Comments

  • On deferring to the opinions of apparent experts
    So you think people are not intelligent enough to measure people's intelligence.god must be atheist

    That clearly depends on the definition for intelligence. According to the Dunning-Kruger research, intelligence is knowing when you do not know.

    Academic education may actually achieve the opposite effect. If you give people a certificate that says that they know, then they will more easily make the mistake to believe that they know when they do not know.

    Hence, academic education cannot improve anybody's intelligence. It can only destroy it, which is actually what it does in the vast majority of cases.

    That means, that people's intelligence is below the level of their own intelligence.god must be atheist

    There's a funny observation about that problem.

    Lots of people are known to write programs that they themselves can no longer read. Reading/parsing source code is considered to be much, much harder than writing it.

    In fact, this is also the case for programs. A program that writes other programs is much simpler than the corresponding program that needs to read/parse them.

    So, writing a program at 100% of the level of your own intelligence is a recipe for disaster, because you may need 150% to understand it again a few weeks later. Someone else may then need 250% of the original intelligence to comprehend it.

    “The problem,” Leveson wrote in a book, “is that we are attempting to build systems that are beyond our ability to intellectually manage.” But these systems have become so complicated that hardly anyone can keep them straight in their head. Barr described what they found as “spaghetti code,” programmer lingo for software that has become a tangled mess. The problem is that programmers are having a hard time keeping up with their own creations. Even very good programmers are struggling to make sense of the systems that they are working with.The Coming Software Apocalypse

    So, yes, the level of (your own) intelligence required to write a program is substantially lower than the one required to comprehend it later on.
  • Planetary Responsibiliy
    We're not resposible for the planet. The planet takes care of itself. It was surviving a long time before humans. We, the human species, have need for a planet. Destruction of habitat is stupidity. We would be wiser to rationalize with our resources.Qwex

    Agreed.

    It is not the planet itself that is at stake. It is our own habitat. If we destroy it, humanity will be gone, but the planet will recover. It always has. That may take 10,000 or 100,000 years, but who cares? It will not be our problem anyway. The very reason why life emerged on this planet will not be gone, and it managed to successfully emerge in an environment that did not even have oxygen.

    Maybe something could be done, but I do not trust the politicians to do it. Everything they do, is messed up:

    There is no problem that the government will not make worse.

    What they are trying now, is just a feeble political attempt at carrying out a new land grab.

    In France, they tried to use their fairy tales to increase taxes on gasoline. That was rapidly followed by the yellow-vest protest, because, just like myself, these people are not buying into the manipulative bullshit.

    I cannot be convinced to give one dollar to the politicians or swallow any regulations from them. It is like that by definition, and that is not negotiable.
  • Is philosophy dead ? and if so can we revive it ?
    So news of their respective demises is still very much premature.180 Proof

    The ontology of X, and the epistemology of X, will not die as long as X does not die.

    (X is any knowledge subject, actually.)
  • Science is inherently atheistic
    Religious studies are a part of many liberal arts colleges and universities and can be majored in, often, and masters and doctorate programs are also available at liberal arts institutions.Coben

    I am not sure about how it works for other religions, but in countries with serious infrastructure for that purpose, Islamic studies are never amalgamated with things like "gender studies" or other typical liberal arts activities. You simply cannot put these students together in one building. It is better that they do not talk. If you do not like someone else's subject, then stick to your own.

    So, it is a separate world, and that is how it should be.

    In my opinion, the liberal-arts crowd had better shut their mouths about STEM as well as about religious studies, because they know nothing about these subjects. They are totally ignorant about what these things are, and they just spout their stupid remarks on things that they would not understand, not even to save themselves from drowning. It is not even their business!

    Religious studies has its own audience, its own field of application, and its own professional pipeline for graduates. Seriously, we do not need these ignorant outsiders.

    Quite a few corporations understand and respect that. For example, all McDonald's restaurants in Malaysia are certified halal. This company tends to be very respectful of religious prohibitions. They even have an internal department to supervise that.

    (Their overly processed food is not necessarily considered particularly healthy, but that is another matter, and the subject field of other disciplines).
  • Statements are true?
    Is it, as some assert, that a statement has the property of truth or is it that a statement is merely labelled as true?A Seagull

    Most generally, it is labelled as true.

    When you feed a logic sentence to a theory, you need to provide the two-tuple (,s) to the formal system. Example:

    ("Socrates is mortal",true)
    

    There are exceptions. Some but not all sentences happen to be provable in the theory T from existing tuples (). According to Gödel's semantic completeness, a statement provable from true two-tuples, is also true (in all models for T) ():



    Meaning: if sentence s is provable from T then sentence S is also true in all models for T.

    The trouble with asserting that truth is a property of a statement is in finding a logical process by which the property of truth can be identified.A Seagull

    This is exactly what is NOT possible.

