:up:

One physical dimension that does interest me is the relationship between entropy and time. Usually, it is theoretically possible to trace any number of paths in any given context. However it seems like the arrow of time might be fundamentally related to the physical gradient of entropy. However the universe doesn't just align itself to the gradient of maximum entropy. There are discrete relativistic frames with - possibly - discrete timelines. And negentropic gradients exist within those frames. Does negentropy entail some kind of divergence of of temporality from its fundamental gradient? Stuff like that.

This doesn't correlate with my intuitions of time. It seems to reflect an inherently reductive mechanistic ontology (which would be reasonable for a physicist). And the correlation of the intuition of time and ontology was something Cassirer mentions. Certainly, from the standpoint of "pure objectivity" time is illusory.....

Yes. My strongest intuition of the meaning of the nature of time as we experience it might be summed in this excerpt of my favourite passage (by Fichte):

Shall I eat and drink only that I may hunger and thirst and eat and drink again, till the grave which is open beneath my feet shall swallow me up, and I myself become the food of worms? Shall I beget beings like myself, that they too may eat and drink and die, and leave behind them beings like themselves to do the same that I have done? To what purpose this ever-revolving circle, this ceaseless and unvarying round, in which all things appear only to pass away, and pass away only that they may re-appear unaltered; — this monster continually devouring itself that it may again bring itself forth, and bringing itself forth only that it may again devour itself? This can never be the vocation of my being, and of all being. There must be something which exists because it has come into existence; and now endures, and cannot again re-appear, having once become such as it is. And this element of permanent endurance must be produced amid the vicissitudes of the transitory and perishable, maintain itself there, and be borne onwards, pure and inviolate, upon the waves of time.

The sensation of the meaning of time contains not only trivial empirical-causal elements, but the awareness of being part of a culture, a species, a world, a universe. Right now I'm reading a chapter called "Intuition of Time" in Cassirer's Phenomenology of Cognition. It woke me up early this morning. A lot of times, I find reading about time to be...frustrating. It's as Augustine said: What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know.

Cassirer mentions that different types of metaphysical systems correspond with differing types of temporal intuition, which I think is accurate. He says Parmenides and Spinoza embody the "present type" while Fichte is determined by futurity. Personally, I am exploring the idea that, while objects may have a temporal position, consciousness actually has a temporal "size." Objects are three dimensional and moving through or in time, as it were. But consciousness actually exists in the past, present and future, has actual temporal dimension. An intuition.

Also I said intuition is limited to the area of knowledge you are using it in. Without any knowledge to draw on you're just tossing a coin. — Darkneos

But this can't be entirely true. Strictly speaking, there hasn't always been discursive knowledge. I would say there is a pre-discursive intuition, which is a general kind of knowing how. Like a proto-human who is expert at hurling stones. He doesn't have a discursive understanding of gravity, or ballistics, but he does have an intuitive grasp of these things. Then there is a post-discursive intuition, in which the subject-matter of discursive understanding itself can become an object of the intuitive faculty. Intuition fills in the blanks.

For example, people intuitively want to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Scientific thought seems to chide this. In fact, relative to any particular object, a more massive object is more strongly attracted than a less massive object, so this intuition has a substantial basis. The intuitive truth is simply not perceptible at human scales and conditions.

Not sure about "transcends". I talked about this in wonderer1's thread, the difference between not reported and not reportable, and the difference between not reportable in principle and not reportable as a practical matter. I get the feeling you're alive to the issues here, hence the careful phrasing. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I said if not transcends meaning as a limitation. That's the funny thing about language. If you're not careful, it can sound like the opposite of what you mean.

I have an further example in mind, but I want to think on it a bit further....

Excellent example. To me it seems that socialization is the supreme 'art.' — plaque flag

For sure. My second wife is a master of sociability. I emulate her as much as possible. It's an art but it can be learned.

That’s not what the research shows again. Without any sort of training or knowledge it’s no better than a coin toss. — Darkneos

I don't think you read my reply. I agreed with you, intuition is integrally related to knowledge. I just don't see it as a trivial occurrence.

