By falling l never meant out of their control, l meant being influenced to a significant effect.

Failing to meet a contractual agreement is a form of deception and it falls under the general category of lying.
If someone lies to you and you fall for it, it will be on you just as you argued in case of murderers who fall for hate speeches and carry out the act of murder.
The key point of your argument is that , the one who carries out an act is solely responsible for the act, irrespective of anyone who motivates him.
Applying your principle to fraud implies that the person who is a victim is at fault.

I'm not saying that people who are murdered are responsible for their own murder because they "fell for it."

I never implied that, but the murderer is only responsible not the instigator according to you. Similarly in a fraud the person who spreads misinformation is not at fault.

I don't have any solid evidence of Hitler ordering killings as such that l can present here but it was a general understanding of the holocaust which is likely correct due to the anti-semitic hate speeches of Hitler. This debate on the responsibility of the holocaust is ongoing among historians with bothsides having credible reasoning and evidence behind their stance.
Considering your argument which states that the burden of act solely lies on the one who carries it out and not the one who motivates it.
Would you regard fraud as being a crime since the victims at the end of the day are actually the ones who fall for it and carry out the act.Frauds obviously use the freedom of expression to scam people and should they be convicted by law. I would like to see how the world will be if we adopt an absolute position on free speech.

I think that's a fair point. The devil is in the details as always. The main problem that l see is deciding where the blurry line lies between cause and effect. If a speaker, specifically points out a person and orders his followers to cause harm to the person, that would clearly be a direct cause of any violence. However if a speaker fuels hatred among his followers against a group and resorts to very general marks such as " We wont let them live here ", which can potentially indicate violent intend and effect.

It would radically change the world because all it takes is a good orator appealing to a disfranchised people to get to power and commit atrocities.Take Hitler for example.
It's a slippery slope argument but l believe that an absolute viewpoint can cause havoc in this crazy place we call earth.

Let's consider the famous case of sharon tate murder.
Charles Manson was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder for the deaths of seven people. Although the prosecution conceded that Manson never literally ordered the murders, they contended that his ideology constituted an overt act of conspiracy.
Should state prosecute people who order killings or have a stance or an ideology which promotes violence.

How about when we use the words like God, afterlife etc.
A lot of words in our language do not correspond to anything in this world or any imaginable world .
Or are these words being misused and cannot have a definite sense.

:smile: I am late here.

In the viewpoint that math is about symbol manipulation formalisms, we may not even be interested in the concept "meaning" as some kind of correspondence factor with the real, physical world.

Let's consider the formalist view of math. I think that mathematics is primarily based on substitution where we replace a set of symbols with another set of symbols which are equal or equivalent in some cases. How do we decide that ? By "meaning" l meant the criterion for substituting one expression to another. Formalism has axioms and there are rules of inference etc. It cannot work without them.

For a starters, the symbol ∞ is just one character and not an ever-growing sequence of characters. Hence, it is perfectly suitable for participation in symbol-manipulation formalisms. An ever-growing sequence of characters, however, would be a problem, because in that case our symbol-manipulation algorithm may not even terminate.

The problem with using the infinity symbol is that there are infinities bigger than others. It is a single character but can we substitute it with numbers ? Consider the real line, all the real number lie on it but infinity doesn't. We can by some fancy definitions extend it to hyper-real and have the rules of adding numbers to infinity like a+infinity=infinity etc. Can you generate this symbol by any finite amount of operations ? I dont think we can and in my opinion formalism is basically about operations on symbols ? Therefore by allowing infinity, we sort of compromise the formal system. This is the basic idea behind the constructivist approach, if l am wrong, you are more than welcome to correct me.

With the various reduction rules available, the symbol ∞ could actually be useful when you seek to produce a closed form output result from a particular input expression. The domain does not even need to be numerical and the algebraic structure not necessarily a field. The rule templates will undoubtedly still be consistent.

