I think that some of the modern, and perhaps not so modern, theological efforts to define evil in terms of goodness (as if evil was nothing but not good) are one of the most profound theological mistakes ever made. This definition of evil is a subversive reification - attempting to attribute existence to an abstraction, thereby denying the independent reality of evil. — Agustino

I agree. I've always found the claim that evil is the privation of the good to be arbitrary. It's just axiomatically asserted with a few paltry examples. Why couldn't evil be real and goodness the absence of it? Why couldn't there be a Form of Evil as the one true reality instead of a Form of the Good?

Once this is affirmed, then God becomes the Creator of the good and of the evil — Agustino

Perhaps you have solved the dilemma (I think that depends on how a lot of the terms you used are defined), but you've failed to provide any compelling reason to worship this God. Why worship a God who deliberately creates evil? Just as we wouldn't follow or admire a human being who caused evil, so we shouldn't do the same of God. It would be morally obligatory to oppose such a being.

I haven't even accused him of being a perennialist and haven't said that perennialism is false, so I don't understand why he feels he's being personally attacked. I also asked him several questions that he hasn't responded to at all.

Anyway, regarding calvinism, I have often said that it is One of the worst and most pathetic world views a human being can hold, and I stand by that. — Beebert

As would I.

"I see only with deep regret that God punishes so many of His children for their numerous stupidities, for which only He Himself can be held responsible; in my opinion, only His nonexistence could excuse Him." — Beebert

Nice quote. In a sense, the Christian mystics and apophatic theologians might agree with him, who often assert that God is beyond being or existence.

This is a philosophy forum. There are many Christian theology forums out there. — Wayfarer

But he doesn't merely proclaim it to be true. If he did, you have a point.

Huston Smith, whom I mentioned, was a living refutation of this assertion. He was born of Methodist missionary parents in China, and maintained a lifelong Christian faith, whilst also being educated in, and practicing, Sufism, Advaita Vedanta and Zen Buddhism. — Wayfarer

This doesn't make him a perennialist. It makes him a Methodist who dabbles in other religious practices. In other words, as a Methodist, he believes in the distinctive truth claims of Christianity.

So long as we're name dropping, I think of someone like W.T. Stace as a paradigmatic example of a perennialist. He didn't formally belong to any religion but thought that all religions propose symbolic structures to describe a single ineffable reality.

You are trying to pretend that I agree with you that nothing follows from perennialism. I'm telling you that your query makes no sense at all. — charleton

Compare the following two quotes:

"Perenialism" and any other set of -isms are not the sort of thing from which a description or exposition of which "LEADS TO", or has things that follow from — charleton

Now, what follows from perennialism? I answer: nothing. — Thorongil

It is extremely ignorant to claim that life is Only a blessing for so many reasons — Beebert

There is a tension between life-affirming optimism and life-denying pessimism that Christianity has never fully resolved. It's witnessed in the books of the Bible, the Church Fathers, and all across the rest of Christian history.

In Augustine's eyes an infant who dies without having been baptized is damned and condemmed to eternal fire. If christians were consequent, it seems to me they would try to do everything in their power to prevent people from having children. Listen to this absurdity; Evangelicals that follow MacArthur and Piper and their line of thought believe in double predestination, that God predetermines before the world began which people are saved and damned only to display his wrath and mercy for the sake of his own "glory". — Beebert

Yes, this is a particularly wicked doctrine that anyone with any moral fiber ought to reject. Even atheism is morally superior to such a Calvinist view, as David Bentley Hart says.

they also claim these two pathetically contradictory things: 1. Abortion is basically the worst sin you can commit. 2. All aborted children go to heaven...
You see, if you believe in double predestination and yet think that all aborted children go to heaven, then abortion should be considered a virtue and a great act it seems to me. Because if you dont abort the child, it will very likely go to hell. — Beebert

Being pro-life, I don't oppose either of these claims, but you are right that they become absurd in light of double predestination.

then why not as well take the next step in to understanding the whole idea of hell as a metaphor? — Beebert

But I would still say that, if it is agreed that hell, as the experience of God's love from a certain perspective, is real, then it can't be metaphorical. What's metaphorical is any language seeming to suggest that God is torturing people in a literal place and the like.

I think that could be generalized and applied to basically any marginal ethical/political point of view, regardless of its validity. Radicals like to pride themselves as being the few noble individuals who fight for justice for the forgotten. And fuck everyone else. — darthbarracuda

Probably so.

Yet that's not my goal at all- fighting for the forgotten, or self-righteous whatever. I'm frankly a bit offended you would try to characterize my argument like that. — schopenhauer1

I don't think he was necessarily talking about you.

I especially went at length to say that the theory isn't meant to be condemning and that it is more aesthetic than moral and that my theory was being characterized in a way that made it moralistic despite my protestations in order to make it a foil for whatever beef you had with "antinatalists" writ large. — schopenhauer1

Is this directed toward me? I still don't understand what "aesthetic anti-natalism" means, if that is in fact your position. I don't see how anti-natalism could be anything other than a moral position.

