To know the world is full of suffering or that Will cannot eliminate itself doesn’t constitute the non-existence of Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Ah, do you see what you've done here? You've cleverly shifted the language to impute a contradiction where none is present. I never spoke of the denial of the will entailing that the will ceased to exist, and neither does Schopenhauer.

People need more than “profound knowledge” to be without Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Prove it.

“Mysticism,” in so far as we are talking about it here (e.g. "rapture," "ecstasy," "illumination," or "union" ) is the confusion of THE WORLD (e.g. the state of ourselves which, in Spinozian terms, is our “Love of God” ) for metaphysics, such that people consider themselves to be defined by Will: as if there person is defined by some logical, metaphysical precept (God, PSR,etc.etc), as opposed to themselves as a state of the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, the will is only the word for what is immediately felt in experience. You seem to be mounting here a criticism of the way language functions as opposed to a criticism of Schopenhauer proper, in which case I can only say that we're stuck with language being inherently metaphoric.

The absence of Will is actually the affirmation of oneself — TheWillowOfDarkness

But see, this could be read as a (somewhat misleading) shorthand for what I said about the denial of the will being simultaneously the affirmation of an unknown X.

He limits our descriptions of the world and Will to metaphysics and so misses out on detailing so much knowledge, even to the point of suggesting it is impossible. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Once again, your criticism here is about how language works, not about Schopenhauer's philosophy. His descriptions are limited precisely to the extent that they are descriptions. The denial of the will cannot be positively described, hence he makes no attempt to describe the indescribable. You seem to lament the fact that he doesn't enter into a blatant contradiction by refusing to do just this.

as if people must do these things to understand the nature of life and avoid existing with the restlessness of Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

As if? No, he nowhere says anyone must do anything. Period. Stop grasping at straw here.

Reaching these goals, he argues, must be achieved through specific practices — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, and this is called a hypothetical imperative. "If you want to do X, then you must do Y." It's entirely contingent on you wanting to do X, which he does not say anyone "must" want to do.

despite the fact it isn’t true at all — TheWillowOfDarkness

You have not shown this at all.

he completely fails to describe what it takes to live without Will and advocate people hold beliefs which fail to describe such a life. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No he doesn't. He has quite lengthy discussions on what it takes to deny the will and moreover refers one to a plethora of sources to further understand how to do so. Read the fourth book of the WWP and the supplements to it in the second volume.

Something undesirable that CANNOT be escaped, altered or fought. If suffering is to be avoided, it must not exist. There is no struggle to turn suffering into the absence of suffering. When suffering is present, it is a state of the world we are powerless to change. — TheWillowOfDarkness

These are unargued for assertions, my friend.

That may have been their aim, but it was not successful, in my opinion.

the mess the West started — discoii

Ah yes, what would a thread like this be without the whiny proclamations from faux liberals who blame the West for Islamic terrorism?

Is it the West's fault that Muhammad himself was a military leader, who led the conquest of Mecca and destroyed the indigenous religion and culture of Arabia? Is it the West's fault that Muslims then conquered by military force the Levant, North Africa, Southern Spain, Mesopotamia, Persia, Northern India, and eventually the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia? Is it the West's fault for defending itself at the Battle of Tours and later at the Siege of Vienna when Europe proper was threatened? Is it the West's fault that the Arab Muslim slave trade lasted for almost 1300 years?

I'm sorry to break it to you, but Arab Muslims were colonialists, and vastly more effective and brutal ones at that, long before Westerners. Islam was a theocratic military machine from the start. The West's history of colonialism and slavery pales in comparison, both in terms of severity and length of time, to that of Islam's history. In fact, there couldn't have been a British and American slave trade had it not been for the infrastructure put in place in Africa by conquering Arab Muslims to enable it.

This is not to condone colonialism by anyone, but the implication that Islamic terrorism as well as the hatred towards the West more generally that we see today would not exist if only Europeans didn't embark on a colonial project and if the war in Iraq was handled more competently or never waged at all is absurd. It is all the more absurd when one considers that Muslims are butchering their fellow Muslims in far greater numbers than Westerners. On the same day as the attacks in Paris, there were bombings in Lebanon and Iraq which left dozens dead. Is the West responsible for these attacks too? Do you really imagine that inside the minds of these terrorists, they're thinking, "I hate the West and its colonial legacy so much I'm going to slaughter my fellow Muslim countrymen in droves?"

