But you can start with the Stoics – I'm no expert on this, but they believed that the necessity of causation was a necessary precondition for the rational intelligibility of the world (and therefore for its existence, since reality is inherently intelligible) — The Great Whatever

Ok so on this view, causality is associated with the intelligibility of the world, not with its possibility - the world could possibly not be intelligible, and indeed that is a different statement from that mentioned before, and requiring separate proof. Under Kant, the world simply cannot but be intelligible, since all experience is so structured.

"By means of a faculty?" — The Great Whatever

Yes >:) just like opium causes sleep because it has sleep inducing properties

I think maybe this is debatable, but the rationalist position has always been that causality is a prior necessary to hold the world together, as its precondition — The Great Whatever

No... the rationalist position has been that causality is required to make the world intelligible - no rationalist held it that causality was required to be able to make the world possible - it was only with regards to the world's intelligibility that this was under discussion. So if they were wrong about the world's intelligibility, then obviously they could be wrong about causality. Causality wasn't certain in other words, which is exactly what Hume attacked. But Kant showed that they can't be wrong about causality, and showed why the world is necessarily intelligible - because it is structured, a priori to experience, by space, time and causality. This is a significant achievement, because it makes the question "is the world intelligible" redundant.

Though there seems to be no good reason to me to believe space isn't an object of perception. — The Great Whatever

Objects of perception are given in space. Space is a precondition of perception, and therefore cannot itself be perceived. You cannot hold space, touch space, etc.

And of course, the eye does see itself. — The Great Whatever

Yeah maybe if you're looking in a mirror.

Pretty much every rationalist philosopher prior to Malebranche and Leibniz and so on. — The Great Whatever

I am unaware that they held them, if you have evidence of this please cite it.

It's not that I think everything has been thought before, it's just that in its milieu no purportedly original insights look very impressive. Their impressiveness is a function of ignorance of the surrounding historical context. — The Great Whatever

Insight has to do with how one solves a problem provided by his context. It can be impressive if the way the problem is solved is spectacular, as in Kant's case with regards to causality.

But consider: how could Hume have been making a stride for Kant to react against, if prior to Kant, everyone had already thought causation was empirical (Hume's position)? — The Great Whatever

No they didn't think everything was empirical, quite obviously. But neither did they think that causality was a precondition of any experience at all... that's Kant's original insight. And in fact, Hume's criticisms would have been irrelevant if philosophers had already thought of causality as a precondition to any and all experience - so Hume was certainly not acting against that position.

Kant was trying to salvage an older position that Hume was attacking. — The Great Whatever

Yes that's true. So what? The way he salvaged it is genius - that is original.

It's misleading to call space and time 'non-perceptual' in Kant's sense, because although they aren't objects of perception, they are conditions of perception, and so in this sense are not independent of perception (are not transcendentally real), which is precisely what Kant's point is. — The Great Whatever

Conditions of perception are not themselves perceived - the eye does not see itself. Therefore, you can say that objects of perception are ideal - which is what Berkeley does - but to make the claim that space, time etc. are ideal requires making them a priori.

But Kant didn't invent the aprioricity of time, space and causality. These are old rationalist notions. — The Great Whatever

Who held them before Kant?

My point is we tend to be ahistorical in discussing individual thinkers, because as single people we just don't read very much, so we don't understand that individual thinkers are not as original as they seem to be when read in isolation. — The Great Whatever

Well of course most of a thinker's ideas aren't original, even if he is a great thinker, like Kant or Schopenhauer - however, some of them are original insights. It would be strange to say that there are no original insights, and everything has already been thought before.

In fact, to understand Kant, you must understand that it was the attempt to empiricize especially causality that he was reacting against. Again, situate it in history. — The Great Whatever

Sure he was reacting against Hume's skepticism of causality, I'm already well aware of that.

The point is, whether you like it or not, that Kant's a priority of space, time, causality, etc. was an original stroke of genius, and I'm not a big fan of Kant either.

The point was just that something being ideal, even in the sense Kant uses the term, is not for it to be a priori. — The Great Whatever

:-} Yes obviously. Nowhere did I claim that. For something perceived to be ideal doesn't require it to be a priori - and space isn't perceived - things are perceived in space. So it could very well be that the objects and perceptions given in space are ideal, but not space itself. So I'd say that for something non-perceptual to be ideal does require it in some sense to be a priori - hence why space and time are called transcendentally ideal.

Ideal, meaning not independent of their perception. What is perceptual doesn't need to be a priori. — The Great Whatever

But space isn't perceptual - you don't perceive space, you perceive objects in space.

ideality of space and time — The Great Whatever

In what sense are space and time ideal if they are not a priori? It seems to me that it is necessary to a priorize them à la Kant to prove them to be ideal...

