It is my understanding that Wittgenstein's 'meaning is use' was a later rejection of Frege's support for 'a picture theory of language'.
From developments in phenomenology, the idea of 'an actual thing' is countered by the views that 'things are thinged by thingers'..i.e. 'things' are those social acquired words we (humans) give to repetitive interaction events of observers and focal aspects of 'our world'. 'Physicality' (of chairs etc) is merely one possible aspect of that interaction. 'Things' such as 'love', 'understanding', 'God', etc...may lack such an aspect, but may still have consistent social usage.

The word 'truth' doesn't come into it except in negotiation of what is agreed 'to be the case'. The 'reality debate' concerns the more general issue of whether 'things-in-themselves' can be separated from 'observers'. It also concerns the status of 'facts' which pragmatists see as 'social constructions'. The futility of 'the reality debate' is perhaps summarized by Nietzsche's point that 'descriptions' are all we can ever have, some being more useful than others according to context.

I agree with your objection if it amounts to dismissal of the functionality of a non-contextual dichotomy between 'subjective' and 'objective'. I mean by this, that in context 'objectivity' means 'shared assumptions' versus individual views. The synthetic scenario of 'the bug' above is an example of what I call 'seminaritis'...a contrived situation beloved of philosophers which rarely occurs in 'real life'.
The general issue of the dichotomy is bound up with a 'reality debate' which Pragmatist's (like Rorty) have dismissed as futile.

Irrespective of Augustines 'mental prowess' or otherwise, you don't seem to have considered that 'the church' benefitted materially by acquiring estates of unmarried cousins which would have hitherto remained in the family. This fact raises issue with the implication of the word 'virtuosity'.

Goethe's color 'theory' was opposed to Newton's 'physics' of color, in that it stressed color as a phenomenological experience in which, for example 'black' and 'white' were still 'colors'. Wittgenstein, despite his earlier scientific training, had moved on to his adage 'meaning is usage' and seems to have taken Goethe as illustrative of this.
Note that this is my simplistic view of what was going on, and you might need to read up on W's 'Remarks on Color' for a more definitive view. But all of this needs to be set against the background that there is no strict isomorphism between physical 'wavelength' and perceptual 'color category' which loosens any propposed ties between 'physicality' and 'realism'. That's where the 'summit' lies IMO.

Yes...you've reached the foothills ...keep going !

That 'colorless world' conclusion seems self evident to me. Nor are 'scientists' from such a world likely to be interested in the rest of what we call 'the visible spectrum' except in terms the behavior of other species who might be 'sensitive' to other wavelengths.

From a general philosophical pov, 'color perception' has been been a central microcosm for debate, from the ontological status of qualia through to Wittgenstein's interest in Goethe's phenomenological 'color theory' which allegedly caused W to reject his own earlier Tractatus. Such 'color issues' in particular, and 'concept boundaries' in general, have also formed the backbone of some of the experimental studies of 'Embodied Cognitionists', like Rosch, who have researched W's 'prototype concept' within semantics.

And more generally, this microcosm the cutural differentiation of color categories in humans, and the species differential in physiological receptors, has raised the issue of 'anthropocentrism' in macrocosmic discussions of 'realism'.

Ah...I seem to remember that gnostics consider themselves to be 'God' (or a manifestation thereof). If so, you presumably have the power to forgive your 'self-indulgence' !.. Great move !

That's a pretty self indulgent assumption !... that you are 'a good man' rather than being merely parasitic on the standard theistic faith of others who also lay claim to 'goodness'. I suggest you face up to the fact that without the psychological palliative and social tunctionality which established that constructed 'God' of others, you would have nothing to say. And since what you say fails to address those psychological and social needs, you are talking to yourself.

Surely the onus 'to go away,' statistically remains with religious 'crazies' who infest cozy respectable philosophy forums instead of standing on draughty street corners with placards.

You have been flogging gnosticism, both here and elsewhere, for the last couple of years without much 'success'. I put to you that any reliance of gnosticism on 'logic' is ridiculously naive, since logic is philosophically well known to be limited with respect to semantics.