No, these people have theocratic intentions and could not be more explicit about it. Read their manifestos. They hate the West precisely because it tries thwart these intentions. However much the West bungles such attempts at doing so, it remains in the right as a matter of principle.

Nothing short of an equivalent to the Enlightenment in the Islamic world is necessary, in my opinion. I see nothing but the status quo of smaller regional conflicts in the Middle East as well as sporadic terrorist attacks carried out in the West continuing for the foreseeable future.

How long into the future? I don't know, but the Arab Spring shows us that a breaking point is very near to hand (this half of the century for sure). I can see Western governments getting fed up enough with attacks, refugees, etc that they decide to cut ties with the Saudis and take out ISIS militarily (we're very close to that already), but Muslim populations themselves need to effect the change necessary to more permanently stamp out the extremism in their religion.

Recall that the Enlightenment came to Europe as a reaction against the brutal wars of religion that went on for several centuries in the early modern period, waged by theocratic absolutists. Nationalism, as a sort of replacement, then caused some nasty world wars of its own, but nowadays, Catholics and Protestants in Europe do not murder each other at all, nor anyone who isn't a Christian. The Islamic world is further behind but rapidly catching up, in part because most of the violence we see coming from it is motivated out of extremist interpretations of religion, rather than nationalism, so they seem to have leapfrogged that stage.

On the other hand, it will still not be easy by any means, since unlike Christianity, it is much more difficult to find any seeds of democratic, egalitarian values in Islam. Nietzsche among others rightly points out that Christianity by nature tends towards democracy. It is a religion of the oppressed and the common man in many ways, for two of the New Testament's constant refrains are humility and inclusivity. Islam by contrast is by nature suited to theocracy and despotism, for its scriptures and especially its proscriptions for proper conduct are inherently legalistic and duty orientated, stressing submission, prostration, and blind obedience.

He fails to describe such a state and, as a consequence, his philosophy fails to pass on knowledge of what it entails. — TheWillowOfDarkness

He does this deliberately, though, for were he to describe such a state, then he would cease to be doing philosophy. Knowledge has applicability only to the world. When the world (as the reflection of the will) disappears through the denial of the will, so too does knowledge along with it. In other words, as he himself claims, Schopenhauer's metaphysical system is immanent; it makes no positive claims about the transcendent. Yet the subject of knowing does not disappear (i.e. upon attaining the denial of the will, "you," at least in the sense of your physical body, do not disappear), which means that something other than the will exists and is affirmed when this occurs. Thus, the denial of the will is simultaneously the affirmation of an unknown X.

Again, nothing positive philosophically can be said about it, but mystics, according to Schopenhauer, do provide some clues, albeit clothed in the language of religious myth (e.g. they will often describe it as "rapture," "ecstasy," "illumination," or "union" with God, Nirvana, Tao, Brahman, etc, depending on the tradition in question). In sum, where philosophy ends, mysticism begins. If you seek positive confirmation about what the denial of the will entails, as opposed to Schopenhauer's merely negative formulations, then your only recourse is to take the mystic's word for it and begin on the path of asceticism. Otherwise, it will forever remain an unfalsifiable possibility.

Acquiring knowledge doesn't define the absence of Will. Someone could know everything yet still miss out on the critical change in their own outlook which is the denial of Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Uh, by "knowledge," he's not talking about being a Jeopardy whiz. Schopenhauer would concur that such knowledge is useless and possibly even a hindrance. What he's referring to is, as I said, knowledge of the will and its effects. It's more akin to a fundamental insight into the nature of the world than the memorization of some meaningless fact.

Schopenhauer might know Will cannot be eliminated by the Will, but he nevertheless argues it must be and offers that as THE solution to restlessness. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Where are you getting this from? You seem very confused if I may say so.

He might say what required (the elimination of Will), but he neither shows it nor practices it within his own philosophy. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I have no idea what this means.

