Most likely I’d trust the person who makes no appeals to unknown worlds or powers and takes seriously the status of an ongoing physical world. Perhaps this comes from hours spent arguing with Christians who say climate change either isn’t real or doesn’t matter because God has it all under control. Generally the people who you have described as ‘when you’re dead, you’re gone’ hold a concomitant belief - ‘this is the only world there is so we must take care of it.’ But no doubt there are outliers in all camps. — Tom Storm

I didn't really suggest it was an appeal. Rather, an underlying factor or condition for evaluating an inherent quality of human motivation. Perhaps it is an exaggeration. Perhaps not. But I think what you are describing is counter-intuitive. I see a lot of materialism consuming, polluting, and destroying. I don't see a lot of "materialist conservation." I do see a lot of spiritually motivated conservation efforts, people who are aware of the significance of the health of natural systems in a cosmic sense.

China has the largest buddhist population in the world, but this doesn’t seem to have prevented them from also being the world’s highest emitter of carbon, surpassing the U.S. So much for ongoing responsibility for deeds. — Joshs

I'm thinking more of the propagation of values at and through the level of individual interaction. The translation of that core credibility into the social arena is another issue. Western politics is rife with examples of individuals feigning alignment with communities of transcendental values only to promote their own basest interests.

I can imagine a Transcendentalist who doesn't care about the future because we reap our benefits in heaven, and a materialist who does because they realize that those are their family members and they are committed to family. — Moliere

Yes, there are nuances and flavours, but I do believe the essence of the reasoning holds. I agree, if you see your offspring as a continuation. I'd argue that is a form of transcendentalism. I think the only form of transcendentalism that would be responsibility-immune would be some kind of crazy-Calvinistic notion that salvation is pre-ordained. If you keep it simple, to the belief in an "ongoing," it is hard to escape the burdens and benefits of accepting full responsibility for the ultimate consequences of your behaviours.

touche

As I said, it was a sidebar on a second thread, in which I referred in the same way to a third thread. Anyway...

"I am sorry for having disturbed your (dogmatic?) slumber. I will let you get back to your ideas now."
~The World

That was a reply to some observations made by some other people. It was contextually relevant to their posts and alluded to an interaction on another thread, which isn't uncommon. And yes, I concur with 180 Proof that there isn't any reason to doubt the existence of the world - certainly not more than there would be to doubt your own reasons for doubting it, at any rate.

That clear things up?

No one would agree with you — Corvus

So far you are the only one I hear. As far as I can see, I am bang on topic. It isn't like it's some abstruse tangent. It's literally the title of your post. If you want to dispute the reasoning, fine. If the thought of what I said upset you, I am sorry. It wasn't intended to be rude in any way.

edit. I see this has gone down before. At which time you said you weren't responsible for making someone leave the discussion. Funny how your attitude changes when it is "your" discussion.



Given this, there is no way that you will be able to understand Austin. You've just got the perception stuff far too embedded in your thinking. It's a bit sad that you have been so mislead, but them's the breaks.

You do know that the world continues while you sleep. Right up until you try to do philosophy.

So I might leave this conversation there.
— Banno

There is a difference between having no logical ground of believing in the existence of X, and the actual existence of X. Please think about it carefully again. Leaving is fine. It just confirms you ran out of the ideas for the arguments. What can anyone do about it?

How is anything I said emotional?

Like I said, you are never not perceiving the world. If your mind is operating, it is "in touch with the world". The fact that I don't see it when I close my eyes does not surprise me, nor should it. Just because you don't continuously see "exactly the same set of things" doesn't mean that "the world" has in anyway ceased to exist or become dubious. You are just continuing to perceive it in a different way.

Not sure if this poster has read even single book on Philosophy in his whole life. Sounds like just making random statements on nothing. — Corvus

Because I said you are never not perceiving the world?

I agree. We are trying to see the arguments either to prove, disprove or the question is illogical itself. The conclusions will only be evident from good arguments. But still I felt bringing experience to the argument sounded too solipsistic.

And the main topic OP is not to prove the existence of the World. But trying to see the arguments for believing in the existence of the world when not perceiving it. — Corvus

Think about what this says. "Prove that there is a world". Whatever doubts exist with respect to the existence of the world likewise exist with respect to any proofs which you might append to that. As to believing in the world when not perceiving it, you are always perceiving something. So just because you don't continue to see the back of something when you move to the front is no warrant to believe the back disappeared. If you are completely unconscious, having no cognitions of any kind, it is just as likely that you have ceased to exist as has the world. In fact, the former seems more likely.

there aren't any compelling grounds to doubt the existence of world. — 180 Proof

Just so.