Regarding this particular thread with the simplistic postural assertion about 'God as servant,' have you considered that any concept, from 'rocks' to 'gods' stands or falls on its functional utility to humans who coin it,? i.e. any concept serves human purposes, in terms of psychological and social needs. That includes your usage !

So there's your answer irrespective of any nebulous blather about the ontological status of 'God', you may try to dangle as 'bait' in your continuing self validation exercises.

Exactly. Words are contextually dependent upon the things that they are about, which are not words themselves.

Not exactly....about 'things' which are 'affordances for interaction' which, for humans are, 'marked' by 'words'.
By saying that a word marks an affordance I am using the phenomenolocial idea that a word can trigger, or re-presents an interaction possibility. The 'tree' in my garden does not 'exist' as an 'object in its own right'....its existence depends on my shifting relationship with it including those affordances which involve the benefits and duties of 'ownership', but since those affordances shift in the praxis of living, so does the tree's 'existence'. What I called 'tree', may not 'exist' as such for a bird, say, who might be looking for the affordance of 'perches' or 'food finding' in which the 'tree as object' is meaningless.

We all hold tend to hold various 'contradictory beliefs'. It takes a bit of intellectual sophistication to realize that ! One concept which follows from that is 'the committee nature of self'.

No.
You ignore the fact that 'existence' is a word like any other whose meaning is also contextually dependent. The alternative, that 'existence' has an 'absolute' sense, is no different to a religious claim.

To All
Have you listened to the Rorty clip (above) ? There is no 'conflict' if science and religion are seen as operating in different domains of human necessity. Ostensibly, science operates in the domain of 'prediction and control'; Religion operates in the domain of 'emotional and social need'. Conflict arises when 'needs' stray out of their domains, like fundamentalist views regarding evolution, or when scientists ask for 'empirical evidence' for a deity.
Unfortunately, it takes a certain level of intelligence and confidence in self integrity to understand this potential resolution in those terms, because social and psychological forces tend to fog a terrain which is already intellectually unreachable by much of humanity. Nor is the 'control' aspect of science 'value neutral' with respect concepts of 'progress', which gives a potential 'handle' to religionists. (as exemplified by the post above).

My reading of Derrida suggests that 'meaning' is a transient directive aspect of our interactions. Contexts are dynamically shifting so that a word like 'car', say, means (has import) at one time 'a convenience', at another 'an expense', etc, whithout those usages being functionally synonymous with respect to subsequent action or thought (aka 'neural activity'). Obviously dictionary definitions attempt to give relationships to other words, or suggest potential usage contexts but that statistical aspect of 'meaning' is also transient over a greater time period. (Consider the word 'nice' for example which was originally related to the word 'knife').

For Derrida 'frame' (usage context) is as important as the focal 'word'....even in text, which in turn is framed by previous texts and 'reading attitude'. This is why he denies that the 'meaning' of text is any more permanent than speech, even though 'the squiggles' are ! And this point is valid even for the authors of the text themselves. Thus so-called 'inconsistencies' are to be likely to occur.

No wonder traditional philosophers don't like him !

See my 'existence' thread !

Complementarity is not a 'size' issue. It's in part a 'set membership' issue...particle versus wave.. which were thought to be mutually exclusive.
I have no problem in accepting pure mathematics as an intellectual exercise, often with later surprising applicability. (I believe, for example, that the equations applicable to electric power transmission lines were formulated in the 17th. century).

Sorry, that was to Harry.

I'm pleased you say you undedstand what each of us is talking about. I doubt whether each of us understands the other !

Yes. Opinions on Derrida tend to polarize due to his iconoclasm.
Have a go with Maturana. He doesn't do 'mind' or 'thinking'...only behavior.
'

I see ! So 'cause' = 'meaning'...good luck with that one!

Let me know if you follow up my references.
Thankyou for the conversation so far.