    Tarski's theorem concerning the undefinability of the truth predicate makes this impossible. A theory is not allowed to evaluate the truth of a sentence. So, this does not exist:



    Such isTrue predicate cannot possibly exist. In terms of computability, the following cannot be done:

    if(T.eval("Socrates is mortal")) then 
      doThis()
    else
     doThat()
    end
    

    Such function that can evaluate the truth of any logic sentence s in a first-order (number) theory T cannot exist, and is therefore uncomputable. The fact that some -- just some -- logic sentences will be provable and can therefore be computed to be true, is the exception. It is not the rule.

    Tarski's artificial meta-system fails to answer this question.A Seagull

    Well, given the theorem about the undefinability of the truth in the object theory, Tarski proposes a work around. He injects the truth via an encompassing meta-theory. The meta-theory is an extension of the object theory that can evaluate the truth of sentences in the object theory but not in itself.

    If T1 is the object theory and T2 is the meta theory, then T2 feeds two-tuples to T1:

    ()

    This convoluted protocol seeks to bypass the limitations imposed be the fact that T1.eval(() is undefinable.

    Then statements like' this statement is true' make no more sense than 'this statement is blue'. and statements like ' this statement is false' would no longer be problematic.A Seagull

    The truth predicate is part of the meta theory, T2.eval(), but the provability predicate is part of the object theory, T1.isProvable().

    So, if you do not need to prove anything in the object theory T1, then yes, the truth of its statements does not matter. If you want to prove sentences in T1, then the truth of its statements is an essential extra piece of mostly external information.

    The T1.isProvable() predicate is rather weak. It cannot handle all true sentences s. The following is Gödel's incompleteness theorem, expressed in Tarski's convention T:



    Which means: T1 is inconsistent (It will prove false statements) or there are true statements that can be expressed in the language of T1 that are not provable from T1. You can use the expression above to derive Gödel's second incompleteness theorem: If T1 is capable of proving its own consistency, then T1 is provably inconsistent.

    All of this kicks in, for a first-order theory that embodies enough arithmetic to reach the level of complexity of Q (=Robinson's arithmetic).
  • Science is inherently atheistic
    Modern Science is an atheistic endeavour.VoidDetector

    So, now we have the liberal-arts crowd criticizing religious studies by trying to re-purpose the credibility of the STEM fields to that effect -- someone else's credibility and not their own which they do not have -- while perfectly knowing that graduates from a STEM field generally despise the liberal arts for being ineffective nonsense.

    As you know, a STEM person, such as myself, takes pride in spitting on the liberal arts, which he considers to be an inferior activity, and a dangerous route to unemployment or underemployment.

    Is this the case for religious studies?

    Well, no.

    Good examples are the food processing industry and the financial sector that increasingly want halal certification for their products and services, because otherwise, a quarter of the world population will shun them. You can easily get a job working in the field of Islamic studies.

    Islamic studies is absolutely not about preparing its graduates for unemployment or slinging coffees at Starbucks.

    In the end, nobody cares whether the slaughterhouse management believes in God or not. If the lamb is not slaughtered according to halal procedure, their bottom line may very well start showing red numbers.

    Hence, where do the born losers from the liberal arts, who are treated by everybody else with contempt only, find the temerity to criticize other fields, such as religious studies, that unlike them, allow for successful professional careers for their graduates? Go figure!
  • Radical Skepticism: All propositions are false
    First I reject all knowledge which may be expressed in the statement A = All propositions are false.TheMadFool

    In fact, it is simple.

    According to Tarski's undefinability of truth theorem, a theory is not allowed to proclaim the truth or falsehood of its own propositions. Therefore, statement A is in violation with Tarski's theorem.

    The theorem applies more generally to any sufficiently strong formal system, showing that truth in the standard model of the system cannot be defined within the system.Wikipedia on Tarski's undefinability

    (That is the reason why convention T is needed in which it is the meta-theory that assesses the truth of the object theory's propositions)
  • Radical Skepticism: All propositions are false
    Do you think this'll work?TheMadFool

    The video on Tarski's Convention T is only 11 minutes, very short, and it is really clear too.



    Logical truth does not exist outside a formal system. So, what is the definition of your formal system? It looks like the empty system. What other system would it be?

    Because of Tarski's undefinability of truth theorem, you cannot assess (logical) truth of a statement that belongs to a system from within the same system. That is why Tarski proposes convention T.

    In Convention T, you need two theories (meta and object) to assess the truth of statements in the object theory from within the meta-theory. In your case, the object theory seems to be the empty theory. Therefore, I don't think that your conclusion will evaluate to true in the meta-theory. On the contrary, the meta-theory will rather conclude that not one proposition in the empty object theory will be true (nor false).

    By the way, it is not allowed to reason within the meta-theory about the meta-theory. The meta-theory can only talk about the object-theory, and never about itself. In your approach, you may actually be conflating meta-theory and object-theory into one single theory, which is exactly what is not allowed.

