I guess you mean that if I have the knowledge to build a bridge, it makes it easier for me to cross the river, and so I'm more free? — frank

Yes, that would be one way of describing it. Phase space is a physical characterization of the possible states of a system. A bicycle-rider system can assume various trajectories in phase space - i.e. rolling along the path that is defined by the rotation of its wheels, the turning of its handlebars, etc. But a bicycle ridden by someone who knows how to ride a bicycle has more possibilities - more degrees of freedom - than one ridden by someone who doesn't know how to ride a bicycle.

Doesn't that seem circular to you? The proof for free will is in the institutions predicated on the presumption of free will. — Vera Mont

The proof isn't in the institutions, it is in my immediate perceptions. If I tried to lift my arm, and it didn't elevate, then I would wonder. If I was paralyzed, then if I tried to think a thought, and I didn't think that thought, then I would wonder. Except no, I wouldn't wonder, because, per the thought experiment, the intention of the thought and the realization of that intention would not coincide. Ergo I would not be thinking the thought I am thinking. Which is absurd. Cogito ergo sum.

I would ask someone who believes you don't have free will "What is stopping your will from being free? — Igitur

I agree. The evidence is so overwhelmingly on the side of freedom of will (it is the basis of all law, qua responsibility for actions, which is the foundation of civilization) that the burden of proof is certainly on the side of the unfree....

What's instrumental value? Could you give an example? — frank

Sure. If you know Archimedes principle of the lever then you can lift something you otherwise couldn't. Practical knowledge is inherently instrumental. In doing so, it creates a greater "degree of freedom" in the system - i.e. it expands the phase space of the system that includes it.

Doesn't the condition that there is no free-will exclude the possibility of the instrumentality of belief, and therefore of knowledge? And yet knowledge clearly has instrumental value.

Also, what would be the practical consequence of knowing that one has no free-will? It would seem that the answer must be, none.

Finally, what is the motivation for even asking the question? The only one that I can think of is "denial of responsibility for the consequences of ones' actions."

I would further call attention to the fact that the earliest conceptions of "god" were of animistic spirits of particular natural phenomena (whose causes were not understood). Suggesting that the idea of god is really, in its most general form, about whatever is "occult" (i.e. hidden) at the time. Since science continuously redefines the boundaries of the occult, it is only reasonable that the idea of "god" should likewise evolve.

Additionally, the whole foray down the tangent of theism is misdirected. Most major religions include a core "monastic tradition" whose emphasis is decidedly on the individual experience of the divine, not on the narrative details of scriptures. Arguably, monks, and not priests, are the keepers of the faith. Priests are just the popularizers.

Anything that isn't a contradiction is possible. It doesn't then follow that it is not reasonable to believe that some possibilities are true and some are false. — Michael

Yes, that is precisely my point. As I said, my experiences on earth have included events indicative of meaningful connections that transcend current scientific explanations. It is a very well-known fact that cognitive predispositions can dramatically affect not only how events are experienced, but whether they are even observed at all. If your experience doesn't support the inference, then it doesn't. Is it because you have a pre-existing bias that is preventing recognition?

I'm currently reading some classical Scepticism. It is a powerful presentation of the benefits of the rationale of "suspending judgement". I highly recommend.

I would say that it is reasonable to believe that Zeus does not exist, that Odin does not exist, that Shiva does not exist, that Allah does not exist, that Yahweh does not exist, and that a supernatural intelligent creator deity does not exist. — Michael

And I already provided the example by way of analogy with the theory of the atom. We have no problem seeing Democritus' theory as a "precursor" to a more cogent theory that evolves in light of the progress of civilization. What possible reason could there be for not allowing for the same possibility with respect to theories about "transcendental entities"?

I'm asking you why a narrative that is from the limited human-centric perspective cannot both be inaccurate but also refer to something that in fact exists. Assuming which, yes, the claim that Zeus does not exist (qua "any possible deity") is not logical, that is, is not warranted.

As I maintained early on, the "story of god" has as much right to evolve as does the "story of the atom". Only a fool would deny quantum theory by refuting Democritus.

P1. Zeus does not exist
P2. Odin does not exist
P3. Shiva does not exist
P4. None of the Greek, Norse, or Hindu deities exist — Michael

Is the "Sun" of the geocentric cosmology the same as the "Sun" of the Heliocentric cosmology?

If you say no, then possibly Odin does not exist. If you say yes, than any and all references to any and all transcendent beings are logically flexible in the same way.

Do you just mean that the proposition "no deities exist" is insufficiently justified? — Michael

You could state it thus. This is the problem with symbolic logic, the elevation of form over content. Existence is not purely logical. Certainly quantum physics is not, as many quantum phenomena transcend traditional logic.