Thoughts? — Posty McPostface

I said this some time ago:

Let's ask ourselves what "climate change denial" could mean:

- One could deny that the climate literally changes (which no one believes, except maybe people who have never seen daylight).
- One could deny that climate change is in any way affected by human activity.
- One could deny that climate change is largely affected by human activity.
- One could deny that we know enough to make a suitably informed opinion either way with respect to the human impact on climate change or that we have done enough to study it properly.
- One could deny that the effects of climate change are going to be as bad some people predict (given that lots of predictions have already failed miserably).
- One could deny that the government, of all institutions, is uniquely capable of "solving" climate change, whatever its origin may be (that is, one could deny that the government throwing money at the problem would lead to any substantive positive results, given its poor track record of trying to solve other problems with this method).

Leftists like to conflate all of these positions, so that they can brand anyone who doesn't line up exactly with their views on the climate an irrational science hater and pollution/corporation lover, but that's clearly not the case.

My question is what kind of "All loving God" condemns anyone to an eternity of suffering? — Gotterdammerung

The reply will be that you're right, God doesn't condemn anyone. We condemn ourselves. God doesn't throw people into hell so much as we leap there with our own two feet. As Agustino is fond of saying, those in heaven experience the fire of God's love as bliss and those in hell as torment. God's love doesn't change in either case. The bulwark separating God's ability to whisk everyone away to heaven appears to be free will. God cannot violate it without violating his own nature, which it is impossible for him to do.

My conclusion is that afterlife does not exist, but since this has shattering implications to the foundations of almost all religion i shall not delve into the third alternative. (Unless asked). — Gotterdammerung

Lol, what's this alternative? Are you gonna pull a Sartre and say that hell is other people? :P

:D

I find this a painfully ignorant and hostile sentiment. That is what caused the sarcastic response. — Wayfarer

I never intended to be hostile, unless you interpret any perceived opposition to your views as amounting to hostility.

I have a busy day ahead, and I could effortlessly produce 5,000 words on this topic, but I won't have time, so will try and keep it brief. — Wayfarer

:-|

The idea of 'the perennial philosophy' has many precedents but the term 'philosophia perennis' goes back to Leibniz. However he was drawing on the Italian renaissance humanists, among them Ficino and Pico Della Mirandolla, whose Oration on the Dignity of Man was practically a perennialist manifesto.

But they in turn drew on many earlier sources, mainly Platonist or neo-Platonist. Ficino was commissioned to produce Plato's complete works in Latin. (These are all great minds, of whom I only too readily acknowledge my scant learning.)

In the East, the Hindu sages have long held an idea of the 'sanatana dharma' which is the 'eternal faith' of which the Hindu vedas are expressions. But India naturally tends towards pluralism. That is why the Christian missionaries found it so hard to make headway there - throngs would come to their churches, sing hymns, praise God, and then move right next door and do the same for Ganesha or Hanuman. All the Divine, right? (Not forgetting that the Church of St Thomas in Goa is one of the most ancient Christian denominations in existence, founded by the Apostle. Little known fact). — Wayfarer

So far, this is just a genealogy of certain figures apparently associated with perennialism, not a refutation of anything I said. The genealogical approach to religion, incidentally, is employed John Milbank, the titular head of the so called "radical orthodoxy" movement in Christian theology, which you mention later in your post. I must say that I side with Paul Griffiths in the following video on this subject (who, by the way, recently resigned from his post at Duke due to pressures from the leftist thought police, as shown here).



So, how is what you're doing not simply an endless prologue, as even Milbank admits this approach can become? You said my post had defects, but you don't tell me what they are! Instead, you give me genealogies and criticize @Agustino, who hasn't even really featured in this thread.

What irks me about Agostino is the undercurrent of Christian triumphalism — Wayfarer

Why cannot he claim that what he takes to be true is, in fact, true? What's wrong with "triumphalism?" To the extent that he does display it and that you do not mean to use the term purely pejoratively, he doesn't do so for no reason. You seem to be assuming some kind of malevolence that may not be and, I suspect in his case, is not there.

accompanied by crypto-facist political tendencies — Wayfarer

He's doesn't appear as a fascist to me, which is such a tiresome accusation. Is there really no other way to describe his views than by linking him to what is popularly conceived to be the worst thing ever? Can you actually back up the claim? I'm open to seeing him in a new light if you can provide the evidence.

Let's not forget that the Inquisition had torture instruments inscribed with the motto 'For The Greater Glory of Christ', eh? — Wayfarer

Are you not here simply assuming that Agustino has "forgotten" the Inquisition?