The difference it makes in whether or not suffering is recognised for what it is: something which cannot be "fixed," which cannot be "muted," which is not "coped" with under any circumstance. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Okay, but you're just stipulating this.

Instead of accepting suffering for what it is — TheWillowOfDarkness

What the deuce does this even mean? I think Schopenhauer does damn fine job of accepting suffering for what it is, i.e. something intrinsically undesirable as an end in itself. What else do you have in mind here?

Schopenhauer imagines we must fight ourselves (e.g. suffering) from within ourselves (e.g. turn suffering into non-suffering), as if we could Will the elimination of Will and were not bound to the identity of ourselves at a given time. — TheWillowOfDarkness

As I said above, your identity is not lost from an objective standpoint when the will is denied. Only from the subjective standpoint of the person in whom the will has been denied is it dissolved. And no, he never says we "must" do anything. He doesn't have any robust normative ethical theory and certainly makes no categorical demands on the reader.

Within his understanding of suffering, he is still treating it as if it is something which can be captured and fought, something with which people "cope with." — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm not entirely sure he would say this, but even if he did, I'm very curious as to what difference it makes. Basically, the full import of your criticism, which has been put so forcefully, is still lost on me.

One has nothing to do. They just are. Will demands nothing of them, no matter what they might be doing in a moment, for there is none. — TheWillowOfDarkness

And what - you're saying this is a state of boredom? Is that what you think he fails to understand? If so, then you have misunderstood what the denial of the will entails. The ego, as a mere phantasm of the will, dissolves when the will is dissolved, so there is no one to be bored, no one to suffer while the will is being denied.

The way his philosophy handles Will is to try and force it out by means of its own objections. In doing so he considers this the means to eliminate Will — TheWillowOfDarkness

How on earth can you say this after quoting my line about it being blown out from within? I explicitly stated that Schopenhauer does not think the will can be denied by its own objectifications. That is precisely the delusion one must overcome, for a fire can't extinguish itself, and the overcoming of it just is the denial of the will. How this is done is by knowledge, which is the water that puts out the fire. The will cannot act in the individual on what it does not know. Hence, so long as one remains ignorant concerning the futility of willing, one will continue to will, believing that what one wills will some day bring one fulfillment (happiness). To recognize the futility of this is to recognize that the world is only the mirror of the will and hence that no single objectification of the will, just as no single spark of the fire, can extinguish it. How does one acquire this knowledge? The simplest, most common, and most tragic way is through suffering, which either over time or through some particularly excruciating event, slowly erodes, chips away at, or detonates the inborn error that we exist to be happy (having our desires be fulfilled) and that one need only affirm one's will to be so. Then a set of choices presents itself: 1) denial of the realization, resulting in the strengthening of the delusion, 2) suicide, or 3) the path of asceticism. Schopenhauer advocates the third option.

I'm still not clear exactly what you mean by "experiencing an Idea". Do you mean something like 'grasping the form of a thing, in a kind of geometrical sense? Or something more like 'feeling a sense of the numinous'? Or maybe both together? — John

No, I wouldn't describe it in these ways. Perhaps the key to understanding what I mean is to consider that such an experience is will-less. One's will has been temporarily quieted when having such an experience, such that one contemplates an object free from the ordinary dimensions of experience (those of time, space, and causality). One no longer views the object in relation to one's will but rather as an object qua object, and the notion of "timeless objects" has traditionally been associated with Plato's Ideas/Forms, hence the name.

For Plato the highest form, the 'master form' is the Good. Do you think works of art can bring about 'an experience of the Good'? — John

No, for unlike Plato, Schopenhauer doesn't think there are Ideas for abstract concepts such as goodness, courage, beauty, etc.

So, it is just by virtue of its sheer formal arrangement that a work of art or a natural landscape of human face might reveal an Idea? — John

No, I don't think so. As I said before, it's by virtue of the removed nature of art from reality proper that enables, or encourages at least, the contemplation of an Idea.

Would it not also have to do with feelings and meanings inherent in the conformation and attendant dispositions or comportments of the human body? — John

Maybe. I don't know.

My point, however, is Schopenhauer’s seeks to maintain restlessness — TheWillowOfDarkness

No he doesn't.