May I ask your background? Based on our earlier discussion I can see that you are scientifically insightful. — wonderer1

Sure. Academically I have university courses in maths, physics, and astronomy, a degree in literature with a minor in philosophy (one course shy of a major). I also have a college diploma in programming and have been a computer systems administrator and analyst since 1996. Currently I'm an electronic medical records specialist and privacy officer.

Fundamentally, I am a melioristic-optimist. I believe that human actions have a real effect on the universe; and, all things being equal, assuming capability (and responsibility) is inherently more reasonable that pessimistically denying it.

It’s not my intuitions about it it’s just the simple fact. Even what you cited before about observing people lots of times it’s knowledge, knowledge of body language.

You’re making it more than it actually is which is something a lot of people like to do.

Intuition is rooted in knowledge — Darkneos

Interesting. You may be making less of it than it actually is. I fully agree that intuition is related to knowledge in that one is always intuiting something in some context, and that the more detailed knowledge you have, the more intuitive knowledge becomes possible. But it is the entire nature of intuition that it extends if not transcends the current limits of what can be discursively extracted from the context. The expert diagnosis of a very experienced MD versus an intern for example.

Still, if you can cite something discussing a practically implementable information processing system which maintains analog fidelity, I'd be interested in taking a look. — wonderer1

Yes, I'm aware of the eventual loss of accuracy that results from extensive analog processing. I'm talking at a purely theoretical level where what is being processed by the neural network is already pre-sliced data. My hypothesis would be that the brain in fact operates simultaneously in a way that is analogous to digital processing (when "conceptually-constrained" information is processed) and also in a way that is more analog in nature (since, qua organic entity, we are, in fact, in contact with the universe at an "analog" level). And that intuition can be productively construed as an exploitation of information that may be embedded in our "overall sensory input" but not as yet conceptually construed. I gave the example of a cat's brain, which exhibits no indicative activity in response to a certain "hearable" tone until such time as that tone is paired with a recognized event. Thereafter, the tone is "heard" (manifests in brain activity).

Simply considering the fact that our visual system relies on discrete rod and cone cells, producing outputs in the form of spike trains, points towards ideal analog representations not being what our brains have to work with. — wonderer1

That fact that the visual system is already highly evolved and differentiated doesn't mean there aren't other aspects of exploitable analogicity. The complexity of actual connections between things in the world is anybody's guess. I'm certainly not limiting the possibilities to whatever might be the current state of the human visual system. It works well enough, for a bipedal ape.

Also, it's not exactly the case that "digitization only encodes what it is specifically designed to encode". There is a trivial sense in which that is true, in that digital hardware is designed to encode bit states and can only encode bit states. However, it is very much the case that digitally instantiated artificial neural networks, after training on whatever inputs were provided to the ANN, will have a great many bit states which were not determined by the designer — wonderer1

I am not talking about bit states, I am talking about the objective data (information) which is digitally encoded. Since data is being specifically symbolically encoded, digital neural networks have only that known data to work with. Versus an analog system which works with a "signal" whose total data properties are not necessarily so restricted. You can talk about bit states being "information", it is a level of abstraction below that at which artificial neural nets actually operate, part of the underlying mechanism and addressed via back-propagation, which is a function of error-correction, which is determined at the top informational level.

Looks like Nicolai Hartmann is another punitively priced author. I bought a couple on ontology for $110, but volume 1 and 2 of his Ethics are nearly $80 apiece. So they'll have to wait. Great perspective on the mind-body psuedo-problem it seems.

Barnaby Rudge
by Charles Dickens

:up: Thanks for your reply. I take it that ‘analog = intuition’ and ‘digital = analytical’? — 0 thru 9

I think intuition exploits analogicity, yes, which analytic thinking cannot do since it involves working with an unknown.

I think it is the consequentialism that leads you to believe, cynically, that personal moralities tend to (and intend to) control others socially.

I cannot agree and find your analysis specious because there are people who do not approach morality from the perspective of consequentialism. They wish to act right no matter the fee-fees of some person, with no care for the consequences or social costs, and with no desire or goal of controlling others. — NOS4A2

:up:

And of that immense amount we are able to ‘collect’, there must be more that is somehow beyond us. Stuff that perhaps animals can detect, or highly sensitive equipment. — 0 thru 9

Yes. Analog vs digital collection and processing of information becomes interesting in this respect. Analog collection of information captures an actual "imprint" of the real world. In which sense, there may actually be information captured which is unexpected or unknown. Neural networks are able to exploit such "hidden" information and extrapolate hidden connections. In fact, that is more or less exactly how they work. By contrast, digitization only encodes what it is specifically designed to encode.

