For example, René Descartes (1596–1650) argued that we perceive the external world through ideas or representations in the mind, not directly. John Locke (1632-1704) developed this idea. George Berkeley (1685-1753) argued that our perceptions are ideas in the mind and not physical entities. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) emphasized the role of the mind in shaping our understanding of reality. — RussellA

I wonder at what stage in the process of this post's creation you found it appropriate to research the exact years of birth and death for each philosopher?

I guess he isn't familiar with discussions about color itself, — frank

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Has anyone addressed the core problem of circularity. We understand the property of redness by the elements in its set, but we must know the property of redness before we can include an element in the set? — RussellA

Noted. I think you mentioned the choice: extension/intension? I suppose the latter is a proposed solution to

we must know the set of red things before we can include an element in the set?

Which isn't a problem (requiring a solution) in natural language. Usage there is guided by exemplification. See Goodman's Languages of Art which cashes in on the theoretical economy of analysing properties (or sets) away as predicates.

In formalised languages, sure. The circularity is famous since Russell B. As plenty here have pointed out.

or making sets into reified metaphysical entities — Banno

Well, they are, a bit. :wink:

But in set theory, sets do add to ontology. — litewave

That's why nominalists (e.g. Quine) didn't like taking it for granted in logic.

Yes, and so does a model theorist? (And earlier theorists of the semantics of first order logic too.) I thought this was what @Banno was pointing out to you 4 years ago? I may have misunderstood.

Alas, I have broken the vows in the course of this thread. — litewave

:rofl:

Although it was not really nominalism about properties; I still regarded them as real separate objects, I just wanted to identify them with sets. — litewave

Right, but, identify them with sets in the way that model theory maps predicates to sets? (Sets defined on elements in a domain.)

Then you can be at least extensionalist about properties just by replacing them with predicates? Or with the corresponding sets if you prefer, yes!

Hyper-extensionalism is a further economy:

The nominalist cancels out the property and treats the predicate as bearing a one-many relation directly to the several things it applies to or denotes. — Goodman, p49

And in this case cancelling out the property is indeed a matter of cancelling out the set. And satisfying @Banno's thirst for a restriction to individuals. See Goodman's "calculus of individuals". (Mereology as @Moliere alluded.)

we would need Tones. — jgill

Yes, where is he!

@litewave

... Nominalism in the sense of, as @Banno says, dissolving properties by analysis.

But not necessarily in any strict sense.

E.g. not in the sense of, as Goodman says, "hyper-extensionalism", i.e. allowing no more than the power set to be defined upon the elements in the domain.

Rather, just in the sense of, as you (and @frank, I think? I need to study the thread) correctly say, extensionalism, i.e. allowing the definition of sets according to their extension to iterate indefinitely. E.g. on the domain {a, b} the sets { }, {a}, {b}, {a, b}, {{a}, a}, {{a}, b}, {{a}, a, b}, {{b}, a}, {{b}, b}, {{b}, a, b}, {{a, b}, a}, {{a, b}, b}, {{a, b}, a, b}, {{{a}}, a}, etc.

Not sure what @Banno is thinking there :chin:

It does indeed continue ad nauseum, but that is indeed set theory.

So much so, that structures in set theory are typically constructed entirely from the empty set.

I don't think that a property is a collection. Redness is not the collection of all red things but something that is had by all red things. — litewave

Glad to see you've since taken the vows of nominalism!

Goodman's discussion of authenticity seems entirely relevant, even if it shows up contrasts as well as parallels. Or contrasts for you, and parallels for me. — bongo fury

More so, now that I have the privilege of browsing the renowned book. The suspicion grows that Parfit reifies consciousness, as a substance capable of continuity (relation R) or discontinuity, instead of hanging it ultimately on bodily activity. Styling his theory "reductionist" seems wrong, on that score.

He comes close to examining the analogy with painting, but is keen to dismiss it:

Suppose that an artist paints a self-portrait and then, by repainting, turns this into a portrait of his father. Even though these portraits are more similar than a caterpillar and butterfly, they are not stages in the continued existence of a single painting. — Parfit, p.203

Er, why not? Why aren't they a perfectly fine analogy with gradual personal transformation?

The self-portrait is a painting that the artist destroyed. — (cont.)

Oh. Why, exactly?

In a general discussion of identity, we would need to explain why the requirement of physical continuity differs in such ways for different kinds of thing. But we can ignore this here. — (cont.)

Hmm.

