Drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things, none of which are language use.
— creativesoul

Example?
— bongo fury

Mice, trees, spatial relations between mice, trees, and the creature themselves... — creativesoul

But an example of how the languageless creature draws a correlation between two or more of these?

Attribution of beliefs to phones is a misattribution.

Good. See edit.

Drawing correlations between different directly perceptible things, none of which are language use. — creativesoul

Example?

What would count as a misattribution of belief as compared/contrasted to correctly attributing belief to such language-less creatures? — creativesoul

Smart phones ? — bongo fury

Ok, and then what counts as "drawing correlations" that isn't some kind of a game of symbol-pointing?

Just interested.

Yes. Some language-less creatures are capable of attributing meaning. — creativesoul

Still cool, perhaps. How, though?

If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x.
— Andrew M

So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise unacountable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?

Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out? — bongo fury

It's worse than I thought, if "x" isn't even abbreviating "x" is true.

Naming and descriptive practices. — creativesoul

Cool. And,

a creature capable of attributing meaning — creativesoul

might do so by other means or in other ways than are implied by such practices?

Yes. Exactly. I thought you were talking about that. Not only about poetry.

Convolute. — Banno

Not the second one: not the (debatably) "languageless" one. To say that the cat,

was disposed to respond to the event as to a mouse-running-behind-tree event — bongo fury

seems to me a fairly credible rough and ready behavioural analysis: a reasonable translation of "the cat believed the mouse went behind the tree" into a form less obviously open to the objection of anthropomorphism, to say nothing of theoretical doubts about beliefs altogether. I don't doubt that it presents problems, but it's fairly straight-forward. You seem to be hoping to exhibit the superiority of the natural idiom here,

The mouse ran up the tree. The cat did not look up the tree, but behind it, and then around the base, not having seen the mouse run up the tree. The cat believed the mouse went behind the tree. — Banno

Point not taken. All I'm seeing is a dogmatic attachment.

I'm not convinced that talk of dispositions is helpful. — Banno

Me neither. But likewise talk of beliefs. I'm just trying to understand how people are understanding this talk. Preferably without having to be uncharitable and conclude mysticism.

Janus was talking about poetry; — Banno

Fine. But I thought this,

To me, that's too close to referent, to there being something that the sentence must be about as a whole denotes, to reified meaning.
— Banno — bongo fury

might be also about eschewing propositions as meanings of statements.

That's plausible, but it doesn't mean we need to recognise any mysteriously non-actual facts ("possible states of affairs" if they can't be just plain old alternative statements). — bongo fury

No mysteries here, just possibilities. — Banno

Qua plain old alternative statements? Cool.

The deluded cat believed the mouse went behind the tree. — Banno

Was disposed to assent (upon being gifted language) to a pointing of "mouse running behind tree" at the inappropriate choice of space-time region? Cool. Apart maybe from the bit about language. So: was disposed to respond to the event as to a mouse-running-behind-tree event?

To me, that's too close to referent, to there being something that the sentence [must be about as a whole denotes], to reified meaning. — Banno

:ok:

Or is a statement not about (at least) what its subject term refers to and (at most) what its predicate term is true or false of?

Or were you just talking about sentences that aren't statements?

Yes, the "hard problem" presupposes epiphenomenalism, which took hold when brain science got in the habit of referring to the "neural correlates of consciousness". Thus placing the ball squarely in front of the goal it should probably have been guarding, and instead stepping graciously aside.

(DPC) For every event E possibly there exists a statement S( E ) such that E is the truth maker for S( E ). — fdrake

Event as in space-time region, or event as in abstract proposition about (or property of) such a region? Or something else? Or both?

Where were we? ... Is the mouse's running behind the tree propositional? Well for the (as for every) event qua space-time region there possibly exist infinitely many statements it makes true, as well as at least that many false. So... ?

All experience consists of a creature capable of attributing meaning. — creativesoul

And putting the ability into practice, presumably?