    I do not think that you can do this analysis without something like convention T.
  • On deferring to the opinions of apparent experts
    No, this is an empirical question, not an axiomatic question.god must be atheist

    It depends on the context. In religious law, it is an axiomatic belief.

    In science, it may apparently look like an empirical question but the falsificationist boundaries of science do not allow for a question that cannot be tested experimentally.

    If a question is scientific, then there exists paperwork that can be filled out as justification as well as a procedure to verify the paperwork. So, what should the paperwork look like and what does the verification procedure entail?
  • On deferring to the opinions of apparent experts
    I don't think the answer to "is there a god" comparable to proving second degree five-unknown sets of differential equations with N degree of freedom.god must be atheist

    "Is there a god" is a question about an axiom. You should rather compare it to :

    The naturals are assumed to be closed under a single-valued "successor" function S. For every natural number n, S(n) is a natural number.Peano's 6th axiom of number theory

    In both cases, we do not seek to prove such starting-point belief. It is just a system-wide premise in a particular theory. It is just a belief, take it or leave it. Furthermore, it is only meaningful to believe that, if you want to use the formal system built on top of such starting-point belief. Otherwise, build something on top of another belief.

    By the way, there are lots of different number theories with other choices for the axioms. Dedekind-Peano (PA) is merely the most popular one ..
  • On deferring to the opinions of apparent experts
    What's PM?god must be atheist

    This following is an excerpt from Principia Mathematica (PM)alcontali

    I tried to spare myself from typing the entire title of his book again, "Principia Mathematica", by tagging it with an abbreviation, but it clearly failed! ;-)

    Still, I just wanted to say that this otherwise famous book is unreadable, and even worse, not even worth reading, because Russell's views on the subject have turned out to be faulty.
  • On deferring to the opinions of apparent experts
    If you study Wittgenstein, Kant, Russell, and the other newfangled philosophers, you'll realize what I am talking about.god must be atheist

    Not so sure about Bertrand Russell. This following is an excerpt from Principia Mathematica (PM):

    Put (fa) ./! (fa%x) . =. : (<f>) ./ ! {(y) .<£!(£, y), x] : (<f>) ./! {(ay) . </> ! (z, y), x],
    where/! {(y) . <f> ! (z, y), x) is constructed as follows: wherever, in/! {<£ ! z, x},
    a value of <j>, say <f> I a, occurs, substitute (y) . <£ ! (a, y), and develop by the
    definitions at the 'beginning of #8. / ! {(ay) . <f> I (z, y), x] is similarly con-
    structed.
    Is Bertrand Russell readable?

    The entire book is like that. I wonder how many people have read it?

    In fact, I don't think that PM is nowadays still interesting enough for anybody to put in that kind of effort into something that ultimately turned out to be a failed enterprise ...
  • On deferring to the opinions of apparent experts
    How do you handle that?Pfhorrest

    A conclusion in mathematics must be about an abstraction that does not exist (in the physical universe). That makes it very obvious when a conclusion cannot possibly be mathematics, as he ends up saying things about the real world. There is no need to find a flaw in his proof, or verify any of his formalisms, because such outcome is already impossible.
  • On deferring to the opinions of apparent experts
    Except this person says that math stuff proves their opinions about race/sex/etc.Pfhorrest

    That is a serious mismatch.

    Mathematics is exclusively about abstract, Platonic worlds while race/sex is a real-world phenomenon. There is no mathematical proof for any proposition about the physical universe.

    There is still science, which can deal with some real-world problems, but that drags the problem of experimental testing into the fray. So, how exactly did this person test his views on race/sex?
  • Is philosophy dead ? and if so can we revive it ?
    What do you mean? Free from empirical data? Free from experience? But then, from where does pure reason get its input? Where does it come from?Pussycat

    That is just a definition.

    In the preface to the first edition, Kant explains that by a "critique of pure reason" he means a critique "of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience"Wikipedia on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', the definition of 'Pure Reason'

    Ok, this is probably new bait for some of the Kant haters here ...

    Ah, I remember Godel saying that he was fond of Islam, finding it a consistent idea of religion and open-minded. This is what he was talking about, right?Pussycat

    I did not know that Gödel was fond of Islam. Napoleon was apparently too. I would have to find original material in which Gödel explains his views on Islam. I like Islam a lot because usul al-fiqh turns it into a formal system. That was a revelation to me because it means that religion does not have to be mere bullshit.

    So you are saying that Islam is being caught in the crossfire, because of christianity?Pussycat

    Yes.

    The disaster at Martin Luther's trial in Worms has set the world on fire. It is horrible what happened there. Instead of discrediting just itself, or even just the Bible, the Church has successfully managed to discredit all possible religion in the western world. Duh.
  • Negative Infinity = Positive Infinity OR Two Types of Zeros
    Surely this is true about the zero-set of any function whatsoever. The study of the zero sets of polynomials is algebraic geometry. That's where I'd look for answers to these sorts of questions.fishfry

    Yeah, I see. We come back to the same issue. Tarski was a great logician but also a great algebraic geometrist. Some people have already tried to explain to me why it is apparently one and the same thing, but that hasn't registered with me already. I still fail to see the "obvious" link between both.