I think that when we introduce the infinity symbol, we will have to drop associative law and commutative law too. There is a theorem by rieman which says that if an infinite series of real numbers is conditionally convergent, then its terms can be arranged in a permutation so that the new series converges to an arbitrary real number, or diverges. This doesn't apply to finite series for a reason and that is different laws regulate the symbols which have finite connotation and those which have an infinite connotation to them.

In other words, a field or other algebraic structure can successfully be extended with the symbol ∞ while maintaining consistency and while satisfying the pattern in existing rule templates for the symbol. So, infinity may indeed not be a number but it is certainly a legitimate extension element in numerical algebraic structures.

The real system has been extended to the hyper real and with it's own extended rules for operation but can we construct the equal or even equivalent of this symbol by same set of operation. By introducing the symbol into the rules and not being able to generate it from the real numbers is cheating. Is this extension valid ?

Lastly, I think you are confusing the motivation for following a maxim with the content of the maxim itself. The reason for adopting a maxim in accordance with the CI should be unconditional duty. But that doesn't mean that the maxim must apply to all circumstances.

Once the maxim is made on the foundation Categorical imperative, it cannot give a maxim which we cannot rationally follow.Every moral act will be carried in some event which is logically related, but the circumstances need not to be mentioned.We will have a hierarchy of maxims that way, where we will end up selecting one maxim over another in a certain circumstance.

I think most people would like to have statements like
" Do not kill except in self defense " , the problem with such maxims is that it can't be universalized.
Consider the CI
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."
If we try to universalized the first statement, we will end up disputing what "self defense".The maxim " Do not kill" can be easily universalized, the right to live is well preserved.

Isn't that just saying that the CI cannot be practically applied? After all real situations are always particular. Besides, "Do not kill" without any conditions cannot be universalised, since it rules out self defense.

We can apply the CI in logically related situations without specifying the particulars.
For example " Do not kill a murderer" or "Do not kill a soilder that has surrendered" are essentially saying "Do not kill".They can be applied to all particular situations if we take their general form.In most of the countries, any lawyer would tell you, using " self defense" is arbitrary/difficult to apply in most of the cases.
Consider how killing someone who has trespassed into your property can be killed if you are also within the realm of your property but if you are outside of the property, you cannot kill the intruder.There is also a dispute about what qualifies as property.
If we try to universalize it, everyone will act differently even with the same maxim.
Let's suppose they act in the same way as you would, l think it will undermine the right to life and hence be unreasonable.

If the CI works, there should not be a hierarchy of maxims, since a maxim that can be universalized cannot conflict with another maxim that can be universalized, or else they cannot be universalized.

I agree with this idea that all maxims should be on the same ethical plane in a sense like parallel lines, they should never conflict with each other.
We can avoid the hierarchy of maxims by clearly defining what we should consider as maxims.
What do you consider as maxims ?

In my opinion, and l can be wrong , the false maxims are those which are circumstantial like
1. Do A in 1 if a
2. Do B in 1 if b
3. Do ( ?) in 1 if a,b
The third one causes confusion, so we should rather say
1. Do A in 1.
2.Do B in 1.
A must be same as B.
3 does not even rise.

A good will is good under any circumstances and conditions but the categorical imperative can only be carried out by a good will. Changing the maxim based on circumstances undermines the role of will and makes it subservient to ends/goals.
Further more the maxim being based on a universal categorical imperative should not be extended into particulars as we cannot practically decide a universal when the conditions exceed the bare minimum but the bare minimum can always be reduced a condition less maxim such as "Do not Kill" a true maxim which can be reasoned and followed by all reasonable man.

and, on what grounds with respect to his thought ?

HIS ? l don't think anyone can claim that he is speaking for Kant after he is dead.All we have is reading his work and commenting on what we think are his thoughts.This may seem a trivial or a stupid point but it is practical and realistic.
Can you explain what you think are the merits of his ideas and the cons.I can either acknowledge or refute them

As a prior generality, it has no concept of the particular in question just as the rules of addition in themselves cannot add even 2+2.

Rules can be explained without applying to any problem, for example addition is opposite to subtraction.We can describe general concepts.