Ok, and you say that such creatures might have no language? Do you mean none at all, and if so, roughly what are you counting as language?

Loaded questions. — Andrew M

Not the first, though:

So is the second sentence a typo, — bongo fury

Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. — Andrew M

One way or the way other, please clarify.

If there is some state of affairs, then there can potentially be a statement that picks out that state of affairs. Symbolically, x and "x" pick out the same x. — Andrew M

So, is the second sentence a typo, or deliberate sophistry? Which the otherwise unaccountable banality of the first sentence is designed to camouflage?

Or have you convinced even yourself that the picker-outer is properly identified with the picked-out?

We need a general relation between an individual and a possible state of affairs, to use when someone is wrong as to the truth. — Banno

That's plausible, but it doesn't mean we need to recognise any mysteriously non-actual facts ("possible states of affairs" if they can't be just plain old alternative statements). Any more than we need to recognise mysteriously subsistent individuals ("the present King of France" etc. if they can't be just fictive or hypothetical terms, empty and non-referring).

How it could look for suitably deluded cats is a question not at all clarified by this metaphysical extravagance.

Ah, I get you. Although "existing in their entirety" isn't a phrase I associate with Banno... :lol:

:ok:

Existing without existing?

Cool.

What are facts, though...

I'd presumed a common ground of realism; that we agreed there were things in the world about which one could make true statements; — Banno

Seems fair enough.

... in a word, that there are facts; — Banno

What are facts, though? Presumably, not single objects. Larger space-time regions, of various (e.g. mouse-running-behind-tree) kinds?

Or platonic abstractions, like "states of affairs"? Do you allow such things on your watch? If so, why bother restricting "propositions" to statements?

To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; — Banno

Yes, but isn't it also roughly to be able to recognise the fact (the kind of event), and respond accordingly?

I don't see a problem with what I wrote. Feel free to be more specific. — Andrew M

Again?

You presume to lecture people on failure of reference. You cite Strawson, who uses "subject" explicitly and unambiguously in just one of its two notoriously opposite uses ("snow", not snow). But notions about Aristotle (or whatever) induce you to systematically equivocate between the two. So you are actually confused, here:

So, just to be clear, do you at last see why

(referring) subject
— Andrew M

would have to be a typo?
— bongo fury

I don't. Feel free to say why you think so. — Andrew M

And then you go straight from (half) acknowledging the error to encouraging the same confusion in Harry.

That is my specific problem with your pre-modern schtick.

There is a parallelism between words and the world, as well as important differences between the two. — Andrew M

Good luck with that schtick! But it is confused.

If at all. — bongo fury

:smile:

Smart phones, though?

I have it in mind that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the skirting board hole, but there are no statements in the cat's mind, but a nameless anticipation. — unenlightened

An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines?

I suggest: those very much future machines skilled not merely in the chasing of mice, but in the chasing of the imaginary trajectories of the pointings of mouse-words and mouse-pictures. A skill which is ascribable literally to humans from infancy. Only anthropomorphically to cats and present-day robots.

That's too restrictive for people who are sure cats literally have beliefs, of course. They must exclude robots some other way. If at all.

The first word is necessarily a complex of beliefs [nameless anticipations] in communication [in the narrower sense of the chasing of trajectories in games of symbol-pointing] that cannot yet be stated. Language developed as a set of beliefs and practices that did not start with the expression of those linguistic [and non-linguistic] beliefs [anticipations]. — bongo fury

Fair enough. I should have used the word "existing" instead of "referring" — Andrew M

Cool. The opposite sense of subject to Strawson's sense, but fine if you are careful not to mix in that other usage without notice, or without noticing. Ah, but you see no such requirement.

