That's just it, Jack. We must use our knowledge to create a population control that works, and that is not an easy task. I never said it would be easy. But without that, we eat up the planet, so to speak, and then we all die.

I hear you, Ross. I prefer the current version: dialogue via written media. It gives the participants more time to ponder and then put their thoughts in order and finally compose an opinion. In speech the loudest and most vehement will hog the floor. Not necessarily the smartest or the dumbest. It is nice to have enough time and peace and quite to compose a text of what one really wants to say.

In line with what TheMadFool said, but probably thinking differently in what the proper approach should be, I suggest a law must be exercised (natural law, or else societal law) that will make human population stop from growing and then make human population decrease in numbers.

This is a tough cookie, because the environment is destroyed beyond its capacity to regenerate; regeneration can only be hoped for if humans reduce their habits by leaps and bounds, and that can only be achieved by reducing the human head-count on the planet.

We need an invention that appeals to human sexuality, and appeals to humans' desire (strong, unsuppressable, biological desire) to have babies, yet prevents babies from happening. I can't think of any such device (may not be a singular device, but a controllable, and multi-aspect device). Somebody sure has to do that in a hurry sometime soon, if we are to survive and not eat the bird that lays the golden eggs -- not destroy nature that provides us with livelihood.

I think it all boils down to man acquiring the knowledge of the laws of nature, and then applying one or more laws to leverage man's interest in battling a law that is against human interest.

For instance, Covid is a natural disaster for humans. We know biochemistry, and we know how to affect changes in biochemistry. The law of biochemistry then are used by humans to leverage their effort to eliminate Covid.

Almost no natural disasters are prevented or fought against or done reparations of their effect, without applying and using as leverage other apparatus that relies on the knowledge of natural laws.

finally I understand you, Cheshire, and I appltaud your patience. Believe me, your writing style is mysterious, alluring and smart, and to me (personally, maybe not to others) completely obliterative to the meaning you wish to put across.

What you described is a simple case to explain, and you were so hung up for so long on it.

This is what it is:

- humans rationalize to the max. They will bend logic to the max. Look at Christianity and its tenets, and the vehemence the believers believe in them and defend them for their truths, whereas they can't be held logically true for one second. Same mechanism of sentiments work for judging for moral issues. Anyone will rationalize any moral issue to give him or her the right to be morally superior. They would immediately switch to the other opinion -- the one that stands against their own -- should the situation change so that it is required.

Why you don't see this as a true and accurate description of reality, baffles me. Insight levels are different in people, I guess, and they don't necessarily correspond to intelligence levels.

The more I think about it, the more I am convinced that you are stuck at the same hurdle as Kant, when it comes to lying (Kant said you can't and must not) and lying for the effect of effecting a moral good. You and Kant can't come to terms with the flip-flop nature of moral conviction, and its effect on people.

Morals would not exist without social dynamics. Social dynamics, as they developed, parallel with morals, had an effect on the voluntary moral system of humans, and the effect is that the same deed can be seen as moral by one group, and immoral in another group, PRECISELY because it is a SOCIAL aid for survival. When two groups have the SAME moral, and they clash over some resource problem, then they MAY invoke the same moral to applied against the other group. I have seen it in the cold war, in its golden age, and I see it now in the new strife for world domination. Precisely the same fabrications are applied to the would-be enemies by both parties, pre-war, to prepare the masses to feel righteous enough to go and kill members of the other group if needed.

Indoctrination for preparing to war. Same moral teachings are applied in both camps against the other camp.

So no, your criticism of my establishing a seemingly self-contradictory picture of what can happen is not valid. Morals are subject to explanation before the interpretation of a situation becomes internalized. If enough indoctrination happens then enough people will be influenced.

THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS the members of the intelligentsia are the first ones to be lined up against the wall and shot. They see the dichotomy of any tyrannical indoctrination, and they will be prone to disseminate criticism of it, making it hard for the authorities to effect their input on shaping public morals. Therefore they are put out of action by way of execution.

The question is, can you refute the whole of the Koran or the whole of the bhagavad gita or the whole of the Book of Mormon or the whole of any scripture from any given religion? All holy books rely on a similar type of justification - the truth in book form. — Tom Storm

Something about things written down. They enforce more forcefully.