If you don't like my metaphor, well, there's no accounting for taste. I myself think of it as a metaphor and a pretty good one, but as with any metaphor, not the thing itself but merely illustrative of some aspect of the thing itself. But you fault it for cause, viz, both that it is a metaphor and given the subject matter is already out-of-court, but also that

It is not a matter of taste but clarity of thought.
If you want to treat ethics like a science ( i think so ), you have to abandon using metaphors.
In Science we use mathematical formulas to clarify doubts when physical phenomena confuse us.Ethics is confusing in philosophy and using metaphor is a tradition, perhaps that explains why things have gone messy in philosophy.

If you exist then your existence is both qualitative and quantitative. If He's this, He's not that. He's here and not there, for examples. And there is a long list of binary considerations that whichever applies the other doesn't.

When we say God exists, we say he exists unlike all the possible existence and the " long list of binary consideration ".
You can argue that we don't understand how he exists and that the sentence " God exists " cannot be understood and it is an emotional conviction which amplifies into a belief.
But in my opinion, we cannot understand God through reason but through another medium which can be experienced second hand but cannot be expressed in logical terms.

This relates to my post regarding conflicting duries "Do all moral dilemmas arise when two different duties are compared"

"If all store employees were rude to their customers then the concept itself of customer service would no longer be a real thing". This kind of granularity seems to be more controversial. You might say that customer service isn't what is violated, but civility in general. Another person would say that those aren't even contradictions like the lying-property one is, and that they wouldn't count as something violated. There is just no epistemological way to tell what kind of action should be universalized nor what the actual contradiction is that might be violated

I think Kant talks of perfect duties and imperfect duties, one is a must and the other is optional.
This is a big mess, simply beacuse we often get rhetoric,enotions mixed with convincing arguments, and trust me there is no way we will agree on what was Kant was saying if we regard him as right.
If we think Kant's position is weak, we can certainly share some common criticism of his theory.

That doesn't matter though, since a maxim can have as many conditions added to it as you like. Whether you treat the exceptions as a competing maxim or a part of the first maxim is logically equivalent.

There is no logic involved here, you should try to use that term in its true sense.A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms.We can throw away certain maxims or make them part of others but that will leaves us confused and destroy any ethical theory.

We should not use metaphors when explaining something that is already difficult and dense.
If the foundation fails, whatever the problem the walls tend to solve wont be solved.Can you describe a good foundation without refering to what it is supposed to support.I certainly can do that but the analogy fails when you try to compare CI to foundation and walls to purpose/duty.Can a categorical imperative be seperated from the action/duty, l dont think so.They depend on each other.
"The point is that the CI corresponds to the foundation. The wall itself, the building of it, what it's for, those can all be apportioned to purpose/function, maxim, duty. When it comes to walls, there are all kinds for all purposes, even just of brick walls never mind other kinds. But the idea of a good foundation is a one, one idea.
What is the reason for a good foundation? To hold up, preserve, protect what is built on it, and its purpose. And this is the reason underlying the whole project."

I can try to build a structure that is made for collapsing when the enemies attack, but that requires a weak structure.In ethics, we cannot do that because nature does not discriminate and reason will not allow us to build a weak foundation, atleast not for ourselves.

Kant points out - makes the distinction - that the CI itself is always already prior - before - the particular question. Just as the need for a foundation for a wall is prior to the wall itself. As such, no matter of the wall itself has anything to do with the need for a foundation. the foundation is prior, the wall after. Similarly, no desire or other consideration of the act itself outside of its conformance with the CI, is relevant to the CI.

Well l don't think the analogy applies here, the act will be relevant to CI, if there is one but if there isn't any, the act can exist on its own.

I would like to respond to more arguments but the matter is not clear.

I just read a little on presumed right to lie.
Most arguments in favour of lying say one of these things.
1.Lying manipulates the situation and makes you the cause of whatever result/end that may come out of a scenario.It also means you are treating the matter as means to something else, but you do not know the end, hence telling the truth should be treated as an act in of itself.
2.The murderer is responsible for the act of killing and it is not your act, hence you are allowed to lie.
3.You may not answer the question or explain the matter in truthful terms.
4.The moral framework of kantian ethics does not apply to this situation as the nazi Gov is unjust in its nature.