(or even better, omitted the qualifier altogether). — Andrew M

Hence no need, apparently, to point out that Harry's usage is at least partly the opposite one:

subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with.
— Andrew M
So subjects are nouns? — Harry Hindu

You instead immediately resume the confused (Aristotelian?) insinuation of some benign parallelism between the two, which the philosopher has just clarified, if only we followed the clear logic.

Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). [...] it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form). — Andrew M

The philosopher has no robes.

Why the stubborn attachment to "subject" at all?
— bongo fury

It's ordinary English. — Andrew M

Sure, but notoriously ambiguous between conflicting senses as a technical term, if not clarified in favour of one or the other.

From Lexico:

subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with. — Andrew M

Sure, and I offered

subject-matter — bongo fury

in precisely this sense, which is the one you chose when offered a choice.

Fine. Other words for the same kind of thing are available, but that needn't matter, as long as we aren't confusing the two senses. Attachment to "subject" in preference to "object" or "referent" only seems suspect because of,

So, just to be clear, do you at last see why

(referring) subject
— Andrew M

would have to be a typo?
— bongo fury

I don't. Feel free to say why you think so. — Andrew M

... which looks very much as though you are using the other, conflicting, sense of the word at the same time. Because, the only obvious reading of "(referring) subject" is to have it mean "word or phrase that refers".

This opposite sense is Strawson's, but he adopts it consistently and exclusively. He does discuss Russell's (further) distinction between grammatical subject and logical subject; but obviously both of these are "snow", and not snow. And we don't

normally use a sentence to assert something about — Andrew M

either of them (the types of "snow"), but only about the snow.

How about:
"The point here though is that we normally use a sentence to assert something about a subject (where the subject exists)." — Andrew M

So, just to be clear, do you at last see why

(referring) subject — Andrew M

would have to be a typo?




Why the stubborn attachment to "subject" at all? Why not referent or object for snow, and term, word, phrase etc. for "snow"? Does a neo-Aristotelian perhaps need to equivocate systematically between the two senses?

Something to do with states of affairs having grammatical form?

That could explain the trouble it took to get you to examine the matter instead of presuming to lecture further.

"The belief is not a statement" is not the same as "the belief has propositional content". It is not something I wish to defend. — Banno

Typo. (wish to attack?) Or unclear.

Boxing Day, 10.25: Just noticeably sharp.

13.10: Semitone sharp.

16.25: Good.

17.40: Good.

20.20: Good. Maybe sharp.

23.25: Bit sharp.



Day 36, 11.10: Good.

12.40: Good.

14.40: More than just noticeably sharp.

17.45: Good.

21.15: Slightly flat. (But quick.)



Day 37, 15.45: Semitone sharp.

18.55: Good.

22.20: Most of a semitone flat.



Day 38: 16.35: Good. And Quick.

20.25: Slightly flat.

21.15: Good.



Day 39: 10.05: Good. and Quick.

13.00: Good.

18.15: Slightly sharp.

21.30 Good.



Day 40, 10.15: Slightly sharp.

16.45: Good.

18.45: Semitone sharp.

21.35: Good.



Day 41, 10.35: Good.

12.50: Good.

16.05: Good.

18.55: Good.

20.55: Good.

23.05: Good.



Day 42, 10.05: Good.

11.40: Good.

15.30: Well flat.

16.50: Good.

21.20: Good.



Day 43, 08.40: Good.

15.50: Good.

19.00: Semitone sharp.

20.00: Sharp again.

22.50: Good.



Day 44, 12.55: Semitone flat.

19.35: Good.



Day 45, 08.20: Good.

17.45: Good.

20.40: Slightly sharp.

20.55: Good.



..day 46, 07.50: Good.

11.30: Good.

13.05: Good.

16.20: Good.

17.15: Most of a semitone sharp.

19.20: Good.



Day 47, 12.30: Good.

16.05: Good.

18.50: Good.

20.55: Semitone sharp. Ish.

22.40: Good.



Day 48, 12.55: Good.

16.05: A tad sharp.

22.00: Good.

