If you're way back there, man, it isn't because you're "slow". :smirk:

Anyway, I don't think I can make my meaning any plainer or clearer than what you've quoted (particularly in the contexts of my prior posts). We agree on the significance of 'enculturation' for moral conformity but, apparently, differ on the efficacy of the role philosophy plays – has played, can still play – in cultivating values, norms, etc.

What constitutes it not being avoidable. If you had to give up all your money to prevent someone stubbing their toe would you do so? — Isaac

No, because living in poverty would lead to more suffering than someone stubbing their toe. Obviously.

The trouble with balancing something as nebulous as 'suffering' is that virtually everything can be framed in those terms. — Isaac

I disagree; just because suffering is subjective doesn't mean we can't observe people's suffering; they can often times explain, quite explicitly, how they are suffering and how intensely; it really isn't nearly that nebulous.

measuring 'suffering' doesn't answer any questions because the questions aren't about the measurement unit, they're about the relative quantity of it. — Isaac

But suffering can, in some ways, be quantified, because we all (usually) do not suffer in ways entirely unique; we can get a general idea of what it is like to lose a loved one even if we haven't. Like I said - people can report on what causes them suffering, and how intensely they are suffering, even if there are no strict units.

Do you have no other preferences? What gives your preference to not suffer it's superlative status? — Isaac

Yes, I do have other preferences, such as a will to live. But at a certain point I suppose the will to live could lead to more suffering than would be incurred if one died, an unfortunate fact. So I suppose that is one circumstance where my intuitions lead me away from the negative utilitarian position; if you can take the pain then keep going, no matter how much it sucks.

No, I criticized you before I said more succinctly that I didn't think you made a good argument for moral objectivity. Go back and read what I wrote if you want to have a discussion.

But I think moral absolutism might be possible, along with objectivity. — ToothyMaw

The closest candidate for moral objectivism/absolutism being the solipsist.

That was funny.

(not because it's wrong)

Go back and read what I wrote if you want to have a discussion. — ToothyMaw

I did and so again ...

↪ToothyMaw Well, since you quote everything but what you're asking about – and by your less than charitable reading of what you did quote – it's fair to assume you're looking for an ticky-tack argument and not a discussion. I can't help you with that. — 180 Proof

So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism? — Isaac

It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist. Such a person is firmly convinced that "the way things really are" is precisely as they view them. Such a person has no sense of their perspective, instead, they believe they can directly perceive the truth. Such a person is, for all practical intents and purposes, a solipsist.

Do we create morality and then it takes on it's own existence? Or perhaps the whole of existence is aware and no event is truly unobserved. — Cheshire

I think that for one's moral stance to be strong, one has to believe that it's not merely one's own, subjective, partial, biased view, but that it intimately has something to do with "how things really are", ie. that it is objective, beyond mere subjectivity.

But, once again, you are just claiming I was being uncharitable without engaging with me - an indication that you have no responses to my criticisms. It's fine; we all make bad arguments sometimes.

It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist. — baker

they believe they can directly perceive the truth. — baker

I know quite a few of those: the universe was created just so that I can have a relationship with some supreme celestial creator/father figure, and all of his edicts in my special book are truth.

I know quite a few of those: the universe was created just so that I can have a relationship with some supreme celestial creator/father figure, and all of his edicts in my special book are truth. — ToothyMaw

The thing is that in the mind of such a person, there is objective morality. I mean this in the metaethical sense. Such a person has an unfailing conviction that they know objective morality.

Perhaps this is the most objective that morality can get.

The thing is that in the mind of such a person, there is objective morality. I mean this in the metaethical sense. Such a person has an unfailing conviction that they know objective morality. — baker

But whether or not morality is objective is still independent of anyone's feelings by definition. Just because I don't believe in god doesn't mean he doesn't exist and that the bible isn't made up of (contradictory) moral facts. The converse applies too.

But I get what you are saying.

