Abduction (or retroduction) is the formulation of an explanatory hypothesis, often prompted by a surprising observation. Deduction is the explication of what would follow necessarily from that hypothesis if it were true. Induction is the evaluation of whether the hypothesis is falsified because those predictions are not borne out by experiments.

Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time — Mapping the Medium

Thanks for the citation. I posted some of my thinking that appears in the paper a while back in a thread on "The Reality of Time." Here is a link to a complete online version that anyone can view: https://rdcu.be/b9xVm

If you want to read Peirce's own writings, I would definitely start with the two volumes of The Essential Peirce. The tables of contents and introductions to both volumes, along with the headnotes for all the selections in Volume 2, are online at https://peirce.iupui.edu/edition.html . Besides the two websites that mentioned, another worth checking out is http://www.commens.org/.

As for the secondary literature, my favorite overview is The Continuity of Peirce's Thought by Kelly A. Parker. Another decent option is Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed by Cornelis de Waal. A shorter treatment that focuses mainly on metaphysics is Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle by John K. Sheriff.

All of the aforementioned systems of beliefs in some way represent the idea that faith in God alone is enough to get anyone into heaven, so long as it is part of their destiny. — BBQueue

This is at best an oversimplification of the Christian doctrine of predestination, and there are significant differences in the details of the Calvinist and Lutheran versions. Even Arminians technically affirm predestination, but understand its basis to be God's foreknowledge of who would freely choose to believe, rather than His sovereign choice. In any case, this seems like the kind of theological (rather than philosophical) topic that the moderators have recently requested not to be posted in this forum.

If A is A (ID) then A cannot both be A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect (NC); next, if the LID and the LNC, neither can A be something intermediate between A and not-A which, thereby, would be neither A nor not-A. Any objections to that formulation? — javra

Yes, I find it misleading because it employs only one variable (A) rather than distinguishing between a subject (S) and a predicate (P) as attributed to it by a proposition. I also prefer referring to the so-called "laws of thought" as principles, since (as already noted) there are viable logical systems in which they do not hold.

The principle of contradiction (PC) is that S is not both P and not-P at the same time and in the same respect; i.e., it is never the case that both "S is P" and "S is not-P" are true. The principle of excluded middle (PEM) is that S is either P or not-P at any given time; i.e., it is always the case that either "S is P" or "S is not-P" is true. Neither of these entails the other, but taken together they entail the principle of bivalence (PB) along with the rule of double negation--if S is not not-P, then S is P.

Architectonic is about a general functional structure to the act of inquiry, not describing the way the flow of human inquiry then breaks up into reasonably distinct domains. — apokrisis

In my experience, when people refer to Peirce's philosophy as "architectonic," they mean it in roughly the latter sense. IEP has a pretty good summary article on "Charles Sanders Peirce: Architectonic Philosophy" here.

I suppose one could approach all of philosophy through epistemology, placing it as their “first philosophy”, but that seems to me like merely one perspective one could take on the interrelationships of different subtopics — Pfhorrest

Peirce's overall system of thought is non-foundationalist, so he does not really have a "first philosophy" in the sense of a set of premisses from which all his other positions follow. Rather than organized bodies of knowledge, he classifies the various sciences as communities of inquiry, arranging them such that each one depends on those preceding it for its principles and on those following it for its data. Perhaps most notably, "Metaphysics consists in the acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being."

As the linked article explains, Peirce begins with mathematics as the science that draws necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things. Philosophy is then the first positive science and has three branches--phenomenology (or phaneroscopy), which studies whatever is or could be present to the mind; normative science, which studies the relations between phenomena and ends; and metaphysics, which studies the reality of phenomena. Normative science also has three branches--esthetics, ethics, and logic as semeiotic. The special sciences, both physical and psychical, come after metaphysics.

I offer two similar definitions given by Charles Sanders Peirce.

Time is that diversity of existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence. — Peirce, c. 1896

Time is a certain general respect relative to different determinations of which states of things otherwise impossible may be realized. Namely, if P and Q are two logically possible states of things, (abstraction being made of time) but are logically incompossible, they may be realized in respect to different determinations of time. — Peirce, c. 1905

Thanks for the shout-out! I am actually fine with the quoted statement by @fishfry; I have consistently acknowledged that the real numbers are an adequate (though approximate) model of a continuous line for many (perhaps most) mathematical and practical purposes.