Needless to say, Goodman's book, fairly famous for bringing to bear (on aesthetics) a deal of previous work on identity and structure, isn't referenced in this book.

A subtly related problem is the conception of memory: as an implanted mental picture, with a natural and causal (as opposed to conventional) manner of depicting its object. Not a radical conception, of course; perfectly in line with Locke and Hume. But this results in a view of neuro-psychology as revealing that

The causes of long-term memories are memory-traces. It was once thought that these might be localised, involving changes in only a few brain cells. It is now more probable that a particular memory-trace involves changes in a larger number of cells. — Parfit, p.220

Perhaps there were then and still are plenty of neuro-scientists inclined to this view. I'll take correction on this, because I'm out of touch with psychology, but I'm vaguely aware of a tidal drift in psychological theory (since Bartlett in the thirties) completely away from that idea of a trace, analogous to a frame of imprinted vision or sound, and towards the contrary idea of memory (and perception too) as a continual project of constructing and testing and revising little mental performances. A drift which would be in agreement with Goodman's "language theory of pictures". (And probably modern trends like Bayesian predictive coding.) And which makes sense, if you reflect on the simple observation that animals have hardly ever, if ever, evolved a black box recorder. (Parrots a counter-example?)

This point of view makes, on the other hand, nonsense of the kind of thought experiment (however familiar) wherein,

[...] neuro-surgeons develop ways to create in one brain a copy of a memory-trace in another brain. This might enable us to quasi-remember other people's past experiences. — (cont.)

Enable us to have similar thoughts, sure. To rehearse (somewhat) similar mental performances. Not enable us to be confronted with a similar scene, though. Not in reality, obviously, but more crucially not perceptually: we shall not be confronted with a memory-scene, susceptible to forensic examination like a real picture.

Quasi-remembering other people's past experiences deflates to endorsing their autobiographical assertions. (In a word language or picture language.) And, we should add, the same is true for our own remembering. The only forensic authenticity available is the "autographic" identity of the person mentally rehearsing the assertions.

Which might be expected to not count for much. Napoleon's own recollections of (i.e. his dispositions towards verbal or pictorial assertions about) Waterloo we would expect to be as badly biased as my own delusional ones. Still, they have the distinction (even if not necessarily a virtue) of having formed through the cognitive efforts of an embodied brain actually there at the scene.

We've no grounds to discount the possibility that personal continuity defined spatiotemporally will make an important epistemic difference to memory. Just as (as Goodman argues) we can't know that autographic authenticity (defined similarly) won't make an important aesthetic difference to a picture.

but evidently you don't bother read through?
— bongo fury

No idea what you're referring to. Everything I've said is relevant and seems pertinent at the time I commented it. — AmadeusD

Wouldn't you think I was referring to the sentence of yours that I had just quoted? This one:

I mean to say that you can't give a criteria for the 'self' to being 'self-same' isn't quite available. — AmadeusD

Did you read that through when I quoted it, and still make sense of it? Just curious. Presumably you knew what you meant. So maybe it's forgiveable that you failed to notice the syntactic malformation, even when urged to reinspect it. Or maybe it's well formed, and I'll be astonished and humbled.

Ok, and you don't think the same is true of personal identity?
— bongo fury

No, and I don't think you do either. — AmadeusD

I do, though. As you later on recognise as a possibility:

If you're simply stipulating that, for you, a 'self' is, in fact, a confluence of mind and body in a single, recognizable-over-time entity, that's fine. — AmadeusD

Oh, good. Yes, I was simply stipulating that obvious materialist usage of "self" and declaring it suitable for discussion, and stress-testing. Goodman's discussion of authenticity seems entirely relevant, even if it shows up contrasts as well as parallels. Or contrasts for you, and parallels for me.

Yes, but sort of at a higher level than seems we're on. — AmadeusD

Is that, like, yes, both? You mean there's an absolute criterion of identity for the artwork, but not for the person... And it's the other way round as well? That would certainly be on a higher level than I'm on.

I mean to say that you can't give a criteria for the 'self' to being 'self-same' isn't quite available. — AmadeusD

I do appreciate that you're trying to clarify here, but evidently you don't bother read through?

Whereas, the initial piece of art (in our exchange, Guernica) is exactly that piece of art, without having to establish any criteria beyond that it is itself (being painted by x at time y etc..) — AmadeusD

Yes. Ok, and you don't think the same is true of personal identity? Whether I'm Napoleon doesn't depend entirely on my (lack of) spatiotemporal continuity with the human being leading the French troops at Waterloo? We have to establish criteria beyond that? I don't follow.