I have also just recently discovered radical orthodoxy - had I encountered these kinds of teachings I might well have stayed Christian. But, as everyone here knows, I converted to Buddhism. — Wayfarer

This is bizarre to me. Why not reconvert to Christianity if radical orthodoxy has convinced you of its truth? Is someone forcing you to be a Buddhist? Do you feel you must continue to be one out of habit? I would say the same thing if the positions were reversed. In other words, if you had been a Christian the whole time and recently discovered Buddhism and thought it to be true, I would see no reason why you ought not to convert to Buddhism. Truth is truth. Or has radical orthodoxy provided you with something different? What is it about this theological movement that would have made you stay a Christian?

However one salient point about Buddhism is this: it is a vehicle, a raft. It doesn't proclaim that it owns the truth, it points towards it, and every individual has to work out how to get there. 'Work out your own salvation with diligence' were reportedly the last words of the Buddha, who left no heir. Ultimately, he said 'all dharmas are to be abandoned, to say nothing of a-dharma'. Work that one out! — Wayfarer

I don't buy it. The truth of nirvana is the truth itself, the very highest form thereof, for one obtains perfect knowledge of the nature of existence. The Buddha's teachings are a raft meant to bring one to this truth. In Buddhism, there are only two truths, the truth of ordinary language and perception and the truth of enlightenment. There is no third which subsumes the latter, as in the perennialist's scheme.

We do live in a pluralist culture - I mentioned this before, Agustino regards it as a consequence of sin (is that right?) But I think a plurality of perspectives and views is unavoidable. We can't proclaim 'one truth faith', especially on a philosophy forum (although I think it is perfectly acceptable to believe it.) — Wayfarer

That's weird you would think that. Why can't we?

I will leave you with this memento from the late great Huston Smith
— Wayfarer

No. I was not agreeing with you but damning you for your childish framing. — charleton

Sure.

Interesting. You dont think procreation should be permitted? — Beebert

I do actually think it's morally permissible, but I'm less comfortable viewing procreation as a positive good in itself. In other words, just because something is permissible does not mean it is recommended. Something not being wrong does not make it right. My views on this issue are very much in flux at this point, as you can see in schop1's thread.

I might add that Christianity adds a new dimension to the issue. If hell is real and eternal, then it's a serious question whether it is morally permissible to create human beings, who may end up in it. Why provide more souls to be potentially ensnared by the Devil?

Besides, amongst the numerous defects of this OP, is the idea of perennialism as 'a religion'. — Wayfarer

I can only guess as to what these unenumerated, numerous defects are, if you will not tell me what they are. The one defect you list here will itself require some elaboration.

I think it would be preferable if everyone returned to the mentality which underlay the 'Religious Wars' of Europe, where entire communities were engaged in murdering each other over over differences in doctrine. Or the highly fruitful Mughal invasions of India, wherein millions of Buddhists and Hindus were slaughtered for idolatry. — Wayfarer

While I appreciate the sarcasm, this is a straw man. The obverse of perennialism is not, and need not be, a form of religious exclusivism that brooks no dissent and whose interactions with other religions are violent. My contrast with exclusivism was religious inclusivism, which is perfectly compatible with a religiously pluralistic society that upholds the freedom of religion.

But from any rational or objective point of view, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that they all cancel each other out, that no 'religion' has or is the truth, but they're simply cultural projections and collective wish-fulfilment. — Wayfarer

Why is this the only rational and objective point of view? I don't see that it is.

"Perenialism" and any other set of -isms are not the sort of thing from which a description or exposition of which "LEADS TO", or has things that follow from — charleton

And this was precisely my point. So thank you, dear charleton, for repeating it.

would you join a religion while willingly knowing that not one religion is exclusively true? Could you do this while also submitting yourself to the demands of your religion? — Noble Dust

No. That would be dishonest, and I respect the religious enough not to patronize them or to dissemble my beliefs in their midst.

How would you reconcile your philosophical knowledge with your submitting to religious authority? — Noble Dust

In terms of my joining a religion, I wouldn't demand that all of its claims be rational, just that they are not irrational.

Have you experienced religious transformation? — Noble Dust

No. I often wish that I could, though.

No matter how great Eckehart, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine or John of the Cross is, I stil treasure The Upanishads more. — Beebert

That's fine. I won't begrudge you your preference. But by the same token, I would prefer that you not begrudge me mine. :)

Therefore I really wonder, when you say that the best of Christian theologico-philosophical writing is as profound, if not more so in some cases, than Hindu, do you then include Badhavad Gita and The Upanishads Into the Hindu writings here as something not as profound as the greatest Christian writings? — Beebert

I would say "as" profound in those cases.

Yes you are correct. But the question remains if it is true. You almost sound like Christian or like you Believe in it. So if I May ask; why arent you a Christian? — Beebert

I wish to thoroughly acquaint myself with the primary literature of the world's religions before committing to any one of them, if I commit at all. As Aristotle allegedly said, it is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it. Hence, sometimes I may speak as though I am a Christian (or a Buddhist, or something else) when in fact I am not one. It's a way of testing claims without having to submit to them and so to engage in a kind of Socratic dialogue with myself.

