I've always had the feeling that Schopenhaur1 has about this. I always said, "I never chose to be born."
And of course it's true. — Michael Ossipoff
"I've always had the feeling that Schopenhaur1 has about this. I always said, "I never chose to be born."
And of course it's true."— Michael Ossipoff
It's only true in the trivial sense that you didn't exist prior to being born, which is in fact a mere tautology — Thorongil
, but not in the sense that you were forced to exist.
It doesn't matter, because tautologies are no less true by being tautologies. — Michael Ossipoff
But being forced into life doesn't require that you were a pre-existing person who was then forced into life. — Michael Ossipoff
Yes it does. — Thorongil
But couldn't you have that perception at the beginning of your life?
"I don't want to be here. How did this happen?"
As a newborn, aren't you forced? — Michael Ossipoff
You exist at the moment of conception. You're apparently trying to say that you don't exist until you're born, which is absurd. — Thorongil
And, at birth, and maybe before it too, you might have felt an opinion about not wanting this unexplained state of affairs, about which you obviously, at any time during those times, had no choice. — Michael Ossipoff
why infants cry at birth — Michael Ossipoff
Wouldn't that attract predators, and therefore be maladaptive and therefore selected against? — Michael Ossipoff
I'm interested in the absence of sex/gender in your musings about this topic. It doesn't require a psychoanalyst to wonder whether there isn't something about *mothers*, rather than people in general, that you're implicitly addressing. The abstractions you talk in seem to be the ways an academic could-be-father would think about such a topic. What of the could-be-mother's body and what the body's moods and tempers and temperaments tell a woman? — mcdoodle
A fetus, by definition, attempts to live and grow unless impeded from doing so by external factors. — Thorongil
"Thrown" has implicit normative connotation. It implies that someone who already exists is forced to do something without their consent. But as I argued and as you acknowledge here, that is not what happens. Parents cause their children to exist, but they do not, and cannot, force them to exist. Thus, the causative act of procreation is amoral and, for that very reason, permissible. — Thorongil
Why are you asking me? I don't plan on having children, but I recognize that other people do and that this can be beneficial with respect to the maintenance of civilization. — Thorongil
No, they live in a primitive society. Primitive -> barbaric -> civilized. Merriam-Webster: "barbaric: possessing or characteristic of a cultural level more complex than primitive culture but less sophisticated than advanced civilization." — Thorongil
I apologize for in any way souring the conversation, but I was simply interested in knowing where you stand on this issue. You and I go back a long time at this point, schop1. As you know, I used to be an anti-natalist, and I know you were one too, but as I explained earlier, over time I realized I couldn't reach its conclusion based on the ethical premises I accept. I have also come to find the arguments for anti-natalism unpersuasive. At the moment, I'm neither a natalist nor an anti-natalist. Your present position has remained a bit of an enigma, in that you make threads like this one that seem to beat around the bush. If you don't condemn people for having children, that is actually news to me, especially given the many artifacts of anti-natalist arguments you have employed thus far in this thread. When did you reject anti-natalism, and how did you come to such a position? — Thorongil
another human was affected without that person having input in the matter (by way of the impossibility of consenting in the first place). I am not saying this means the parent should be condemned (as I don't think of it in those terms with antinatalism), but just as I have explained it (that someone was affected without input). — schopenhauer1
However, it does implicate the parent in not perhaps thinking of the implications of causing that child's existence. The parent is causing a new being to contend with life, when there did not need to be anything to contend with in the first place. This is where I implore the future parent to look deeper at this implication. — schopenhauer1
I also do not believe that we can choose NOT to deal with life once born. We are always dealing with life, forced to make goals, forced to make choices as is how life is structurally.. Thus to be caused to be born is to go through this, it is not something we can choose NOT to do (even the goal or choice of suicide is something we have to choose if we do not want the alternatives). — schopenhauer1
I just don't see how maintaining civilization or committing suicide is a goal unto itself. It is a hypothetical imperative that you seem to be making categorical..