I think therefore I am ... Descartes could even have said I shit therefore I am, for pretty much any other activity that he would put in there apart from thinking would entail being... obviously *facepalm* >:O

>:O This one is hilarious. But I prefer this version:

Haha that's a good romantic song, but not my favorite. This is my favorite:



Followed quickly by a few italian ones from Umberto Tozzi, Celentano, etc.

Best to stick to the little pond! — John

? >:O What's this supposed to mean?

So, what's your answer? Is the self irreducible, or reducible in the some naturalistic way? Or...? — John

I think the self arises from nature, yes. The self is a possible action/activity of nature. And I think laws of nature are merely models we use for purposes of modelling and predicting the world. I certainly don't understand the Kantian position of postulating necessary transcendental subject and transcendental object - I don't agree that either of them have been shown to be "necessary".

I think this is all backsliding from the superior Platonic/Aristotelian ontology which was developed with Spinoza, St. Aquinas, etc.

Both are either irreducible, or reducible in the usual naturalistic manner. — John

:-} again Kantianism of some sort... :P

but he certainly has a mighty high reputation in many circles — VagabondSpectre

In modern academic and popular culture circles, and I swim in none of those.

For me, Noam is a puny ant, he hasn't even come under my radar, that's how (un)important he is

The Critique of Pure Reason is often said to be the key philosophical text of the modern age, and I firmly believe that to be true — Wayfarer

WWR is probably deeper than CPR, in that it contains the same insights that CPR does, and more. CPR is more original and revolutionary but not the deepest. TLP is probably also superior, as is Spinoza's Ethics.

Because Kant turned the focus squarely onto the 'conditions of knowledge', what it requires to say that we know something, what the conditions are for us to know anything whatever — Wayfarer

So? Why is this so significant?

None of these accusations can be leveled at Descartes. He was a madman! — The Great Whatever

Descartes was an idiot - probably the vast majority of his ideas are worthless (dualism, homonuculus etc.). I don't know of anyone else in the history of philosophy who has had no virtually good ideas, and so many terrible ones >:O

I think it's a reactionary text that systematizes the thoughts of more innovative thinkers — The Great Whatever

I agree - a lot of Kant is prefigured in the combination of Berkeley and Hume to a large degree. But Kant was original in the way he thought about space, time etc. Berkeley et al. didn't conceive of space as synthetic a prioris.

But I tend to think, no, those early reviewers saw it for what it was, and of course once something becomes influential it's a self-fulfilling prophecy, and its own influence spirals out of control, until all kinds of attributions of innovation are ahistorically attached to it in retrospect, because people read the Critique and don't read much of anything else. — The Great Whatever

>:O

Let me get this straight. You are claiming that the atom is the cause of existence of the relationships which constitute the existence of the atom. So there are particular relations between the protons, the neutrons, and the electrons, and these particular relations are caused by the atom itself? Now you claim that this is a statement of scientific fact. Do you not see how silly this is? I suppose that the relationships between atoms which make up a molecule, are caused by the molecule itself? I learned in science, that it is a chemical reaction which causes these relationships, and the molecule comes into existence as a result of a chemical reaction. Likewise, with respect to the relationships which constitute the existence of an atom, it is a nuclear reaction which causes these relationships, and consequently the existence of the atom. So much for your "scientific" fact. I should rather class it as an "alternative fact", claimed as a fact just to support your untenable position.. — Metaphysician Undercover

>:O >:O >:O fucking hell mate, this was like

Since we're ALL on death row and if the law is sensible may I ask what grievious crime did we commit to deserve death? — TheMadFool

Sin.

From a different perspective is the death penalty a sensible form of punishment? — TheMadFool

Yes. Death penalty should be reserved for those cases in which the wrong-doer has committed such crimes that they have exited from the jurisdiction of human society - their crimes are so terrible, we can't even adequately and fairly judge them anymore. Death in that case is sending them to the Divine Tribunal to be judged.

I'd argue that death is the reward and life the penalty. — Heister Eggcart

As may Socrates:
"Those of us who believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of this [...] either the dead are nothing and have no perception of anything, or it is, as we are told, a change and a relocating for the soul from here to another place. If it is complete lack of perception, like a dreamless sleep, then death would be a great advantage. For I think that if one had to pick out that night during which a man slept soundly and did not dream, put beside it the other nights and days of his life, and then see how many days and nights had been better and more pleasant than that night, not only a private person but the great king would find them easy to count compared with the other days and nights. If death is like this, I say it is an advantage, for all eternity would then seem to be no more than a single night. If, on the other hand, death is a change from here to another place, and what we are told is true and all who have died are there, what greater blessing could there be, gentlemen of the jury. [...]
It is not difficult to avoid death gentlemen it is much more difficult to avoid wickedness, for it runs faster than death"
>:O >:O >:O

the most significant being that scientific theories are not models and they are not equations. — tom

