' sentience to all possible worlds? God creates a possible world consisting of, say, a piano, and not much else. Why does the piano have to be sentient? It looks as though there is the assumption of immanence??? — unenlightened

    That's not quite how possible worlds semantics work.
    A possible world is an inclusive entirety, where ordinary logic holds. Here are some suggestions, e.g. deism (ignore the simplicity, it's just for illustration):

    495j518fr9i3hdnc.jpg

    A significantly simpler suggestion is the zero-dimensional "thing" above, which does not need sentience (or sentient entities) to be logically consistent, non-contradictory.
  • Non-necessity (modal logic) and God (theism)
    At a glance, I see a couple objections:

    • outright reject modal logic
    • solipsism, panpsychism (or some other special idealism)

    It's trivial to come up with an idealist objection.

    Suppose I'm a solipsist, holding that only whatever I'm certain of is the case (thereby conflating epistemology and ontology). My error-free knowledge extends roughly to the existence of (self)awareness and some (other) experiences, including sentience (perhaps depending a bit on what's understood by the term). Regardless of any modalities, my sentience becomes necessary.

    It's already broadly agreed upon that solipsism is not deductively dis/provable. My self-awareness is essentially indexical, and noumena to any other (self)awarenesses. Phenomenological experiences themselves are "private", part of onto/logical self-identity and not something else.

    So, there's no dis/proof to be found here, though obviously such sentiments has consequences that most folk find ridiculous, but there you have it, that's one objection.

    Does a necessary God, that's necessarily sentient, imply idealism (well, or substance dualism or whatever)?
  • What are you listening to right now?
    Playing right now?

    Miles Davis: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbxtYqA6ypM
  • What are you listening to right now?
    Yep, remember this. Not the concert in person, but the rest. The sentiment of "fuck you, you, and you.". Damn, how boring and mellow I've become.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBojbjoMttI
  • What are you listening to right now?
    Sinner, where ya gonna run to?

    Regardless of the superstitious nonsense, Simone gives an impressive musical (and felt) performance. The only "power" is the music itself. Such is music, and Simone's got it.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QH3Fx41Jpl4
  • Problem with Christianity and Islam?
    Some emotional responses here. Maybe I should have posted it over in the sociology section. Of course killing infants is repugnant, as held by most believers and others alike. :)

    There's a fairly simple observation involved.

    Remove the Christianity and Islam part, and go by common religious beliefs, like taught in Sunday school and madrasas, for example.

    1. It's uncontroversial among such believers that an infant (or other innocent child) that dies, goes to heaven, to be with God. I'd say this often enough includes accredited pastors and imams and such, although "heaven", "God", "innocent", etc, can be subject to all manner of ideation and definitions.

    2. If an infant is killed, then the killer has committed a crime, both by various religious and secular rules. Those entertaining faith as per above — the killer in particular — may believe the killer can still be "saved", others may believe they cannot and don't care (or perhaps believe they're damned in any case), yet others may believe something else, who knows.

    As per such faith, killing an infant will secure the infant's entrance into heaven, to be with God. Believers, be they (would-be) killers or not, commonly share 1 above.

    That does not mean the act of killing is good or anything — it goes against other rules — yet, the repercussions extend just to the killer, not the victim.

    It's not so much about consequentialism, as it is about believed consequences of an infant's (or other innocent child's) death. Neither is it about throwing Abrahamic religions in the bin. It's about analyzing real-life beliefs, irrespective of any (perceived) controversy.

    Anyway, have a good weekend, and holidays.
  • What are you listening to right now?
    I can't watch this in the UK due to copyright, hope you can where you are. — Punshhh

    Blocker here, but here's a live performance, that's not blocked here at least (Canada, per se):

    https://youtu.be/XPpCRAQdkDU
  • What are you listening to right now?
    Beat this. Well, Mozart perhaps, but contemporary (no, Satriany doesn't quite measure up). Amazing.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U5Vki76x-EU
  • What are you listening to right now?
    Rock.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrAfrV-sCvM
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