I didn't say that god exists. I said that something that can be described as "the creator of consciousness" possibly exists to the same extent that you believe in strong AI. That's all. However a believer reconciles those two beliefs, if an atheist, is that believer's business. I don't believe the strong AI premise myself.

Unless you happen to believe in strong AI. Which Daniel Dennett demonstrably does. And his 'no good reasons for believing' foundational argument explicitly contradicts that consciousness, what we are, could be created.

Wrong thread for this. Sorry. I shouldn't have rambled.

Could be. How does that relate to what I'm proposing? I am discussing beliefs qua beliefs, which may or may not accurately represent the mechanisms involved. But the beliefs as beliefs have meaning. If not, then what does?

Creation involves a creator. One scenario necessarily involves creators while the other doesn’t. I don’t see any contradiction here. — NOS4A2

Exactly. They are equally possible.

I'm not following that. — Banno

No?

This does not follow. Besides, you're begging the question – the creator of the consciousness creator's consciousness, etc ... — 180 Proof

No, it is premised as the position of a Strong AI proponent that consciousness can be created, that's all. It is a hypothetical, applicable in the case of that position.

Are you claiming that it was a thought before it was painted — Banno

Not before only, because.

What is the ultimate currency, the ultimate validation of belief to the believer?

You should feel the sense that your belief, your philosophy, is shaping your experience of Life.

And if you do, then your belief is at least that valid.

Thanks for the further details of Scheler's ideas. It does seem that the themes on the various threads overlap frequently. I am also quite interested in your new thread, but I have a book with a few chapters on Dennet, so I may have a look at that first. It is sometimes hard to find the time to write informed comments to other people's thread discussions. — Jack Cummins

Yes, I am reasoning backwards in that thread, Hypothetically, if the belief that AI is possible is not un-selfcontradictory, then our consciousness must also possibly have been created. That is, possibly being created must be a property of consciousness. So there possibly could (a fortiori) be a creator of consciousness, which is more or less consistent with a universal description of "god."

So all I said was IF Dennett does espouse hard AI (which I looked up, he does) then his whole "reasons for believing" argument at its foundation collapses because his conclusion is self-contradictory, in that it necessarily posits both the falsity and the possibility of god.

I accept that consciousness is created. But who says it is created by god? It could be created by a salamander. Or a black hole in the vast expanse of the universe. They are NOT GOD. — god must be atheist

If consciousness can be created intentionally, then our consciousness could have been created intentionally. All it does is put the concept of god on equal footing with whatever other theories you would care to propound in good faith as having produced consciousness.

Again, I am not conceding that consciousness, can be created intentionally. I believe all AI will ever be is a sophisticated facsimile. It's only if you actually do believe it that this argument has force.

And yes, I am saying that if something has the property "It created our consciousness intentionally", then it matches in a very broad sense a key feature of a god, as we commonly understand it.

But "fantasy" can be, at its best, playing with counterfactuals — 180 Proof

Yes. Scheler even describes a scenario in which the ultimate counterfactual (that the principle of non-contradiction is false) can be proven true based on an aesthetic metaphysics:

There are even attempts to see aesthetic principles of pleasing relationships
and configurations in subjects such as logic. Certainly, as far
as mathematics is concerned, Poincaré expressly stated that the highest
measure of mathematical achievement was not logic itself, but an aesthetic
value, whereby a unity and harmony of thought and proposition
were reached. Poincaré sought to prove, against the opinion of pure
logicians, that there were an infinite number of mathematical representations
of some logical problem, all of which could be equally correct,
and that it was infinitely boring, and scientifically pointless, to go
through all, or even most, of the proofs. The achievement of a creative
mathematician lay exclusively in being able to select that sort of proof,
from among equally correct candidates, which was the most ‘elegant’,
in terms of a harmony between axioms, consequences, theoretical
principles and proofs. This selection of aesthetic, valuable and elegant
proofs constitutes, according to Poincaré, the only and ultimate way
of measuring the value of mathematical achievement. Even illogical
and contradictory propositions can, and should, conform to the same
value of maximum unity and harmony as proposed for logical ones,
according to him. Above all, the principle of the non-contradiction of
a proposition – if A = B then A = non-B cannot be true – would be
deniable [if its denial were couched in more aesthetic terms than the
actual proposition itself ].