If you need to understand intuitionistic logic better in order to argue against it effectively, how do you already know that you will want to argue against it once you do better understand it? Perhaps understanding it better will lead you to realize that it makes perfect sense on its own terms, even though it is inconsistent with classical logic--which, by the way, absolutely no one denies. Everything that conforms to intuitionistic logic also conforms to classical logic, but certain results of classical logic do not obtain in intuitionistic logic. In that sense, it is a more modest formal system, like non-Euclidean geometry relative to Euclidean geometry--one fewer axiom.

No, the Planck system of units is an alternative to the SI system of units. The Planck length and the Planck time are derived from the speed of light (c=1) and two other physical constants (ħ=1, G=1), which are all taken as fundamental. Their relation is that the Planck time is the duration required for light to travel the Planck length in a vacuum. Both can be expressed in SI units, but this is just a conversion; they are not derived from meters or seconds.

Speed of light by definition as the distance (m) over Time (s) — BB100

Apparently you did not come across the post where I pointed out that the only non-arbitrary units for measuring distance and time are the Planck length and Planck time, respectively, which are derived from the speed of light and two other physical constants. Continuous motion through spacetime is thus more fundamental than distance in space or duration in time taken separately.

The definition of abstact is something conceived in thought. — BB100

No, the definition of abstract is "not concrete."

The reason there exists 3 laws of logic is because there is only existence, things like concrete or abstact are just distinctions like those within them that are simply is. — BB100

No, existence is not the only mode of being.

The simple premise is reality or existence is just existence. — BB100

No, reality includes existence but is not limited to it.

Again, our disagreements are fundamental, and I am tired of repeating myself. Cheers!

Abstract quality means that which exists in thought. — BB100

No, it does not mean that. Again, the mode of being of an abstract quality is essence, not existence.

Real ,as you are using, means an object existence. — BB100

No, it does not mean that. Reality and existence are not synonymous or coextensive; everything that exists is real, but there are realities that do not exist--including time, qualities, states of things, and events.

When you say some abstract essence exists, you mean it describes a physical object. — BB100

No, I do not mean that. Again, a quality only exists by inhering in a concrete thing. A proposition, such as "S is P," is what describes this relation by signifying a state of things.

When you say s=p, then you must be saying a,b,and c,p=p. When you say s is not p, then a,b,and c is not p. — BB100

No, that is not what I am saying. Again, "S" denotes a concrete thing and "P" denotes an abstract quality; so "S is P" does not mean "S equals P," it means "S possesses P." I have no idea what "a, b, and c" are supposed to be in this context.

The moment you say s is neither p nor not p, you are actually saying s itself is nonsense for the definition of s has to be means nothing if p exists. — BB100

No, that is not what I am saying. Again, the statement that neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true means that the thing denoted by "S" is really indeterminate with respect to possessing or not possessing the quality denoted by "P." The universe is never strictly determinate, so the principle of excluded middle is never strictly true, because everything is always changing in some ways.

Just define Time as the whole set of instants ordered from the present. — BB100

No, that is not my definition of time. Again, there are no real instants in time, only the ones that we artificially mark for some purpose. Real time is continuous, not discrete.

Motion is just just the change of certain propositions of distance of objects, and the concept of continuity is simply an illusion. — BB100

No, that is not my view. Continuous motion is the reality, while positions are something that we invented to describe it, and an arbitrary unit of distance is how we measure it.

These are fundamental disagreements, and I doubt that there is anything more to say at this point, other than further repetition.

I read your thread of definitions, and have an idea of intuitive logic. — BB100

The thread includes a lot more than definitions, and it is intuitionistic logic not intuitive logic.

You can not have a situation s is neither p or not p, for that means p does not exist at all. — BB100

Again, "P" denotes an abstract quality. The mode of being of such a quality is not existence, but essence. It only exists by inhering in concrete things. When "S is P" is true, the quality denoted by "P" inheres in the thing denoted by "S." When "S is P" is not true, the quality denoted by "P" does not inhere in the thing denoted by "S." It might inhere in other things, or it might not inhere in anything, but its non-inherence in one particular thing does not affect its being a real quality.