NB. In terms of your flair for combative philosophy you might appreciate this critique of the Schaller study.

It has been suggested that the characterization of Ildefonso as entirely "languageless" may be an oversimplification. In the same review, Padden speculates that "Schaller may have been teaching language to Ildefonso, but more accurately, she was teaching him how to map a new set of symbols on a most likely already existent framework of symbolic competence."

Thankyou for the Brouwer reference. I certainly think he was correct with respect his critique of the law of the excluded middle (as evidenced, in my mind, by the concept of complementarity in quantum physics).
But you have not processed my suggestion to examine what you mean by 'the real world'. For example, there is the pov that 'reality is a social construction', but I have no knowledge of whether Brouwer's constructivism is related to that.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fn2F2BWLZ0Q

Not 'odd' at all according to Derrida. Aporia is inevitable. Every assertion involves its negation as a backcloth to establish its ephemeral semantic import..

I suggest your concept of 'the real world' is just as nebulous, as say, 'the imaginary component of a complex number'. Both are concepts which stand or fall on their contextual utility with respect to human affairs. Both involve a grammar of usage which structures their relationship with other concepts.

Suppose I said 'football is not about anything'....or 'doing philosophy is not about anything'...
Neither statement is generally open to a truth value, but such values are assigned contextually in specific social transactions in which a consensual domain is being sought.

IMO It is the glossing over of such social contexts which generates much of the 'word salad' on threads like this, but of course even that activity no doubt has its social recreational function.

Correct because 'existential import' is a human value judgement outwith the formalisms of classical logic. This point is one illustration of the limitations of logic with respect to 'semantics'.

You ask 'what words are about'. They are about 'ephemeral agreement about action decisions' whether in internal or extenal dialogue. They are not about 'things' except insofar that 'things' are contextual focusings of attention towards which action might be directed. 'Things' are actively 'thinged' by thingers !
So to think 'meaning' is about independently existing 'things' is to assume a 'bedrock' which is in essence 'quicksand', because it fails to take into account the subtle dynamics of linguistic interactions which constantly shift or negotiate the focal boundaries of 'thinghood'.

So the 'direct answer' to your question has been given. 'Words' are behavioral markers in the process of organising actions to fulfil human needs. They could be considered to be 'the currency of thought', and like monetary currency their 'value' can change according to context.

So, from that pov, which is supported by my references, any failure to take this on board constitues an incestuous 'language game' involving futile demands for words to define words...futile because its like asking 'how many dollars is a dollar worth' ?
Q: What does a dollar/word mean ? A: What action you can perform with it.

BTW Your 'scribbles' are equivalent to banknotes/coins/poker chips, etc.

I don't have a clue where you get this 'ad hom' nonsense from...
..on the other hand...
...maybe the 'clue' might be that you have invested so much in this 'meaning fixation' of yours (considering your similar thread of 2 years ago) that like a religious believer, your self integrity is dependent on it ? For a believer, an attack on his belief system is taken personally.

You are playing language games without the semantic background of references, such as those cited by me, but apparently not read by you. It is a truism that we are stuck with 'words' to communicate about 'words', but understanding the process of deconstruction (Derrida) of 'word use' per se adds the potential for a vantage point which can, if understood, prevent the game from degenerating into 'semantic dancing' for its own sake.

Good point except that two 'idiots' speaking their own mutually understood language are involved.
Looks like 'idiosyncratic' is redundant. !

i see, so your answer is 'Heidegger got it wrong' ! You dismiss his admirable attempt to use neologisms to transcend the infinite regress as futile ? .....

And die Kehre in philosophy has been equally applied to Wittgenstein's dismissal of his earlier Tractatus which involved a 'picture theory of language' . Also..to non representationalist views of language developed by Quine et al conducive to neo-pragmatism (Rorty), and post modernism (Derrida) all of which were iconoclastic with respect to traditional analytic philososophy (which concerned itself with 'pseudo-problems' like discriminating between 'thought' and 'belief' !).