    In other words, I have been trying to avoid having to dig deep into algebraic geometry, but that strategy apparently also prevents me from understanding the fundamentals I need in order to answer my questions ...

    Off the top of my head since there must be models of the reals of all infinite cardinalities, the zero-set of xy - 1 = 0 would have the cardinality of whatever model you're looking at.fishfry

    Ok. I suspected something like that ...

    I also have trouble with particular areas in model theory, but at least and unlike with algebraic geometry, I actually like reading up about it ...

    But honestly to the best of my understanding I don't think this means anything.fishfry

    Of course, it does not mean anything, but it is still exhilarating, because it is surprising. That is enough for me to actually like it. As far as I am concerned, it does not have to "mean" anything.

    That is my problem with category theory (as opposed to model theory). They never seem to commit to saying anything. Something needs to be impossible to do, because of a structural constraint that was introduced. With category theory, they never really seem to do that ...

    My personal opinion is that people shouldn't get too hung up on Lowenheim-Skolem. It's essentially a curiosity.fishfry

    Well, it's actually fun to understand something weird they have discovered in an already weird subject.

    The nonstandard arithmetic models of which Lowenheim-Skolem predicts the existence turn out to be a bit inert, because you cannot calculate in them. Tennenbaum's theorem could ultimately be a disappointment, unless someone figures out something else to do than arithmetic, that would be possible in these nonstandard models.

    In general, the more the conclusion is surprising and the more it even sounds a bit absurd, the more interesting I find the whole thing. For me it is just a hobby ...
  • Is philosophy dead ? and if so can we revive it ?
    Philosophy without Logic or Reasoning would be Faith and Religion.Gnomon

    That is a complete misunderstanding.

    Logic is also based on faith, and very much so, because of the 14 speculative, unjustifiable, and otherwise arbitrary axioms of propositional logic. Pure reason does not mean "free from otherwise unjustifiable premises". It means "free from sensory input".

    Therefore, the fact that religion rests on system-wide premises merely puts it in the deductive-axiomatic domain as opposed to the empirical domain. There is nothing wrong with that, because if there were, there would also be something fundamentally wrong with mathematics.

    Furthermore, religious law is a formal system, just like any theory. For example, Islamic law has a largely mechanical epistemology, very much like mathematics, and when written in formal language, Islamic law is machine verifiable, just like all sound knowledge.

    Furthermore, all attacks on religion would also apply to any subdiscipline in mathematics, including logic itself. The reason why atheists pick religion as a target, is simply because it looks like an easier target than mathematics. This wrong perception is caused by Christianity, because, unlike Orthodox Rabbinic Judaism and Islam, Christianity is not and has never been a formal system.

    The magisterium of the Catholic Church is the church's authority or office to give authentic interpretation of the Word of God, "whether in its written form or in the form of Tradition." ... Such solemn declarations of the church's teaching involve the infallibility of the Church. ... Such teachings of the ordinary and universal magisterium are obviously not given in a single specific document. ... men who had to be obeyed by virtue of their position, regardless of their personal holiness, and the distinction between “man” and “office.”Wikipedia on the 'living' magisterium of the Church

    Martin Luther tried to defend himself at his trial through scripture and reason, i.e. by treating religion as a mechanically-verifiable formal system, but the Church explicitly rejected such procedure. Still, the refusal to treat religion as as formal system is very much unique to Christianity. It generally does not apply to other religions.

    Therefore, the entire idea that religion would not be a sound formal system is solely based on western ethnocentrism. It is simply an error.
  • Cognition and Reproduction
    Claiming the behaviors of billions of individuals are determined by who they are closely related to doesn't make empirical sense in the context of human society or biology more generally.Enrique

    It actually does make a lot of sense to seek to collaborate closely with close relatives. It can successfully protect the individual from an otherwise hostile environment. It is also a strong barrier against allowing artificial structures such as government and corporations to gain too much power.

    In fact, it is their strong, local social structure that has caused the spectacular failure of the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, we cannot say that strong kinship does not work, because we can see good examples of where it clearly has.
  • Roots of Racism
    Racism is learned cultural behavior.Baden

    Preference for one's (extended) family may actually be a biological behaviour. However, racism confuses one's family with one's race. Therefore, it is a spectacular bug.

    Imagine that prince William's children reject prince Harry's partially-black children based on race. That would be un-biological because they are close relatives, and therefore, that behaviour would simply be a depravity.

    Racism tends to occur in situations where people have no legitimate concept of extended family, and therefore, misunderstand race as family, which it is obviously not. Therefore, it mainly occurs in societies where extended families no longer exist.