Then what are they if they are neither models nor equations? :s

My apologies Agustino, I didn't realize that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, no problem :)

The problem is that physical theories, as they are mathematical in nature, are underdetermined. For any finite set of facts - where a fact takes a mathematical form of correspondence between two or more variables - a fact is simply a coordinate point in a space with as many dimensions as there are variables - there can be an infinite number of mathematical models (ie formulas) which describe the set of facts. For example, if I have the following set of facts in a two dimensional space, corresponding to two variables:

{ (0;3),
(2;4),
(3;1),
(1.5; 3),
(23; 20) }

I will have an infinite number of relationships that can account for the underlying structure of the two variables which have generated these facts. How does modelling them - creating one formula to account for them - even if I model them such that even the next observation seems to corroborate (for even then, I will reduce a larger infinity of possible models, to a smaller infinity of possible models) - how does this modelling tell me anything about how the world really is like - ie about ontology? At any point in time there are an infinity of models that will account for all the observations I currently have made, and all the observations that I will ever make in a given finite time.

Therefore at no point am I justified to prioritise one of those models from the infinity of possible models - and therefore at no point am I justified to attribute ontological significance to my model. For example the curvature of space-time - the curvature of space-time is NOTHING - it is an abstract mathematical object, not an ontological object. We chose to conceptualise it, and visualise it as the curvature of spacetime, but we could have chosen a million other ways. Atoms themselves are nothing - merely mathematical objects, because all their properties are mathematical. Therefore physics IS mathematics, and physics will never be able to tell us something that mathematics cannot tell us. The objects of physics aren't the tables and the chairs we see and interact with everyday - they are abstract mathematical objects - they are illusions, from an ontological point of view.

Mathematics constrains our conceptualisation of physics, and hence constrains even our capacity of measurement - we cannot measure that which we cannot conceive. But it is somewhat foolish I think to, without argument, ascribe the constraints established by mathematics to be the constraints of reality. That would need additional argument. To assume mathematical Platonism begs the question.

You started your thread with a quote from me. Don't you think you should provide a reference as to where the quote was taken from? Otherwise it is a quote taken out of context. — Metaphysician Undercover

:s I did provide a reference, what are you talking about? If someone clicks your name in my quote, they'll be taken to the post where the quote is from - to the context...

I tend to unfortunately agree. I really feel like all this science and mathematics is mumbo jumbo to be entirely honest. Useful mumbo jumbo, don't get me wrong, but definitely mumbo jumbo in that it pretends to be a lot more than it really is...

You can go a little deeper and ask if the wavefunction is real and if so does that commit us to platonism. — Question

http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittmath/

Platonism (N)

Perhaps you should provide a reference just to make the context a little clearer. — Metaphysician Undercover

Reference to what do you mean?

these people on the Physics Forums know much much more than you think. Those who reply to those thread reply for a reason. They know what they are talking about. — FLUX23

More significant than what they know is what they don't know. Indeed, it is what they don't know that is limiting them. What we know is always of relatively small significance once we know it. It's what remains to be known that is of importance.

Science is much more sophisticated than you think. It's not something people casually interested in science can handle with few weeks or months of research. These people spend years working in these area after specialized education in college (that typically takes around 9 years to complete to get Ph.D.). Have you ever seen a scientific paper? They cite at least more than 20-30 other specialized papers. Review papers generally cite more than 150 - 200 papers. That is only small part of what they've actually read and know. — FLUX23

I've read a lot of scientific papers, and also written a few, but they're not as "difficult" as you make it seem. Most people are just lazy. Also scientific papers are written in bundles - there's always a group of researchers pushing one view, and another group(s) pushing other views. Once you understand what view they're pushing you pretty much understand what the paper contains. Now scientific people are stubborn and want to feel superior for having spent 9 years or whatever educating themselves - something that they didn't even like to begin with, but they wanted the prestige associated with it. Now after all that time, there is no real prestige for most of them, so they're depressed - hence their domineering and snappy attitude.

Also, there's a lot of unpublished research - a lot of the stuff I worked on for example is unpublished and remains unpublished - I have the data but never published it, simply because the publishing process itself, and putting it in the right format is not worth the bother. Other researchers in the field have not yet discovered what I have discovered, but I have no doubt at one point they will. But it can take many months to get an article published, it's not worth the bother - the bureaucratic process of most journals is a living hell.

But it is an ideal in America. If you're in America, living contrary to that puts you in the oddball category. There are pros and cons to being an oddball. — Mongrel

A foolish ideal.