It is incapable offering people philosophical understanding which mutes or resolves anxiety about what happens next in life. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Actually, this is precisely what Schopenhauer's philosophy intends to do! Have you honestly read the man?

it fails to accept suffering — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, I'm pretty sure it does.

It misunderstands Will, mistaking it for something to calm, when it is actually needs eliminating entirely. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Schopenhauer would concur. But the will cannot be eliminated by force, by means of its own objectifications. It requires being blown out, like a candle, from within, as a completely free choice.

Many other times though, it just makes someone bored, resisted or frustrated- an action which generates Will- as it denies the goal that have, meaning the go into “seeking mode” as they need to find it again — TheWillowOfDarkness

He never says eliminating suffering is easygoing. But there is an inner, ineradicable calm, even in the midst of great suffering or boredom, by those who have tasted the denial of the will, which enables them to overcome the blows of life battering them from without.

I find the continuous return by pessimists to discuss pessimism akin to TV evangelism: repetitive, futile and a little annoying - nobody who isn't already a pessimist is going to be convinced by it because it is an interpretation of the world incompatible with personal experience for most. — Benkei

What a ridiculous statement. No one is evangelizing. We're simply having a discussion on a forum, trying to clarify our own views and correct misrepresentations of our position as best we can. We even welcome debate and criticism, which is necessary to test any position, not just ours. What's wrong with that and how is that any different from debating the merits of any position in a (hopefully) clear and intelligent way?

The moral judgment of Schopenhauer is "life isn't worth living", which you take into account when making a utilitarian judgment that "life isn't worth living" (I paraphrase). That doesn't seem entirely the right thing to do for several reasons. The most obvious to me is that Schopenhauer's conclusion should not be part of a utilitarian calculus because the utilitarian consequences of a moral judgment are nil. — Benkei

Schopenhauer is not a utilitarian and no where, to my knowledge, says that life is not worth living, for that directly implies suicide, which he condemns. He rather says that life has no intrinsic worth, which is quite another thing, and that no compassionate, rational person would impose the burdens of existence on the coming generation.

It's not the absence of a cuddle that makes me want to cuddle. — Benkei

No one would make the absurd claim that you cuddle your wife due to the absence of cuddling in your life. The privation is deeper than that. "There are no real pleasures without real needs," as Voltaire says. There are a whole host of more primitive and primordial needs for which cuddling is merely one minor attempt at fulfilling.

I don't need to justify suffering because it simply is there. — Benkei

The justification the pessimist is looking for is for not doing anything to prevent it, alleviate it, or escape from it.

Philosophical pessimism is a certain state in addition to all other states (including suffering) of their life. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, it is not a state of being but a judgment.

Rather than accept that suffering is an inevitable part of life, he ties himself up in knots over our inability to avoid it. To Schopenhauer we are failures because we cannot compete the task of eliminating suffering. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I am not aware of him denying that suffering is an inevitable part of life. On the contrary, it sounds like something he would quite readily admit. Nor, also, does he call any human beings failures.

Why not a form of philosophical pessimism which recognises we cannot escape suffering, but avoids the practice of beating ourselves up for that inability? — TheWillowOfDarkness

Because we can escape from suffering, according to him. The inevitability of suffering does not negate the possibility of escape from it.

Is life, suffering, something we can accept as inevitable? You don't think so. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm pretty sure Schopenhauer does think this.

It is not a description of how life is suffering. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes it is.

it is the state of suffering because one knows there is suffering which one cannot avoid. It is to put an extra scoop of suffering on top all the other suffering we have. Schopenhauer notes the inevitability of suffering and then demands we must suffer for that too. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Again, Schopenhauer makes no demands of anyone. You seem intent on ramrodding a very peculiar reading of Schopenhauer onto us that has little basis in the actual words of the man himself. You also seem to be saying that anyone who is already suffering will only multiply their suffering merely on account of reading a book that tries to make generalized statements about suffering, which constitutes a form of philosophical pessimism. This is bizarre! Most pessimists, including myself, take great pleasure in reading pessimistic literature, for it comes as a welcome antidote to the optimistic drivel contained in almost everything else one reads. It reminds me of something Einstein said, which is somewhat related:

"I do not believe in freedom of the will. Schopenhauer’s words: ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of freedom of will preserves me from taking too seriously myself and my fellow men as acting and deciding individuals and from losing my temper.”