If the attendant says "please take off your shoes," you look at him as if he were mad, and you make a decision to take off your shoes or not. But if the attendant shows a printed plaque on the wall with the words on the plaque, "Please take off your shoes", you take off your shoes without hesitation.

If the announcer in the auditorium says "please put your telephones on airplane mode", you laugh and clap and fidget, and you may adjust your device accordingly, or you may elect not to. But if at the entrance there is a huge sign "Please put your phone(s) on airplane mode," then chances are higher that you will.

If the guy on the mound says, "blessed are the meek for they shalt inherit the Earth," then you feel mildly righteous and you feel your generosity has been satisfied. The Earth after doomsday will worth much less than before the End, but it will be worth SOMETHING.but way too true and spot on. However, when it is WRITTEN that thou shalt not kill, then you don't pontificate, you just obey without putting up an argument first.

I don't know. To me my theory is clear-cut, no loose ends, and easily digested. Your reply indicates it has inherent difficulties; by agreeing to something, I capitulate to disagreement, and vice versa.

I just really can't fathom the jist of your criticism. You tie things in the model of your critical analysis to things where I don't even suspect a connection, let alone see a relationship that you see. You are talking in largely conceptual terms, and I don't know, don't understand, how your analysis relates to my theory in any way.

Am I to take away from this that you are seeing related logic in the theory as self-contradictory, and your vision is superior to mine? Or am I to take away from this that you (haha) don't get my point? Or am I to take away from this that you simply try to confuse me, for lack of better things to do, or because it's fun. Honestly, and in complete frankness, I could not tell the difference between the three. If my three-year-old great-grand-son asked me to explain what you mean, I would be lost not only for words, but also for even a modicum of understanding (cognitive understanding, not empathic) w
hat you are trying to say, and how what you say relates to my theory.

Your demonstration of multi-sided ethics via a soccer gain result. — Cheshire

Cheshire, you're a gem. Thanks.

I asked if you meant they were all equally valid, which you confirmed. — Cheshire

I am now confused. I can't identify what you mean by "they". But it's not your fault... my mind is going, I can't mentally encompass a great number of data items that require short-term memory recall. Sorry, again, it is clearly my fault and my problem.

Is it an immoral question, because of how you feel? Why not? — Cheshire

The question I did not like because it showed you did not get my point. I never said because it was immoral. I never said because how it made me feel. I did not like it because -- you know. Because it revealed that you did not get my point.

I said so, and then you had to go and invent a number of OTHER reasons -- none of which were indicated or hinted at -- why I may not have liked that question.

If any of those invented concerns were the real reason why I did not like your question, I either would have said so, or admitted to them. But I don't admit to them, because... because the reason I did not like your question was that it revealed you did not get my point.

All facts are approximate. No facts are absolute - except as we say they are, but then, that's our saying. Of course, many facts are as accurate as they need to be - but still approximate. — tim wood

You need to learn the meaning of "fact". Sorry, tim, but a fact is not subject of debate for whether it is this way or that way. It is our perceptions of the fact that we argue. You said it so in many other threads, so please don't contradict yourself for the sake of the argument.

For instance, we know that combining the statement “it is wrong to steal on the sabbath” with “it is okay to steal on days that are not considered holy” yields the normative statement: “it is wrong to steal on the sabbath, but you can steal on some days that aren’t the sabbath”. We need only check this law against the truth of its constituent parts to then decide whether or not it is a valid approximation. If it is consistent, and this one is, then we have a law governing when it is okay to steal - on some days other than the sabbath. Exactly which days it would be okay to steal on would require more testing. — ToothyMaw

This paragraph begs the question. How do we know the statements reflect morality? There is actually no logical connection between "it is wrong to steal on the Sabbath" and anything wrong stealing on the Sabbath. Semantically your theory may work, but it is not tied to reality, and thus, it is not something that says anything.

but we can't actually safely and without any doubt in our minds decide what feature in an act makes it moral, immoral or amoral.
— god must be atheist
Sure we do. Goals is the feature. If you didn't have goals what would morality be? Those that help realize your goals are good, those that inhibit them are bad. — Harry Hindu

What if your goal is to enslave half of mankind, make their lives miserable, painful and their spirits broken, for the benefit of the other half of mankind?

Goals? This is a goal. To enslave half of mankind.