I don't want to distract from the OP, which I think stands on its own as an important topic. The mechanics of belief and knowledge covers a lot of ground.

But then, in humans, everything rational is constitutive of consciousness, so in that respect, there is nothing particularly significant in merely holding some belief or another. — Mww

Again, here we must agree to disagree. Which I hold to be a significant difference. :wink:

Our senses take in a huge spectrum of information all the time. We only successfully process a small portion of that spectrum. Increasing our knowledge is one way to increase the portion of the spectrum we process.

At a purely neural level, an experiment showed that a cat's brain did not even register the input from a tone within its auditory range until that tone was subsequently paired with a significant event (feeding). So there could be sensory cues of which we are unaware but which could contribute to this kind of performative intuition.....

Nahhh…I’m not getting into the belief/knowledge mudhole — Mww

Roger that. For my part, I favour a radical view of belief. I believe that belief is constitutive of consciousness in a real and fundamental sense, hence my contention of the importance of an "ontological commitment" validating that a belief is genuinely held.

As you said, a matter for another time.

:up:

Well, falling back on the traditional, "true belief based on sufficient evidence," the sufficiency of the evidence constitutes part of the knowledge.

We’re saying the same thing for all practical purposes, in language two centuries apart.

Except for the trust part; that I can’t reconcile with disparities in language. My problem, not yours. — Mww

Well, knowledge is essentially self-justifying, right? It contains the framework of its own validation. Intuition doesn't. So what other option is there?

Actually, this is probably what you meant to say. There is an idealized model of the information received from perception, it even has its own name; intuition constructs the model but does not use it, hence, the notion of being a bridge. — Mww

Without delving too deeply into the informational aspect, what I wanted to emphasize was the way that intuition bridges the gap between the ideal-theoretical and the actual, especially as that relates to the need to operate and enact in the real world. I'm not saying information is unimportant, but information is inextricable from symbolization or encoding, and what I'm suggesting is that intuition is integral to the cognition of the differential between the concrete totality and its only-ever-partial or approximate conceptual cognition.

As for the trust being misplaced, good intuition is effective, so being committed to the accuracy of one's intuitions is an ontic-epistemological commitment. If I really believe in the truth of something, that is a practical commitment. Hypothetical truths are empty. Consciousness does not just believe truths, it instantiates them.

Very interesting. Doesn't this reflect the distinction between mathematical idealisation and reality? The former allows for complete precision as a matter of definition, of which the reality is always an approximation. (I have in mind the argument from equality in the Phaedo.) — Wayfarer

I think mathematics could be construed as the extreme limit of ideal-theoretical symbolization? The golden ratio appears in organic forms, but these instantiations are close approximations to the mathematical ideal.

As you've probably noticed, I like to try to view things as concisely as possible.

Doesn't this really fall under the general rubric of a standard of rationality, and rational discourse? Because there are dimensions and appeals of discourse and rhetoric that can temper the importance of truth (or logic or accuracy). For example, if there is a significant discrepancy of objective knowledge, a truth may have to be cast in metaphorical or approximate terms. Like explaining reproduction or gravity to a five year old.

:100: Old school. — Wayfarer

Discursive or conceptual cognition operates by casting concrete particulars in symbolic terms, which relies on general concepts or universals. But there is always a gap between the ideal rational cognition made possible by symbolic thought and the concrete totality. I remember being very struck by this when I moved from the high-school physics of vectors and formulas to university physics, where the plethora of approximations involved in real-world calculations were suddenly being considered.

So intuition is what bridges the gap between the cognitions made possible within discursive thought, and the reality that is being cognized. In essence, it is about making estimates that are based on information that is extracted from an idealized model of your perceptions. And allowing yourself to trust that faculty is also part of intuition.

So right & wrong, fair & unfair, and concepts of justice aren't part of morality? — Judaka

Right and wrong are evaluations made of actions that are judged to take place in the context of morality. So you can heed a legitimate cry for help and do right, or ignore the plight of your fellow man and do wrong.