Rather, if one is inclined to that civilization is something that is good because it provides X, Y, and Z and that is preferable, then by all means, one should support the cause of civilization, and ya know, "Rah Rah, Sis Boom Ba!" .. But if you would hypothetically prefer to see violence, chaos, and anarchy.. then that would make things less pleasant for those who do support the cause of civilization, and so unless you want to see, that nay nay.. but why ruin the parade of others boo boo!.. — schopenhauer1
It's very antiquated — schopenhauer1
But to support civilization means nothing, without the people there that "benefit" from the civilization.. But I am saying is you don't need the people to be there to benefit from it in the first place.. — schopenhauer1
No one has to hold a toga together with one hand, stoically stare into space in a statue pose, and carry around philosophy books to continue civilization either. — schopenhauer1
I think it is best not to be born, and promote this idea. I don't condemn people who do procreate though, which you may think is hypocritical, but may be different approaches to how we see the world. — schopenhauer1
They can take a softer approach — schopenhauer1
Why create more people that will need stuff? — schopenhauer1
How is this not making the same contradictory point but with different vocabulary? How is "affect without input" different from "force without consent?" The former appears as merely a euphemism of the latter, made in order to hide the contradiction embedded in the latter. — Thorongil
Agreed. — Thorongil
I suppose suicide could be seen as dealing with life, but I don't see what this is a reply to. I'll take it as a general comment. — Thorongil
But I would argue that one should support civilization because it's moral to do so. And it's moral because civilization is better than the alternatives at administering justice and providing for the well being of others. The person who prefers violence, chaos, and anarchy is not a moral person. — Thorongil
On the other hand, it is not wrong not to support civilization for those who, as you say, peacefully pursue their self-interest within the framework of civilization. — Thorongil
Antiquation does not equal falsity. — Thorongil
Yes, and I am saying that the people will be there whether, by your lights, they "need" or "ought" to be or not! Call it a paradox, if you like, but that is the crux of my position. — Thorongil
Yes, this does seem mildly inconsistent and slightly confusing to me still. Are you a moral relativist now perchance? — Thorongil
Endlessly repeated questions like this, by the mere fact that they are questions, suggest that you wish you had an answer, or at least, a good answer, to them; that you believe there may be good answers to them that you simply haven't yet come across. Is this so or do you axiomatically deny that there could ever be any adequate answers given, such that these questions are meant merely to be rhetorical? — Thorongil
To take up the question again, no, maybe we don't need to create more people. But there are lots of things we don't need to do that we do, that you do. Why do you continue to do them? "Because of habit or natural instinct," you might reply. Ah, but if you realize that you do such things out of habit and instinct, and yet still continue do them, on what grounds can you criticize the act or the decision to procreate? Just because something is natural doesn't make it right (an appeal to nature), but it doesn't make it wrong either. "I just want parents to think about their decision more seriously." So do I. And if they have, and decide to have children while acknowledging and considering your questions, are they to be condemned? You have said both that you are an anti-natalist and that you don't condemn parents for having children. But you must choose, for these are not mutually compatible. — Thorongil
Just because that person was not around before his own birth does not mean that the impossibility of causing his own existence means that he was not affected without any input in the matter.. I don't see how that stands as a contradiction. — schopenhauer1
If you want to rephrase it so that it satisfies your word-game, be my guest.. But I think you are getting it, but are stuck on the language used. For example, I have used in the past instead of "forced into existence" that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X. Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, and Z". If you prefer me to assert the claim in that fashion, I'll accommodate. "Forced" is a colloquialism for this more elongated version. I feel this does not need to be stated, as you probably know it already. — schopenhauer1
I would not see people should be born to pursue this.. — schopenhauer1
that of the concept of instrumentality and unnecessary struggle. The absurd repetitious nature of life, the need for survival and entertainment, the burden of dealing with one's self, society, surroundings, and the contingencies of life itself — schopenhauer1
My hope is this makes people take pause. — schopenhauer1
It is existentially motivated- not consequential, not necessarily deontological, but methodological.. It is antinatalism via a more overriding Pessimism, not antinatalism stark and naked. Why the methodology? Because that is the part that answers the "how about the people already existing part". Simply saying.. more people means more suffering is hallow without the implications of what this means for us.. It makes us take stock of our own condition by going through the methodology and not merely acting on a principle in some "If-then" none self-reflecting way. — schopenhauer1
So in a very roundabout, with many caveats way, Thorongil, I agree with you. I have sympathy with people who have children out of some joyful hope of things. I think there might be non-reflection going on, but this again is methodological... The person can come to the existential conclusions about life even after they have a kid. It is not the direct consequence that matters, but the self-reflection and understanding from this. Thus, no the "blame" is not necessarily on the parents, the way someone who is torturing can be blamed. I am not sure if what I am laying out is even considered "ethics" in the traditional sense as more of a theory of value and aesthetic outlook in a more general sense. — schopenhauer1