He seems cooler when I'm asserting the things he thinks. — Wosret

lol >:O

If we include that and other non-visual spiritual encounters as 'seeing' then to believe without seeing simply means being gullible, and believing whichever proselyte, from whichever religion, just knocked on our door, doesn't it? — andrewk

Personally I would count those experiences as deeply personal and vague - totally unlike the kind of seeing that can be confirmed by society. There is a leap of faith in holding true to those very personal experiences - one could always discount them as hallucinations for example.

Where's that from? — Wosret

Works of Love

I know that his concept of anxiety is half a response to Kant, and also other guys I haven't read, and the "anxiety" is basically the friction between duty and freedom. The anxiety he's talking about here is a habitual, or ritualistic crippling of action. Something like, all identity is based in memory and recollection, so that the crippling anxiety is always recalled, and recreated to prevent actions by rendering the idea of them impossible to you. — Wosret

Yes but don't be mistaken about everything written under a pseudonym as being K's own views - that's precisely why he is an ironist. Works of Love is arguably his central work - written in his own name. Anxiety in the sense used where I quoted is fear - fear of loss. Anxiety is what remains for the one who hasn't sworn his love by the higher - by the eternal - by duty. That's why Kierkegaard says "you shall love" as a command - it's a duty to love, whether this is in romantic love or otherwise. Only this can make human love eternal - grounding it in God. When one has sworn by God, then there is no anxiety left - neither is there any burning passion on the surface, it has all shifted inwards. Outward passion is always born out of fear - you fear that you will lose the beloved, your passion is merely an effort to prevent that or mask the anxiety. The fear is certainly born out of love, but it is a fear that exists only in the lover who hasn't sworn by the eternal.

His message wasn't that people should sin, but rather that people should really believe, and feel things fully, become entirely invested, consumed, and act with that genuineness, or good faith. This is superior to not believing or feeling anything with conviction, and not sinning, as well as doing a whole lot of nothing else either. — Wosret

No, I think this is superficial too. Kierkegaard was against outward passion and for inward passion. Indeed, what I quoted is only a small passage. If you read more, you'll see he calls "burning passion" to be the product of anxiety, and therefore inadequate - a deception.

Kierkegaards mortal enemies were the ironists, romanticists — Wosret

Kierkegaard was an ironist and a romantic.

This "lack of passion" is rather an attack on not really believing, and feeling things fully, and powerfully -- but rather aways lukewarm, doubtful, relativistic everything, and nothing is true bullshit, and no one really feels or believes anything completely anymore. — Wosret

Yes, he did protest against this.

But if we are to become like God, what are we to do? Isn't that the idea, to become like Christ? — Agustino

Well I aim to say that you are right, we are not God. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't attempt to be like God. And, in-so-far as being like God involves trusting in our love, we are to trust - faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen. I personally think you read the Doubting Thomas story too literally. Its meaning isn't the literal event of Thomas not believing Jesus was resurrected - but rather Thomas not having faith.

Go on. — Heister Eggcart

Go on what? :s

Theologically, God would not test himself, but because we are not God, we must wrestle with both ourselves and others, so that we might sense God's love more fully. — Heister Eggcart

But if we are to become like God, what are we to do? Isn't that the idea, to become like Christ?

It seems like he has failed to distinguish between the nature of God's love and our own imperfect forms of love. — Heister Eggcart

The latter is a symbol for the former, indeed :P

Am I motivated and habitual in my painting? Or is it something I never quite get around to because I'm too busy rehashing Spinoza with John every second day? — TheWillowOfDarkness

>:O But rehashing Spinoza with John may be a way to actually increase your productivity and creativity in painting :P

Definitely Descartes >:O Infinitely worth skipping, by any student of philosophy.

subtler and more exciting British empiricsts — The Great Whatever

Who? I agree /w regards to Berekely, but not with regards to Locke or Hume.

Albert suave-as-fuck Camus — darthbarracuda

Albert Camus is interesting, but not a great philosopher. He isn't considered that great either, so... not very overrated.

Nietzsche — csalisbury

There's nothing Nietzsche couldn't teach ya about the raising of the wrist, but reading him makes me permanently pissed. — Thorongil

Probably adequately rated actually. Nietzsche is a very deep and profound philosopher even though I think he's wrong in many regards.

Schopenhauer — darthbarracuda

Underrated.

My vote goes to Kant — The Great Whatever

Probably I disagree.

H E I D E G G E R — Ciceronianus the White

Maybe - though even Heidegger offers good insight, but probably overrated compared to the value of his insights.

Hegel — Heister Eggcart

Quite possibly, though folks would accuse me of not having studied him enough... :P