    In the West, it was caused by Church policies aimed at dismantling the existing clans (by banning cousin marriage). By reducing extended-family solidarity this policy allowed for increased State -and Church power. The long-term result, which was specifically desired by the Church, is that people misidentify family with country and race.

    This disintegration process cannot be stopped. By stripping layer after layer of the extended family, sooner or later, even the nuclear families will start falling apart. In that sense, racism, (dumb) nationalism, punitive taxation, and a runaway divorce rate are all part of the same long-term degeneration process.

    State power has indeed successfully been increased, but this result is fundamentally unsustainable, because sooner or later, the State will no longer have a population to rule over.
  • Is increasing agency a valid basis for morality?
    In normative ethics, people resort to different systems like deontology, utilitarianism, rights, and virtues.Peaceful Discord

    System-less morality is the weakest part in western philosophy. It has the same propensity to infinite regress as metaphysics. I do not understand why people do not grasp the fundamentally inferior nature of such approach. It literally leads to nowhere at all.

    If you ever studied even just the very basics of Jewish law or Islamic law, you would quickly see that western "ethics" is just a pile of nonsense. Morality requires the system-wide premises of a legitimate formal system.
  • Radical Skepticism: All propositions are false
    The result is that everything must be taken as possibly true until we can show that it is false.Pfhorrest

    Yes, but that is a practical heuristic in absence of knowledge of the truth of a (logic) sentence.

    Tarski addresses this problem in another way. Tarski assumes the existence of a meta-theory which knows the truth of sentences in a subordinate, embedded theory.

    Tarski's theory of truth is quite relevant in the context of a formal theory, which is in my opinion the context in which OP carries out his approach.
  • Radical Skepticism: All propositions are false
    What does 'true' mean in this context?A Seagull

    I propose to use Tarski's definition for (logically) 'true' as in his semantic theory of truth.

    Truth is then a property of a (logic) sentence within a theory T en provenance from an encompassing meta-theory Tm. We therefore disallow a theory T to define the truth of its own sentences.
  • Radical Skepticism: All propositions are false
    First I reject all knowledge which may be expressed in the statement A = All propositions are false. If A is true the A is false because A is itself a proposition. Ergo, A is false which then implies B = Some propositions are true. It is absolutely certain that B is true.TheMadFool

    Gödel-Henkin model existence theorem.
    We say that a theory T is syntactically consistent if there is no sentence s such that both s and its negation ¬s are provable from T in our deductive system. The model existence theorem says that for any first-order theory T with a well-orderable language, if T is syntactically consistent, then T has a model.
    Wikipedia on Gödel's completeness theorem

    Propositions, i.e. sentences, live in an abstract, Platonic world. If its construction logic is syntactically consistent, then this world's theory has a non-empty model, i.e. a set of objects/facts that satisfy the sentences of the theory.

    A theory is itself defined as a formal language with formal construction rules. Example: Hofstadter's MU puzzle.

    There are still two situations in which all propositions in a theory can be false:

    • The empty theory has an empty model, which is equivalent to no model. All its non-existent sentences are false, but all its non-existent sentences are also true. That is indeed ambiguous.
    • Any syntactically-inconsistent theory has no model either.

    Hence, "In any theory T some propositions are true" is formally false.

    The physical universe is a model that satisfies the otherwise unknown theory of everything (ToE). Since the universe exists, the ToE cannot be empty nor syntactically inconsistent.

    However, not one known theory has the physical universe as (one of) its model(s). In absence of the ToE, there do not exist logically true and/or provable logic sentences about the physical universe. In that sense, "Some propositions are true about the physical universe" is undefined.
  • Negative Infinity = Positive Infinity OR Two Types of Zeros
    The graph is a pair of hyperbolas, one in the first quadrant representing all the positive solutions, and one in the third quadrant representing the negative solutions.fishfry

    This question got me wondering.

    If we represent xy=1 as a predicate function which is true when xy=1 and false otherwise, then we get a model-theoretical model with logical sentences that are true or false about (x,y) tuples.

    Does the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem apply to this model? In that sense, are there different models that satisfy for successive infinite cardinalities (as proposed by Cantor)?

    ... if a countable first-order theory has an infinite model, then for every infinite cardinal number κ it has a model of size κ, and that no first-order theory with an infinite model can have a unique model up to isomorphism. As a consequence, first-order theories are unable to control the cardinality of their infinite models.Wikipedia on Löwenheim–Skolem theorem

    Or does the LS theorem not apply to this theory, because it is about a real function (not a natural-number one), and therefore, about satisfying a second-order theory? Therefore, is the infinite cardinality κ in this case only uncountable infinity? Or could there also be other models with larger cardinalities that satisfy this theory?
  • Is philosophy dead ? and if so can we revive it ?
    Can we revive or perhaps review our philosophy ?
    Even from the very dawn of the enlightenment age ?
    David Jones

    It is alive in ontology and epistemology.