So it's wrong if it's harmful and not wrong if it's not harmful. — 180 Proof

It harms a painting. I won't assume it harms a person, so it's not wrong(if I apply your criteria for you). Yet, it seems wrong to destroy a painting that commands some degree of intrinsic value. Is this inconsistency immaterial to your positions considerations?

Conclusion: There are universal and thus objective criteria upon which a person can act or judge his actions. It does not matter how he (for brevity) evaluates good or harm, this is always subjective. But from the moment that he believes that something is right or wrong, and acts according to those criteria, his actions are moral. "Be true to yourself", they say. Moral integrity is one of the most important things in human behavior and consciousness. The only thing one can do wrong is breaking that integrity! — Alkis Piskas

I think this is the most comprehensive and clearly described point of view the thread has inspired.

It harms a painting. [ ... ] Yet, it seems wrong to destroy a painting that commands some degree of intrinsic value. Is this inconsistency immaterial to your positions considerations? — Cheshire

Can "a painting" suffer harm? (Category mistake.)

How does it make sense to say that something which cannot value itself has "intrinsic value"?

To answer anyway: No, but "intrinsic value" is not determinative, or the decisive factor in moral judging. As I said "in relation to rather than the essence of" – sentients over above non-sentients (things) because the latter cannot suffer – is the ethical criterion I find more reasonable and pragmatic.

No, but "intrinsic value" is not determinative, or the decisive factor. As I said "in relation to rather than in essence" – sentients over above non-sentients (things) because the latter cannot suffer – is an ethical criterion I find most reasonable and pragmatic. — 180 Proof

Interesting, I'm not trying to be difficult. But, you seem to include criteria that isn't necessary for making a judgement - in this particular case - and exclude criteria I would think is most informative. Specifically, you noted a preference for "sentients"; No sentients were harmed in the filming of the OP. Next, you discard "intrinsic value" from the decision. Seemingly in direct opposition to the meaning of value.

Is it still not wrong to destroy a thing or is it wrong to destroy a thing without having to favor a sentient in the process.

Not saying it's incorrect; but it is curious.

Can "a painting" suffer harm? (Category mistake.) — 180 Proof

If it were a true conflation, I was aware you meant harm to people. I know you don't consider these uses of harm to be equal.

How does it make sense to say that something which cannot value itself has "intrinsic value"? — 180 Proof

I took for granted that art of a certain quality has intrinsic value.

So what gives in the cade of inconsistency here, the premise or the conclusion? One of the two has to be wrong, but it's not given which. Either the moral theory is wrong because it produces a judgement that's inconsistent with some intuitive moral theory, or the intuitive moral theory is shown to be wrong because it's inconsistent with the rationally worked out answer. Doesn't seem like we've got any closer to knowing what's right. If some moral theory proved that killing some small child was the 'right' thing to do would you do it, or would you question the theory? — Isaac

Or the opposite is true. We in fact already know and can't explain it.

The test of a theory against intuitive morality is done with the expectation the intuitive morality is in fact shared. So, the beast seems to coil around itself.

1. I present a moral theory.
2. You demonstrate that it can produce a permittable immoral act.
3. We agree the theory is flawed; but based on a shared theory that is unstated but seemingly understood.

No one has ever been cheated and then wondered if the dishonest party knew what they were doing was wrong. Maybe, morality is too broad or nuanced to be decided by axioms; we might be making a type of grammar by pretending patterns are rules.

I strongly urge you (who ever YOU are) to read these papers. If you have a comment to make on the papers, please for god's own sake, leave the comment on those paper's forums, not here. This thread has enough exposure. My threads are ignored BIG time. — god must be atheist

People like their own ideas, so starting with a concluded matter that isn't pre-distributed is asking a lot. The most success I've had is when I truly don't have an answer, but rather a few premises. I hope that helps with the future attempts. In regards, to evolutionary pressures for morality; I think it is one of the most overlooked. It's been regulated to feminism by mistake or to some disservice. The idea that the preservation of relationships describes the basis for what is moral or immoral seems compelling to me. I'll take a read this evening. Cheers.

