Hi, thanks so much for your reply — you've given me a lot to think about. I really appreciated the connection you drew between Plato’s lyre argument in the Phaedo and modern debates around emergence. I hadn't made that link before, and it's a compelling parallel.
I also liked your discussion of the Pythagorean view of being as mathematics. Personally, I don’t resonate all that well with this idea — though I’ll admit I haven’t explored it deeply. I’m a nominalist, in the sense that I see mathematics as an incredibly effective tool for describing and predicting the behavior of systems that exhibit regularity. The universe, as it appears to us, behaves in highly structured and regular ways, which is likely why mathematics is so successful. But I don’t think that means mathematics is the essence of being.
As a physicist myself, I’d argue that physics can only ever tell us about the relations between things, not their intrinsic nature. This is because physical theories work by specifying how systems change relative to one another—how one thing influences another over time and space. Whether we’re talking about force fields, wavefunctions, or geometric structures in spacetime, all of it is defined relationally. We never get a glimpse of what a thing is “in itself,” only how it behaves in a web of other things.
You raised this thought experiment:
So would a carefully constructed neural network made from pipes and water wheels that is set up to process inputs and outputs like a human brain be conscious? Could we carefully set up toilet paper rolls to be conscious? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Very good point. If we take informational or structural accounts of consciousness seriously, then in principle, any system that implements the relevant patterns should be conscious—even ones made from absurd materials.
That said, I think we can sort these possibilities into three broad camps:
- 1. Consciousness is a purely relational or informational property, and any system that mirrors the brain’s causal structure would be conscious—regardless of its physical makeup.
- 2. Consciousness is still informational, but the kinds of informational structures that give rise to consciousness can only be supported by certain kinds of physical processes—such as biological ones. In this view, consciousness arises from information, but complex processes like glial signaling, cellular metabolism, or quantum coherence might unlock a richer space of informational dynamics. These aren’t just “decorations” on top of neural processing—they expand what kinds of patterns are even possible, potentially enabling consciousness where simpler systems (like pipes or silicon) can’t.
- 3. Consciousness isn’t informational per se, but is the product of some other kind of natural mechanism—possibly a novel quantum effect or a highly specific interaction type. To be clear, I don’t mean something non-physical or mystical here. I mean something still grounded in nature, but not captured by standard informational models. If that were the case, then consciousness might be more “substance-like” in the sense that only systems with the right physical properties could support it, regardless of structure.
Personally, I lean toward either the first or second view. I find the third possible, but it would likely require extensions or reinterpretations of physics. The second view seems like the best middle ground: consciousness is still relational or informational, but subject to real physical constraints. In other words, not all informational structures are physically realizable—only certain complex, fine-tuned systems (like living bodies) can support the right kinds of interactions.
On Terrence Deacon — I haven’t read his work yet, but I’ll definitely check it out. The idea of using semiotics and constraint-based models to rethink causation sounds right up my alley. I also completely agree that substance-based metaphysics struggles to handle emergence. If we view things as nothing more than what they’re made of, then so-called emergent phenomena—waves, organisms, minds—end up being treated as mere large-scale approximations of the "real" underlying stuff. That feels deeply unsatisfying. It undermines the explanatory power and causal relevance of the very patterns that define higher-level reality.
That’s one reason I’m drawn to process metaphysics. I’d argue that much of modern physics is already (mostly) process-based. While we still refer to entities like quantum fields as kind of “substances,” (although, again, we don't really explain what they are - only their role in an enormous web of interactions with other things) what physics mostly does is track interactions, transformations, and constraints over time. It describes evolving relationships, not timeless chunks of being.
In my own field—complex matter organization—I’ve noticed that many systems seem to operate in a way that’s semi-teleological. We regularly work with attractor states, self-organizing processes, and feedback loops that appear goal-directed - a shift I've seen in recent years within physics. This contrasts with more mechanistic branches of physics where behavior is rigidly determined by initial conditions. But it seems unlikely that we live in a reality where some systems operate teleologically and others mechanically. That would imply a strangely split ontology. Whatever causal model we settle on—mechanistic, teleological, or something else—it likely applies universally.
Thanks again for such a thoughtful comment — I’ve really enjoyed reflecting on all of this.