    It is dead in logic, which is now mathematics. It has never been alive in metaphysics, because infinite regress does not work. It has never worked in ethics either, because it cannot compete with religious law.
  • Christianity without Crucifixion?
    Where would Christianity be had Jesus not died on a cross?Jacob-B

    And they did not kill him, nor did they crucify him; but [another] was made to resemble him to them. And indeed, those who differ over it are in doubt about it. They have no knowledge of it except the following of assumption. And they did not kill him, for certain. Rather, Allah raised him to Himself. — Quran 4:157–158

    The idea that the son of Mary was crucified, is based on a forgery, i.e. the replacement of 'Jesus Barabbas' by simply 'Barabbas' in the narrative. It is Church father Origen who is responsible for this forgery:

    Benjamin Urrutia, Latter-Day-Saint and co-author of The Logia of Yeshua: The Sayings of Jesus, agrees with a theory in biblical scholarship[15] which says that Yeshua Bar Abba or Jesus Barabbas may have been none other than Jesus of Nazareth, and that the choice between two prisoners is not historical. Despite this, early scholars, such as Origen, found it unlikely that the story was fictional, pointing out that the incident occurred with a decision between two people with extremely similar names, as having such a similar name to Jesus by appending Yeshua to Barabbas would have been heretical, which is evidenced in some manuscripts by the removal of the common name Yeshua from Barabbas in order to differentiate between him and Jesus Christ.Wikipedia on Origen's forgery of the name 'Barabbas'

    "Bar Abbah" means: Son of [a/the] Father, which was used to designate him as: "Son of an unknown Father", meaning: "bastard". Hence, Jesus Barabbas was the Son of Mary, who was indeed considered the son of an unknown father, and who was released by the Roman governor. It is the other Jesus who got crucified.

    The reason why there were two "Jesus" figures in the narrative, is clearly because the Rabbis had designated two convicts as "Yeshu", i.e. "heretic", to be put to death.

    Therefore, the name "Yeshu bar Abbah" means: the heretical bastard.

    Jesus had no known father and he had been saying things that the Rabbis considered to be utmost disturbing and even blasphemous. Hence, his name says exactly what the Rabbinical clergy thought of him.

    Since the original Gospels clarify that "Yeshu bar Abbah" was released, the entire view on the crucifixion in Christianity is solely the result of Church father Origen's forgery.
  • What can logic do without information?
    How are you doing that? Color and all.TheMadFool

    Put it in a code block with the "< >" button.
  • 4>3
    I think this doesn't follow.TheMadFool

    It is the starting point itself, F(x)>G(x), that is always undefined. The expression G(x)-F(x) is never defined because there is no overlap in the domains for F(x) and G(x). Absolutely nothing could ever follow from that.
  • 4>3
    Clearly F(x)>G(x)Wittgenstein

    The expression "F(x)>G(x)" is undefined, because there isn't one x for which both F(x) and G(x) are simultaneously defined.

    defined    F(x)       G(x)
    1 - 30      no         yes
    31 - 90     no          no
    >= 91       yes        no
    

    The expression "F(x)>G(x)" does not evaluate to true or false if either F(x) or G(x) is undefined. Therefore, your premise "F(x)>G(x)" is always undefined. Hence, it is not possible to draw any legitimate conclusion from it.
  • What can logic do without information?
    Cutting out the slack, I'm pointing out that the private language argument shows that the world hypothesised in the OP cannot happen. Language is essentially social.Banno

    Machines very well understand (formal) language. Machines are not necessarily social.

    #!/usr/bin/env lua
    
    print("hello world")
    print("I can correctly parse this. What would there be social about me?")
    
  • What can logic do without information?
    Logic validates reasoning as a specific epistemology* validates the assumptions from which we reason.jambaugh

    We cannot validate the assumptions, i.e. the first principles, from which we reason, because they cannot be justified.

    We can generally also not validate the entire theory that rests on these assumptions. If you can prove in a sufficiently-powerful first-order theory (The problem starts occurring from Q, i.e. Robinson's arithmetic) that it is consistent, then it is necessarily inconsistent (Gödel's second incompleteness).

    Hence, provable consistency implies inconsistency. It simply means that the theory is lying to you about its consistency, and through the principle of explosion, about absolutely anything it says. Therefore, you cannot trust anything such theory tells you.

    Many of the first order theories described above can be extended to complete recursively enumerable consistent theories. This is no longer true for most of the following theories; they can usually encode both multiplication and addition of natural numbers, and this gives them enough power to encode themselves, which implies that Gödel's incompleteness theorem applies and the theories can no longer be both complete and recursively enumerable (unless they are inconsistent).Wikipedia: List of first-order theories

    If the first incompleteness applies, then the second one automatically applies too (second incompleteness is provable from first incompleteness).
  • What can logic do without information?
    Mathematics is the recognition of patterns - no patterns, no maths.,Banno

    Well, no. That is science. That is not mathematics.

    Look at first order (predicate) logic, i.e. the language of mathematics.