23.40: Good.



Day 49, 10.30: Good.

12.25: Slightly flat.

13.00: Good.

16.25: Good.

18.40: Good.

21.40: Good.



Day 50, 10.10: Good.

12.10: Good.

16.05: Good.

19.35: Good.

20.43: Good.



Day 51, 17.35: Good.

23.00: Good.



Day 52, 17.40: Good.

22.10: Good.



.Day 53, 10.50: Good.

17.50: Good.

18.45: Good.

21.10: Good.

23.20: Good.



Day 54, 08.30: Slightly sharp.

14.15: Ditto. (Both hurried.)

18.00: Good. (And hurried.)

24.00: Good.



Day 55, 13.20: Good.

16.10: Good.

19.50: Good.

21.35: Good.



Day 56, 09.50: Good.

14.15: Good.

16.20: Good.

23.50: Semitone sharp.



Day 57, 09.45: Good.

14.25: Good.

20.05: Good.



Day 58, 14.05: Good.

15.45: Good.

17.45: Good.

00.15: Can't get YouTube but pretty sure it's good. In at least 20 per cent of trials I now have this feeling straight away, generally confirmed. Still have to wait a while usually.



Day 59, 09.50: Haha, forgot to hang on and check last night's dubious claim. Anyway, good right now, but only after a couple of minutes' struggle to obtain an "image" having the required feeling of certainty.

17.10: Good.

00.35: Good.



Day 60, 15.05: Good.

16.30: Good.

18.45: Slightly sharp.

21.00: Good.



Day 61, 08.30: Good.

15.00: Good.

21.20: Ouch, can't hurry yet. Semitone sharp.

23.00: Good.



Day 62, 10.00: Good.

19.45: A bit flat.

20.35: Good.

22.10: Good.



Day 63, 10.55: Slightly flat.

14.35: Good.

17.20: Good.

00.55: Good.



Day 64, 09.25: Good.

15.50: Good.

17.20: Good.

20.00: Good.

21.30: Good.



Day 65, 16.40: Good.

19.40: Sharp.



Day 66, 10.05: Good.

17.40: Good.

22.20: Semitone flat.



Day 67, 12.20: Slightly flat.

17.55: Good.

23.45: Good.



Day 68, 19.05: Good.

00.30: Good.



Day 69, 14.55: Good.

16.50: Good.

21.10: Good.

00.50: Slightly flat.



Day 70, 10.45: Slightly flat.

15.00: Slightly sharp.

17.45: Good.

21.00: Good.

00.45: Slightly flat.



Day 71, 09.45: Good.

12.05: Good.

18.55: Good.

20.30: Good.



Day 72, 19.50: Good.

21.35: Slightly sharp.



Day 73, 10.15: Slightly flat.

12.20: Good.

17.00: Good.

21.20: Good.

23.50: Sharp.



Day 74, 10.55: Slightly flat.

18.30: Good.

21.00: Aargh, semitone sharp. Still can't hurry.



Day 75, 14.30: Flat.

17.35: Good.

19.25: Good.

00.00: Good.



Day 76,10.30: Good.

15.15: Good.

18.40: Flat.

20.35: Good.

23.00: Good.



Day 77, 13.00: Good.

17.15: Good.

20.15: Flat.



Day 78, 11.45: Good.

14.40: Flat.

16.20: Good.

21.10: Good.



Day 79, 11.35: Good.

19.10: Good.

22.00: Slightly flat.



Day 80, 09.10: Good.

18.00: Good.

21.35: Good.

23.05: Good.



Day 81, 13.10: Good.

17.25: Good.

19.00: Good.

22.25: Good.



Day 82, 13.20: Good.

16.35: Good.

19.00: Slightly sharp.

20.50: Good.



Day 83, 09.00: Good.

11.55: Good.

15.55: Good.

18.15: Good.

20.30: Good.



Day 84, 08.35: Good.