If we have an event where s exists and is p then p must be some statement. — BB100

No, "P" is not a statement. "S is P" is a statement; i.e., a proposition that attributes the abstract quality denoted by "P" to the concrete thing denoted by "S."

Remember there is and only is . P=-(-p). — BB100

That is precisely what intuitionistic logic denies, because it requires the principle of excluded middle. It holds only for determinate states of things, and if the universe were truly determinate, then change would be impossible.

Simply put that state of things means that which exists — BB100

No, states of things are real--they are as they are regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about them--but they do not exist. Only concrete things exist; i.e., react with each other in the environment.

can you list your definitions of time , event, change, indefenite moment, and potential infinity in any order. — BB100

Rather than further repeating myself, I will refer you to my recent thread on "The Reality of Time."

Getting to the wall is impossible if a thing was always going halfway the distance. This would naturally disprove the existance of infinite events — BB100

No one is arguing for the existence of infinite events, which would be an actual infinity. An event is not a concrete thing that exists, it is a state of things that is real; again, a change from one prolonged state of things to another (logically incompossible) prolonged state of things.

rather we motion is dicrete on that all particles are essentially teleporting at a certain distance, which is consistant with quantum theory and special relativaty. — BB100

Nonsense, it is the infinite series of steps going only halfway that wrongly treats motion as discrete. Continuity is not synonymous with infinite divisibility, the latter is only one of the five properties that I specified for the former. The rational numbers are infinitely divisible, yet no one considers them to be continuous.

I fail to see how Non Excluded Middle is not a law like the identity and noncontradiction. — BB100

Again, please read up on intuitionistic logic.

Each event occurs one after the other, so getting to the wall is impossible. — BB100

Again, it is not necessary to break up the motion into a series of discrete steps, such that each "occurs one after the other." Getting to the wall is obviously not impossible--I can simply move from my starting point toward it at a constant velocity, and I will get there. I do not have to stop at each halfway point, then start again.

Instant, which I define here as the state of reality. — BB100

Again, I deny the reality of instantaneous states of things. The minimum of real time is an indefinite moment, and an event can only be realized at a lapse of time during which the transition from one prolonged state of things to a logically incompossible state of things is strictly continuous. Consequently, I also deny that events are rigidly sequential and never simultaneous; on the contrary, an isolated event is impossible. Every concrete thing is constantly changing with respect to some of its abstract qualities, such that the overall state of things at the present is always an indefinitely gradual state of change.

Now if we assume infinite past there is a real infinite instants , regardless of the events you define as, such that ( ...I3, I2, I1). — BB100

Again, I deny that there are any real instants in time, just those that we artificially mark for some purpose. Moreover, our inability to mark an actual infinity of instants has no bearing whatsoever on whether real time extends into the infinite past; it is sufficient to recognize that there is a potential infinity of such instants. This remains true even if we posit that there was a first event a finite number of years in the past; in my view, there could have been time without events, but events without time are impossible.

Wait, I defined an Event as a complete description of reality meaning an instant of what is or was. — BB100

Well, I reject that definition, as well as the underlying assumption that time is composed of instants. An event is a change from one state of things to a logically incompossible state of things.

Lapse would entail a change of instants in Time. — BB100

No, a lapse is a real and continuous portion of time, while an instant is an artificial and discrete limit that we mark for some purpose, such as measurement or description.

Since any instant of time exists one after the other, then you still can not go an infinite events after a point. — BB100

Again, this is precisely what I deny. For any particular instant that we single out, there is no "next" instant. Put another way, between any two instants that we actually mark, we could potentially mark other instants beyond all multitude.

What do you mean by "prolonged" or "during" in your two prior posts? — BB100

A prolonged state of things, such as what "S is P" or "S is not-P" signifies, is realized at any and every arbitrary instant within a certain continuous lapse of time. An event is realized when one prolonged state of things, such as what "S is P" signifies, transitions to an incompossible state of things, such as what "S is not-P" signifies. The two states cannot be realized at the same discrete instant, because that would violate the principle of contradiction. Instead, the event must be realized at another continuous lapse of time, when neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true; instead, "S is becoming not-P" is true. During that lapse--i.e., at any arbitrarily shorter but still continuous lapse within it--an indefinitely gradual state of change is realized.