    It is a syntax/grammar along with the 14 axiomatic rules of propositional calculus that operates on variables that do not need to represent anything. For example, the following logic statement says that a particular real function f is continuous in point :



    This logic statement expresses an abstraction ("continuity") about another abstraction ("real function"). It is an idea about another idea. These ideas are not part of the physical universe. They are merely concepts that live in a Platonic world constructed from scratch from basic rules as building bricks.

    Such abstract, Platonic world is not observable and has nothing to do with observation.

    Science and engineering do indeed end up using these abstractions in a real-world context, but then, very tightly governed by an empirical regulatory framework that seeks to maintain correspondence.

    It is absolutely not advisable to use this kind of abstractions directly, in a real-world context, without empirical regulations.
  • Native Americans as true Christians?
    Nope. Analogies are inductive. Comparing the natives to the Pilgrims to the words of Jesus is not deductive.Noah Te Stroete

    Concerning the epistemic principles of jurisprudence, I can see that there is also a debate in the usul al-figh ("epistemology of jurisprudence") concerning qiyas ("analogies"):

    Among Sunni traditions, there is still a range of attitudes regarding the validity of analogy as a method of jurisprudence. Imam Bukhari, Ahmad bin Hanbal, and Dawud al-Zahiri for example, rejected the use of analogical reason outright, arguing that to rely on personal opinion in law-making would mean that each individual would ultimately form their own subjective conclusions.[11][5][12] Bernard G. Weiss, one of today's foremost experts on Islamic law and philosophy, explains that while analogical reason was accepted as a fourth source of law by later generations, its validity was not a foregone conclusion among earlier Muslim jurists.[13] Thus, while its status as a fourth source of law was accepted by the majority of later and modern Muslim jurists, this was not the case at the inception of Muslim jurisprudence as a field.Wikipedia on the epistemology of Islamic jurisprudence

    Hence, analogies are a bit controversial.

    They can easily damage the provability of a religious advisory. In my impression, they have probably no place in a serious formal system. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, a legitimate advisory must be produced by deductive inference only.
  • Native Americans as true Christians?
    You’re being pedantic. It is clear from the Gospels what were the words of Jesus and what were the words of the authors. What did Jesus say? Who better reflects this? You’re getting into some sort of pedagogical pedantry that is besides the point and is a total waste of our time.Noah Te Stroete

    You want to derive theorems, i.e. deductive conclusions, from the words in the Gospels. It is obvious that the theory on deduction, i.e. proof theory, is very, very relevant in this context.

    I am not being pedantic.
    I insist on the soundness of the formalisms to be used.

    That is the essence of what you are supposed to learn from mathematics, i.e. the very basics:

    If your procedure is flawed, then your answer will be too.

    Furthermore, this is exactly the problem that Martin Luther raised at his trial: Please, use a sound procedure. The answer of the Church to his request was: That cannot be done, because the Bible is merely an arsenal of deceptive arguments.
  • Native Americans as true Christians?
    It probably is, as is most of the tenets of faith of the various denominations.Noah Te Stroete

    As I mentioned earlier, this is only the case in Christianity, which is not a formal system unlike Orthodox Rabbinic Judaism and Islam.

    What did Jesus actually say about God, God’s commandments, and about himself? Who better personifies what he said? The natives or the pilgrims?Noah Te Stroete

    There are two major problems with that question.

    First of all, this is a jurisprudential question, while Christianity is not a formal system. Hence, there is no deductive method available to answer your question. You are treating Christianity as if it were a formal system and that is where you make a serious mistake.

    Secondly, in his Sermon on the Mount, Jesus clarified that did not come to alter, modify, abolish or abrogate Jewish law. Therefore, the opinions of Jesus and the opinions in Christianity are simply not the same. If you want to know what Jesus would have said, you will need to ask the question to a religious scholar in Jewish law. If you want to know what Christians would think, there will be as many answers as there are Christians. It is important to emphasize that Christians generally do not think like Jesus did. Again, Christianity is not a formal system and is therefore not suitable to answer jurisprudential questions.
  • Native Americans as true Christians?
    Apparently you’ve never heard of the probably hundreds of Protestant denominations who believe that the entire Bible is the divine Word of God, passed down to humanity through God’s will?Noah Te Stroete

    From a jurisprudential point of view, the scripture is a set of first principles, from which it is permitted to derive theorems, inasmuch as they necessarily and provably follow from these first principles.

    As such, religious jurisprudence is an axiomatic formal system. Just like for any formal system, religious jurisprudence is not interested in a justification for its first principles, from within the same system. That is not possible anyway, as it would lead to infinite regress.

    Furthermore, we also do not try to further justify the 9 axioms of number theory (PA) or the 10 axioms of set theory (ZFC). The principle of system-wide premises is simply the essence of the axiomatic epistemic domain.

    So, yes, we can say that the scripture comes from God, but so do ultimately the 9 axioms of PA and the 10 axioms of ZFC, or any first principles that we use.