So, yes, it is not "logically substantiated" to arrive at the conclusion that "no deities exist." Whereas, based on the experiences I have had of a kind of overarching meaningfulness, I have at least some kind of empirical basis for intuiting the operation of "occult" (literally, hidden or concealed) connections between events that could be consistent with something like the existence and operation of a transcendent entity.

No, atheism is not illogical. The proposition "no deities exist" is not a contradiction. — Michael

Doing the same action repeatedly expecting a different result is not a contradiction either, but it is illogical. The logic of human actions is not entirely compassed by formal symbolic logic. But if I had to put it in propositional form I would say:
1. The universe is full of things that are beyond human comprehension.
2. Some of those things might be deities.
3. Therefore the proposition that no deities exist is illogical.

Show me where this thread is about the defining attributes of "theism".
— Pantagruel
Non sequitur. — 180 Proof

It's a non sequitur to argue within the stated parameters of the question? That is a very strange conception of logic indeed. Which IS precisely to the heart of the stated parameters of the question.

But again, as to your idiosyncratic characterization of theism (as a complete tangent), the burden of proof is, of course, on you to establish that your framework is valid. I challenge you to provide an authoritative source corresponding with your views. In addition to which, I did provide the counter-examples you demanded (to which you once again failed to respond).

Whatever might be the specific details of any and all theistic religions are incidental to the salient fact, which is the possibility of the existence of the deity at the core of theisms. And THAT most certainly is what is in question, per the OP. The Aztecs, Egyptians, and Greeks all incorporated sun-worship in their pantheon, with vast differences in detail. But there is no question that they were all talking about the same sun.

Cite any deity-tradition, sir, that you consider 'theistic' and that does not conceptualize its (highest) deity with these attributes, or claims. :chin: — 180 Proof

I'll go you one better. Show me where this thread is about the defining attributes of "theism".

This thread is about whether atheism is illogical. Atheism isn't about refuting theism. Atheism is a disbelief in the existence of god or gods.

I continue to dispute that theisms accord with your ad hoc criteria. Simply put, your criteria don't appear in any definitions of theism. The "ultimate mystery" condition is completely vague, therefore meaningless. Being "morally worthy of worship" isn't true. The gods of the Greek pantheon exhibited no such consistent morality. Nor the Egyptian. As I said, that is about what humans think about gods, not what gods might be in and of themselves.

But all of that is moot, since none of that is relevant to the belief in "the existence of god" which is black letter by definition atheism. Which just goes to show, I guess, how illogical some atheists are prepared to be in defense of their dogma.

I love how you strategically omit citing the argument. Wise choice.

It isn't against you. It is a generalized fact about the epistemological makeup of individual entities, of which you happen to be one.

"In general, if an argument is to convince you, then, first, you must be capable of understanding it; and secondly, you must accept the truth of its premises. You may be capable of grasping arguments (say, in some of the more esoteric branches of mathematics) which others are quite unable to understand; others may have no inkling about the truth of certain propositions (say, in the history of logic) which are utterly familiar to you. For such simple reasons an argument appropriate to you may be inappropriate to me."
(Annas & Barnes, Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism)

edit: In other words, no more or less ad hominem than your criticisms of my experiential claims. And I like my substantiating argument far better. I love scientific realism, because the first tenet of science is to acknowledge its own limits, including its approximate nature. I don't know what the limits of possibility are, but given what I can see of them in the span of one little human lifetime, I'd assume that much vaster intelligences would compass magnitudes more. Same thing with abilities.

We do not "deny" anyone's "experience" only observe that such "experience" does not correspond to anything outside of your head. The experiential difference between us, sir, is not that we 'have failed" but that you seem to emotionally need to take fantasies (of "possibility") literally and we do not. — 180 Proof

Or you have failed to observe the evidence in the events comprising your own life due to your own attitude, or simply some inherent limitation of your cognitive makeup.

"In general, if an argument is to convince you, then, first, you must be capable of understanding it; and secondly, you must accept the truth of its premises. You may be capable of grasping arguments (say, in some of the more esoteric branches of mathematics) which others are quite unable to understand; others may have no inkling about the truth of certain propositions (say, in the history of logic) which are utterly familiar to you. For such simple reasons an argument appropriate to you may be inappropriate to me."
(Annas & Barnes, Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism)

"Do I really have free will?"

Doesn't asking the question itself imply that you do? It is like asking "Am I conscious now?"

i.e. it is the difference between Cogito ergo sum being a declaration and a question. If you can't be certain of that, then there can be no certainty.