Frankly this thread is a manifestation of ↪Ciceronianus's question concerning affectation. — Banno

That's funny. I said the same thing with respect to the thread on empirical normativity. Which goes to show you that consensus forms an integral component of cognition.

If your claim is that here is an implicit ought in (1) then you seem also to be reiterating objection 2 from the article. Yes, you ought to keep your promises - that's a fact about what a promise is - and a mere tautology. — Banno

That is the whole point about promising. It is a voluntary binding of the is and the ought. It isn't trivial. It is the voluntary human enaction which bridges the is-ought gap. Not language. The entire concept of normativity is not just to identify, but to actualize. You can derive completely different oughts from virtually identical is statements just by the addition of one statement.

Tom sees a child about to be hit by a bus.
Tom has only one day left to live.
Tom ought to push the child out of the way, sacrificing himself.

Tom sees a child about to be hit by a bus.
Tom has only one day left to live.
The child just contracted a deadly new form of avian flu that will decimate the population.
Tom ought to let the child die.

The linguistic argument assumes that conditions can be exhaustively elaborated, which is misleading. Even when they can the statements apparently logically entail, it isn't linguistic, it is just a fact of historical consensus about fundamental behaviours. Yes, "promise" implies a binding of behaviour to language. That doesn't mean that language entails behaviour. It doesn't.

I know meditation has been proven to be useful, but nirvana/moksha isn’t that. You can meditate all your life and still never reach nirvana. A lot of people seem to conflate beneficial religious practices with the goals of religions / way of life — Sirius

And this is why it is all about your expectations and your goals. Whether those are conformant or consistent with the goals of the community of practice can only be decided by you. In general, advanced spiritual training usually involves the active setting aside of personal preferences as one inherent aspect of the practice. It doesn't sound like that meshes with your goals.

My point is, are you asking because the tradition appeals to you, but you find it too challenging? Or because you are seeking an alternative? Or is this merely a criticism? You say "what is more terrible". This suggests to me that you have a negative disposition towards the types of practices associated with the pursuit of moksha. In which case, this particular goal isn't for you. It isn't terrible, it simply isn't for you. Why do you feel compelled to defend your choice not to pursue this particular type of goal? For some people it isn't terrible at all. Brain scans of meditating buddhist monks have demonstrated there are remarkable things going on in their minds.

Do you think that the answer to this question is (or should be) the same for everyone?

Even if this is so, the issue is that the fact of the utterance implies the obligation. — Banno

The fact of the obligation implies the obligation, not the utterance. The utterance is secondary. The real statement of facts is:

Jones borrowed five dollars from Smith.
Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The verbalizations memorialize the normative force, they don't create it.

Determinism is true. So folk cannot be responsible for their criminal actions. Thus, we ought not punish folk for their criminal actions. — Richard B

We punish people for their actions. Ergo determinism is false.

I think this is mistaken. My hunch is that a satisfactory accounting of intentionality will include an explanation of the way perspective and semiotic elements of reality are "baked in" from the outset. Scott Mueller's "Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information," and Carlo Rovelli's "Helgoland," have some interesting points on this front. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I just grabbed the Kindle of Incomplete Nature, it looks excellent. Unfortunately the Mueller books is $$$! Maybe there is a PDF floating around....

Correct. If I promise to do something it presupposes I have decided already that is the right thing to do. The only way to make it an is would be to disconnect it from the agent. But you can't do that proactively. You can say, Jones owed Smith five dollars. You can say Jones paid smith five dollars. Those are factual statements. Saying "Jones uttered the words" however is just a sneaky way of trying to make an already normative statement "factual".

Doesn't the fact that Jones makes a verbal promise to pay suggest that the normative force precedes the statement, rather than being derived from it?

According to a prominent line of thought, the notion of correctness involved in the seemingly platitudinous claim that meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application is intrinsically normative. — Sirius

Hmm. Saying that a meaningful expression inherently contains its own context of correct application is "normative" is not the same kind of normativity which applies to behaviour, at least not trivially so. A meaningful expression could "rightfully" be interpreted to mean "this man must be executed," but the agent is still free to disregard this claim. The disregarding would be an example of real normativity overriding this "semantic normativity". Which doesn't seem normative to me at all in any kind of significant or "meaningful" way.....

There is another thread on when philosophy becomes affectation. This makes me think of that.

Exactly.

:up:

Language itself is normative — Sirius

Language can be used to make normative statements.. Stating that language is normative is overreaching. Normativity describes a standard of behaviour. To the extent that behaviour and language do not necessarily coincide, language absolutely is not normative.

