A belief is something that you actually consciously believe. People aren't guilty for their instincts or fantasies, if they were the entire world would deserve to burn. — BitconnectCarlos

Well, people have - or can have - a degree of control over their habitual behaviours. The terms "instinct," "sub-conscious," "habit," are all constructs and there is not real evidence as to exactly what they correlate. But conscious attention for sure can modify motives and habits which may have only been operating below the level of conscious awareness up until then.

I'd agree, but it's not worth flagellating oneself over an attitude one has on a subconscious level. — BitconnectCarlos

I really think this is where it is most important. Whether philosophically or socially, our unexcavated beliefs can be among the most powerful, and the most dangerous.

What I do believe is that prejudice is a subtle force. It is most obvious in obvious forms of discrimination against minority groups. However, that is the tip of the iceberg, ranging to the much more subtle. Where does 'dislike' end and prejudice begin? — Jack Cummins

Yes, I think it is important to excavate the true depths and nuances of "prejudice." Essentially, even something like the phenomenological reduction can be viewed as a kind of elimination of prejudice. However I think that you rightly focus on the social dimensions, as this is where prejudices do the most damage. Let's see what other ideas emerge.

Interesting. I believe that every human being has particular weaknesses that they are subject to, as well as particular strengths. Very often people may be highly critical of another persons' dependency on alchohol, lets, say, while they may themselves have a corresponding weakness, but perhaps in a socially more acceptable sense, being a workaholic for example.

So I would agree, in general terms, that we all are subject to "prejudices", but I don't think these always are manifested the the specific form of prejudices against types of people, which is the sense in which I assume you are using the term. A prejudice is fundamentally a "pre-judgement."

When it comes to the common usage of prejudice today, I think that those specific types of prejudices are to a very large extent learned-taught behaviours. And I do think that, to the extent that our society becomes enlightened, they can and will be eliminated.

I hope you'll be twice as hard on me! ;)

I'd be good with that!

I’d go one step further and say that the “objective” in “objective knowledge” or “objective reality” or “objective morality” just means that same thing: unbiased, divorced from any particular point of view, consistent with all points of view — which is not the same thing as consistent with all opinions, else it would be impossible for anyone to ever be wrong about objective things. — Pfhorrest

:up:

Objective measurement is only valid within limits. Whether it is the limit of the accuracy of a device or the limit of our current knowledge. And the context within which this discussion is occurring is that of the real-world exchange of ideas. I think my example of the "relative in-tune-ness" of a band in a concert setting is far more a propos than yours of walking around with a spectrum analyzer.....

The Human Place in the Cosmos
by Max Scheler

So if I found myself in a group of Rolling Stones fans, a more 'objective' view of whether Mick Jagger hit the right note would be obtained, not by analysing the recording, but by adjusting my belief thereby gained to be more consistent with that of his fan base, regardless of the spectrum analyser. — Isaac

If you were at a concert, yes. Also, what if he was "objectively" out of tune, but so was the entire band, uniformly? Then he would be objectively in tune. This really illustrates the point.

True. But since that's not what "being objective" typically means, I'm not sure I see the relevance. — Isaac

You think that "being objective" is typically used in the sense of "possessing objective knowledge?" I'd have to strongly disagree. I'd submit that in its usual use and here "being objective" in the sense of "trying to minimize one's personal biases to achieve a more collectively consistent perspective" is a much better description of "objectivity" than "possessing objective knowledge".

Politics does not proceed on the basis of a common morality. — Kenosha Kid

Maybe not, but that is definitely part of the standard under which democracy operates:

Decisions about laws typically involve a combination of validity claims: not only truth claims about the likely consequences of different legal options, but also claims about their moral rightness (or justice), claims about the authenticity of different options in light of the polity's shared values and history, and pragmatic claims about which option is feasible or more efficient.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/

Why would a lack of objectivity preclude commonality. There's no objective 'best film' but that doesn't prevent people from collectively promoting the one they all agree is such. — Isaac

There is a difference between "an objective truth" and "being objective".

From a strictly theoretical standpoint, if "being objective" means adopting a certain type of perspective oriented towards agreement with others, then a lack of objectivity certainly has to, at the very least, limit the extent to which commonality can be realized.

I think the concept of instrumentality only focuses the question of the interaction between mind and matter. An instrument is an object in which knowledge has been embedded. Conversely, there are discovered or natural instrumentalities. I think that the objective and the subjective both reach towards each other. Things only interact to the extent that they share some commonality.

1 - Would you say this "being-instrument" would be today equivalent to being a technology? — Raul

Marcuse's entire work is about technological society, so technology is definitely instrumental, I'm not sure all instrumentality is necessarily technological, unless you just make that part of the definition. There are natural instrumentalities.