Likewise, Schopenhauer's pessimism more generally, far from increasing one's anxieties and suffering, rather aids in alleviating them to a considerable extent.

Pessimism is an attitude — Agustino

False. It is in one sense an attitude, and in another, a position about the nature of the world.

It presupposes that new individuals could possibly not deal with life. — Agustino

You commit the same presupposition by using the phrase, "dealing with life." That life must be "dealt with" at all already acknowledges an adversarial relationship between oneself and what it is one is dealing with. It implies a problem to be solved, something to wrestle with and combat, and a non-ideal state of affairs. In other words, you acknowledge that life is inherently a struggle, to borrow a Darwinian phrase, and yet think it might be possible for it not to be so. I might be willing to grant that the latter is indeed possible, but then it would cease to be life!

doesn't mean everyone ought to feel so — Agustino

The "ought" is only ever implicit. No categorical imperative about accepting the pessimist's conclusions is being foisted upon you.

This is integrity, and courage. — Agustino

I don't see how this amounts to either integrity or courage. In fact, the opposite seems apparent, that this is actually cowardice. Defending what you take to be true is real courage, for it entails sacrifice and an element of danger not present in simply submerging oneself in an echo chamber of like minded opinions.

I noticed that most people are not like me - for them, it's extremely meaningful to struggle - for them, this is the point of life. — Agustino

Sometimes one must struggle to maintain and vouchsafe the quiet life you so desire (and I desire) from those who do like struggling for its own sake. They greatly outnumber us and daily seek to obliterate self-reflection and contemplation.

I am not sure what you mean by saying that "the experience of the Idea is entirely contingent". — John

I'm saying there is no single, perfectly replicable method one can follow that will, by necessity, result in experiencing an Idea. My position is only that art as I have defined it tends to bring about such a result more than other things, and for the reason I gave earlier.

Does Schopenhauer think, or do you think, that the ideas can be perceived via the senses? Because it seems the only other kind of perception that could be meant is precisely the kind of intellectual perception (intuition) that you say that Schopenhauer agrees with Kant in denying. — John

I think he would be obliged to answer your question in the affirmative, and so would I.

Such labeling is fine by me, as long as one distinguishes between the psychological and the philosophical. An optimist by disposition or predisposition may still yet hold to pessimism as a philosophical position, or vice versa. In fact, you will notice there are four possible combinations according to this distinction. My plea is only for their non-conflation.

but all thoughts are subject to experience and those experiences occurs in time and space... or are there thoughts that are not experiences? — Mayor of Simpleton

I don't think all experiences are in both space and time.

and I have one in which it does meet.

Now what? — Mayor of Simpleton

We're simply done here, I think. I would merely make the appeal that my definition most closely matches the etymology of the word and its usage, both historically speaking and at present.

You might wish to be a bit careful with the word 'eine Vorstellung'. — Mayor of Simpleton

I think I was, which was in effect my point to John.

I have problems suggesting that this must be an associative quality for all people who have an aesthetic experience. — Mayor of Simpleton

Well, there's nothing more for me to say on this, then. I take it to be a brute fact of aesthetic experience (though by no means the only fact); it's the raw data that needs to be explained by aestheticians.

but you could just as well state that all thought occurs in space — Mayor of Simpleton

No, I couldn't actually. If thoughts were in both time and space, then they would be physical objects, which they are not.

How exactly do you wish to make any confirmation that anyone has 'transported outside of themselves' much less state what the criteria is for such a metaphoric notion to literally occur? — Mayor of Simpleton

The former is impossible and the latter criteria are merely suggestive. In fact, part of what demarcates them as aesthetic experiences is their inability to be perfectly replicated, much like religious experiences. Aesthetics is therefore not a science.