That said, there are significant hurdles to overcome before I could become a Christian. These are some of the issues I have with Christianity:

- The Fall and the nature of God as revealed in Christ in light of evolution and the history and nature of life on the planet, which is and has been for hundreds of millions of years filled with disease, predation, suffering, natural calamities, and death.

- The doctrine of creation ex nihilo and why God would choose to create anything at all, given that he is apparently free in some sense to do so and already completely fulfilled by the love between the persons in the Trinity.

- Biblical inerrancy and why God appears to command genocide and other atrocities in the Old Testament.

- The permissibility of meat eating and, despite my changing views on the topic, procreation.

- Hell's reality and/or eternality.

- Whether epistemological idealism, to which I subscribe, is compatible with Christian doctrine and with the tradition I am most attracted to (Catholicism).

There are probably some other difficulties I have, but these are the main ones that I can think of. However, instead of simply ruling out the possibility of ever becoming a Christian due my prima facie disagreement with certain Christian doctrines, my goal is to explore, to the best of my knowledge and ability, the possible ways in which Christians have responded to these issues.

What are the benefits? — Noble Dust

Good question. In my final paragraph, I alluded to what I would probably take to be one important benefit, namely, the ability to be personally transformed in a positive way. I would add the benefit of knowing the truth. I think people are attracted to a religion, or ought to be, first, because they believe it to be true and believe it will bring them closer to the truth, and second, because they desire personal transformation. Jesus, for example, says he comes not for the well but for the sick. Those who are well don't need a savior, so if one believes one is well, then that person has no need of and likely doesn't care about religion. That is fine by me, but I am not well and nor do I believe the world to be well either, so I am interested in religion.

But, you seem to be describing a definite type of person that exists; the "spiritual but not religious", the type who wants to avoid conflict by painting over disparate views with a broad brush. They have a fear of commitment. — Noble Dust

Yes, well said.

But it's possible to study religion and philosophy in more depth and come to a perennialist conclusion. You haven't actually shown an argument for why the idea of different religions having kernels of the truth is wrong. It looks like your argument is just that taking some religious stances but then not adhering to one is fruitless because it's undemanding. — Noble Dust

Correct. This is exactly what I'm arguing.

On the other hand, the notion that different philosophies, different religions, might have bits of truth in them, amongst the dross, is a far more demanding prospect. It requires both a courage (the sense of leaving the familiar shore in favor of the uncharted sea), as well as a comforting reliance on the spiritual intuition which is the tool that uncovers those truths, and the very tool that sparks the belief in the perennial nature of truth. — Noble Dust

Not to mention, a pretty thorough knowledge of the world's religions so as to rule out any one of them being exclusively true.

One must also take into consideration, that if the religious texts of India (now I mean Baghavad Gita and The Upanishads) are possibly more stimulating and suiting for the "intelligent", then why have Christianity often in history (and today also many protestants, catholics and orthodox) preached eternal damnation for all those who follow another religion than theirs instead of accepting them? This shows that those "less intelligent" that christianity suits for have proclaimed something they dont know which potentially causes lots of harm. — Beebert

It is my understanding that Christianity teaches that the damned go to hell, not people who follow other religions. Some individual Christians may have believed the latter, but they are, as I say, individuals.

Moreover, one could turn the question around and ask: why would any intellectual assent to the possibility of hell as an afterlife destination were it not the case that they thought it followed from the truth of Christianity as a whole? The Church Councils could have declared hell to be a fiction and universalism to be true, and yet they didn't. Why? Were they trying to make it harder to attract people to the faith? One answer would be: no, they couldn't assert any other doctrine than the one they did, since that is the one the Holy Spirit guided them to accept and promulgate. Truth does not care about our preference or lack thereof for it. It remains what it is regardless.

But I can't find much in the Christian tradition that reaches the level of the upanishads in profoundity and depth. Some come close though. — Beebert

This would be where my comparison fails, yes. It's difficult to place "profundity" on a scale, and so we're now left with comparing subjective impressions. I will merely submit, speaking for myself, that the best of Christian theologico-philosophical writing is as profound, if not more so in some cases, than Hindu.

There's also the point that the true religion would have to appeal to both intellectuals and the common man. The common man shouldn't find it impossible to enter just because he's not smart enough. — Agustino

I think this stands to reason, yes.

The decision to create the child "forces" the child into existence. You can take any act and make a claim of determinism. So a murderer killed someone but he had a bad upbringing too. Are the parents then put on trial? Society as a whole? Certainly a state of affairs where someone is dead by the hand of another occurred where it may not have occurred.. You can use blame there. But, as I stated earlier, I do not even look at procreation in the same moral category as murder and the usual suspects of ethical inquiry. At least that is my current position. — schopenhauer1

I genuinely don't know how this is a reply to what you quoted of me, and I'm not sure what you're trying to say either. It seems that we can't get past the question of whether people are forced to exist. I say, unequivocally, that they are not and cannot be forced to exist. To say that they are is strictly meaningless, though, I admit, has the appearance of meaning. I've tried explaining why several times now. If you don't understand or I'm just being unclear, there's not much more I can say.