Can you point out some objections to these arguments.Btw, l am not well versed in kant and once l have free time, l would consider reading kant extensively.

Lets consider the statement " do not lie "
Consider that you are a german living in nazi Germany and you are hiding a jew in your house.
An officer of nazi police knocks at your door and inquires whether there are jews residing in your house.Will you tell the truth or lie.
kantian ethics does not take care of delicate situations like these where a universal law fails to appear moral.But kant would argue it is the act which matters and the will.

:wink: there is no end to a joke about infinity.See what l did there.

I am a bit on the asperger side, but l can sense that you are kidding.
Are you talking about this series.
1/2 +1/4+1/8......till infinity =1
This converges.
Consider this series
-1+1-1+1.......infinity, this is not well defined.
So a bounded sequence can have a series that is not well defined.

How is existence a limitation ?

I couldn't get what you were saying, can you elaborate.

3.333 The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself. For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument: in that case there would be a proposition 'F(F(fx))', in which the outer function F and the inner function F must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form O(f(x)) and the outer one has the form Y(O(fx)). Only the letter 'F' is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing. This immediately becomes clear if instead of 'F(Fu)' we write '(do): F(Ou). Ou = Fu'. That disposes of Russell's paradox.

Is wittgenstein simply saying that in f(x) and f(f(x)) the outer f perform different function in both of them and does he imply that a proposition cannot take another proposition of the same ( logical ) order as its argument. So to avoid confusion we can write F(u) where u=f(x) , to clear up that F and f are different propositional functions.

L and ~L would be a contradiction. L and L would be a tautology

If you are using "and" as /\, the logical operator then yes but that was not my point.What l was trying to say was if L is a contradiction, then in classical logic ,~L would be a tautology.

Proof can be combined with these, but it cannot combine with, lets say, what the best colour is.
If you wanted to picture "proof", as a concept, how would you do it? Or if you wanted to explain it to someone ignorant, what would you tell him?

If you want to treat prove as an object, but l don't think wittgenstein would allow it. Wittgenstein describe objects combining with each other as in chains, he kept silent on the relations between them. Objects exist independent of each other and maybe we can determine which objects cannot be combined when we see that the proposition lacks sense. How would l picture a proof, that is a tough question, l can think of its logical form but the picture would not be possible in certain cases.Wittgenstein does not consider mathematical propositions to be a part of reality, so we cannot picture them.A proof about the wife cheating her husband can be pictured easily ( I will leave that to your imagination ) . If proof were a simple object, l would give you a definite answer.I dont think a proof is an object, when like a shirt is not a an object, it is a combination of different things, hence not simple.

“I want you to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or the sun. Socrates himself does not render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like ‘Socrates.’ . . .We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain
property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a ‘fact.”’ (‘Logical atomism’,41, my emphasis) [\quote]~Russell
So do words like cats,dogs represent a fact, or did wittgenstein believe in that ?

But that would not be a picture of the facts. Dogs are not cats and chairs are not tables. It is not the case that a dog is on the chair

It will be a different fact but the proposition will have a sense.Since you disagree with that reason for cats,table being accidental feature.How do you determine an accidental feature and how do you determine an essential feature ?

No, it simply changes the truth value of the propositions

It does change the truth value of proposition.There are some problems with negation, consider the proposition
" there is a shape which is both circle and square" , its negation is true ( correspondance to reality shows) but can you say the shape which we are talking about exists in reality.Is its picture possible.It isn't.However the negation is true.I hope l have shown that a proposition can have sense and be true yet have no corresponding picture in reality.You can claim it is not logical but since l haven't used the term "square circle", but used the term shape which is logical.I can be wrong.

Is the problem with logic or with a formal system of logic? Wittgenstein says that logic is transcendental (6.13) - it is the condition for the possibility of the facts of the world and language. I think Wittgenstein regards set theory, along with mathematics, to be an invention, a construct. Any problems that arise within it are inherent in construct not in the logical scaffolding.

