(a) How do you know (i.e. corroborate) that you or any other agent is "conscious" if "consciousness" is completely, inaccessibly subjective?
— 180 Proof

cogito, ergo sum — Wayfarer

:smile:

Well, apparently you're too lazy to think — 180 Proof

You mean like when you asked me to explain Mario Bunge's metaphysical concept of energy and I provided a link to his text and you told me "never mind" because you were too lazy to read his essay? Ok. Sure.

I'm not really sure why you even bother to engage people who are legitimately trying to offer good commentary only to mock and belittle them. It's not productive. You are definitely the Donald Trump of philosophy. You strike me as the kind of person who would tattoo "Prove me wrong" on his forehead. Maybe that could be your avatar.

Straight-forward, relevant questions are beyond you. Gotcha — 180 Proof

I'm sorry, what exactly was the question again? All I saw was more of your trademark wit, but no actual philosophical commentary of any kind. I substantiated my position anyway.

Inasmuch as you didn't see fit to amplify it I took it that way and responded appropriately. What I thought was funny was that you didn't bother to offer any comment.

Mary's room. — Lionino

Is based on a faulty premise that one can acquire "all the physical facts" that there are about something. Which is implied by my further comments on the inherently compartmentalized and abstract-approximate nature of scientific knowledge in general.

In short, experience overflows our knowledge of it, which is self-evident to me. I know there are some people who think they "know it all" though. They don't.

Life is largely anecdotal [sophistry].
— Pantagruel
Yeah, like your posts ... care to try again? — 180 Proof

Sure.

"Practical Science...is philosophy, which deals with positive truth, indeed, yet contents itself with observations such as come within the range of every man's normal experience, and for the most part, in every waking hour of his life....These observations escape the untrained eye precisely because they permeate our whole lives...."
CS Peirce, "Philosophy and the Sciences"

Indeed, I find Peirce's views to be entirely consonant with my own with respect to the fundamentally limited and approximate character of scientific knowledge, compared with the plenary nature of both reality and our phenomenological experience of it. Peirce is also careful to distinguish between the experimental endeavour, versus just "reading about" something, which I also endorse.

In short, scientific reasoning, if it is legitimate, inherently acknowledges that its results are always open for further correction. And it also acknowledges that there are dimensions and aspects of reality of which it is wholly uninformed. If it doesn't, it is just dogmatism, mere dogmatism.

Not everything that can be proven can be proven at this moment, just like not everything that can be rebutted can be rebutted at this moment. Life is largely anecdotal. For someone with a formidable intellect, you are remarkably unimaginative.

Of course it's relevant! It is not a "glaring issue" that Aristotle is avoiding. The question of the ethics of a species that is by its nature unethical makes no sense. It is asking how something bad is good. — Fooloso4

:up:

Quite right. From an organic perspective, the only analog to a "devil species" would be "some species that human beings don't like". Which means nothing. Every species is integral to the biosphere in some way. It is a meaningless investigation, either of species or of ethics.

If so, then what makes "consciousness" mine? If it's not mine, then why should "consciousness" matter to me? If, however, "consciousness" is mine, then what does "trans-individual" mean and why should it matter to me? — 180 Proof

I watched a small murder of crows spooked from their foraging recently. They dispersed in a strategic fashion, the majority heading to a distant safe perch, two scouts remaining closer to the scene. All the while calling and responding to one another. It was evidently highly coordinated, a social entity, an organism, a macroscopic brain.

We are unquestionably already cooperative collective entities. Cells form organisms form colonies. There is no individual apart from the collective, nor vice-versa.

Thought...must presuppose communication.
Man is essentially a social animal.
~ Charles Sanders Peirce

The idea that we need to confirm our subjective experiences in controlled settings or they're not veridical is ridiculous on its face. — Sam26

:up:

Specifically, subjective experience overflows or transcends controlled settings exactly as concrete reality overflows and transcends the artificially constrained environments within which alone experimental science proceeds (and which render all scientific results as merely a set of ever-improving approximations).

I think the whole idea of consciousness "surviving death" is misleading. What is plausible is that consciousness transcends the apparent physical boundaries of the individual organism. It is a feature of a larger system. It isn't so much about surviving death as never having been entirely constrained by the limits of the purely individual organism to begin with. Consciousness, in its essence, is imminently trans-individual.

"People who want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere"
~C.S. Peirce

Then you are not talking about intentionality as it is commonly and predominantly understood. So we are talking past each other. I am only interested in intentionality as it is largely understood. Your view of intentionality strips out the essence of intention and swaps it for causality; which of no use when we analyze the intentions of someone. — Bob Ross

If you concede that our intentions can be imperfectly realized, as you said, then it follows that what we are trying to do is at least as well exemplified by our actions as by our putative objectives. It is in this sense that Aldous Huxley, for example, argues in Ends and Means that the end cannot justify the means but, rather, that the means employed must be consistent with (representative of) the intended ends.