It's funny how the same circumstances can breed opposite results. One self-made man who raised himself up from poverty believes "anyone can do it" because he did and is critical of social welfare. Another dedicates himself to philanthropy. It is all about how one chooses to interpret something, which is really about how one chooses to live one's life, I suppose. Poverty motivates some, while it surpasses others. Freedom might be like that. If you deny freedom, then you excuse yourself from responsibility for everything that freedom implies, but also forgo whatever benefits it confers.

That's a nice position to take outside a prison cell. — Vera Mont

Or inside. Consider Boethius.

but you can't have decided differently. — Vera Mont

Ok. I believe that I make decisions based on a process of reasoning. This belief is itself (per now) a process of reasoning. So you are saying that this process of reasoning now is completely determined? In what sense can that possibly be true? Or is it only true if I come to a decision? i.e. I "decide" now that I am free. So I am wrong? I "decide" that I am determined. I am right? Kant says the "idea of freedom" is sufficient to freedom.

Outlines of Scepticism
by Sextus Empiricus

You sound like the God of Abraham. Or Socrates. Or Descartes. Or the ministry of truth. — Fire Ologist

:up:

Realistically, there may well be things happening in the universe that the human mind - intermediated by the limited faculties of the human body - may only be dimly able to grasp. The golden ratio has been "known" for millenia; fractal patterns abound in nature. But it is only with the advent of advanced computer modelling that that we have identified the real effects of this mathematical phenomenon in the existence of attractors at the heart of non-linear systems.

Hence, I believe that some people are simply "open" to certain types of experiences which, while "meaningful," may not be immediately reducible to a concrete meaning. Other people, of a more inflexible frame of mind, are not open to these kind of experiences and, hence, simply do not have them. Or, more precisely, do not recognize that they have them.

The substance of any belief is the effect that belief has upon the actions of the believer. Individuals inspired by the sublime, the divine, have created great works of art and philosophy, sacrificed themselves for the common good, and, yes, achieved great scientific breakthroughs. I personally am inspired by the glimpses of the sublime my life has afforded me.

To deny the possibility of something that someone else has experienced because you have failed to experience it seem to me nothing more than a bad case of sour grapes.

Just finished Konrad Lorenz's "Kant's Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology." It knocked my socks off. I've been looking for something like this for a long time - a discussion of how our human nervous system and mind have evolved as a "negotiation" between Kant's things-as-they-are, the noumena, and our animal need to survive — T Clark

Cool. On Aggression was excellent; this looks fascinating.

intervenes in – causes changes (which cannot be accounted for otherwise) to – the universe — 180 Proof

This single condition alone defines the being practically and can be the sole sufficient condition to account for your other conditions, such as having created existence. Being morally worthy of worship is a function of human relationship, not an intrinsic property. Having an 'ultimate mystery' certainly doesn't mean anything relevant to the being of the deity, that is a feature of the religion itself. We are not talking about religions, we are talking about conceptualizations of deities.

That condition I agree is universal, and it correlates with what I said, possessed of abilities which humans don't understand. Which is really all it would need to be and, given the limitations of the human mind, isn't all that high a bar anyway, as I mentioned.

Your muddled interpretations aside, the actual state of affairs is that the concept of "God" exists across all cultures and in such variety that your claim that there is some definitive version of that concept that anyone wishing to discuss the concept must adhere to is trivially false.

As to your position. You reject the supernatural concept of god because it is illogical. Fine. But then you reject my non-supernatural characterization...because it is not of the supernatural variety. Your dogmatic mind is evidently in a state of blatant self-contradiction. One of the hazards of dogmatism.

You also should not comment on God, as what you understand by the word "God" is completely distinct from what God actually means. — Lionino

Surely you see the irony of someone who denies entirely the notion of God setting himself up as an authority on "what God actually means"?

Ok, I challenge you to bring up any academic citing (not mentioning) another academic using the word "God" in a way that is not supernatural. — Lionino

Ever hear of pantheism?

The definition of mathematics doesn't contradict the definition of banana, and yet the two are not the same thing. — Lionino

This is a complete non-sequitur. I said that the description of the being(s) that I provided did not preclude them being consistently identified with the being(s) that conformed to the Cambridge definition that you supplied. Which isn't to say the Cambridge definition is authoritative, because it isn't.

What you are doing is not refining a concept but changing the meaning of a word completely — Lionino

Refining a concept could certainly ultimately end up in changing the meaning of the word. That is entirely the point.

Unintentional denial of the scientific method and proofs by contradiction right here. — Lionino

What does this even mean? I certainly did not deny the scientific method or proof by contradiction. I pointed out that someone who is authentically interested in framing a concept should not appeal to someone who denies the validity of the concept.