If S is niether p or not p, then that just means p is not applicaple to be describe S. — BB100

Right, it means that the concrete thing denoted by "S" is indeterminate with respect to possessing or not possessing the abstract quality denoted by "P." Again, the principle of excluded middle only applies to determinate states of things.

Either way there is a distinct event you put forth of "S is P" — BB100

"S is P" does not signify an event, it signifies a prolonged state of things.

Also answer me this, what is a true continuity? — BB100

The short version is that the following five properties are jointly necessary and sufficient for a true continuum.

• Rationality: every portion conforms to one general law or Idea, which is the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out its parts.
• Divisibility: every portion is an indefinite material part, unless and until it is deliberately marked off with a limit to become a distinct actual part.
• Homogeneity: every portion has the same dimensionality as the whole, while every limit between portions is a topical singularity of lower dimensionality.
• Contiguity: every portion has a limit in common with each adjacent portion, and thus the same mode of immediate connection with others as every other has.
• Inexhaustibility: limits of any multitude, or even exceeding all multitude, may always be marked off to create additional actual parts within any previously uninterrupted portion.

The long version is my forthcoming paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum: A 'Thicker' Theory." I do not know yet when it will be published.

A = TWA 800 was shot down
B = TWA 800 was bombed by terrorists
C = TWA 800 suffered from mechanical failure

P1: A or B or C
P2: not B
P3: not C
C: therefore, A

Please learn to use the quote feature. Just highlight the text that you want to quote from a previous post, and the "Quote" button should appear. Click on it, and the highlighted text shows up in the reply box, tagged with the name of the author and linked to its source.

that is the definition that is used in the dictionary. — BB100

Dictionary definitions are often inadequate for philosophical discussions.

To say that a thing neither is or is not would be a contradiction for a thing is an existence by definition. — BB100

Let me try restating my example of an event using "S" to denote a concrete thing and "P" to denote an abstract quality. At the lapse of time before the event, "S is P" is true. At the lapse of time after the event, "S is not-P" is true. At the lapse of time during the event, neither "S is P" nor "S is not-P" is true. There is no contradiction here--that would require both "S is P" and "S is not-P" to be true at the same determination of time--but the principle of excluded middle does not hold.

all emperical data is a combination of points in time. — BB100

If by "empirical data" you mean individual observations and measurements, sure; but this does not entail that the phenomena being observed and measured are really discrete.

I wonder if aletheist is referring to Bergson’s notion of durée. — emancipate

No, I subscribe to Peirce's theory of time as truly continuous. It is somewhat similar in holding that the present is an indefinite lapse, such that "moment melts into moment" rather than being distinct.

It is ironic that Bergson criticized the spatialization of time, but then used spatial analogies to explain his notion of durée--"the unrolling of a spool," "a continual winding … of thread onto a ball," "a spectrum of a thousand shades," "an elastic being stretched," and "a spring being wound or unwound."

A duration is literally the time inbetween events — BB100

Again, this is an assumption, which I reject.

a second being just the composition of the periods of a cesium atom. — BB100

This is simply the basis of our arbitrary unit for measuring the passage of time.

What actually happens is like you throw a ball in the air. It is not going through a continous motion, but like a film Instants of change is occuring that we perciew as continous. — BB100

Again, this is an assumption, which I reject.

But that just proves that motion is not continous for motion is change of distance — BB100

No, continuous motion is the reality and distance is how we measure and describe it. A meter is an arbitrary unit for that purpose.

Time though, is successive, meaning one event after the other. — BB100

Again, this is an assumption, which I reject.

First of all, a continous function means infinite points inbetween any point with no gap. — BB100

That is the mathematical continuum, not true continuity. I deny that the real numbers are truly continuous. A truly continuous line is not composed of discrete points.

The point is is there exist discrete points in a continous function like the Natural Number Integers in a plane. — BB100

No, again, I deny that time is composed of discrete point-like moments; i.e., durationless instants.

First of all it is a thought experiment that says any point the takes half the distance for every change of distance to some point, then it will never get there. — BB100

Right, but it is faulty because continuous motion does not require a series of discrete steps, going only halfway to the destination with each step. Likewise, continuous time does not require a series of discrete moments or events.