The contradiction resides in the word "affected" here, or any other synonym you might use. Prior to birth, the person was not affected by anything, because he didn't exist. Birth is not itself an affection but rather the condition for being affected. — Thorongil
The language here matters precisely because, put one way, procreation and those who engage in it are immoral, and put another, they are not. In other words, — Thorongil
Let me give an example. When Iceland beat England in the European Cup a year ago, nine months later, the country experienced a surge in births. See here. Now, if we use the language you have just agreed to use, namely, that "a state of affairs will take place that leads to X, Y, Z, when another state of affairs could have taken place that did not lead to X, Y, Z," then the Icelandic footballers form a link in a causal chain that leads to the creation of more human beings. Would it make sense to cast moral blame on them? No, of course not. We're just describing a state of affairs, which, by definition, carries no normative weight. But if human beings are "forced" to exist, then the situation changes, for such language cannot but entail negative moral evaluation of procreation. The footballers would then be implicated in the creation of human beings, so that if procreation is wrong, you would have to be opposed to football. But think of all the other things that play a causal role, however dimly, in the creation of children. One would have to be opposed to civilization itself. This is why a consistent anti-natalism is incompatible with civilization, such that to accept one is to reject the other, and vice-versa. — Thorongil
Does this make sense, and, if so, do you still believe we are in agreement? — Thorongil
I don't think these things are for naught, for to believe that they are would entail metaphysical naturalism, which I don't believe is true. But if you think they are, then I would love to know why. — Thorongil
So is it that you think that by merely encouraging people to think about the topic, to "take pause," as you said, they will choose not to procreate of their own accord and as a matter of course? — Thorongil
Again, though, what of the people who choose to have children after having taken pause, considered anti-natalism, and charitably listened to your thoughts on instrumentality? Can such people exist or would you simply declare of them that they weren't reflective enough (meaning that, if one reaches the level of reflection you seek, they couldn't not choose not to have children)? — Thorongil
Being birth is "affecting" someone — schopenhauer1
The decision to create the child "forces" the child into existence. You can take any act and make a claim of determinism. So a murderer killed someone but he had a bad upbringing too. Are the parents then put on trial? Society as a whole? Certainly a state of affairs where someone is dead by the hand of another occurred where it may not have occurred.. You can use blame there. But, as I stated earlier, I do not even look at procreation in the same moral category as murder and the usual suspects of ethical inquiry. At least that is my current position. — schopenhauer1
Why do people who do not want children but support civilization need to have children? — schopenhauer1
These are the reasons I gave for not putting forth new humans if it can be helped. To not give them these burdens. — schopenhauer1
I thought you would understand this, especially after seeming to be a devote of many of the observations that Schopenhauer elaborates on that are similar in theme. — schopenhauer1
I would like to think the latter. However, if it is the former, than what can I do? — schopenhauer1
I think that could be generalized and applied to basically any marginal ethical/political point of view, regardless of its validity. Radicals like to pride themselves as being the few noble individuals who fight for justice for the forgotten. And fuck everyone else. — darthbarracuda
Yet that's not my goal at all- fighting for the forgotten, or self-righteous whatever. I'm frankly a bit offended you would try to characterize my argument like that. — schopenhauer1
I especially went at length to say that the theory isn't meant to be condemning and that it is more aesthetic than moral and that my theory was being characterized in a way that made it moralistic despite my protestations in order to make it a foil for whatever beef you had with "antinatalists" writ large. — schopenhauer1
They don't! I said many posts ago that I was speaking of a general, not an individual, duty. There is more than one way to support civilization, not just procreation. But I say procreation is one way. — Thorongil
Yes, but I'm saying that if naturalism is false, it's possible that such negative experiences do have some greater meaning or purpose. I believe I said this earlier, but naturalism directly entails anti-natalism. If nothing but the physical world exists, i.e. the world is self-justifying, then nothing in principle could ever justify all the suffering, misery, etc that it contains. — Thorongil
Why stick around and prolong the burdens of "instrumentality?" There would be no reason to, absent any possibility of greater meaning and salvation. — Thorongil
I've moved beyond Schopenhauer a bit in recent years. His philosophy still forms the prism through which I view the world, but precisely because I know it so well (or at least I think I do), its deficiencies are put in starker relief. — Thorongil
But it doesn't follow from the fact that it appears as though most people don't think about the morality of procreation that procreation is wrong. — Thorongil
Is this directed toward me? I still don't understand what "aesthetic anti-natalism" means, if that is in fact your position. I don't see how anti-natalism could be anything other than a moral position. — Thorongil