Why do people who do not want children but support civilization need to have children? — schopenhauer1

They don't! I said many posts ago that I was speaking of a general, not an individual, duty. There is more than one way to support civilization, not just procreation. But I say procreation is one way.

These are the reasons I gave for not putting forth new humans if it can be helped. To not give them these burdens. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but I'm saying that if naturalism is false, it's possible that such negative experiences do have some greater meaning or purpose. I believe I said this earlier, but naturalism directly entails anti-natalism. If nothing but the physical world exists, i.e. the world is self-justifying, then nothing in principle could ever justify all the suffering, misery, etc that it contains. In fact, suicide would be a perfectly moral decision in that case. Why stick around and prolong the burdens of "instrumentality?" There would be no reason to, absent any possibility of greater meaning and salvation.

I thought you would understand this, especially after seeming to be a devote of many of the observations that Schopenhauer elaborates on that are similar in theme. — schopenhauer1

I've moved beyond Schopenhauer a bit in recent years. His philosophy still forms the prism through which I view the world, but precisely because I know it so well (or at least I think I do), its deficiencies are put in starker relief.

I would like to think the latter. However, if it is the former, than what can I do? — schopenhauer1

I have asked myself the question I just posed to you. In contemplating the former option I sketched, what I have done is engage in critical self-reflection. Anti-natalists take great pride in the fact that hardly anyone seems to problematize procreation like they do. Anti-natalism's obscurity is therefore perhaps its greatest strength. But it doesn't follow from the fact that it appears as though most people don't think about the morality of procreation that procreation is wrong.

If you ask Nietzsche, or Perhaps even Schopenhauer, the reason why christianity "is apparently more attractive to human beings generally" is because people are apparently more unintelligent than intelligent generally. That many believe in and appreciate/prefer christianity would not speak to its advantage if you ask them, or probably even if you ask Plato. — Beebert

But if we really want to go down this road, then it's clearly the case that there have been just as many, if not more, and possibly more profound, Christian thinkers than Hindu thinkers. So, Christianity has produced, at minimum, the same number of geniuses as Hinduism, while also attracting more of the masses.

Being birth is "affecting" someone — schopenhauer1

This is incoherent to me. "Birth" just designates the moment that one came into being. It can't "do" anything, for it describes a fact, a state of affairs. It's a noun, not a verb.

are you a Christian? — Beebert

No.

Christianity embracing People from different Cultures hasn't only been about love and openess but about power, just as Russia probably would like to be the whole world. — Beebert

It hasn't "only," yes. I wouldn't claim that Christian evangelization has had a spotless record. But it has achieved something that Hinduism has failed to achieve and is apparently more attractive to human beings generally, and not just Indians.

Yes I know. And it shows. — Beebert

A cleverly ambiguous reply!

"The value of the Upanishads, however, does not rest upon their antiquity, but upon the vital message they contain for all times and all peoples. There is nothing peculiarly racial or local in them." The wisdom of the Upanishads is grounded in the Universal in a way the Bible and its religions have often failed to be. For example, even if Christ is proclaimed as the universal Truth, christians have more often than not completely FAILED to see that the same Truth is in many ways expressed in writings like the Upanishads and Baghavad Gita. Even to the point of completely blaspheming their own God by calling these scriptures demonic. — Beebert

The quote and your commentary don't quite match. The former is talking about universalism in the sense that the truths the Upanishads attempts to covey are available to all people to discover, regardless of national origin. Ironically, though, the religion which these texts form the basis of, Hinduism, has remained largely the ethnic and tribal religion of the sub-continental Indians, paying virtually no attention to proselytization, whereas Christianity has embraced innumerable different peoples and cultures across the globe. Moreover, the Upanishads was a production of the Brahmanical caste and largely read and interpreted by that same caste down to the current day. The authors of the New Testament, while literate and fairly well read, were not in anything near the same status as the Brahmins or, in their context, Greek philosophers, and their audience was explicitly for all people, not just the intelligentsia.

This sounds a lot like Dietrich Bonhoeffer's "cheap grace": — Bitter Crank

Interesting quote. I will look him up now.

It is easy to claim that one is "spiritual" rather than "religious" because "spiritual" is amorphous, vague, undemanding, and solitary — Bitter Crank

Yes, exactly! The bolded word in particular summarizes my point well.

Well said. I haven't been following your debates with Agustino that closely, but I'm curious to know where you stand with respect to Christianity now. Are you open to conversion, and if so, what branch of Christianity attracts you the most?

As if it is salvation FROM the world rather than salvation OF the world that is important. — Beebert

A very pithy summation. It also strikes me as constituting the fundamental difference between Christianity and Indian religions, the former seeking salvation of the world and the latter seeking salvation from the world (escape from samsara).