Past is before , present is the refrence and future is after. Right? — BB100

Yes, that is McTaggart's A series that provides the direction of time.

Your last statement is false because under the law of non excluded middle a statement has to be either true or false. — BB100

It is misleading to call excluded middle a law, because it is not universally applicable. Instead, it is a logical principle that holds only for whatever is determinate. At the lapse of time when a concrete thing is changing from possessing a certain abstract quality to no longer possessing it--i.e., during an event--that thing is indeterminate with respect to that quality, so excluded middle does not hold. By contrast, the principle of contradiction is indispensable--there is no determination of time at which the same statement is both true and false. Look up intuitionistic logic for an example of how this can be worked out formally.

The order I thought I visualized with (E(nth)... E3, E2, E1, P). — BB100

Again, the order is not the issue, it is the direction that is lacking; and this "visualization" wrongly treats events as discrete individuals.

The existence of time requires that what is , is no longer the case. — BB100

Again, you are making what I consider to be a faulty assumption. In my view, time is real but does not exist--it is as it is regardless of what any individual mind or finite group of minds thinks about it, but it is not a concrete thing that reacts with other concrete things. Instead, it is a law that governs concrete things, enabling them to possess different abstract qualities at different determinations of time.

A change of what characteristics in reality exist and what does not, meaning if a statement X is true and then not, then the we can say statement X is an event along with all other statements that were true along with it. — BB100

A statement is not an event, although it might be a description of an event. Statements can be true or false, but events cannot. In my view, an event is a definite change; if statement X is true at an earlier determination of time and false at a later determination of time, then an event is realized at a lapse of time between those two determinations, during which statement X is neither true nor false.

Imagine you are facing directly a wall and every step you take is half the distance to it. Since each step happens one after the other, there will never be any step that gets you to contact the wall. — BB100

Why would anyone be restricted to traversing only half the distance to the wall with each step? If the first step goes halfway, and the second step goes the same distance, then you are contacting the wall after just those two steps. Zeno's paradoxes dissolve once we recognize that he is smuggling in a requirement for discrete steps that does not apply to continuous motion--just like assuming time to be composed of discrete moments, rather than continuous.

Let us Define Time as simply the whole set of ordered events. — BB100

This is McTaggart's C series, which by itself is inadequate as a definition of time, because it lacks direction. The A series is also required to get past, present, and future.

An event is the entire characteristics of existence ... — BB100

This does not really define what an event is, which seems rather crucial for your argument.

A visual is ( E(nth)....E3, E2, E1, P), where P is the present and E1 is the first event that occurred before the present, E2 the second, and then all the rest. — BB100

You are clearly assuming time is discrete and not continuous. — jgill

Indeed, and this was also McTaggart's assumption--time is composed of individual moments, whose contents are individual events--which I consider faulty.

I don't know where to go with this. — TheMadFool

How about nowhere, since it is nonsense.

Time and space are continuous in themselves, so any units assigned to them are completely arbitrary, and you cannot measure a worldline except along the two different axes. Apples are discrete and dollars are defined, so comparing them to time and space is like comparing ... apples to oranges.

For spatial coordinates, the "unit" along each axis is an arbitrary interval of space and applies in any direction whatsoever, which is why it can also be used to measure the hypotenuse. Moreover, the axis orientations are likewise arbitrary, so you could rotate them and say that you simply moved 5 units along the revised x-axis (or y-axis).

Apples and dollars do not work that way. Apples are truly discrete units that we can count individually, and dollars are units of exchange that measure value. When you assign apples to one axis and dollars to the other, you are simply representing the relationship between these two different units as a line corresponding to an equation: dollars = 4/3 x apples; the hypotenuse has no meaning at all. The same is true even if you assign both axes to apples or dollars; then the equation is apples = apples and dollars = dollars, while the hypotenuse still has no meaning at all.

If we're entertaing metaphysical solutions to an infinite regress, then we can also consider solutions consistent with metaphysical naturalism. Right? — Relativist

As long as we acknowledge that metaphysical naturalism is no more "scientific" than theism.