Our bookstore outing last weekend was a bit disappointing. The first store had a lot of inventory, but it was poorly sorted, shelved, and laid out. And the books were overpriced. However I spotted this gem of ancient scepticism and I knew that $10 for a Cambridge University press publication would be a good deal. As with some academic books, no price on the cover, so she guessed low. It's a $50 book in mint condition. This is on deck.

Martin Chuzzlewit
by Charles Dickens

sine qua non claims of theism — 180 Proof

My sine qua non theistic claims are that there are greater-than-human conscious entities. And that the most general definition of a deity is a being possessed of abilities that humans don't understand. Whether such beings are then worshipped, feared, etc. is about how human's react, not about what those beings in essence are.

As far as I know, there is no universal consensus that could legitimately be called the "sine qua non" of theism. i.e. you are making it up in order to then argue against it (as I have repeatedly pointed out).


edit: Among (many) other things, the Wikipedia article on God notes that "God is often conceived as the greatest entity in existence". This agrees perfectly with my approach since there is certainly in reality a referent.

The one that academics are part of. — Lionino

Sorry, that's just plain ridiculous.

Cambridge dictionary seems to disagree:

a spirit or being believed to control some part of the universe or life and often worshipped for doing so, or something that represents this spirit or being: — Lionino

This doesn't in any way shape or form contradict the generalized description I provided.

In any case, that is not a defining feature because it is nonsense. Our modern ability to solve differential equations in our head transcends the human understanding of Bronze Age Europeans, and yet we are not gods. — Lionino

Exactly. Every other concept that mankind has ever entertained has evolved into more sophisticated forms as our species has evolved. So why should the concept of god not likewise be amenable to...refinement?

The epistemic stand of a person has zero bearing or whether they are qualified to define something or not. — Lionino

Of course it does. If you claim not to believe in atoms, you are certainly the last person that someone should talk to who is interested in developing a theory of atoms.

Yet, nobody in the academy, when discussing philosophy or theology, has the above in mind when talking about God — Lionino

What academy are you referring to? The main defining feature of a "god" is having abilities which transcend human understanding. That's really not a very high bar....

If you are going to set yourself up as presenting an authoritative definition of "god," I would think that advertising yourself as an atheist isn't the most credible first step.

Let's face it. Atheists, by their own declaration, are really only qualified to speak about what god is not.

Do you then grant that I have all the rights to flesh out the concept of God as the banana that I will eat in 15 minutes before leaving for the gym? — Lionino

If that seems reasonable to you. It doesn't strike me as something someone striving to frame a credible concept would do though. Rather, someone striving to frame a flimsy concept for easy criticism. If that's an argument for atheism, then I'd say it qualifies as illogical.

If the conceptualisation of something is flawed because it entails contradiction, what people have in mind is demonstrably false and what can exist is something other than what people have in mind. Assigning this or that label to this or that conceptualisation doesn't change the facts about the world — Lionino

That's right. And my definition is empirical. Given that consciousness obviously exists, and there are gradations of consciousness, there is come greatest extant consciousness. I have as much right as the next person to flesh out the concept of God in whatever ways make the most sense to me. You think that each and every individual has a concept of god that reduces to whatever they read about in some piece of orthodox literature? Even if so, every person would have a slightly different defining set of references, based their unique intake of information.

No, that fact that my conceptualization is empirically sound isn't a weakness to me. However, if you persist in wishing to maintain that the actual concept of God is logically unsound, only for the purposes of therefore denying the concept, well, that is very much a dogmatic assertion. You choose to support an invalid version of a concept that you want to deny.

Anything can exist as soon as we arbitrarily and unilaterally change the definition of "anything". But what we get is not informative, it is a tautology. — Lionino

We get what we are essaying to conceptualize. If you assume the conceptualization entails the non-existence of the thing then perhaps it is the conceptualization that is flawed. I fail to see how one position begs its question more than the other.

How We Think
by John Dewey

Dewey never fails to satisfy, like a cool drink of water on a hot day.

So I see tons of points that lead us to rationally conclude consciousness does not extend on after death. There is no how, where, what, or why. There is only a personal belief in the desire that it be true. — Philosophim

Perhaps the possibility is a function the belief itself.

Just as plausible that everything we know in physics will be found wrong in the future — Philosophim

Like the JWST crisis in cosmology?

I have a pretty good grasp of what's scientific and what's not. I'm not aware of any science that contradicts the fact that consciousness appears to transcend materialism in significant ways. What you are claiming might be true in a reductionist reality. But reductionism is no longer, what is your word, plausible.

More importantly, do you agree by the definitions above that it is impossible for life to continue after death? And I don't mean your feelings, I mean rationally? — Philosophim

Life? Sure. Consciousness? No. They are not necessarily equivalent. Perhaps Consciousness is emergent from Life.

Its plausible that we survive after death. — Philosophim

I agree.