Not true as I understand it. We do not weight our childrens' brain nodes and backtest the weights repeatedly until we get good results. Current approaches to ML aren't anything like how brains work. We don't even know how brains work. This kind of misunderstanding is very prevalent and is a real hindrance to understanding both brains and AI. — fishfry

Yes, and neural network simulations operate at a conceptual level. Simulators that actually emulate the transmission of neuro-chemical waves in the brain have been tried, but they are much less efficient.

I don't think that perspective on the view of mind and matter is unique to Marcuse. It is a whole tradition of thinking, especially the transpersonal tradition of psychology. It is simply that within psychology that this whole perspective has been dismissed by those intent on claiming that psychology is a science, like the other hard sciences. — Jack Cummins

For sure. I just really, really liked the way he puts it. Really gave me the sense of being "the product of mind and matter", versus purely "mind" as I used to conceive myself. Possibly "Material Mind?" I like how some yogic systems have seven "subtle bodies" that gradually intermediate between matter and mind.

I believe he is saying that the nature of matter is determined by the informational content of the relational properties which define it. Hence the objective structures of matter and mind are comparable.

Artificial intelligence is not there yet, agreed, but they are already reaching the level of artificial dumbness. — Olivier5

:lol:

I just wish Alexa could follow what I say and do what I ask more than half the time. Maybe AI is making some time in big labs, but practical, interactive AI is a long way from where I'm sitting now.

I'm talking about the abolition of Philosophy as system, though. I'm talking about it becoming praxis. — thewonder

Everything that human beings do is literally praxis. Philosophers teaching at schools are engaged in philosophical praxis. Are you saying that every philosophical theory should be realized as a specific type of action? Seems to cry out for some more details.

Presumably a philosopher will stay open to new ideas indefinitely, so that any conclusion will, at most, be just temporary. — baker

:up:

Legitimation traditionally consisted of actions aligning with social and ethical norms, hence conformity with accepted religious interpretation and authority. Also, with the notion of static ideals of right and wrong which are likewise aligned with that type of authority. As the inherent authority of christianity declined along with the feudal system, new standards of legitimation evolved, consistent with the emerging humanistic trend. Consensus became an important feature of legitimation.

Well, commitment is the measure of value and the price of reward.

Appreciate that, I was able to find the PDF.

I'm pretty committed to my books. I just bought a used copy of Sydney Hooks' Metaphysics of Pragmatism that cost me $45 with shipping, and it's not a big book. The Popper I bought last year were about $60 each.

↪Pantagruel Andre Leroi-Gourhan's Gesture and Speech. I cannot, cannot, cannot recommended this enough. — StreetlightX

Ah, MIT Press, always a winner.

Doesn't look like it is available to buy, checking the InterLibrary Loan system...

Thanks!!

Jurgen Habermas wrote extensively on the history of legitimation and legitimacy and its status in post-modern capitalist democracy. Worth a read if it is a serious interest.

Much better: we're not fundamentally alone, our selves are made of interactions we have with others - extracted patterns from the social instances we're exposed to. Our self concept forms in adaptation to our developmental environs. We were never "truly" in our own heads to begin with. — fdrake

:up:

? Seems to be right there in the OP. — Isaac

I'd say it is more a fundamental premise which contradicts the reasonableness of some of the other categories.

I think I'm just going to watch and see where this goes with some other comments for now.....

A person whom you think might be right is not a person with whom you disagree and so is outside of the scope of situations this advice applies to. — Isaac

Yes, as others have commented, the OP as formulated has problems. Following Habermas (and discourse theory in general) if you are entering into a genuine dialog, then you must not only be prepared to offer reasons but also be persuaded by them. Which precludes ever making such assumptions as that one is "correct" and the other "incorrect". The OP, as presented, is the end of dialog, not the beginning.

From the introduction to "Facts and Norms"

Yet modernity, now aware of its contingencies, depends all the more on a procedural reason, that is, on a reason that puts itself on trial.

You might not think they are right, but you could be wrong. Hence there is a whole missing category.

What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong? — Isaac

They could be right.

Your interpretation of the limitations of the application of philosophical thought is ludicrous.

I'm currently reading Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man. When it was written, it was a cutting-edge contemporary philosophical critique of contemporary society.

In it, Marcuse excavates historical thought all the way back to Plato and Aristotle. Your criticisms of my post are simply not credible from any perspective. So, you can focus on criticizing the actual content of my post, or, better yet, come up with something substantive yourself.

Chapter 5 - Negative Thinking, from One-Dimensional Man

The closed operational universe of advanced industrial civilisation with its terrifying harmony of freedom and oppression, productivity and destruction, growth and regression is pre-designed in this idea of Reason as a specific historical project. The technological and the pre-technological stages share certain basic concepts of man and nature which express the continuity of the Western tradition. Within this continuum, different modes of thought clash with each other; they belong to different ways of apprehending, organising, changing society and nature. The stabilising tendencies conflict with the subversive elements of Reason, the power of positive with that of negative thinking, until the achievements of advanced industrial civilisation lead to the triumph of the one-dimensional reality over all contradiction.