I'm not all together sure how that's supposed to work — Mayor of Simpleton

My point was that concepts are not present when experiencing the Idea. Of course one can view art and make judgments about it.

for me the source/catalyst of aesthetic experience is another from your source/catalyst. — Mayor of Simpleton

Note that I have repeatedly said that literally anything can be a catalyst for experiencing the Ideas. If conceptual art does the trick for you, it doesn't defeat my position in the least. My disagreement is a matter of semantics on that score: I have a definition of art that it simply doesn't meet.

I think so. I'll try it here.

I was in useful hints and tips when I read about the menu bar. I'm saying that in the old PF, replying to someone took you to a separate page with just the post you wanted to quote from. Here, there is no such page. If the post you want to quote from is at the top of the page in the thread, then you have to scroll all the way up to do so.

I guess I'm asking is if there is a way to swiftly ping pong back and forth between the post you want to quote from and the one you're writing at the bottom of the page.

Another question: What does the menu bar refer to? When replying, I keep having to scroll back up if I want to read or quote what someone said, which is somewhat annoying.

Care to expand on that notion? — Mayor of Simpleton

I do not honestly think I can be any clearer in what I mean. Aesthetic experiences have the quality of being timeless, of transporting oneself outside of oneself. This is simply axiomatic, though subject to numerous explanations by philosophers.

As for what they communicate not being concepts found in books, would that not depend upon the books one reads?

Have you considered that the concepts that do not 'transport you out of time' might have less to do with the concepts, but more to do with you in particular?

Could you imagine that these concepts may well indeed 'transport one (other than yourself) out of time'? — Mayor of Simpleton

If one is transported out of time, then one is no longer thinking, since all thought occurs in time. Thought is nothing other than the formation of judgments, the subjects and predicates of which are composed of concepts. Hence, concepts cannot transport one outside of time.

this has probably more a fundamental ground to it in that I reject idealism and embrace relativism. I feel you cannot, nor can I or anyone else, fully define what is and is not art. — Mayor of Simpleton

Yes, that would explain things. I will not dispute your relativism here, as it would take us too far afield from the topic.

btw... the 'maddening' number of ellipses in my posts have more to do with these concepts/notions ellipsed (as I see it) are far from agreed upon concepts/notions, just as I'm not too sure what is so 'maddening' about ellipses; thus fail to endorse that the ellipses are indeed maddening. In short... the notions are relative and I really fail to see any universal or absolute understanding of those concepts/notions. — Mayor of Simpleton

This is unclear to me, but note that I only inquired as to the number of ellipses you used, not that you used them at all. I don't mind them in and of themselves, but their frequency in your post struck me as odd. Though it does remind me of Céline 's writing, some of which I admire, so I suppose I can't complain too much.

No problems, Thorongil, we all misspeak at times. — John

Not to rain on your victory parade here, but your original question - "What do you take representational art to be representing?" - is somewhat ambiguous, for the word "representing" could also imply "communicating" or "expressing," both of which are in accord with my position that art is a catalyst for experiencing the Ideas. Technically speaking, I suppose one could call the Ideas representations, in that they still presuppose the relation of being an object for a subject, but they are not in time, space, or causal relation to each other like all other representations are.

However, it might be helpful to specify that by "representation" I mean Vorstellung. Looking back at your original post, I see you made a distinction between presentation and representation, but these are both legitimate ways of translating said German word. I prefer to use presentation actually, but it is by no means the academic standard. So I would be in agreement with you insofar as "non-representational" means that art is presentational.

because they are by definition beyond any and all interpretations and perspectives — John

Yes, but in interpreting an artwork, one is not interpreting the Idea, for the experience of the Idea is entirely contingent. When one interprets an artwork one is rather doing so in terms of its historical context, the symbology present in it, etc - surface level interpretation, as it were.

Having said that I do believe that artworks are capable of evoking a sense of the numinous and the mystical. — John

This to me sounds like only a more vague and imprecise rephrasing of my position that art evokes the Ideas!

I think Kant was right that there is no intellectual intuition in those kinds of senses. — John

Well, neither does Schopenhauer permit any intellectual intuition of the sort Kant explicitly denies. The Ideas are perceived, not thought up and then alleged to exist. Schopenhauer is a nominalist with respect to concepts/abstractions: they do not afford knowledge of anything real. If the Ideas were merely concepts, then you would be right in pointing out their fictitiousness.