Jack, I think you and I bruited about the concept of "elegance" a while back.

I'd like to provide some more details on Scheler's "more radical" version of the transcendental reduction if you are interested Jack. I'm not sure they fit entirely in the scope of this thread though.

success, anything you want to achieve. — Huh

Hmm. Doesn't that seem to be a kind of task-oriented or episodic definition? Whereas "success" usually connotes ongoing and in-the-balance or cumulative achievement in a variety of different types of tasks.

Consciousness is consciousness. There's no equivocation possible.

Is success more influenced by luck or skill? — Huh

What is your definition of "success"?

↪Huh Before I answer, could you give us a definition of luck. — Sir2u

I think luck is pretty unambiguous, sums up in the "right place at the right time" chesnut, no?

Near as I can make out, Scheler is describing how fantasy is integral to the conative-creative power of the mind. He also discusses the connection between "wishing" and "willing".

"We can feel what we have never exactly experienced, and wish for something that we have never personally known....there is a gradual shrinking of the realm of wishing [as one ages]."

But conversely, eventually,

"there is a transformation in the realm of striving from what was originally a 'will'...to a 'wish,' when the impracticability is experienced, so, in each individual's old age what was once a 'will' becomes a 'wish.'"

His conclusion approaches what I'd call my own metaphysical position of "radical experimentalism":

"[The] original productive power of imagination...is subjected by the noetic acts of spirit to an increasing correction, critique, and selection."

No, his good reasons for believing in “strong AI” are not thats it’s possible. There is an entire branch of science that give good reasons to think AI is possible contrasted by no such scientific field to source for good reasons god exists. All believing in god has is naked possibility, — DingoJones

No, this is precisely not the case, which is the entire point of my post. The only germaine possibility is the possibility of creating consciousness. If you hold that human beings can create consciousness, then consciousness can be created. End of story, nothing more is required than that. If AI were created, it would only strengthen the argument for the existence of God. As it is, it validates the possibility to the extent that it is believed to be possible.

You are arguing a strawman.

It’s fallacious as an argument against a position Dennett holds. You started by quoting Dennett, “good reason” being the two key words. You have not provided a “good reason” to believe...something being possible is not a good reason to believe in it. So your argument in no way refutes what Dennett said. Dennett isnt denying the possibility, he is denying that there are good reasons. — DingoJones

I'm not arguing against Dennett explicitly, as I made clear. What I am doing is presenting my own argument, which amounts to a type of "ontological proof," which establishes Dennett's position as self-contradictory. Hence casting doubt on the whole "reasons for believing" approach in the first place.

i thought that what my main argument was was pretty clear, inasmuch as it was both stated and short.

If Dennett has "good reasons" for believing in strong AI then he as equally good reasons for believing in God.....

Jack, you must be reading my mind. I literally just read Max Scheler's take on "Metaphysics and Aesthetics" which culminates in the role of fantasy in metaphysics:

Because metaphysics, which is knowledge of the real...begins at the pont where possible direct and indirect sensory experience come to an end, all its concrete intuitively-derived settings-out...are works of fantasy.
(Scheler, The Constitution of the Human Being)

Ok, so you don’t seem to really be saying much at all then. You haven’t presented a “good reason” for believing, just acknowledging a possibility.
A - that is one possibility out of a virtual infinity of possibilities and demonstrates nothing.
B - it doesn’t refute anything you say Dennett claims.