but then I go back to my objection that you are weighting civilization greater than the individual's suffering — schopenhauer1
People should be born to keep civilization going is using individuals for some cause. Using people for this means, seems uncaring towards the individual. If people must be used to make the people existing not suffer, then there is a knot that needs to be untied, and the solution is not more people (and ipso facto suffering people). — schopenhauer1
Okay, so we agree on something if naturalism holds true (I am not sure I am a naturalist, but I will entertain it for the sake of argument). — schopenhauer1
Because as I've stated in another discussion: Fear of death, the "unknown", pain, and the unsettling idea that there will be no future "self" that we are so used to chattering with, are sufficient enough reasons to me for why people do not commit suicide often outside of extremely painful circumstances. — schopenhauer1
As far as a possible religious answer to the suffering (as I think you are gravitating towards that right? — schopenhauer1
ugh, the "Forms" and his mis-understanding of evolution.. he was just a bit before Darwin's theory was popularized — schopenhauer1
But many of his observations about the nature of suffering and the nature of our own needs and wants were very well-stated. The spirit of his message still rings true. — schopenhauer1
No, but it is at least misguided that most people don't think of procreation in the realm of moral theory in general (whether it is right or wrong). However, my point was exactly that because it is so outside people's purview, I would not be self-righteous about it (at least not outside philosophy forums and those who would possibly understand its implications and even then I would not characterize my arguments as self-righteous but more explanatory, descriptive, etc.). — schopenhauer1
Aesthetic here means the recognition of the suffering that occurs through a series of existential question-asking. You work to work to work. You do to do to do. You exist to exist to exist. The repetitious nature of existence coupled with subtle and profound, necessary and contingent forms of suffering become apparent with enough reflection. That is important in this ethic- the self-reflection. Simply stating "procreation is wrong" is simply a conclusion but does not encompass the full picture. You can say that the ethic is more Pessimism with antinatalism as one main idea that comes out of it, but not antinatalism completely separated as its own thing that is independently and starkly thrown out as a polemic against people for blame or condemnation. So in this view it is a whole package. — schopenhauer1
That's not how I see it. I'm privileging civilization precisely for its ability to address the individual's suffering better than the alternatives. — Thorongil
But again, it's not uncaring. It has the care of the individual primarily in mind. Also, you can't "use" people who don't exist. — Thorongil
1. It is wrong to treat humans as means and not as ends in themselves.
2. Procreation is to treat potential humans as means and not as ends in themselves.
3. Therefore, procreation is wrong.
Both premises, however, can be challenged. The first doesn't seem to admit of universal applicability. If I use a doctor as a means to fix my tooth, have I really committed wrongdoing? Clearly not, as both parties have consented to an action that will mutually benefit them. In fact, there doesn't seem to be any actions that would escape being wrong, according to the first premise, apart from rare instances of pure altruism and compassion perhaps. Concerning the second premise, as I said right before the argument, you can't treat or use people who don't exist as or for anything, so the premise is nonsensical. — Thorongil
They may be sufficient reasons, but they are not good reasons, for they make the individual a coward and a hypocrite. — Thorongil
Ironically, I tend to think he ought to have reversed the status of the Ideas and the will, as in fact he did do in his early manuscripts. In other words, I think he ought to have moved closer to Platonism, not farther away. — Thorongil
Yes, but no less stated by countless other religious, philosophical, and poetic texts. — Thorongil
Granted, but I would expand this by saying that the anti-natalist ought not to assume that anyone who has looked into anti-natalism and rejected it rejects it because they're an incorrigible and delusional optimist. I witness a lot of armchair psychologizing among many anti-natalists: "Oh, you reject our arguments? Well, that must be because you don't really understand them and are just looking to make excuses for your own selfish, immoral behavior." It's exactly equivalent to what the fundamentalist often says to the person who has lost his or her faith: "Oh, you rejected Christianity? Well, that must be because you never really believed, just didn't pray hard enough, or were abused by a Christian as a child." — Thorongil
Hmm. I'm still not quite sure I follow this, alas. :( — Thorongil
Some Pessimists might be at odds with especially utilitarian consequentialism altogether because utilitarian consequentialism assumes that improvements can take place when in actuality we are never really improving. The human condition is such that it does not happen. It is veiled utopianism, the most optimistic of optimistic ideas. It is to buy into the carrot and stick.. if we just work harder to live together better now, we can make it work for a future, more ideal state. That is just something you will rarely see a Pessimist say. So no, they are probably not breaking their own ideals- they probably never had them. If you want to REFUTE their ideals, that is one thing, but I do not think they are being hypocritical to their own ideals. So again, to entail utilitarianism with Pessimism is to unfairly tie two concepts together that are not necessarily entailed. Pessimism actually has very little in the way of ethics- it is mostly an aesthetic comprehension of the world. What one does about it is more open for interpretation. What it does have (i.e. Schopenhauer's compassionate ideal), is not necessarily utilitarian anyways.