While it sounds like a nice parallel, I don't think it works that way. A representation is necessary as an identifiable landmark or guidepost which can then spark the contemplation of the Idea. It serves as a gentle push to start one on one's way towards said contemplation. An abstract creation is not identifiable by definition and so would only arouse confusion. There are, more importantly, no Ideas for abstractions. I am (and Schopenhauer is too) a nominalist with respect to them. Ideas are only of natural kinds. Nor are they (the Ideas) abstractions, as you suggest, if by this you mean concepts, since they can be perceived as opposed to being conceived.

Oh I see.

I came across that stupid video recently. It follows all the common tropes of YouTube "educational" videos, wherein the goal seems to be to simulate verbal diarrhea as accurately as possible.

Did anybody PM WhiskeyWhiskers? I really like/d his posts and I don't know if he has migrated yet.

I don't understand how it can make sense to say that the Platonic Ideas can be represented. — John

I don't believe I said or implied that, and if I did, my apologies for the unclarity. The Ideas are not represented in art, but rather experienced by means of art. Art is, as it were, a reliable catalyst for experiencing them. As I said in an earlier post, literally anything can inspire contemplation of the Ideas, but art rather uniquely does this better than most things. The primary way it does this, I would submit, is because, as a representation of the world, a piece of art is one step removed from our ordinary experience of the world. In this way, we do not react the same way to a painting of a man as we do to an actual man. The latter involves all kinds of subtle, instinctual, and emotive responses, whereas the former does not or need not. The painting allows one to intellectually contemplate the man free from the constraints of embodied interaction, and in this way, uncover the Idea behind him.

I think Schopenhauer's use of the Ideas in his aesthetic theory is a vapid distortion of Platonism — John

I don't see what's so vapid about it. He's using the term as Plato does, but of course the status of the Ideas in his system is very different than in Plato's (they serve a different function). Again, I don't see a problem with this.

If there were signatures on this forum I would be tempted to put as mine: "Pessimism can mean either a psychological disposition or a philosophical position." Most people either conflate the two or think pessimism only refers to the former.

As a psychological disposition, it is usually thought of in terms of someone who "views the glass as half empty," a thoroughly overused and annoying phrase. It's also incoherent, as emptiness cannot be divided. Viewing it as half full is the only semantically precise way of viewing it. Of course, this isn't to say the optimist is right! It also refers to someone who might be depressed, unfriendly, overly cynical, mean spirited, disposed to complain about everything, or someone who likes to entertain quasi-nihilistic notions about the nature of morality and human beings.

All of this describes a certain personage, not a defensible position. Pessimism as a philosophical position can be variously defined as the view 1) that life and the world ought not to be, 2) that human beings are by nature irresistibly prone to acting out of pride, greed, lust, envy, gluttony, wrath, and sloth, to name the seven deadly sins, but also out of delusion and ignorance, willful or otherwise, and 3) that there is no such thing as progress in human history, and hence, that virtue cannot be taught.

The difference being that one is denying in Schopenhauer, and one is affirming nature in Spinoza. — schopenhauer1

While true, there is a way to read the denial of the will as an affirmation. He says, for example: "It can still be asked from what this will has sprung, which is free to affirm itself, the phenomenal appearance of this being the world, or to deny itself, the phenomenal appearance of which we do not know." So the affirmation of the will results in the world, but the denial of the will is in some sense the affirmation of something of which we know not.

Thanks for your thoughts in this thread, too, by the way.

In this way it makes sense specifically as a reaction, comment or overcoming of your view that art needs to be representational. — shmik

To be honest, the quote is unclear to me, so I can't honestly say how much it does in overcoming my conception of art.

What do you take representational art to be representing? — John

The Platonic Idea.

I was speaking in generalities.

Okay, good to hear!

Did they (as I have sort of always supposed) try to 'communicate' via their art at all and if so... why didn't they simply write a book or just say what they had in mind rather than to go to all the trouble of making us sort of 'feel their intentions' via paint of a canvas? — Mayor of Simpleton

They communicate, certainly, but what they communicate are not concepts, as one finds contained in books. They communicate the Ideas, or universals, of the particulars of which they paint. An Idea is not the same as a concept. Concepts do not transport us out of time, as happens in aesthetic experience, only Ideas do, seeing as they do not exist in time. Hence, "conceptual" art is a contradiction in terms.