    Protestants aren’t taught about the Council of Nicaea and if they know about it, they would just say that God’s will was done.Noah Te Stroete

    Protestants who do not know that the trinity was decided at the Council of Nicaea, and who do not know that it does not originate from the Bible, are simply ignorant about their own religion:

    In 325, the First Council of Nicaea adopted the Nicene Creed which described Christ as "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father", and the "Holy Ghost" as the one by which was incarnate... of the Virgin Mary".[56][57]Wikipedia on the trinity

    Except for the Unitarians, all Protestants subscribe to the Trinity:

    Protestants who adhere to the Nicene Creed believe in three persons (God the Father, God the Son, and the Holy Spirit) as one God. Movements emerging around the time of the Protestant Reformation, but not a part of Protestantism, e.g. Unitarianism also reject the Trinity.Wikipedia on Protestantism and Trinity

    The Trinity is a theory that does NOT necessarily follow from the Bible. Hence, I consider it to be a heresy within the context of Christianity.
  • Native Americans as true Christians?
    And the various churches all believe that their different and varied tenets of faith do indeed come from Scripture.Noah Te Stroete

    Not true at all, and even admittedly so.

    The early history of Christianity was about mandatory Church council advisories, such as the one in Nicaea, and the one in Chalcedon. The religious persecutions against Arians, Nestorians, and Copts was about the fact that they rejected these Church council resolutions.

    For example, there is not one Church that pretends that the Nicene creed comes from the Bible. On the contrary, they all admit that the theory of the trinity was decided at the Council of Nicaea.

    As I understand it, there are different sects of Jews (the Reformed and the Orthodox as examples)Noah Te Stroete

    As far as I am concerned, Reformed Judaism is not a valid religion. It is also known to be epistemically unsound. In the context of Judaism, I only mention Orthodox (Rabbinic) Judaism as a legitimate formal system.

    there are the Sunni and Shia Muslims. The two Muslim factions have been at odds for centuries.Noah Te Stroete

    The following is an example where the Shia and the Sunni disagree, i.e. the Shahada (central Islamic creed):

    Sunni: There is just one God and Muhammed is his prophet.
    Shia: There is just one God, Muhammed is his prophet, and Ali is his friend.


    That last bit cannot possibly originate from the Quran or the Sunnah. Therefore, it is epistemically unsound. It clearly amounts to introducing an additional first principle. Now, in my opinion, Shia jurisprudence does not seem to derive any new theorem from this (heretical) addition. Hence, it does not materially affect their take on Islamic theory. In that sense, this addition does not particularly matter in practice.

    Plus, there is the Wahabbists, too.Noah Te Stroete

    It is a protest movement against heretical advisories of which they deem that they do not necessarily or provably follow from scripture, or which are even contradictory to scripture. It is obvious that heretical advisories exist, but I disagree with any condemnation in globo. In my opinion, the problem of heresy can only be assessed per existing advisory, on a case by case basis.
  • Native Americans as true Christians?
    You are not saying there isn’t Church dogma, are you?Noah Te Stroete

    Their advisories are not axiomatic from scripture, i.e. from the Bible. Therefore, no, not at all, their practices do not constitute a sound formal system.

    That is the difference with Rabbinic Judaism and Islam, which contrary to Christianity are effectively sound axiomatic formal systems.

    The difference is entirely and exclusively epistemic. It is really not about what the scripture says. It is about the consideration whether their advisories necessarily and provably follow from scripture.
  • Native Americans as true Christians?
    I’m not talking about religious dogma taken from the Bible that was sanctioned by the corrupt Roman Catholic Church that all Christian church denominations also use as their sacred text. Dogmatic bullshit is what it is full of.Noah Te Stroete

    In comparison to Rabbinic Judaism and Islam, what characterizes Christianity is that it does not necessarily reason from first principles contained in the scripture. I personally consider that to be Christianity's most serious weakness.

    In fact, Luther already pointed that out at his trial in Worms, Germany, in April 1521, before Charles V, emperor of the holy roman empire. Luther said:

    If you can show me through scripture and reason that I would be wrong, I will retract what I have said.

    Luther's defence was ultimately rejected by Church and Empire on grounds on what Van Eck, emissary of the papacy, argued. Van Eck said:

    The Bible itself is the arsenal whence each evil heretic has drawn his deceptive arguments.

    The Bible has never been used to reason from first principles, and therefore, Christianity is not dogmatic, which in my opinion, is the religion's most severe weakness.
  • Brexit
    I can only surmise that it is due to a cultural difference.Punshhh

    By keeping the child away from its relatives, it will never become a true member of the royal family. It will not properly bond with the other children of the family, such as the ones of prince William. It will never really learn how to think like them, speak like them, or behave as expected from a Mountbatten-Windsor. She is now actively creating a cultural difference in the next generation instead of diligently overcoming hers. In the end, it is she who married into the royal family and not the other way around.