That is the typically American obsession. "When were you saved? Ser you saved?" Etc. Despicable questions often. Why would you avoid the question though? — Beebert

I agree, but as criteria used to determine whether one is a Christian or not, these questions appear rather late in the history of Christianity, being largely an invention of Lutheran Pietists in the 17th century. If you asked your average Joe peasant in the Middle Ages what makes him or anyone a Christian in the most basic sense, he would respond by saying that it depends on assent to the major creeds and dogmatic pronouncements of the Church Councils along with participation in the sacraments. Protestants raised the Bible above that of Church Tradition and either modified beyond recognition or outright rejected most of the sacraments of the Church. In their place and by necessity, they began stressing "having a personal relationship with Jesus," "knowing that you're saved," and other such phrases to determine Christian identity.

Just because that person was not around before his own birth does not mean that the impossibility of causing his own existence means that he was not affected without any input in the matter.. I don't see how that stands as a contradiction. — schopenhauer1

The contradiction resides in the word "affected" here, or any other synonym you might use. Prior to birth, the person was not affected by anything, because he didn't exist. Birth is not itself an affection but rather the condition for being affected.

If you want to rephrase it so that it satisfies your word-game, be my guest.. But I think you are getting it, but are stuck on the language used. For example, I have used in the past instead of "forced into existence" that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X. Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, and Z". If you prefer me to assert the claim in that fashion, I'll accommodate. "Forced" is a colloquialism for this more elongated version. I feel this does not need to be stated, as you probably know it already. — schopenhauer1

The language here matters precisely because, put one way, procreation and those who engage in it are immoral, and put another, they are not. In other words, if it's true that all people are "forced" into existence, then anti-natalism follows, and possibly suicide along with it. If it's not true that people are forced into existed, but are merely caused to exist, then anti-natalism doesn't follow.

Let me give an example. When Iceland beat England in the European Cup a year ago, nine months later the country experienced a surge in births. See here. Now, if we use the language you have just agreed to use, namely, that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X, Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, Z," then the Icelandic footballers form a link in a causal chain that leads to the creation of more human beings. Would it make sense to cast moral blame on them? No, of course not. We're just describing a state of affairs, which, by definition, carries no normative weight. But if human beings are "forced" to exist, then the situation changes, for such language cannot but entail negative moral evaluation of procreation. The footballers would then be implicated in the creation of human beings, so that if procreation is wrong, you would have to be opposed to football. But think of all the other things that play a causal role, however dimly, in the creation of children. One would have to be opposed to civilization itself. This is why a consistent anti-natalism is incompatible with civilization, such that to accept one is to reject the other, and vice-versa.

I would not see people should be born to pursue this.. — schopenhauer1

I would, though. My position is that there is a general duty (or that it is good) to support civilization, which directly entails the creation of life for that purpose, not in order to support civilization for its own sake, but for the sake of those who will be born into the world regardless of whether there is civilization or not. If it were the case that only people who understood this had children, there would be no reason to have children. But there are people who have children for a multitude of other, less justifiable reasons, and so there is a reason for the former to have children for the sake of the latter. This is why I spoke of my position as being somewhat paradoxical. Does this make sense, and, if so, do you still believe we are in agreement?

that of the concept of instrumentality and unnecessary struggle. The absurd repetitious nature of life, the need for survival and entertainment, the burden of dealing with one's self, society, surroundings, and the contingencies of life itself — schopenhauer1

I don't think these things are for naught, for to believe that they are would entail metaphysical naturalism, which I don't believe is true. But if you think they are, then I would love to know why.

My hope is this makes people take pause. — schopenhauer1

Fully agreed.

It is existentially motivated- not consequential, not necessarily deontological, but methodological.. It is antinatalism via a more overriding Pessimism, not antinatalism stark and naked. Why the methodology? Because that is the part that answers the "how about the people already existing part". Simply saying.. more people means more suffering is hallow without the implications of what this means for us.. It makes us take stock of our own condition by going through the methodology and not merely acting on a principle in some "If-then" none self-reflecting way. — schopenhauer1

So is it that you think that by merely encouraging people to think about the topic, to "take pause," as you said, they will choose not to procreate of their own accord and as a matter of course?

So in a very roundabout, with many caveats way, Thorongil, I agree with you. I have sympathy with people who have children out of some joyful hope of things. I think there might be non-reflection going on, but this again is methodological... The person can come to the existential conclusions about life even after they have a kid. It is not the direct consequence that matters, but the self-reflection and understanding from this. Thus, no the "blame" is not necessarily on the parents, the way someone who is torturing can be blamed. I am not sure if what I am laying out is even considered "ethics" in the traditional sense as more of a theory of value and aesthetic outlook in a more general sense. — schopenhauer1

Again, though, what of the people who choose to have children after having taken pause, considered anti-natalism, and charitably listened to your thoughts on instrumentality? Can such people exist or would you simply declare of them that they weren't reflective enough (meaning that, if one reaches the level of reflection you seek, they couldn't not choose not to have children)?