You have to qualify now what those goals should or must be. And ay, there is the rub. That is precisely what the debate has been for thousands of years, with no end in sight.

My idea is that analyzing approximate moral facts in terms of the semantics of their constituent parts and comparing the combinations of constituent parts to the outcomes arrived at by their application could yield a basis for combining said constituent parts into a more accurate approximation of moral facts through trial and error. — ToothyMaw

Facts can't be argued. There are no such things as facts that are approximate. Our opinion based on our differences of observation may be approximations. But facts are never approximate.

Furthermore, to speak about moral facts, you need to know what they are. Do you have a description of what makes a fact a moral fact? A completely accurate conceptual definition that delineates moral facts from other facts? If yes, I'd like you to show what it is. Without a benchmark, you can't approximate. And the benchmark is missing.

Some folks swear by a plumb-line, some by the way water finds its own level, and yet others by the illumination of coherent light produced by a lazar. Have I convinced anyone that there is no hard and fast resolution about what is the active ingredient in a straight line? — unenlightened

There is belief based on evidence, and there is proof based on evidence. I tried to say that I did not prove that there is no hard and fast resolution about what the active ingredient is in ethics; but I challenge you to tell me what that is. I can challenge anyone on the globe, and they can't prove by pointing at X and saying "this is the active ingredient in morality". Therefore it is safe to say that there has no active ingredient found yet, yet it allows for its existence. Your analogy I won't challenge, as you wrote it in mockery.

I say you wrote it in mockery because there is no active ingredient in what makes a triangle a triangle, and a straight line a straight line. Moral acts, on the other hand, are complex, manifold, and often self-contradictory (one will call it moral, the other, immoral). No normal person will call a triangle a non-triangle; and call a non-triangle a triangle. Whereas that is the case often with moral actions. There is a huge difference there, and your model in your example throws out this difference... hence your model does not apply.

Well, I've got a little philosophy cheat sheet. It says that if you think you've solved the entirety of a philosophical sub-category based on a single unrevised document then you are probably wrong — Cheshire

You covered yourself. "Probably" in front of "wrong". Either way, you may claim victory of predictive power. If my theory stands the test of peer review, or else if it does not.

There has been at least one other issue in philosophy that has been solved: Zeno's paradox of the hare and the turtle (the hare will never catch the turtle ... like heck it won't.)
-

Besides, Kant already did by identifying the difference in nature versus civilized context for moral decisions and he was tossed a sunder in the conclusion. You by proxy threw out your own idea. — Cheshire

Yes, I missed the information content. Mea culpa. I did not understand the post, because... you're welcome to laugh at me, I never read Kant. I know about the categoricus imperativus, but that's all. And that theory is nice, cuddly, but useless... because most people know they could gain unfair advantage if they don't follow it, and some people actually make not following it into a habit.

So I don't bother much with Kant. He is overrated, because, basically, he was the first in a long time who gave morality a serious thought, and he himself knew he failed achieving his own goal with regard to moral theory.

There could be a perfect prediction, but then the person should not face the day thinking "I won't drink this poison, but I will, due to the prediction." It is not the prediction that precipitates the action; the example describe it as if it did.

If the prediction is perfect, then the person would want to drink the poison on the day, with or without knowing the prediction.

So for the prediction to be perfect, the person should not face the day "I won't drink the poison" and then drink the poison only due to the prediction's wording.

We can and have made reasonable approximations. Being imperfect is not the same as without value. — Cheshire

They say there is much to say for a system that is easy to comprehend but is only an approximation of the truth, but is useful as a model. It's better than a complex description of the precise truth, that is hard to implement.

Right. Being imperfect is not the same as being without value.

My system, however is not only a better description of the truth, but is also simpler and easier to implement, than the two-thousand-year-old system that has been debated in its nodal points in the precise same way for 2000 years. The conventional, old system has had systemic problems that can never be solved. It may have had some value, but it could be argued (and has been argued) what that value was.

No such thing in my system.

I don't think dispensing with several thousand years worth of inquiry is justified because we can sort moral issues into two categories. — Cheshire

I don't seek justification ... it's like justifying gravity or the speed of light. I only describe a system in a way that gives a wholly different way of classifying data of phenomena, and yields a much more accurate description. It actually throws out thousands of years of dilemmatic discourse... I don't see that as a sin, or a negative, or a mistake or a fault... in fact, I see it as the strength of my idea/ theory.

You may be nostalgic about Kant and others, and rightfully so... their theories have become in one fell swoop archaic, inaccurate, should I say useless. This is not something that needs to be justified, I don't think. It is something that changes an entire industry of thinking: thinking about morality.

I may have sounded haughty here, or overly confident. I do stand behind my words, and actually yes, I did notice and I think, like I said, that my theory dismisses a lot of others. This needs to be justified? Why? By whom? It's a category mistake to think so, I believe.

In fact, the entire theory I drew up in an effort to create a new framework in which a lot of old undecidable debates can be thrown asunder, as you said.

Ok, what else is contained in a moral calculation. — Cheshire

I am talking voluntary moral calculations.
- peer induced moral values
- whether the actor accepts them or not
- if the actor does not accept and internalilze them, then there is no moral calculation
- if the actor accepts them then most acts are straightforward
- acts become not straightforward when an accepted and internalized voluntary moral contradicts other internalized morals -- this is the only time of conflict, when the person will act to the outside world unpredictably, and according to the actor, as he sees how he or she makes the decision, weighing the pros and cons between two choices.

You are implying they are all equally valid? — Cheshire

I don't like that question, because it shows to me you haven't been getting my point.

They are equally valid in two groups: valid for one group with one set of answers, and valid for the other group with a different set of answers. The validity is decided on whom the answer vindicates morally. To one group those questions will be valid that morally vindicate them; to the other group, conversely so.

There is no objective morality in the world of voluntary morals. This is the point of my paper as well. You actually took exception to my mentioning that in only one sentence in the paper. You wanted to see more of that, but to me it has always been clear. I did not want to clutter the paper with proving already accepted truths.

To you and to some others in this thread it may be not self-evident, that morals are never absolute and objective. Just think of cannibalism and burning witches at the stakes. Some cultures foster it, some cultures are abhorred by it. Voluntary (acquired) morals are not pervasive over all cultures. That's very much one of the points in my paper.

What if we just organized a vigorous infrastructure revitalization plan? Maybe that would drain enough to avoid the overproduction crisis? — ToothyMaw

You are absolutely right! In fact, in minor depressions this is the described practice by economists. The great highways, the damns, the huge infrastructure works are done in times when production is low. These activities suck up the work force, so employment levels go higher, and the economy recovers.

How do you distinguish between an emotional reaction and moral calculation? If I am angry, does that mean some one did something wrong? — Cheshire

All moral calculations contain some emotional reaction, but not all emotional reactions are part of moral calculations.

Well, if I can approach a problem that shows a moral judgement can be reasoned from a neutral position; then it contradicts the notion that morality of a win is side dependent. — Cheshire

That's just it; my examples showed that there is no neutral side in some moral questions. By the multitude of answers to the multitude of questions I aimed to demonstrate that any rationalization can be fabricated to support one's position.

But wouldn't production naturally slow down if people weren't buying things and there was no tremendous military industrial complex draining the economy — ToothyMaw

Yes, production would slow down, workers would lose their jobs, and would buy even less. Less bought, production would plummet deeper down. Bunch of workers fired again. ETC. This is the prescription for the overproduction crisis, and this was the reason behind the Great Depression.

Making decisions relative to an emotion alone isn't as reliable. When decisions are large enough people have to put forward some type of reasoning or risk being seen derelict of a duty for due diligence. — Cheshire

Right you are. But you are swaying from the decision made on a moral basis. If logic is at the top of the list, and morality is at the bottom, then the reasons put forward would be the real ones. instead of saying that we are waging a war for the glory of god or for the embetterment of mankind, we would say we are waging a war to satisfy the greed of our leaders at the cost of many of our compatriot's death, suffering, maiming, mutilating and damaging psychologiclally. I guess that would not go down so well would it.

So logic is the trigger for wars, and ideology is the lie that covers the real reason to make sure the war will happen.

I guess you could ask if it is immoral to enjoy a victory not fully earned? — Cheshire

There are many ways to skin a cat, but the cat has nine lives, and the cat-o-tail has nine whips.

That's just it. You could ask a number of things, and they could answer a number of things. "The victory was fully earned because the game goes to the team with the higher score." or "The refereeing is a human act, it is prone to error, and it could have happened the other way around. The rules say the referee's judgment is the ultimate judgment in the game, so who are we to argue with the referee? It may even earn us a yellow card (personal punishment) if we pressed an argument." "No, it was not offside. The referee saw it correctly." ETC.

Suffering e.g. starvation is much more than "inner gut feelings". — 180 Proof

Nice pun!

none of the neocons in the US can even give a fucking half-decent rationalization for their forever-wars, so the tendency towards hegemony with regards to the US is quite explicit. — ToothyMaw

That is true. What many don't realize is that the USA would be in the middle of a long-long elongated depression, created by an overproduction crisis. This is counter-effected by the powers that be by draining the economy; they do it by building up a military. The military brings nothing to the table of the economy; but because it only takes away, it makes sure that whatever is on the table will get bought up. If things remain on the table, they have a poisonous effect on the economy. A bit like a real, food table: if you don't wash it and empty it of food every day, it will develop greasy dirt that attracts microbes, rodents and disease.

How does that relate to what you quoted? I think Cheshire was more talking about how we have to give a justification for why one act is better than another - and explain it in words; we have to be able to give
- at minimum - a rationalization about why we are right, if not a fully logical explanation. — ToothyMaw

that's precisely what the subjectivism is about (voluntary) morality; the precise thing that eradicates any trace of objectivism. You said it yourself, and ever so rightly: we rationalize our actions into moral superiority, without any substantive support for it. I have seen it in communist Hungary, I have seen it in capitalist USA, I have seen it in fascist anti-Semitic literature.

Karl Marx (one of quite a few of his observations that I find true that are not related to communism) discovered this in political movements: "Humans of a common movement create an ideology to help them succeed in their efforts." In other words, humans must lie to themselves to explain the evil acts (not in a religious sense evil, but in a moral sense) they are about to commit. The WARS to satisfy the greed for Indian spices was explained as crusades. The killing of the Jews was explained as an economic and moral good deed by Hitler. The enslavement of Blacks was explained by saying they are sub-humans. The American Civil War was explained as a humanitarian act.

Morality eludes objective definition. Its definition relies on subjective experience, it avoids an objective definition.
— god must be atheist
This point is a thread and half itself and it's not critical to understanding what you are trying to say. — Cheshire

This is the "comparison" with other moral theories you said I should have done to show this idea, if you like, as a theory.

I think I did not elaborate on this either, because of the wordiness problem.

I don't know if you have enough time or inclination or interest in reading the long version as well. Some, but perhaps not all, your issues are hopefully taken care of it in the long version. I think. I wish you would read it, because your points are right on and well supported; your criticism is honest and not meant to deflate; and mostly they make a lot of sense. I can't disagree with them, but I hope I did a decent job in explaining why what you find missing is not there.

Involuntary moral acts are pervasive among all societies, unchanged in required behaviour to the same triggers.
— god must be atheist
Any universal statements become a target; the reflex to argue is strong with this crowd. Because arguing is fun.
There is no subset of humanity of normal people who would violate the involuntary moral acts.
— god must be atheist
Another universal. — Cheshire

You are absolutely right. Universals are challenging in and by themselves. I did not want to elaborate, but I can't see a parent not dive into water (if he or she can swim) to save his kid in the frothing brime. Or I can't imagine a cat who would not dare a raging fire to bring her kittens to safety. Or I can't imagine a wolf mother who would not fight to the death to save her cubs from other predators.

This would have made the paper wordy though, for those who complained about it being rambling and unfocussed.

An idea is just something to be understood. A theory entails tests and competition with other preferred theories. — Cheshire

Thanks, this is a good point. I thought a theory was something that has not enough proof for acceptance, but enough evidence and not enough mistakes / errors / wrong ideas in it to reject it outright as fantasy or fiction.

I hesitate still to call it an idea. An idea is a simple thing, like a function; a theory is more complex, like a program. I think the paper describes more complexity than a simple reaction.

, we should be able to put into words why one decision is in fact better than another. — Cheshire

That's just it: feelings are not universal over some particular action or event.

For example: One nation's celebration of victory over the overlords is a sad day in the life of the overlord. The victory is moral on one side of the fence, immoral on the other side.