"B theory" is not Einstein's; it's McTaggart's, introduced in McTaggart's work "The Unreality of Time". In McTaggart's work, he also introduced "A theory" and the lesser discussed "C theory". — InPitzotl

Actually, McTaggart's landmark 1908 paper did not say anything about the A/B/C theories, only the A/B/C series:

• The A series is "the series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future."
• The B series is "[t]he series of positions which runs from earlier to later."
• The C series is "a series of the permanent relations to one another of those realities which in time are events."

The A series and B series are both temporal, consisting of individual "moments," but the C series is not; "it involves no change, but only an order" of individual events--the "contents" of moments--and "while it determines the order, [it] does not determine the direction." The B series also involves no change, because the relations of earlier and later between different moments and events are permanent, "and consequently the B series by itself is not sufficient for time, since time involves change." On the other hand, "the A series, together with the C series, is sufficient to give us time."

I make my case for the reality of time, contra McTaggart, in this recent thread.

What has Einstein's theories to do with B theory? — InPitzotl

Einstein posited a "block universe" in which time is the fourth dimension of spacetime, such that all "positions" in time are fixed along with all positions in space--consistent with McTaggart's B series (and C series). In other words, the past, the present, and the future all exist, a view also known as eternalism. The main alternatives are presentism, in which only the present exists, and the so-called "growing block" theory--it really needs a more respectable name--in which the past and present exist, but not the future.

In every scientific theory there are brute facts: they are the assumptions and postulates of the theory, be they laws, constants or whatever. — SophistiCat

We evidently have different definitions of "brute fact." For what it might be worth, Wikipedia states, "In contemporary philosophy, a brute fact is a fact that has no explanation. More narrowly, brute facts may instead be defined as those facts which cannot be explained (as opposed to simply having no explanation)." The whole point of formulating scientific and metaphysical hypotheses is to explain the facts.

On the contrary, modern science largely has its roots in cultures that affirmed divine creation and were motivated by this belief to study nature more carefully. — aletheist

One could instead make a case that natural philosophy has always had to struggle against religious dogma and conservatism. — SophistiCat

I suggest that both of these statements are true.

Divine creation is not consistent with methodological naturalism. That hypothesis can only be entertained with a metaphysical scope. — Relativist

I did not state or imply otherwise. Methodological naturalism can only go so far, which is one reason why it is a mistake to convert it to metaphysical naturalism.

Leaving something unexplained (which is what "brute fact" means) leaves the matter open for further inquiry. — SophistiCat

On the contrary, a brute fact is something that is deemed to be inexplicable in principle, thus closing off further inquiry as allegedly pointless.

Contriving a pseudo-explanation such as "divine creation" prematurely forecloses the inquiry. — SophistiCat

On the contrary, modern science largely has its roots in cultures that affirmed divine creation and were motivated by this belief to study nature more carefully.

That is appropriate for scientific inquiry, but metaphysical naturalism entails some sort of brute fact foundation for what exists. — Relativist

Scientific inquiry employs methodological naturalism, but it is a mistake to convert this to metaphysical naturalism.

Otherwise there's an infinite regress. — Relativist

On the contrary, divine creation is an example of an explanatory hypothesis that avoids an infinite regress.

Perhaps the values of the constants are set by natural law. If not, their values are brute fact. The FTA treats them as brute facts that could have differed. — Relativist

The spirit of scientific inquiry should preclude us from ever simply accepting something as a brute fact. Like anything else that we observe in the universe, the particular values of the constants call for an explanation, and the FTA poses the hypothesis of divine creation.

Thanks for the links, I will take a look when I get a chance.

That's of course possible, but what's the motivation to propose that? — Relativist

The motivation is simply to challenge the widespread and usually uncritical assumption that the laws of nature have remained essentially unchanged for billions of years. It seems to me that the only motivation for that is to enable us to extrapolate our present observations into the very distant past, which I find highly dubious.

It seems to me the motivation is the premise that our improbable existence entails an explanatory gap that must be filled. The purpose of my Op was to dispute that. — Relativist

I was not commenting on the OP, only the specific post to which I replied. As a theist, I happen think that fine-tuning arguments are interesting, but by no means demonstrative. On what rational basis could we assign a prior (im)probability for the boundary conditions of the only existing universe to which we have access?

My intent for this thread was to discuss the claims in my Op. — Relativist

That is presumably the intent of every author of an OP, but side issues inevitably come up as the thread develops.