Only the good kind.

Whom, not who.

For could be: War, inequality, greed, sexism, shallowness, animal abuse and so on. — Andrew4Handel

Hate is never a moral disposition. If the misanthrope hates the above immoralities, then he does not morally raise himself above them by hating human beings. Wrong does not cancel out wrong.

I'm not entirely sure why van Inwagen thinks such a minimum line does not exist. — darthbarracuda

I'm not either. He seems to think that any argument that accounts for horrors in general accounts necessarily for any specific horrors, no matter how grave. I suppose this is true, but as you say, I don't see that he's explained why the baseline of horrors is what it is.

I might be wrong here but is his point that the Problem of Evil is essentially a necessary component of God's plan? The point being that there has to be an arbitrary line drawn in order for us to think about the Problem of Evil which in turn is necessary for God's plan to work? — darthbarracuda

I only tried reading what I took to be the problem of evil sections, so perhaps he addresses this elsewhere, but it seems to me that he assumes that God possesses freedom in the same way as we do such that, given that the world exists as it does, he must have had good reasons for choosing to create such a world, constituted in the way that it is, for he could just as easily have created a different one. But this doesn't seem to conform to more classical conceptions of God. Here is a passage from Henry Adams that I have always liked:

Strange as it sounds, although Man thought himself hardly treated in respect to freedom, yet, if freedom meant superiority, Man was in action much the superior of God, whose freedom suffered, from Saint Thomas, under restraints that Man never would have tolerated. Saint Thomas did not allow God even an undetermined will; he was pure Act, and as such he could not change. Man alone was, in act, allowed to change direction. What was more curious still, Man might absolutely prove his freedom by refusing to move at all; if he did not like his life, he could stop it, and habitually did so, or acquiesced in its being done for him; while God could not commit suicide or even cease for a single instant his continuous action. If Man had the singular fancy of making himself absurd,— a taste confined to himself but attested by evidence exceedingly strong, — he could be as absurd as he liked; but God could not be absurd. Saint Thomas did not allow the Deity the right to contradict himself, which is one of Man's chief pleasures. While Man enjoyed what was, for his purposes, an unlimited freedom to be wicked,— a privilege which, as both Church and State bitterly complained and still complain, he has outrageously abused,— God was Goodness and could be nothing else. [...] In one respect, at least, Man's freedom seemed to be not relative but absolute, for his thought was an energy paying no regard to space or time or order or object or sense; but God's thought was his act and will at once; speaking correctly, God could not think, he is. Saint Thomas would not, or could not, admit that God was Necessity, as Abélard seems to have held, but he refused to tolerate the idea of a divine maniac, free from moral obligation to himself

I would suggest that God may possess freedom, but that it is of a completely different kind from our own and that it would not entail God having created a world he might otherwise not create, much less a world wherein he tinkers with its processes like evolution. That brings me to another criticism of Inwagen. He claims, in his story of the Fall, that God guided evolution to bring about human beings. Once human beings existed, they obtained preternatural powers that enabled them to Edenize the world. They failed, however, by exercising their freedom to do evil, which accounts both for postlapsarian human and natural evil. Several chapters later, anticipating the immediate objection I had formed, he says that his story says nothing about prelapsarian evil and that he has no real response to it. Well, in that case, his whole defense is deficient! What defense of the problem of evil only defends evil from a certain date? It isn't one. Evolution lumbered along for hundreds of millions of years, not in spite of, but because of predation, disease, suffering, natural disasters, and death. And God is said to have "guided" this process? Please.

Discuss. — darthbarracuda

Don't tell me what to do! I have free will!

I'm a deep thinker addict — Locks

>:O

Do you think the soul exists — Locks

Define soul.

if any x is (modally) necessary, then x is something like (logical) consistency — jorndoe

What do you mean by logical consistency? The principle of non-contradiction? You think God is the principle of non-contradiction? That is incoherent.

I don't understand your reply, but that might be because I'm mostly ignorant of formal logic.

I will simply reiterate that to say that God is a necessary being does not, in itself, prove that he exists. Proving God's existence comes before proving that his existence is necessary.

another human was affected without that person having input in the matter (by way of the impossibility of consenting in the first place). I am not saying this means the parent should be condemned (as I don't think of it in those terms with antinatalism), but just as I have explained it (that someone was affected without input). — schopenhauer1

How is this not making the same contradictory point but with different vocabulary? How is "affect without input" different from "force without consent?" The former appears as merely a euphemism of the latter, made in order to hide the contradiction embedded in the latter.

However, it does implicate the parent in not perhaps thinking of the implications of causing that child's existence. The parent is causing a new being to contend with life, when there did not need to be anything to contend with in the first place. This is where I implore the future parent to look deeper at this implication. — schopenhauer1

Agreed.