I can't see that your further comments then make sense: — AmadeusD

Yes, I must be confused.

I could not point to a 'fake self' and support my pointing. I could do so with a piece of art, given I was actually capable of spotting fakes (or, had some evidence of provenance showing it was not the original). It doesn't seem available to the one claiming 'fake self' to do so. — AmadeusD

You wouldn't seek to convince me I was deluded by pointing to evidence of provenance contradicting my claim of bodily continuity with Napoleon? By asking me to reconcile that claim with historical evidence of my more recent birth in South London, e.g., etc?

I do think there's a significant analogy between fake artwork and fake self, and between genuine artwork and genuine self. — bongo fury

Does this make sense, now? The painting is a spatiotemporally defined unit just like a person or a ship?

If so, maybe you'll see the point of this?

Someone purchasing Guernica for say $100millionUSD, they aren't buying a painting, per se.
— AmadeusD

And someone paying that much to prolong their life in the same body, they aren't preserving their person, per se?

But then, what's the painting per se, and what's the person per se? — bongo fury

Between a fake piece of art and a self? — AmadeusD

I do think there's a significant analogy between fake artwork and fake self, and between genuine artwork and genuine self.

Hence my initial remark:

I'm a material token, not a type? — bongo fury

Although, to be more precise, the analogy is with singular artworks (such as paintings) which are types that are uniquely instantiated (they have a unique token).

The obvious dis-analogy is with multiple artworks such as photographs and prints and texts.

Do you mean there's an absolute criterion of identity for the artwork, but not for the person?

Or the other way round?

These aren't comparable at all, imo. — AmadeusD

It was your analogy?

I think the same fits with the Teletransporter. — AmadeusD

Too right.

the de re reading, contrasting with the more common de dicto reading, [...] relational, contrasting with notional; transparent, contrasting with opaque; and wide scope, contrasting with narrow scope.
— IEP

Also reference, contrasting with sense? (I wonder.) — bongo fury

Also objective, contrasting with subjective, according to Davidson.

Also semantics, contrasting with syntax, according to Searle in his Chinese Room.

Also rigid, contrasting with flaccid.

Also real, contrasting with pretend, according to any five year old.

Or real, contrasting with suppose, from about 10 years.

Let's take care not to confuse the two, as @Banno says. Sure. But let's maybe see the possibility or likelihood of confusion (and the struggles to avert it) as a condition of "rationality", as Davidson says?

@frank's objection is to making it a sufficient as opposed to merely necessary condition of rationality? A machine doesn't achieve beliefs just by getting in a logical tangle over sentences?

Just trying to over-simplify. Carry on.

Someone purchasing Guernica for say $100millionUSD, they aren't buying a painting, per se. — AmadeusD

And someone paying that much to prolong their life in the same body, they aren't preserving their person, per se?

But then, what's the painting per se, and what's the person per se?

@Mijin Where do you stand on The Perfect Fake? (Chapter III)

We decided not — frank

Haha, cheeky! No we didn't.

The normal, everyday, commonly held attitude is that Sentence C is wrong, and as a result of an invasion of propositional attitudes, we have referential opacity. — frank

Yes. Quine agrees. Maintain the common attitude by not quantifying in, and hence not trying to reconcile Lois' Superman with ours. Not cashing in on the (future!) "rigid" rhetoric. Not substituting. Not going de re. Not concluding sentence c.

Why not? — frank

Because if it did, we'd be able to substitute?

No, you can't put it in quotes. — frank

Not without losing transparency, no, exactly. But Quine says, do this instead:

t1 = t2
Lois believes t1 can fly
therefore Lois believes t2 can fly — frank

and things are no better. The " t1" in "believes t1 can fly" won't have the same reference as the one in line 1. So substitution not ok. Quantifying in (from outside) not ok. Lois' t1 not our t1.

So belief ascriptions are (if we're not careful) as chaotic in their logical consequences as quotations.

So you do get opacity that way. You don't necessarily get belief, no. You may just have lines of questionable logic about belief ascriptions, yes.

Comport yourself so that t1 shows up in the b sentence, and we can evaluate for referential opacity. — frank

But isnt Quine saying, let it show up in a belief context and transparency will be sacrificed quite as much as if you put it in quotes?