Is it still not wrong to destroy a thing or is it wrong to destroy a thing without having to favor a sentient in the process. — Cheshire

If a destructive act harms a sentient, it's usually morally wrong; otherwise, it could be wrong on non-moral (e.g. instrumental or aesthetic) grounds.

I took for granted that art of a certain quality has intrinsic value. — Cheshire

And I called into question taking for granted that "art ... has intrinsic value" in ethical terms.

I think that for one's moral stance to be strong, one has to believe that it's not merely one's own, subjective, partial, biased view, but that it intimately has something to do with "how things really are", ie. that it is objective, beyond mere subjectivity. — baker

Why does my lone perception carry less moral validity than some one's imagined consensus with the universe? I expect the opposite to be true. If I had to convince some one what they were doing was wrong then my system is probably in error. In terms of not feeling emotionally insecure in applying moral judgements a belief in a objective source is helpful. I suppose I have resistance to the subtext and mixed thoughts on the surface. The king and I think what your doing is wrong. It does feel better.

If a destructive act harms a sentient, it's usually morally wrong; otherwise, it could be wrong on non-moral (e.g. instrumental or aesthetic) grounds. — 180 Proof

So, things can be wrong in a non-moral sense; and in this non-moral sense aesthetics are relevant.

And I called into question taking for granted that "art ... has intrinsic value" in ethical terms. — 180 Proof

I thought it was just a reflex to arguing with people in disagreement. An aesthetic ground is an intrinsic value in my understanding; which is subject to error. So, there is a separate non-morality system that includes right and wrong as it applies to things. If I am properly identifying the implications.

Are you saying the OP fails to describe a moral decision?

I'm only saying something can be wrong – incorrect, faulty, fails – for other than moral reasons. My reply to the OP only says that the questions posed are answered as morally wrong, as a negative utilitarian sees it, when a person is harmed. That's all I've said about the OP.

↪Cheshire I'm only saying something can be wrong – incorrect, faulty, fails – for other than moral reasons. My reply to the OP only says that the questions posed are answered as morally wrong, as a negative utilitarian sees it, a person is harmed. That's all I've said about the OP. — 180 Proof

I selected the case because I know how many systems rely on human suffering in order to make a determination. I thought eliminating this element would highlight something different or even new regarding morality. You have successfully confounded my attempt by insisting to judge it as if it were regarding human suffering. I don't have any traps set; people are more important than things; but damaging at least some things must carry a moral element. Consider things are destroyed for their lack of moral value; so the opposite should be true.

I disagree; just because suffering is subjective doesn't mean we can't observe people's suffering; they can often times explain, quite explicitly, how they are suffering and how intensely; it really isn't nearly that nebulous. — ToothyMaw

I didn't say you couln't measure it, I said it was nebulous and everything can be framed in those terms. Take any existing moral dilemma, then say 'we should look at this in terms of how much each option would cause suffering'. What is achieved by framing it that way. All the factors being considered (tradition, God's will, personal preferences, in-group bias...) can be framed as types of 'suffering', so no factors are being filtered or highlighted for consideration. The dilemma is exactly as it was.

But suffering can, in some ways, be quantified, because we all (usually) do not suffer in ways entirely unique; we can get a general idea of what it is like to lose a loved one even if we haven't. Like I said - people can report on what causes them suffering, and how intensely they are suffering, even if there are no strict units. — ToothyMaw

As is often the case with arguments about moral calculus, you select a clear case with which no one would disagree and imply that the same calculus could be used to work out real dilemmas. Consider it like simple maths. I say to you "take a handful of ball bearings and then six handfuls of marbles and add them to a bucket" without accuracy, we can say a lot about the bucket, it's not going to contain a million items (that'd be obviously too many), it's going to contain more marbles than ball bearing (six is way more than one even though ball bearings are smaller). But this success doesn't mean we can apply the technique universally. Comparing two buckets filled this way we wouldn't have a clue which one might have more marbles in it, make it 27 and 32 handfuls respectively and we're lost as to whether there'd be more marbles or ball bearings.