13.50: Good.

18.05: Flat.

20.00: Good.

23.20: Good.



Day 85, 11.00: Good.

13.20: Good.

16.30: Good.

19.10: Slightly flat.

22.25: Good.

(referring) subject.
— Andrew M

was a typo?
— bongo fury

No, I meant it in the sense of "existing" or a successful reference, as opposed to a failure of reference (such as the present King of France). — Andrew M

So, not

"Snow" or snow?
— bongo fury

Snow. — Andrew M

At all. Not, one instead of the other. Rather,

"Snow"'s referring to snow.

Something like,

The point here though is that we normally use a sentence to assert something about the reference of its (referring) subject term to its referent. — Andrew M

A typo, then, but a different correction now?

:up: Ordering that book today. Despite...

Where fans of synaesthesia allege "cross-talk" between folds of cortex (so what?) I prefer this kind of talk:

How our lookings at pictures and our listenings to music inform what we encounter later and elsewhere is integral to them as cognitive. Music can inform perception not only of other sounds but also of the rhythms and patterns of what we see. Such cross-transference of structural properties seems to me a basic and important aspect of learning, not merely a matter for novel experimentation by composers, dancers, and painters.
— Goodman: Languages of Art

(My emphasis.) — bongo fury

Language is not needed for the event to happen, — creativesoul

There is the space-time region independent of our talking about it now (or whenever), sure.

nor is it [language] needed to believe that a mouse ran behind the tree. — creative soul

Language isn't needed to correlate the event (region) with others of the same (mouse-running-behind-tree) kind?

Because the cat shows it has drawn exactly or roughly this correlation?

snow outside — Andrew M

Indeed. Deep and crisp and even. Not composed of four letters. So, just to be clear, this phrase,

(referring) subject. — Andrew M

was a typo?

we normally use a sentence to assert something about a (referring) subject. — Andrew M

Gosh.

"Subject" in the sense of grammatical [or logical] subject, a word or phrase (e.g. "snow" or "king of France") capable of referring to an object or subject-matter (snow or French king), but which is not itself, typically, what the sentence containing it is used to assert something about?

Or "subject" in the sense of a typically non-referring object or subject-matter (snow or French king) about which we use a sentence to assert something? ... Normally to the exclusion of referring to or asserting about any parts of the asserting sentence?

"Snow" or snow?

Oh, an experiential facet. I see.

Banno can grant beliefs to cats because he assumes beliefs are mythical folk psychology anyway. He needs them to be propositional so that they can be true or false all the same.

Others assume that beliefs are real mental furniture, or real behavioural or systemic dispositions. Or real something. They need to liberate them (the beliefs) from language in order to be able to grant them to cats without having to anthropomorphize.

But, when used to define belief, the two senses of the word are alike in appearing (superficially at least) to deny beliefs to cats, who are oblivious to either sense.

Would you brush a speaking in tongues question away to a religion forum?

are all mental disorders just distortions or exaggerations of aspects of normal mental functioning? — Pfhorrest

Arguably.

https://philosophybites.com/2016/01/steven-hyman-on-categorising-mental-disorders.html

But is skepticism on a spectrum, or is there a discrete categorical syndrome of anti-psychiatry?

perhaps DID is "all a fake", but no more than anyone's usual self-identity is "a fake". — Pfhorrest

To the asylum with you!

:ok:

https://youtu.be/Uzx2UWKvrM4?t=1407

Is it,

[1] Can we see the whole world as it is?

Or is it,

[2] Can we see a suitable portion of the world as it is?

Assuming the latter, is this short for,

[3] Can we see a suitable portion of the world as it is described truly?

Or does it have to be,

[4] Can we see a suitable portion of the world as it is described truly and completely?

Or,

[5] Can we see a suitable portion of the world as it is described truly and definitively?

Or is it short for something else? Or is "as it is" perfectly clear as it is?

Answer: