Apart from what has been brought forward against P1, your argument reminds me of the Kantian notion with regard to the possibility of freedom. In short, he asserts the possibility of freedom on grounds of his distinction between the object (in our case the action of someone as the objectification of their "soul") in sensory perception, which, by necessity, is either subject to physical laws and thus determined or possesses some negative freedom (other comments have elaborated on that), which, indeed, is unlike the positive freedom that an autonomous individual should possess, and the thing-in-itself, which is fully disclosed from sensory perception and, thus, not necessarily subject to any determination, rendering the coexistence of the seemingly determined action (as it is perceived by, say, other beings) and a cause (the soul as an imperceptible thing-in-itself) that possesses some form of positive freedom uncontradicted. (naturally, this is a simplification of the argument!)
In that sense I would associate the non-physical nature of this freely acting facility (insofar as, given that it's undetermined, it cannot be the object of an appreciation without contradiction) with your argument.
Cheers!

If we consider the Kantian notion of freedom as autonomy, which, by necessity, entails the selection of a particular 'purpose', I would argue that the negation of meaning and purpose (on grounds of nihilism) would eventuate in a negative freedom (in the sense of: free from determination) rather than a positive one (freedom to autonomously "subscribe" to purpose x) and, thus, constitute an utterly meaningless freedom, which, since nihilism negates any meaning whatsoever, cannot justifiably be more valuable than a state of unfreedom (since a differentiation would presuppose some form of objective standard) and therefore confine the individual (of which freedom ought the be the opposite) to randomness (negative freedom) on grounds of a notion of freedom, which appears to be somehow exempt from the nihilistic negation.
I would thus argue that the autonomous option (which always entails the option of freely choosing to discontinue the pursuit of purpose x) is, in fact, more consistent with a genuinely free state of being, as opposed to the nihilistic stance, which would be truly unfree in the sense that one has to obsess himself with the extermination of anything that would 'infringe upon' this freedom and hopefully realize that the underlying notion of freedom is more dogmatic and restrictive than any purpose or meaning one may choose to pursue.
The existentialist stance, as far as I am acquainted, does not conflict with this, because the initial realization of meaninglessness is the very thing that enables (and necessitates) creation of meaning through action, which, subsequently, necessitates some (postulated) purpose (because one must act towards something).
Hopefully, this does not distort your argument in any way; if so, please correct me.

Is belief in the supernatural an intelligent person’s game? — Gnostic Christian Bishop

As far as I'm concerned, it is a matter of the extent to which the belief is prevalent and the self-reflection a person conducts. For instance, it would be just as foolish to refuse to reassess your atheism as it would be to refuse to reevaluate your religious beliefs. Indeed, I would intuitvely attribute higher intelligence to a religious person who is capable of reflecting his/her beliefs than to an over-confident atheist. However, beyond my subjective intuitions concerning the matter, some credible studies (http://www.midus.wisc.edu/findings/pdfs/1197.pdf) have been conducted, and indeed low levels of intelligence are associated with high levels of fundamentalism, whereas they display a modest association with more diluted (e.g. no active practice of religious belief) forms of belief. I suppose it is thereby conclusive, statistically speaking, that it really depends on the way a person does or does not reflect and integrate his/her (dis)belief in a supernatural being.

I suppose you're quite right when you point out the flaws of democracy, however, in theory, a dictatorship/aristocracy etc. (assuming a, by any measure, "perfectly suitable" person/group of persons in charge) works out just fine as well, whereas in practice its flaws begin to surface; the magnitude of which, especially considering (recent) history, surely exceeds the flaws of democracy you are lamenting.
I'm not saying don't criticise unless you can offer something better (though that's always desirable) but in this debate it is useful to question the alternative.
Furthermore, your argument (which (subliminally) isn't inherently undemocratic; I suppose you still believe in contest of ideas etc.) erodes the legitimacy of democracy which, for instance, would be legitimized by the social contract in which citizens confer power to a group of leaders that in return provides security and rule of law etc. (e.g. Hobbes or Locke) or the natural right to property etc. which legitimizes legislative power. So if you're unwilling to give citizens their say you are inevitably endorsing tyranny etc.