Wittgenstein regards math as a method of logic, so if we were to take it by face value, it would mean a formal system of logic ( like maths ) has the problem.I think your point of view is closer to being correct to what wittgenstein had in mind but l would wonder where the boundary lies between formal system of logic and logic, and how would logic allow the systems to have a logical fault in their construction.

Thanks for going at detail length on names,objects.If l understand you correctly.
Simple names are left untouched in tractatus, their configuration forms words which name object.
"The configuration of objects form the things of this world, the facts - cats and dogs and tables."
Is "cat" a picture of reality- a fact.However wittgenstein claims states of affairs ( facts) are the combination of objects.So would the proposition " the cat is sitting on a table " be a complex proposition?

" Unfortunately, set theory fails to distinguish externally observed processes from internally constructed processes, hence the reason why finitists and infinitists continue to argue past one another. "
"Well consider For it might well be the case that a sequence of coin-tosses is truly random in the sense that cannot be represented by any computable function "

I agree with the first paragraph, it is a great observation in my opinion.However for the second paragraph, can you consider two guys that have unending supply of coins, and each toss say for n times, we can calculate the probability for the next test by n/2^n.Well l dont think a coin toss can be that random, however if we were to pick a prime numbers out of real numbers, l think we would not have a comparable function for it.

Therefore it makes no sense to insist that the sigma algebra of infinite coin tosses must be constructive.

Since in the end you mentioned the defect in set theory, l think we can argue for a constructive case, where a statement is either true or false.
My knowledge in this field is weak and it would be of great help if you can provide some resources on treatment of probability theory from a non classical point of view.

I think that he was just trying to clarify what the concept of "proof" really is, and what does it do. Wasn't it in this section that he wrote that squaring the circle with just using only compass and straightedge was proved impossible, or do I remember incorrectly? And that this proof stopped people from further trying? So, if I remember correctly, he said that proof ends all further attempts, this is what proof actually does to you. And my take is that he was afraid that, once people accepted Godel's theorem, taking it as a proven fact, they would stop further inquiry into the matter. oof!

Well squaring the circle was proved to be an impossible feat by proving pi was transcendental.Wittgenstein was a an advocate of math being our creation, we cannot say what can or not be done in mathematics or in another case, he found fermet's last theorem, as not falling in mathematical realm as it was essentially saying
a^x +b^x=c^x, there is no set of numbers (a,b,c ) which satisfy the equation for x>2.He did not believe this statement to be decidable, hence you are right in saying he thought they discouraged people from looking on but the key point was he did not consider them to be mathematical propositions.

the object (proof) is the name's meaning. What is its pictorial form, how do we know it, and how does it combine with other objects to form propositions?

Well it is clear a proof consist of more than one proposition, is it simple, I dont think so.Further can we l dont think wittgenstein says object and proposition are same, let alone a set of proposition and an object.I could be wrong though.

Cat and table do not name simple objects. The names are accidental. The signs are accidental. We might say: Die Katze sitzt auf dem Tisch.

I can see them being accidental in the sense that we could easily replace cat and table with dog and chair respectively.However this depends on how does one define accidental or essential in a system.Their placeholders must be there in the proposition," x is sitting on y", in this general proposition, x and y are essential as all they denote all the possible substitutents. We can also argue in a certain world, only cats can sit on table ( it is not hard to imagine ), would that make them essential.
To give a better example, consider this "electrons are negatively charged and are found in the atom " are the electrons an essential feature in this sentence in this world.I believe that it is not possible to distinguish essential and accidental feature, it is all relative to the the frame of reference.

What if we have a system of 100 propositions and we negate all of them, what does that leave for us to picture ?
— Wittgenstein

4.462 Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations. For the former admit all possible situations, and latter none.

l have a made a distinction between two different types of contradiction. If we consider a world(system), where we have 100 possible propositions, how does negating one of them lead to no possible situation.Is still allows us to 99 other possible situations
What are the two different types of contradiction? Negation is not a contradiction. A contradiction cannot be negated.

Actually it was a miscommunication, sorry for messing it up, l actually wanted to ask you if we can can call a proposition which negates all of the proposition in the system except itself to be a picture of the reality.
It is interesting to note the feature which a contradiction and a negation share in this special case, ( a contradiction says nothing so we cannot picture a reality while a total negation also leaves nothing to picture reality, it is close to Russell's paradox.) The proof by contradiction and proof by negation are also similar.I disagree that a contradiction cannot be negated, suppose L is a contradiction then ~L would be a tautology.

We cannot have an illogical thought (3.03). Any thought already complies with logical syntax. It is not as if there is a set of rules that we can either comply or not comply with. We either say something that has sense or is nonsense. Logic takes care of itself.

How will that sit with incompleteness theorem since we have something that Is not provable in a system and there are other controversial axiom of choice,axiom of infinity in logic which cause trouble.I agree that we can not think illogically but sometimes illogical proposition can appear even in a rigorous system.Logic needs to be taken care of sometimes.

He never names simple objects simply because he can't. This was at the basis of his criticism of the Tractatus in PI

Well, I will look up to that, does it mean that naming simple object causes a lose of generality.

. It's hard for me to understand admitting the existence of a collection of sets but denying their union

I would like to quote this for explaining my point of view regarding your objection.

Since a mathematical set is a finite extension, we cannot meaningfully quantify over an infinite mathematical domain, simply because there is no such thing as an infinite mathematical domain (i.e., totality, set), and, derivatively, no such things as infinite conjunctions or disjunctions

How will you generate negative number using n+1 ?
( natural numbers are infinite nevertheless)

Nobody claims that the infinite collection [not yet a set, that requires the axiom of infinity] of natural numbers is instantiated in the natural world. It only exists as a mental abstraction, like justice or traffic laws or Captain Ahab.

My problems is with the use of infinity as a number in certain mathematical problems, for example the lim 1/x as x approaches 0 will be written equal to infinity.But using an equal sign with infinity can be challenged even in its abstract form, l do understand the theory behind limits but in certain cases referring to infinity, mathematicians treat it as a number, not a concept.
Let's suppose in an ideal world, it is treated merely as a concept, Quine would argue that there are certain infinities allowed which find applications in science but those which are not applied to natural world should not be given equal weighting to the earlier ones.

Or are you arguing that you accept mathematical abstractions but denying that they're physically real? That's perfectly sensible

Consider a mathematical abstraction which describes the world ( quantum mechanics for eg ), l think some mathematical abstraction can co-exist with the real world although some don't.If such an abstraction does not agree with reality as we know, we can drop them even if they are consistent mathematically.
On the other hand, l am not talking about their existence as cats or dogs exist ( that would be stupid ) but their metaphysical existence.Earlier on you mentioned generating an unending natural numbers, but can you ever list them, l am not talking about physical limitation but the nature of infinity would not allow even the fastest computer to list them all, hence it can be contended that infinity as an abstract mathematical can never be produced theoretically, hence it does not exist.

In any event, infinitary probability theory is well understood and allows for probability zero events that nevertheless may happen. For example the probability of picking a random real number and having it be rational is zero; yet the rationals are plentiful. [That's not a precise statement, but it can be made precise without loss of intuition].

I used the probability theory as an example because it is related to the world, but since you claimed it can be made intuitive, l would like you to clear that up. If someone were to talk of negative probability ( fenyman did l think ), where we consider things we do not observe but which do occur in the real world.( l can be wrong here ), that is more understandable than the use of infinity in probability theory.There is also another problem, if all the probability are 0, then the the total probability of all events will not give 1.That is against the law of probability.Further more if you take natural numbers as the domain of probability distribution, it would be not be well defined.

Does this answer your question?:

3.34 A proposition possesses essential and accidental features.
Accidental are the features which are due to a particular way of producing the propositional
sign. Essential are those which alone enable the proposition to express its sense.