Philosophical Writings of Peirce
by Charles Sanders Peirce

To attribute the cause to some philosophical jargon that no one cares about except philosophy hobbyists seems far fetched. — Mikie

Essentially, traditional religious values provided a morally realist framework. Durkheim's anomie is the state of normlessness that arises from alienation from fundamental values of life, including the decline of traditional religious morality. So this isn't a new idea, at all. Just something recloaked in modern jargon. Which seems to be a favourite strategy of modern thinkers. Which, unfortunately tends to alienate them from the philosophical history of ideas, producing a state of normlessness, leading to the decay of civilization....lol.

This is emotional reasoning. — Leontiskos

No, it's a fact about human intentionality.

We ought to associate intentionality with the act itself, which is the means, rather than with the end. Intention is a cause, and what is caused is action. — Metaphysician Undercover

Precisely. I believe this is essentially identical with my observation:

Intentionality is not just about what is aimed at, it is also about what is the reason for a certain type of action. — Pantagruel

Some people act carefully. Others act recklessly.
— Pantagruel

How would you know, given your curious claim that, "There is no 'standard' of foreseeability"? — Leontiskos

There doesn't have to be a standard for there to be a spectrum. There is no "standard" of colour, but there are lots of colours.

I personally know lots of people that live their lives recklessly and whose "intentions" routinely cause all kinds of havoc and produce all kinds of "unintended consequences". One such person was directly responsible for the death of my fiance by being an unfit driver. I'm not inclined to pursue this further because it is so trivially evident. We are not masters of intentionality and causality such that we are capable of surgically creating only the results we intend. The consequences of our imperfect intentionality abound in the tragic mess that humans have made of their world.

unforeseeable — Leontiskos

There is no "standard" of foreseeability. Some people act carefully. Others act recklessly. Many people think that they know what they are doing and do not. We do not live in a world where we go around executing "transactional" events that are over and done with. It isn't realistic. It is an invalid abstraction to view intentional action in this "A causes B and over" sense.

This is exactly the kind of false "insular causality" reasoning that leads to the debacle of externalized costs destroying the biosphere. Along with whatever other unfortunate accidents you'd care to add.

:up:

Just because something is caused by something done intentionally, it does not follow that that effect was intentional. You are forgetting or omitting that intentionality is about what is being aimed at---not what happens.

If I am aiming with a bow an arrow at a bullseye target, and I miss fire and hit a deer of which I had no clue was somewhere behind the target; then I did not thereby intentionally hit the deer even though it follows from the causal chain which derives back to an intentional action. According to you, it would be intentional. — Bob Ross

You have misdirected my rebuttal by mis-characterizing it. Intentionality is not just about what is aimed at, it is also about what is the reason for a certain type of action. My point is that, whatever action you do, you are not always - not often - in a position where you can determine that exactly and only what you want to happen will happen. You may intend to help a co-worker get a promotion by doing some of his work for him. Only to have the boss discover you did it and give the promotion to you instead. Or, as I said, you may hit someone because you are mad at him. Then he goes home and hits his wife because, after a bad day, your blow was the straw that broke the camels back.

Intentional causality is often done with an imperfect knowledge and therefore, even when it "works" often has additional unexpected effects. This is exactly what companies who choose to disregard "externalized costs" do. And it is a poor choice all around. If a company disregards externalized costs, then the explicitly choose not to manage the ongoing consequences of their actions. Which means that, the system in which they are involved (the ongoing project of exploiting resources for example) they have elected not to manage some of the results of their actions, the consequence of which can only be that that system can never be made stable (by their actions).

What do you think an “intention” is? If a consequence of something intended is accidental, then it was unintentional: that’s what it means for it to be accidental. — Bob Ross

If I push someone around because I am bigger and stronger, and that person then goes and pushes another because he is upset that I pushed him around and that third person then kills himself, there is arguably a causal link there. I think it is very salient to recognize that actions inherently transcend intentions in their scope. Hence Descartes' observation that the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding.

It is completely unrealistic to envision that when we intend to do something the results will be exactly what we envision. Some corporations entire business model is structured around "externalized costs" - i.e. things that they cause to happen but don't happen to want to assume responsibility for.

The paradox here is that if someone has 'bad faith' how can we tell? This is because the very idea of 'bad faith' is a being-in-itself created by a being-for-itself. What one person may point at as a system of oppression or bad faith may very well be doing so in bad faith.