No doubt, they all 'got it wrong' !
...which in my terms translates as 'if you want to structurally couple, with me you need to commune with my psychological need to reinforce my understanding of philosophy'.

I can only give an 'Irish' response to that, which is
...'If you want to get to Dublin, I wouldn't start from here' !

But your lay term 'aboutness' is vacuous, because unless you are a naive realist you have no 'bedrock'. My 'cordination of coordination' rests on the bedrock of 'action decisions' involved in physical, psychological and social 'prediction and control'. Now part of that coordination certainly uses the abstract persistence of 'words' to mentally paint shifting snapshots of 'an external world', but my contextual 'snapshot' can never be guaranteed to be synonymous with yours. All that matters is a degree of mutual coordination as to what might happen next (which Maturana calls 'structural coupling').

I suggest you need to consider some of the empirical studies of language pathology to understand my position. For example, it is well known that the development of twins can be hampered by an ideosyncratic private language. And studies by Merleau-Ponty of brain damaged war veterans showed for example that the command word 'salute' produced no understanding but social situation of an officer entering the room produced immediate saluting action.

'Languaging' is a form of behavior which co-ordinates behavior. Your languaging sample about 'just squiggles on a screen' is your attempt to to elicit a response from me involving the word/concept 'ideas'. But from Maturana's 'languaging' point of view, 'ideas' are merely sequences of 'internal actions/conversations which we call 'thinking'. It is this ability to 'act off line' which gives humanity an evolutionary advantage over most other species. In fact, one definition psychologists use for 'intelligence' is 'the capacity to delay a physical response'.

But you havn't analysed 'context' which I suggest always consists of 'an action decision scenario'.
Your examples:
Take the word 'good' for example...look at the action it might promote like 'continue to work like that (teaching scenario)....'to enjoy eating something good' ...to enjoy reading a good book...etclook at verbs !

Take the word 'design'...already a verb implying activity fulfilling overt or covert criteria some of which may not be explicit.

Take the word 'quality' ...implying the mental action of deciding between desireable alternatives.

Without action, or potential action as to 'what happens next', there is no meaning !

Weird context...suppose a stranger puts his head round the door and says 'shark'....what action would you take?...does the word 'shark' mean anything other than to act as though 'this guy is a lunatic' !

'Thoughts'..?
I suggest you think about the 'meaning' of that one key word ...'context'.
You might find that discussion of 'meaning' without that is as vacuous as trying to play tennis with no tennis court and no other player.

What you have ultimately done here is talk about language - about what language is. So where is your infinite regress?

No, what I have 'done here' is to use 'languing' behavior to elicit languaging behavior from you ! There is no 'ultimate', but It would have been more gratifying if I had also elicited 'research behavior' as well !
http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html

'Realism' has nothing to do with it. 'Reality' a concept denoted by a word like any other. It's 'meaning' resides in its particular contextual usage where consenus as to 'what is the case' is being negotiated. Naive realists attribute 'properties' especially 'physicality' to 'objects' ignoring the fact that 'physicality' denotes expected types of sensory interaction events with 'the world' on the part of observers. As far as 'mathematical entities' are concerned like 'set membership', Lakoff &Nunez have argued that their 'meaningfulness' resides in the metaphorical relationship to the the experience of bodily actions like 'putting an object into a container'.

It is not just mathematics that exists in some ethereal platonic domain. All language does.

No ! All languages, including the metalanguage of mathematics exist ie. are useful concepts in the only 'domain' that matters to humanity i.e actions and interactions connected with prediction (including pattern seeking) and control. That sentence of mine can be behaviorally construed as an attempt to control/elicit future interactions with me.

Okay. Point out to me where you have discussed any impact of die Kehre on analysis of 'meaning'.

Are you familiar with 'Where Mathematics Comes From' (Lakoff and Nunez) ?
Your exposition above may have some points in common.

LATER EDIT
I note your impressive website which imo goes exactly in the 'required' direction to counter the Geschwätz. !