This aesthetic comprehension, despite your protestations, does have to do with the ennui/instrumentality/vanity/absurdity of existence. It is the idea that there is an uncalmness to existence. With the animal, especially the human animal, this becomes its own self-contained suffering in the organism. There is the need to survive, and then this need to thrash about on the stage of the world with whatever entertainments we can pursue. We not only deal with present pains, but must anticipate future ones and worry about the past. What there is not, is ability for complete repose. This would be sleep. We MUST get up, we MUST survive, we MUST entertain. On top of this kernel of uncalmness, is the complexities of contingent harms that we must face. Is this the real metaphysical "truth" of the world, or is this just the product of a certain temperament? I brought that up in a previous thread, but indeed, there is a Pessimist aesthetic and a certain byline that runs through it.
As you note, Schopenhauer's ethic came from lessening one's will by way of being less individuated- it was not necessarily about the outcome of compassionate acts. It is much more of a metaphysical problem he is working on. Each person, being a manifestation of Will in some illusory individuation that causes suffering, is supposed to extinguish one's Will by being less individuated and more concerned in others. However, Schopenhauer also thought that character was generally fixed, and only the rare individual had the capacity to be truly compassionate, or at least compassionate in a way that makes them less individuated. Compassionate acts are one step, but even this is not complete in his conception, to be complete everyone must be an ascetic and renounce one's will-to-live. This of course, is a tall order. — schopenhauer1
Premise 1: If a person has an experience that a rational and well-informed person would prefer not to experience, then this person has been harmed (definition of harm).
Premise 2: But life as an experience is not something a rational and well-informed person would prefer (the negative perspective).
Conclusion 1: Therefore, life is harmful to a person.
Premise 3: But the life of a person depends on them having been born (self-evident truism).
Conclusion 2: Therefore, the birth of a person is harmful to this person.
Premise 4: But it is wrong to hurt other people (the fundamental ethical articulation).
Conclusion 3: Therefore, it is wrong to give birth to a person.
" — darthbarracuda
And while I agree with you that there is a fundamental "uncalmness" to phenomenal existence, I'm specifically focused on the anxiety produced by our inherent moral disqualification. We have to make do with the "lesser of all evils", go for the "greatest good", oftentimes solve difficult problems by appealing to the majority, and inevitably hurt or manipulate other people simply because we feel the need to live, progress, survive. We feel forced into political discourse, dirtying our hands and getting pissed off. We have to make exceptions to the fundamental ethical articulation, we can't get bogged down and worry about the "little things" we do that hurt other people. They are expendable and forgettable, apparently. — darthbarracuda
I happen to have consequentialist leanings but only because I believe the world we live in is incapable of sustaining a more natural, primordial deontological ethic. Deontology is often criticized for not addressing the problems with agent-relative reasons (refusing to hurt one person to prevent five more from equal treatment - it has an air of irrationality to it) - but that's not really the fault of deontology per se as much as it is the fault of those who decide it's okay to sustain a world in which we have to substitute this ethic for another one. — darthbarracuda
In my view, the existence of substantial moral disagreement is a very troubling thing. — darthbarracuda
Therefore I believe that life is structurally negative and is morally disqualifying. We will never have a satisfactory ethic that affirms life, and this produces an anxiety in us. There's no such thing as "the good life", and everyone is guilty of doing something wrong. Most of the time it's not even our fault. — darthbarracuda
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