I’m afraid your argument is still fallacious. — DingoJones

What I am saying is that if Dennett (or anyone) believes that consciousness can be created, a fortiori, he must believe that his own consciousness could be created. And since being the creator of consciousness is one of the most important properties (if not the most important) usually ascribed to the concept of God, if Dennett (or anyone) believes that consciousness can be created, he a fortiori believes in the possibility of God.

How is that fallacious?

It doesn’t follow that because consciousness can be created by humans that human consciousness must be created too. — DingoJones

I didn't say must be created. It follows that if you believe consciousness can be created then you believe consciousness can be created.

It's the simplest possible form argument. If A believes in the possibility of x, a fortiori, A acknowledges the possibility of y.

Your inability to follow or comment on the actual argument suggest that the problem lies more on your side rather than mine.

Though like I said, I am not familiar with Dennett's argument, this doesn't sound remotely like your 5-word summary of it. — SophistiCat

I don't need to summarize his argument if his own beliefs demonstrate the contrary, in the context of my argument. (As I said, even the argument itself proves nothing except that he himself fails to find any good reasons for believing. That's another thread, but one obviated by this one).

I don't follow Dennett, but I checked and he seems to be a very active proponent of strong AI. That's all that is required to substantiate my argument.

The arguably irreversible damage done to children and teens by the restrictions and changes to their freedoms is huge. — dazed

Like spending more time with their parents? A large percentage of children surveyed in Canada now identify their parents as their "best friends". Like learning the value of sacrificing trivial personal freedoms for the greater good? Like being forced to utilize their minds to come up with creative alternatives to habitual rituals?

Human beings thrive and grow and learn through challenges.

That’s ‘cause he believes in science, and he thinks it’s one or the other. — Wayfarer

Right. So I am assuming he probably believes in the possibility of realizing AI. In which case, per my argument, a fortiori, he should believe in the possibility that human consciousness is itself created...

Personally, I do not believe that we will succeed in creating actual artificial intelligence, only a facsimile. Consequently, this proof does not work for me. However I also do not "actively disbelieve" in the possibility of God, in abstracto.

If it can be thought, it can be put into words. — baker

Can the Mona Lisa be put into words? It certainly was thought.

Good question. I think you have hit the psychological nail on the head.

The Constitution of the Human Being by Max Scheler

Max's central writings on metaphysics and anthropology

"Why is there something instead of nothing"
Since there are two threads with the same title I guess my answer works for both of them...

This is the central theme of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics :"Why are there beings at all instead of nothing" (p. 215)

What he does is essentially recast and reconceptualize the understanding of the nature of Being in a way that encompasses the concept of nothing. One of his most interesting conclusions is:
The concept of being that has been accepted up to now does not suffice to name everything that "is". (p. 218)

I recommend this, it's a good read, extremely dense but fairly short. As the "successor to Being and Time" alone it is worth consideration.

The old-age metaphysical question: Why is there anything at all? — Wheatley

This is the central theme of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics :"Why are there beings at all instead of nothing" (p. 215)

What he does is essentially recast and reconceptualize the understanding of the nature of Being in a way that encompasses the concept of nothing. One of his most interesting conclusions is:
The concept of being that has been accepted up to now does not suffice to name everything that "is". (p. 218)

I recommend this, it's a good read, extremely dense but fairly short. As the "successor to Being and Time" alone it is worth consideration.

↪Gus Lamarch Hasty generalization fallacy. The only thing that validly follows from your first two propositions, Gus, is

'Therefore, evidence of, or ruling out, Humanity's "intelligent extraterrestrial" hypothesis is still lacking.' — 180 Proof

Hmm. Yes, this was exactly my first impression of the logic as well. I think this is accurate.

:up:

So thinking about thinking is equivalent thinking about the nature of instrumentality I guess. The concept of the "tool" as something mediate between thought and objective reality is interesting.