And isn't Davidson saying the parrot wouldn't recognise the opacity?
— bongo fury

I haven't gotten back to Davidson. — frank

Nor have I, which is why I edited out that remark. :wink:

Well, it doesn't say the ascriptions shouldn't be in terms of dispositions to assent and dissent? Seems bizarre if it did, given that would rule against Quine, who introduced the phrase. (I think?)

a. Clark Kent = Superman
b. Lois is ready enough to say S1 with sincerity, where S1 is "Superman can fly."
c. Therefore, Lois is ready enough to say S2 with sincerity, where S2 is "Clark Kent can fly."

This is a misapplication of the Identity Elimination Schema, — frank

I dare say. More to the point, it's referential opacity. :smile:

How could you tell from watching Ralph's behavior that he's "ready enough to say" something? — frank

Let alone that the readiness is to say it "in all sincerity"!

Not sure I see an inherent problem. But I don't know if anyone (e.g. Davidson) has to be fundamentalist about the behaviourism, anyway? I think it's plausible that we describe the psychology of a linguistic animal in terms of its dispositions to assent and dissent to sentences?

As with Ralph accepting sentence (11) here?

https://www.uvm.edu/~lderosse/courses/lang/Quine(1956).pdf

Yes.

A behaviourist wouldn't necessarily deny belief or opaqueness, though?
— bongo fury

To support that, you'd need to explain how a substitution failure cashes out in terms of behavior. — frank

Well, as assent to contradictory sentences?

the de re reading, contrasting with the more common de dicto reading, [...] relational, contrasting with notional; transparent, contrasting with opaque; and wide scope, contrasting with narrow scope. — IEP

Also reference, contrasting with sense? (I wonder.)

A behaviourist wouldn't necessarily deny belief or opaqueness, though? Belief can be a disposition to assent to sentences, and opaqueness will be a natural affliction, given imperfect information? My point was merely that the opposite would be more surprising?

Edit: @Leontiskos exactly :ok:

There's a magical thing about belief: that it causes referential opacity. — frank

Wouldn't it be more a cause for wonderment if it created referential transparency?

Then the Superman of Lois' beliefs could be relied on to share all his properties with the actual fictional one?

Granted that would spoil story-telling, and perhaps also Davidson's proposed intentionality test.

Ok cool. But then, was I wrong here?

most of us accept Copied, and you too, — bongo fury

Rather, you think Copied can't answer:

what happens to the consciousness — Mijin

?

You don't think consciousness events must be at least as separate and numerically distinct as the regions of spacetime at which they occur? You do think they might rather achieve some inherent unity? Like entangled particles, perhaps? I guess it's far from inconceivable. I just don't see why you think that a technology of instant copying would demand such an explanation. Copying could just be copying, and why ever not?

apart from the proposition that perhaps our consciousness is never persistent. — Mijin

Maybe not as persistent as we'd like, but it often ebbs and flows in a fairly continuous stream, doesn't it? I need more help seeing the problem here?

If you consider Copied to already be refuted then great; — Mijin

You mean Sent?? Or confirmed? (Sent refuted or Copied confirmed.) Otherwise I don't know what's going on.

there are two major positions*, let's call them Sent (your consciousness is transported) and Copied (the person on Mars or wherever, is a new instance of consciousness). — Mijin

Right, and most of us accept Copied, and you too, but you want to tackle Sent on their own ground (show them it's a quagmire), so it's tiresome if I don't join you on that ground?

Fair enough. But the ground over at Copied is perfectly firm? You keep saying it's soggy? Like,

why spatio-temporal continuity matters, I mean why is it critical to whether consciousness persists or not? — Mijin

What's consciousness got to do with it? Copied doesn't need consciousness. (Nor unconsciousness of course.) It just needs a reliable basis for individuation (same what? different what?). Spatiotemporal continuity is such a basis.

E.g. same person?... stage of the same body?

The common answer — Mijin

Can you edit this to clarify which position is answering which, and what you mean by "existence is branched"?

No worries. I wonder if you are equally (or differently, or not at all) non-plussed by this:

Well, if the transporter didn't kill you when you entered at the source (such that now there are two "yous"), everyone would call the machine a people fax instead of a transporter and you would be the original and the person at the destination would be the facsimile. Thus the "transporter" isn't a transporter at all, it's a fax machine that destroys originals. — LuckyR

?

Why? Because of the definitions of the words. — LuckyR

Agreed.

Perhaps you're proposing at a certain point a facsimile becomes indistinguishable from an original. — LuckyR

Yikes, not me.

More to the point, though, I'm denying that at any point the facsimile becomes a part or continuation of the original.