How can this gap be closed, if at all? — I like sushi

Is it even relevant for people to know or say of others that they are in bad-faith? As you point out, it is an 'internal' concept.

Perhaps the cafe waiter who truly aspires to be the best cafe waiter possible is not in fact in bad faith at all. Sartre's biography of Saint Genet (Jean Genet) would seem to bear out this interpretation. Genet embraced the judgements of society that were heaped upon him (which is what makes him an existential 'saint').

Could Karma be the expression of basic physical laws of motion emerging/permeating into the sphere of sophisticated societal dynamics? — Benj96

Sure.

Perhaps free will and determinism both exist as a mutual duality/ neccessary dichotomy — Benj96

And I think this is the rational approach. Human beings do act "automatically" in the sense that they enact their own physical "habits", but they can also (to varying degrees) modify their own habits. Life isn't "transactional" it is cyclical. We are constantly re-enacting in a kind of cybernesis into which free will can be injected, with varying degrees of success depending on the individual.

My main point is just that accidents, by definition, cannot be intentional. That's categorically incoherent to posit. — Bob Ross

But is something accidental if it not only could have but should have been forseen? People manifest different degrees of "epistemic responsibility." Is there an objective standard separating accident from culpability?

Unintended consequences are not necessarily accidental, only unforseen.

I think this issue is good for revealing how people think and what biases they have. Notice how each participant in this thread has their own take on what it means. — frank

Absolutely. The core of Scepticism revolves around the recognition of deep (epistemic) subjective relativism, which extends so far as to be able to shape what we are able to perceive. Which is why Scepticism touts the suspension of judgement to the greatest extent possible.

It sounds like you're equating freedom with potential. That's an interesting take. — frank

How do you mean exactly? Certainly, I'm construing it within the composite framework of the subject-object system. As such, it is measurable and quantifiable. More radically, I think it may be a feature that is "conferred" by subjectivity on the system. But it is still in evidence as a systemic feature.

I guess you mean that if I have the knowledge to build a bridge, it makes it easier for me to cross the river, and so I'm more free? — frank

Yes, that would be one way of describing it. Phase space is a physical characterization of the possible states of a system. A bicycle-rider system can assume various trajectories in phase space - i.e. rolling along the path that is defined by the rotation of its wheels, the turning of its handlebars, etc. But a bicycle ridden by someone who knows how to ride a bicycle has more possibilities - more degrees of freedom - than one ridden by someone who doesn't know how to ride a bicycle.

Doesn't that seem circular to you? The proof for free will is in the institutions predicated on the presumption of free will. — Vera Mont

The proof isn't in the institutions, it is in my immediate perceptions. If I tried to lift my arm, and it didn't elevate, then I would wonder. If I was paralyzed, then if I tried to think a thought, and I didn't think that thought, then I would wonder. Except no, I wouldn't wonder, because, per the thought experiment, the intention of the thought and the realization of that intention would not coincide. Ergo I would not be thinking the thought I am thinking. Which is absurd. Cogito ergo sum.

I would ask someone who believes you don't have free will "What is stopping your will from being free? — Igitur

I agree. The evidence is so overwhelmingly on the side of freedom of will (it is the basis of all law, qua responsibility for actions, which is the foundation of civilization) that the burden of proof is certainly on the side of the unfree....

What's instrumental value? Could you give an example? — frank

Sure. If you know Archimedes principle of the lever then you can lift something you otherwise couldn't. Practical knowledge is inherently instrumental. In doing so, it creates a greater "degree of freedom" in the system - i.e. it expands the phase space of the system that includes it.

Doesn't the condition that there is no free-will exclude the possibility of the instrumentality of belief, and therefore of knowledge? And yet knowledge clearly has instrumental value.

Also, what would be the practical consequence of knowing that one has no free-will? It would seem that the answer must be, none.

Finally, what is the motivation for even asking the question? The only one that I can think of is "denial of responsibility for the consequences of ones' actions."

I would further call attention to the fact that the earliest conceptions of "god" were of animistic spirits of particular natural phenomena (whose causes were not understood). Suggesting that the idea of god is really, in its most general form, about whatever is "occult" (i.e. hidden) at the time. Since science continuously redefines the boundaries of the occult, it is only reasonable that the idea of "god" should likewise evolve.

Additionally, the whole foray down the tangent of theism is misdirected. Most major religions include a core "monastic tradition" whose emphasis is decidedly on the individual experience of the divine, not on the narrative details of scriptures. Arguably, monks, and not priests, are the keepers of the faith. Priests are just the popularizers.