Those are valid observations Jack. However if you look at the question of language and being foundationally or genetically as Heidegger does, the obscure becomes clearer. The essence of logos is a joining together, that is, grasping the different in their sameness, ie. abstraction. Heidegger points out, the more comprehensive a concept is in scope, the more indeterminate is its content. And what is a more comprehensive concept that "Being"?

So if the underlying-total project of the logos is the comprehension of Being as such (the Being of beings), then, necessarily, as we approach higher layers of abstraction, the experience of Being becomes increasingly "ineffable". Suggesting a kind of original intuitive-synthetic apprehension. The word "sinks down to become a mere sign".

I do think that the mystifying is language is a real problem in philosophy — Jack Cummins

Yes, H. repeatedly touches on this, when language fails to un-conceal it begins to conceal.....

"The authentic interpretation must show what does not stand there in the words and which is nevertheless said....What is authentic is to be sought where nothing further can be found by scientific exegesis, which brands as unscientific everything that exceeds its domain."
(Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics)

Heidegger's take on "the ineffable"....

I have hardly read any Parmenides, but I am inclined to think that the further removed from ordinary language that thinkers go, this is more inclined to mystify understanding. This seems to happen more within philosophical writing, where the abstract is often given preference. In literature, including poetry and fiction, even when there is emphasis on the symbolic, the descriptive has some link with the senses. — Jack Cummins

This is Heidegger's evaluation of Parmenides, and he absolutely grounds this originary grasp of meta-phusis in the poetic too. You have to really take it slow. At least I do.

I absolutely think there is an element of focus to it. I have spent considerable time trying to define and quantify exactly what constitutes "cognitive effort"....

I spent 4 hours over the last two days trying to decipher why the Western interpretation of being versus thinking was irremediably damaged by a misinterpretation of Parmenides and thus the loss of an "originary meaning" that somehow synthesized being and thinking through the concepts of polemos and logos in a kind of proto-dialectical process. Nothing is really ineffable, just...difficult. Or maybe challenging is a better way to put it.

It probably depends on how one considers the idea of the ineffable. Is it beyond words at all, or just beyond a certain person's ability to articulate? Also, when someone says that they can't put some aspect of experience into words, perhaps they can push themselves further to find the words. The words may be descriptive rather than explanation, but the description may be the starting point for further enquiry, including some kind of grasp for explanation. — Jack Cummins

:up:

I don't see why we can't use language to remark on the limitations of our language. That would seem like saying we can't use our minds to think about our own mental limitations. — Jack Cummins

The tao that can be spoken is not the eternal tao.

That is using language to describe the ineffable. Moreover, the more deeply contextualized the reference, the more the ineffable is "caught".

It's not impossible, it just requires careful execution.

I think all of our knowledge fits into this category. When we are very young, we are very limited in our understanding of the meaning of words, the content of words surpasses our understanding. Eventually we reach a point of "average comprehension," where in most contexts our understanding of the meaning of words lines up with that of our fellows.

But if we continue to study and develop, usually what happens is we begin to focus in more on certain specialized subjects. Then our understanding can begin to grow vertically beyond the sedimented historic meanings of words and begin to encapsulate expanded meanings, based on whatever frameworks of investigation and validation.

But there is more than that. We can also expand our understanding horizontally, covering a wider array of subjects and contexts. And this is the process wherein we encounter most the limitations of language. Or, I'd rather say, where intuitive apprehensions of connections surpass or supersede sedimented meaning. What kind of light does quantum physics shed on evolution? Or what does early twentieth century intellectualism teach us about social democracy?

Even further than that. The longer we live, the more opportunity we have to observe what I'd call "very long term consequences" of our habits of thought. Things that simply cannot be "reasoned out" in an hour, or a day, or even a year. Because they are the results of many different kinds of efforts, in many different dimensions of life.

So, yes, in the largest sense, I think words are only ever approximations. I think the closer we look at life, the more we come to understand exactly how much of it really is "ineffable" as you say.