I also do not believe that we can choose NOT to deal with life once born. We are always dealing with life, forced to make goals, forced to make choices as is how life is structurally.. Thus to be caused to be born is to go through this, it is not something we can choose NOT to do (even the goal or choice of suicide is something we have to choose if we do not want the alternatives). — schopenhauer1

I suppose suicide could be seen as dealing with life, but I don't see what this is a reply to. I'll take it as a general comment.

I just don't see how maintaining civilization or committing suicide is a goal unto itself. It is a hypothetical imperative that you seem to be making categorical..

Rather, if one is inclined to that civilization is something that is good because it provides X, Y, and Z and that is preferable, then by all means, one should support the cause of civilization, and ya know, "Rah Rah, Sis Boom Ba!" .. But if you would hypothetically prefer to see violence, chaos, and anarchy.. then that would make things less pleasant for those who do support the cause of civilization, and so unless you want to see, that nay nay.. but why ruin the parade of others boo boo!.. — schopenhauer1

But I would argue that one should support civilization because it's moral to do so. And it's moral because civilization is better than the alternatives at administering justice and providing for the well being of others. The person who prefers violence, chaos, and anarchy is not a moral person. So it's not that he's wrong to engage in such things "because they oppose civilization," but because they are wrong. On the other hand, it is not wrong not to support civilization for those who, as you say, peacefully pursue their self-interest within the framework of civilization.

It's very antiquated — schopenhauer1

Antiquation does not equal falsity.

But to support civilization means nothing, without the people there that "benefit" from the civilization.. But I am saying is you don't need the people to be there to benefit from it in the first place.. — schopenhauer1

Yes, and I am saying that the people will be there whether, by your lights, they "need" or "ought" to be or not! Call it a paradox, if you like, but that is the crux of my position.

No one has to hold a toga together with one hand, stoically stare into space in a statue pose, and carry around philosophy books to continue civilization either. — schopenhauer1

Maybe nobody "has" to, but they do. And they will continue to do so whether you and I like it or not. The sooner we own up to this fact, the better, for then the burden of pining away in lonely, illimitable exasperation for an impossible utopia where no human beings exist, assuming it is one, will be lifted.

I think it is best not to be born, and promote this idea. I don't condemn people who do procreate though, which you may think is hypocritical, but may be different approaches to how we see the world. — schopenhauer1

Yes, this does seem mildly inconsistent and slightly confusing to me still. Are you a moral relativist now perchance?

They can take a softer approach — schopenhauer1

I see. Anti-natalism, but not as loud and abrasive.

Why create more people that will need stuff? — schopenhauer1

Endlessly repeated questions like this, by the mere fact that they are questions, suggest that you wish you had an answer, or at least, a good answer, to them; that you believe there may be good answers to them that you simply haven't yet come across. Is this so or do you axiomatically deny that there could ever be any adequate answers given, such that these questions are meant merely to be rhetorical?

To take up the question again, no, maybe we don't need to create more people. But there are lots of things we don't need to do that we do, that you do. Why do you continue to do them? "Because of habit or natural instinct," you might reply. Ah, but if you realize that you do such things out of habit and instinct, and yet still continue do them, on what grounds can you criticize the act or the decision to procreate? Just because something is natural doesn't make it right (an appeal to nature), but it doesn't make it wrong either. "I just want parents to think about their decision more seriously." So do I. And if they have, and decide to have children while acknowledging and considering your questions, are they to be condemned? You have said both that you are an anti-natalist and that you don't condemn parents for having children. But you must choose, for these are not mutually compatible.

I don't think you can define something into existence, as it were. — jorndoe

I don't think that's what he's doing, though. I've struggled with this too, but I think the claim is that if God exists, then he exists necessarily (cannot not exist). The "if" entails composing proofs, and giving a proof is different from merely stipulating a definition.

I concede that the statement "before the big-bang" is nonsensical because time arises precisely with the big-bang — Brian A

You don't know this, though. You seem to be taking certain physicists' word for it, who tend to be ignorant of philosophy, that time began with the Big Bang. The Big Bang is what's known as a singularity, which in layman's terms is code for "we don't know what we're talking about," because the laws of physics break down and we reach the limits of observation. It's more accurate to say, "based on our current measurements (which may change), we can't observe anything past about 13.7 billion years."

Consider also that you have shackled your argument to a claim that may not be made by scientists in the future. There's no reason to believe that another Einstein will not come along and fundamentally change our understanding of the physical universe, such that the Big Bang is then subsumed into an even more expansive and cogent theory, much like how the physics of Newton was subsumed into relativity theory. Who knows what could happen to the claim that time began with the Big Bang in that case. In other words, it would be like a 19th century person basing an argument for the existence of God on the notion of the ether. At the time, scientific consensus accepted its existence, but scientists in the 20th century discarded the notion, and so too would one then have to discard that theistic argument.

The best cosmological arguments don't start from mutable scientific claims but from certain basic concepts, like motion.