Justice is the interpretation of morality at the social level. One human being doesn't get to be just (unless he is a judge). Also, I think some of what you are discussing might be more ethical - a formal presentation and codification - than moral. For me, morality speaks loudest in actions.

To what extent should consumers be free to make choices about what products and services they consume in the context of neoliberal capitalism? — Judaka

The standard for overriding personal choice is usually public safety (as in the limits of the right to privacy) or the public good. This begs the question of who decides what is the public good. No matter what regulatory policy is put in place, it is guaranteed that some group will reject it. Some people feel that it is inherently safer to open-carry firearms than to restrict them. So asking "should people be free to open-carry firearms" is a loaded question, so to speak, since it is really about having a fundamentally different standard of reason.

Cassirer characterizes intuition as a consonance of being and knowing which bypasses and transcends discursive understanding. It overcomes the limitations of discursive thought and is the basis of metaphysical cognition. I like this view.

I have no idea what "true" morality means, so I just clarified my views on the subject. If we're going to talk past each other, may as well be honest about it. — Judaka

I don't think that there is such a thing as "moral thoughts." You can think about morality. But ultimately only one's actions can be classed as moral. As such, morality is always a specific response to a specific request for support being made either by a specific person or persons or (as society enlarges) made by groups who are suffering under some known systemic burden, an implicit request.

I am not looking for an argument, I am just saying, we can recognize objects as such, that's kind of strange is it not? — NotAristotle

If we were not able to identify objects it is unlikely we would have evolved to our current form.

For example, two trees are green, but I recognize that, despite the similarity in their color tone, they are not the same tree. — NotAristotle

Beyond the cognitive and psychological construal of identity, are you looking for some kind of argument for a logically fundamental category? Our minds are wired to identify things in certain ways.

We perceive objects in contexts, gestalts.
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/waymaker-psychology/chapter/gestalt-principles-of-perception/

↪Manuel Recently observed 'time-dilation in the early universe' might account for JWST's anomalous "six galaxies" ... — 180 Proof

But would this effect have the opposite result? The anomalous galaxies appear much older than they should be?

You might want to look at some gestalt principles. Objects are always embedded in a context. Analogously, what is more fundamental, the word or the sentence? Dictionaries contain words, but the fundamental unit of thought is the sentence. Our object-oriented consciousness may be a modern conceit.

Moral discussions are often couched in terms of "fairness" or "goodness" or other general terms. However moral actions are demanded in very specific circumstances, which may never have been exactly anticipated or discussed. So when you are discussing morality in general terms, you may not be really facilitating moral actions. Which is why people can rationalize not doing the right thing so easily.

I certainly think it's an important aspect of moral discourse. It seems inconceivable to me that one could take the position that X is immoral but not be concerned if anyone actually does X. — ChrisH

But is moral discourse an essential feature of morality? Or only incidental? Do you think morals are more explicit or implicit in nature?

As I see it, the point of a moral position is not simply to defend one's views but, more importantly, to persuade others. — ChrisH

Are you saying that proselytizing is a feature or purpose of morality? Morality is fundamentally performative in nature. The best defense of a moral position is the things that one has in fact chosen to do, consonant with that position.

It has recently been shown, rather convincingly [for me, at least,] that we cannot distinguish between living in a simulation and living in a 'real' universe.

That brings into question whether we can truly know anything at all.

Comments? — Torus34

I guess the empirical cases would be:

1. Someone somewhere knows something or
2. Nobody anywhere knows anything.

It seems pretty self-evident to me that 2 is false. By whatever criterion or standard of knowledge you might pick, it must be the case that somebody knows something. In fact, I would go so far as to argue that everybody knows something.

Personal moral beliefs, though seemingly individualistic, ultimately align with the core features of morality, including social control, emotional responses, and the application of moral principles to oneself and others. I would argue there are very few, if any, notable differences between either approach. — Judaka

This is the thrust of your thesis, correct? So, whatever your personal morality is, it is inherently just? So you are claiming that, regardless of any putative "objective" or "intersubjective" moral code, the implementation of that code is always a matter of personal discretion, ergo the only true morality is a personal morality?