A poor child comes to you and spreads his hand saying, "I am starving" , you can derive the implication from his statement, "You should give me ( a poor child ) some money" . He is not just stating a fact, "I am starving" , he is begging for help and expecting you to be a kind person. — Sirius

I completely agree that this we can and should contextually interpret such things as requests. One hundred percent. I have made the point myself. But there is a difference between the illocutionary utterance (the declaration) and the interpretation whereby that utterance gains normative force. The request itself does not have that normative force. This is precisely where the "gap" occurs.

Perhaps if you specified exactly what "Ought" you are deriving I might be able to offer a more specific argument. If you are suggesting that "You should kill Tom" is an ought, I would respond that this is nothing more than an example of an illocutionary act (command by the boss) and that the perlocutionary effect consists of the hitman's response to the command. If this is your definition of the meaning of an "ought" then, logically, any time anyone tells us to do something and we accept, the conditions for normativity have been satisfied, which is absurd.

A command is not the same thing as a moral ought. An ought is something that we do "because it is right" not because we are commanded to do it by another person.

How does it follow from your premises that the statements (already) exist? — Echarmion

Yes. You would have to establish some kind of necessary connection between the existence of a necessary truth and the existence of the conditions that make the necessary truth true.

I do agree that necessary truths implicate a cognizer though.

The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird Stories
H.P. Lovecraft

Mmm. Yes and no. Being-for-others itself can be genuine. Perhaps someone acts bravely, even to the point of self-sacrifice, catalyzed by the gaze of the group. There is an inescapable honesty in solitary thought, but there can also be the revelation of a publicly discovered truth. I think that commitment is the differentiator; and I agree that a lot of gratuitous philosophizing smacks of affectation.

My view is that determinism must be true. — RepThatMerch22

The notion of truth and falsity are inapplicable in a completely deterministic context. The fact that you are able to offer a statement about the truth or falsity of something means that your capacity for making a statement must, at bare minimum, not be subject to determinism.

@Bob Ross Do you believe that ethical reasoning ought to be effective in influencing actual moral behaviour? Or does it simply exist for the purpose of providing post hoc justifications? If actual moral practices are not directly affected by ethical analysis, of what merit is the analysis?

The early Confucian philosopher Hsun Tzu holds that man's original nature is bad or imperfect. Thus man desires improvement in the same way that anyone who lacks something beneficial desires to increase it. So stupidity would be not desiring to correct one's own deficits.

Galactic Patrol
E.E. "Doc" Smith

A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
Wing-Tsit Chan, Translator

Pre-Confucianism to Neo-Rationalism. Should be...enlightening.

Similarly, even if a super-intelligent alien showed us a page from "The True Nature of Reality", we could never make sense of it. — RussellA

Yes, if man tried to explain the universe to an amoeba it wouldn't translate.

But essentially, the amoeba eventually becomes a man. So maybe it does happen?

As a cat cannot transcend the physical limitations of its brain, neither can a human. — RussellA

But, for the cat's brain to actually register something, that thing has to already fit with its perceptual schema. There is an experiment I keep citing where a meaningless tone that is within the cat's audible hearing range is played, but the cat's brain does not appear to register having heard the tone. Subsequently, after the tone is associated with something meaningful, the cat's brain will display the signature of auditory stimulation.

So it is "mechanically" possible that there are exactly such unregistered events as Corvus is postulating. With what concomitant causes, who is to say?

James has a unique approach to interpreting the connection between beliefs and reality. Materialism, for example, is not so much a fact about the universe as it is a fact about the way a certain type of person lives his life. What is a fact? In the limit, it is an isolable quantum of human experience, "this redness now." As soon as you start to expand that momentary quale, to generalize it, you lose the only true measure of facticity, its givenness. So maybe your fact becomes gravity. Then whether the quale was an apple or the planet mars, what is evidenced is the facticity of gravity. But the momentary expression of gravity in both cases is not a pure or simple thing. The apple falls under the composite influences of gravity, air pressure, coriolis force, etc.. And while the path of the planet seems to be a straightforward exemplification of the law of gravity, that is only an illusion of approximation. The three-body problem has no closed solution.

Materialism relies upon rationality for its facticity. But rationalism and idealism too are also facts insofar as they are embodied by people....

Pragmatism
by William James

The lyrics of "The Boxer" by Paul Simon are often appropriate when discussing beliefs, facts, and reality.

Still, a man hears what he wants to hear
And disregards the rest — Agree-to-Disagree

I prefer the Doobies,

But what a fool believes he sees
No wise man has the power to reason away
What seems to be
Is always better than nothing