Or take the crucifixion of Jesus. Christians decry and hate the decision by the Jewish leadership to crucify him; yet without the act, people of Jesus' followers would never be saved. So should Christians thank the Jews for killing their god, or hate them for it? Christians by-and-large chose the hate part.

If my soccer team wins by one goal where the referee did not punish my team for being off side, then it's not a moral sin for the followers of my team, but it is for the opposing team.

Thank you, ToothyMaw! That was a useful comment by you. Thanks.

1. I present a moral theory.
2. You demonstrate that it can produce a permittable immoral act.
3. We agree the theory is flawed; but based on a shared theory that is unstated but seemingly understood. — Cheshire

1. You present a theory on something that we don't know what it is. It's like stating a theory on god: everyone has a concept of god, or of morality, but we can't put our fingers on it just precisely what it is.
2. To decide something is immoral we only rely on our inner gut feelings. It can't be proven that it's immoral, while the emotional judgment is so strong that we are unilateral in the opinion -- without having a basic definition of it. For instance, we agree that biting kitten's heads off is immoral, or raping babies... but why? We have no concept of morality other than emotional judgment.
3. No, it's not flawed; and we are not basing our moral compass on theory, but on feelings. It's not flawed, because moral theories try to emulate the truth behind morals, which actually follow the explicable but unreasoned rules to help society's propagation and the propagation of the individual's DNA.

This can also be inferred from my paper.

Thanks for the critical comment, ToothyMaw... would it have killed you to leave the comment on THAT thread instead of this one? At any rate, you said you read it and did not think much of it. That's fine, I can't argue with your opinion, as you did not make an argument.

People like their own ideas, so starting with a concluded matter that isn't pre-distributed is asking a lot. The most success I've had is when I truly don't have an answer, but rather a few premises. I hope that helps with the future attempts. In regards, to evolutionary pressures for morality; I think it is one of the most overlooked. It's been regulated to feminism by mistake or to some disservice. The idea that the preservation of relationships describes the basis for what is moral or immoral seems compelling to me. I'll take a read this evening. Cheers. — Cheshire

Thank you for giving me the time. My idea I like, tremendously, as you said. Opposed to many or all dilettantes (which I am one of) I don't prescribe a moral code or ethic; I simply state "this is how it is, why it is so, and how it developed." Nothing more.

Incidentally, none of your sentences make sense to me, other than the last two. Don't take me wrong; I am not belittling you. It may be due to the fact that you're much more intelligent and deeper than I. I dunno. It could be mockery on your part, too, for all I know.

It's not publishing success I am after, but getting the idea I developed and described popularized. I don't write to publish; I wish to publish what I wrote. Totally the wrong concept, I know, but I like what I write. I think my pieces are cuddly, they're likeable, they're cute.

If you have any comment to make, please make them on that thread. Thanks.

The lesson to take away is that subjective-as-in-phenomenal doesn't have to be subjective-as-in-relative, and conversely, something doesn't have to be objective-as-in-transcendent just to be objective-as-in-universal. — Pfhorrest

Truly agree. Furthermore, the goal of utilitarian morality could be subjective, phenomenal, relative, objective, transcendent and universal; and so would morality by intent be.

The whole morality thing hinges on two things: Humans, mammals and birds are capable to feel moral; and it is helpful in the survival as a species; or the survival of the individual's derivative DNA. Everything else (aside from moral or ethics surely exists but is undefinable, and the nature of moral code) are variations on a theme.

I summarized it very nicely in two papers, both of which appear in the Ethics forum of the The Philosophy Forum. I do not describe a guidance of how to behave; I simply explain the formation and present mechanism of morality, and it allows nicely for the variations.

I strongly urge you (who ever YOU are) to read these papers. If you have a comment to make on the papers, please for god's own sake, leave the comment on those paper's forums, not here. This thread has enough exposure. My threads are ignored BIG time.

There are two versions of the same paper. One is longer, in narrative style; people complained here that it was too long and contained too much ballast, too much extraneous information. The second version is shorter and in a point form, to satisfy those who think the first version was too long.

The longer version:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10744/ethics-explained-to-smooth-out-all-wrinkles-in-current-debates-neo-darwinist-approach

The sorter version:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10903/shortened-version-of-theory-of-morality-some-objected-to-the-conversational-style-of-my-paper

Please read, enjoy, and if you feel like it, and only if you do, please leave remarks on those two threads I am pointing at in this post.