3.341 The essential in a proposition is therefore that which is common to all propositions which
can express the same sense.
And in the same way in general the essential in a symbol is that which all symbols which
can fulfill the same purpose have in common.

Consider this proposition, "The cat is sitting on the table", can you point out the accidental and the essential feature.
What are the particular ways of producing propositional sign ? according to ramsey, propositional sign are actually sentences but they express the essence/quality of the words of which they are composed of.
Now to take on "the essential" since it enables proposition to express something common to all proposition which express the same sense, what part of proposition can be termed as essential, you have quoted him but l think the ambiguity here is really confusing.I don't think we can understand wittgenstein unless we apply his philosophy on practical examples to see his theory of proposition becoming alive and clear.

What if we have a system of 100 propositions and we negate all of them, what does that leave for us to picture ?
— Wittgenstein

4.462 Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations. For the former admit all possible situations, and latter none.

I have a made a distinction between two different types of contradiction.If we consider a world(system), where we have 100 possible propositions, how does negating one of them lead to no possible situation.Is still allows us to 99 other possible situations.

3.334 The rules of logical syntax must go without saying,

What are the rules of logical syntax ?

He does not identify anything as a simple. He never names a simple object. He never analyzes a word to determine what the simples are that it is composed of.

He never names the simple object but since he was influenced by Russell who treats objects as names, we can say that his silence was for allowing different Interpretations.Names are used in propositions but names must refer to something in the world, otherwise they would be meaningless, hence names are the meaning of objects.

He has always already studied, learned, and accepted his community's understanding of justice and how it works.

Well just because there is a consensus in the community regarding it, does not follow that there is no moral obligation on an individual.Can you say the same on the nazi leaders who used the exact same arguement in the international court, that "we were following orders " .It is not related to this case but you can see the community's understanding failings.Most people do not have to make such decisions and I don't think every lawyer would be willing to defend a ted bundy or a war criminal.The community isn't only the government, it is the people too,
People really don't think of such tacky situations when they imagine lawyers.

Perhaps this: we all have desires. Duty is apart from desires. You may even have a desire to not perform as duty requires. But it turns out that, usually, duty provides the greater reward - unless you're a member of the SS

I am considering the unusual cases.But we are not talking about leaving a duty but favouring one over another

. Just what those objects are, however, he never says.

I have to disagree, he does mention what objects are in the tractatus.

3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.)

The question remains that are the names universals or particulars ?
Can you clarify on pictorial form ?

2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way that it does, is its pictorial form.

2.174 A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.

How can we know a pictorial form since it is outside the representational form, are there rules in which object combine to form a proposition ?
There is also another important question, I hope you will give it a little attention, Can two proposition be different yet be logically equivalent.Consides this below
~p implies q and ~p implies q" , does that make q and q" logically equivalent, although they maybe different proposition.
Final question, How would you describe the picture of a contradiction, consider a proposition p having a pictorial form.Can we picture or imagine a singular ~p ?
What if we have a system of 100 propositions and we negate all of them, what does that leave for us to picture ?

Can you consider this arguement against an infinite set,
What is the probability of an event happening over an infinite amount of events, it would be zero.We can go on and prove that the possibility of any event happening will be zero but that would be absurd if we applied it to the world.

I agree with everything but I was advocating,

just because they think that or just because there's a consensus about it.

Well can l go a little further and say that many laws in the world, particularly those relating to sentencing spies involved in espionage to death are immoral despite the general consensus. Let's suppose l take all the countries that approve death penalty for murderers and they rely on consensus in the society, can l call it immoral.
It is easy to argue against consensus when we consider the atrocious holocaust in nazi Germany but we must remember that, we can reverse this argument and apply it to reasonable ideas reached by consensus over centuries of social evolution, such as slavery being bad.

Well l kind of agree and disagree with you, I can see people not having any regards for a moral obligation and in that sense, they obviously don't view it as a duty.
But nevertheless the importance of duty remains, can you imagine someone arguing in a court and telling the judge,
" it wasn't my duty to hand over the wanted criminal that was living in my basement " It would not be accepted and practically the society imposes moral obligations on you.