Anything that isn't a contradiction is possible. It doesn't then follow that it is not reasonable to believe that some possibilities are true and some are false. — Michael

Yes, that is precisely my point. As I said, my experiences on earth have included events indicative of meaningful connections that transcend current scientific explanations. It is a very well-known fact that cognitive predispositions can dramatically affect not only how events are experienced, but whether they are even observed at all. If your experience doesn't support the inference, then it doesn't. Is it because you have a pre-existing bias that is preventing recognition?

I'm currently reading some classical Scepticism. It is a powerful presentation of the benefits of the rationale of "suspending judgement". I highly recommend.

I would say that it is reasonable to believe that Zeus does not exist, that Odin does not exist, that Shiva does not exist, that Allah does not exist, that Yahweh does not exist, and that a supernatural intelligent creator deity does not exist. — Michael

And I already provided the example by way of analogy with the theory of the atom. We have no problem seeing Democritus' theory as a "precursor" to a more cogent theory that evolves in light of the progress of civilization. What possible reason could there be for not allowing for the same possibility with respect to theories about "transcendental entities"?

I'm asking you why a narrative that is from the limited human-centric perspective cannot both be inaccurate but also refer to something that in fact exists. Assuming which, yes, the claim that Zeus does not exist (qua "any possible deity") is not logical, that is, is not warranted.

As I maintained early on, the "story of god" has as much right to evolve as does the "story of the atom". Only a fool would deny quantum theory by refuting Democritus.

P1. Zeus does not exist
P2. Odin does not exist
P3. Shiva does not exist
P4. None of the Greek, Norse, or Hindu deities exist — Michael

Is the "Sun" of the geocentric cosmology the same as the "Sun" of the Heliocentric cosmology?

If you say no, then possibly Odin does not exist. If you say yes, than any and all references to any and all transcendent beings are logically flexible in the same way.

Do you just mean that the proposition "no deities exist" is insufficiently justified? — Michael

You could state it thus. This is the problem with symbolic logic, the elevation of form over content. Existence is not purely logical. Certainly quantum physics is not, as many quantum phenomena transcend traditional logic.

So, yes, it is not "logically substantiated" to arrive at the conclusion that "no deities exist." Whereas, based on the experiences I have had of a kind of overarching meaningfulness, I have at least some kind of empirical basis for intuiting the operation of "occult" (literally, hidden or concealed) connections between events that could be consistent with something like the existence and operation of a transcendent entity.

No, atheism is not illogical. The proposition "no deities exist" is not a contradiction. — Michael

Doing the same action repeatedly expecting a different result is not a contradiction either, but it is illogical. The logic of human actions is not entirely compassed by formal symbolic logic. But if I had to put it in propositional form I would say:
1. The universe is full of things that are beyond human comprehension.
2. Some of those things might be deities.
3. Therefore the proposition that no deities exist is illogical.

Show me where this thread is about the defining attributes of "theism".
— Pantagruel
Non sequitur. — 180 Proof

It's a non sequitur to argue within the stated parameters of the question? That is a very strange conception of logic indeed. Which IS precisely to the heart of the stated parameters of the question.

But again, as to your idiosyncratic characterization of theism (as a complete tangent), the burden of proof is, of course, on you to establish that your framework is valid. I challenge you to provide an authoritative source corresponding with your views. In addition to which, I did provide the counter-examples you demanded (to which you once again failed to respond).

Whatever might be the specific details of any and all theistic religions are incidental to the salient fact, which is the possibility of the existence of the deity at the core of theisms. And THAT most certainly is what is in question, per the OP. The Aztecs, Egyptians, and Greeks all incorporated sun-worship in their pantheon, with vast differences in detail. But there is no question that they were all talking about the same sun.

Cite any deity-tradition, sir, that you consider 'theistic' and that does not conceptualize its (highest) deity with these attributes, or claims. :chin: — 180 Proof

I'll go you one better. Show me where this thread is about the defining attributes of "theism".

This thread is about whether atheism is illogical. Atheism isn't about refuting theism. Atheism is a disbelief in the existence of god or gods.

I continue to dispute that theisms accord with your ad hoc criteria. Simply put, your criteria don't appear in any definitions of theism. The "ultimate mystery" condition is completely vague, therefore meaningless. Being "morally worthy of worship" isn't true. The gods of the Greek pantheon exhibited no such consistent morality. Nor the Egyptian. As I said, that is about what humans think about gods, not what gods might be in and of themselves.

But all of that is moot, since none of that is relevant to the belief in "the existence of god" which is black letter by definition atheism. Which just goes to show, I guess, how illogical some atheists are prepared to be in defense of their dogma.