This conflict dates back to the origins of philosophic thought itself and finds striking expression in the contrast between Plato’s dialectical logic and the formal logic of the Aristotelian Organon. The subsequent sketch of the classical model of dialectical thought may prepare the ground for an analysis of the contrasting features of technological rationality.

In classical Greek philosophy, Reason is the cognitive faculty to distinguish what is true and what is false insofar as truth (and falsehood) is primarily a condition of Being, of Reality — and only on this ground a property of propositions. True discourse, logic, reveals and expresses that which really is as distinguished from that which appears to be (real), And by virtue of this equation between Truth and (real) Being, Truth is a value, for Being is better than Non-Being. The latter is not simply Nothing; it is a potentiality of and a threat to Being — destruction. The struggle for truth is a struggle against destruction, for the “salvation” (sozein) of Being (an effort which appears itself to be destructive if it assails an established reality as “untrue”: Socrates against the Athenian city-state). Inasmuch as the struggle for truth “saves” reality from destruction, truth commits and engages human existence. It is the essentially human project. If man has learned to see and know what really is, he will act in accordance with truth, Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology.

This conception reflects the experience of a world antagonistic in itself — a world afflicted with want and negativity, constantly threatened with destruction, but also a world which is a cosmos, structured in accordance with final causes. To the extent to which the experience of an antagonistic world guides the development of the philosophical categories, philosophy moves in a universe which is broken in itself two-dimensional. Appearance and reality, untruth and truth, (and, as we shall see, unfreedom and freedom) are ontological conditions.

I think that's a step in the right direction, but it might also be worth considering that it's not a real possibility to bridge certain disparate positions. Beliefs seem to be clustered in coherent wholes, i.e. you typically don't just change your mind on some fact or value in isolation, but because it fits better into a larger structure of beliefs that is already there. And those seem very hard to alter, as is I think well documented with the phenomenon of religious conversion or de-conversion. — ChatteringMonkey

Absolutely, which is why it may be necessary to excavate the historical origins of some positions to see where the fundamental divergences really are.

Rarely have I seen someone change their minds following rational arguments. — ChatteringMonkey

This is why I am pursuing the sociological approach which views detailed ideological positions as representative of more fundamental social trends, driven by actual volitional energies of the "whole man". If we can understand why groups of people come to believe what they do then we can begin to find ways to bridge the disparate positions. And indeed, we can see that these type of inter-evolutions and even reconciliations do occur, aiding us in our analysis.

Because politics is a normative field. The questions at hand are what are the right or wrong things to do with our society. Anyone who thinks that nothing is actually right or wrong are just bowing out of that discussion. — Pfhorrest

Maybe. But while it may be reasonable to flag certain opinions as less credible because of poor justification (kind of ethical falsification), saying that other opinions rise to the standard of correctness is overreaching. Being well-justified is a long way from being correct. Correctness conveys an absolute authority which can only contribute to antagonism when mediating between conflicting viewpoints.

Wtf is a "correct opinion"? Politics has obviously driven some our members insane. — Harry Hindu

This is true. There is a strong, underlying normative tenor here.

What I claimed it lacked was contemporaneity. — Isaac

John Dewey makes the obvious point that there is nothing more ephemeral than "the modern". I like to think that, when I absorb the nuances of Mannheim's thought, or Heidegger's, I am in a way bringing the force of their intellects to bear on current situations. I believe Heidegger would agree with that inasmuch as he talks about a kind of exo-temporal dialog of a "community of rational beings".

Mannheim may not be your contemporary, but I certainly am.

...is not a philosophical investigation, it's an empirical one. Social membership is an empirical property and the effect it has is an empirical observation. — Isaac

Empiricism is a philosophical position. Maybe that's the advantage of reading seventy year old books. You pick up a few things.

Why on earth would you centre such an analysis on a book that's 70 years out of date. Do you really have such a poor opinion of modern sociology that you think nothing of note has been advanced since then? — Isaac

Why read Plato? Philosophies can only present certain things within the limitations of the social and ideational context in which they developed. Within new contexts, new meanings can arise. That is also in that out of date book and a common theme to studies in historicism.

If you really don't believe that great historical works contain elements of current merit and value, then you're probably not in the right place....

I'm actually just starting a detailed analysis of the way that social membership steers political and ideological domination through an ongoing process that evolves from simple consensus to monopoly with dissenters (the dominant ideology becomes ossified and less able to accommodate new facts) to competing ideologies and the eventual concentration of these new ideologies into dominant 'polarized pairs', liberal-conservative, idealist-positivists, etc.. All centered on Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, but hopefully extending it in a kind of dialectical circularity to present-day application.

Key is to recognize that people hold ideas from a standpoint of a complete worldview that is primarily action-oriented.

I still wrote the post because that's one of the things that people do when they are bored during the weekend. — Rafaelsanchez53

Yes, some do :)