The reason why most real moral dilemmas remain dilemmas is because they are of the latter sort. The values on each side are close, difficult to put a number to. That's why I say couching it in terms of 'suffering' doesn't help, because the problem is the closeness of the estimated values on either side of the balance, not the units in which those values are measured.

So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism? — Isaac

It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist — baker

No, but it's not morality either, which involves how we ought to act toward each other. If there's no other (either in one's reality, or in one's calculus) then there's no moral question to answer.

1. I present a moral theory.
2. You demonstrate that it can produce a permittable immoral act.
3. We agree the theory is flawed; but based on a shared theory that is unstated but seemingly understood. — Cheshire

This would be treating ethics as if it were trying to describe what we consider moral rather than trying to determine it, which would make it a science, not a philosophical practice. I think that's a valid aspect , but it sidesteps the question of what I 'ought' to do.

Maybe, morality is too broad or nuanced to be decided by axioms; we might be making a type of grammar by pretending patterns are rules. — Cheshire

Yes, that's my view. Morality is a complex and dynamic collection of decision-making tools and no one rule-set captures it.

People like their own ideas, so starting with a concluded matter that isn't pre-distributed is asking a lot. The most success I've had is when I truly don't have an answer, but rather a few premises. I hope that helps with the future attempts. In regards, to evolutionary pressures for morality; I think it is one of the most overlooked. It's been regulated to feminism by mistake or to some disservice. The idea that the preservation of relationships describes the basis for what is moral or immoral seems compelling to me. I'll take a read this evening. Cheers. — Cheshire

Thank you for giving me the time. My idea I like, tremendously, as you said. Opposed to many or all dilettantes (which I am one of) I don't prescribe a moral code or ethic; I simply state "this is how it is, why it is so, and how it developed." Nothing more.

Incidentally, none of your sentences make sense to me, other than the last two. Don't take me wrong; I am not belittling you. It may be due to the fact that you're much more intelligent and deeper than I. I dunno. It could be mockery on your part, too, for all I know.

It's not publishing success I am after, but getting the idea I developed and described popularized. I don't write to publish; I wish to publish what I wrote. Totally the wrong concept, I know, but I like what I write. I think my pieces are cuddly, they're likeable, they're cute.

If you have any comment to make, please make them on that thread. Thanks.

Thanks for the critical comment, ToothyMaw... would it have killed you to leave the comment on THAT thread instead of this one? At any rate, you said you read it and did not think much of it. That's fine, I can't argue with your opinion, as you did not make an argument.

1. I present a moral theory.
2. You demonstrate that it can produce a permittable immoral act.
3. We agree the theory is flawed; but based on a shared theory that is unstated but seemingly understood. — Cheshire

1. You present a theory on something that we don't know what it is. It's like stating a theory on god: everyone has a concept of god, or of morality, but we can't put our fingers on it just precisely what it is.
2. To decide something is immoral we only rely on our inner gut feelings. It can't be proven that it's immoral, while the emotional judgment is so strong that we are unilateral in the opinion -- without having a basic definition of it. For instance, we agree that biting kitten's heads off is immoral, or raping babies... but why? We have no concept of morality other than emotional judgment.
3. No, it's not flawed; and we are not basing our moral compass on theory, but on feelings. It's not flawed, because moral theories try to emulate the truth behind morals, which actually follow the explicable but unreasoned rules to help society's propagation and the propagation of the individual's DNA.

This can also be inferred from my paper.

I think this is the most comprehensive and clearly described point of view the thread has inspired. — Cheshire

Thank you, @Cheshire. I am very glad that you consider my contribution valuable! :)