Not all art is for everyone...

... I can live with that.

Can you? — Mayor of Simpleton

Sure, but some things purported to be art I do not find to be art. Can you live with definitions that clearly demarcate the limits of concepts? A definition that includes everything is no definition at all. I do not mean to denigrate the creations of Duchamp et al, but I do mean to exclude them from what it means to be art.

To be fair...

... any realist after the invention of the camera should have just take an photo and saved us the effort of bothering to look at their efforts of representation, eh? — Mayor of Simpleton

No, for again, what is being represented is not the representation of a representation, but the Idea of a representation.

By the way, why did you include a maddening amount of ellipses in your post?

Isn't it a pity that you diagnose the optimists so well for seeing the world through tinted glasses, and yet fail to see that the pessimists also see the world through the prism of their own feelings? — Agustino

This pregnantly worded question is only interesting to the degree that it suggests the impossibility of truthfully analyzing the character of the world. If you meant to imply such an impossibility, then you end up begging the question by asserting the impossibility of making true statements about the world by means of purportedly true statements about the world, i.e. that it contains beings who are determined by their feelings and that these feelings in turn determine their statements about the world. Such a claim is self-defeating. If you did not mean to imply such an impossibility, then it is possible to make true claims about the world, and I would again maintain that pessimism truthfully describes the world. It is then up to you to refute my position if you disagree.

Your whole post attempts to be an apologetic. And just like all apologists, it seems you feel the need to justify why pessimists feel as they do. — Agustino

I'm not sure I meant it as this. I find it to be more analytic than apologetic, though I suppose an explanation can be a defense in the sense that it clears away misconceptions about the position in question.

A free man is neither pessimist nor optimist. He sees the world as it is. He is a seer; doesn't stamp himself all over the world. — Agustino

Pessimism is realism, in that it adequately describes the world as it is. Do not confuse pessimism as a psychological disposition with pessimism as a philosophical position. The latter is all I am concerned with.

Since our beliefs (and therefore our knowlege, K=JTB) to the determinist are not based upon justifications nor truth, but just on whatever happens to bounce into the brain of the decision maker, we have no knowledge at all. That being the case, we can know nothing at all if determinism is true. — Hanover

I find this to be a non-sequitur. To speak of knowledge being "true" or not is a category mistake. Truth is a function of propositions, which can be justified or unjustified according to logical analysis. Beliefs by definition are propositions, therefore, they can be justified or unjustified.

Very interesting. Do you think you could rack your brain as to where this does indeed come from? I would be very interested to know.

This "I", which is the entire framework of all of that, plays a causal role. For example, your desire to transcend the world, that certainly plays a causal role in whatever you do or believe. When your internal resources play a greater role in determining your behaviour than external forces, we say that you are "self-determined". Therein lies your freedom. — Agustino

Keep in mind that I'm talking about beliefs, not actions, but regardless, if I play a causal role in determining either of them, then they are determined! You have it precisely backwards it seems to me: the empirical self is clearly not free; only the transcendental self, which is a misleading way of referring to the thing-in-itself, is free. The subject of knowing is always and forever determined by the forms of knowing, whereas the subject of willing is not determined by anything, as it lies outside of all such forms of knowing.

and it does so, when your behavior becomes governed by your internal resources much more than by circumstance. — Agustino

Again, "being governed by internal resources" is not freedom, it's just another way of saying one is determined. And I think I now know what you mean by doxastic fatalism, but that is not what I am arguing for, nor something I would argue for, seeing as I think it would have to presuppose a rationalistic teleology.

Nevermind. I found it. It was hiding, though!

Quick question: where/how exactly do I log off?

Yes, I quite agree about compassion. That would be the positive aspect of my negatively worded definition. I should have specified that. Indeed, how could I forget!

Your song quote also reminds me that partly what I'm getting at is Socrates' definition of wisdom: knowing that you don't know anything. Here, knowledge does not mean perception or cognition so much as certainty with respect to what is purported to be true. The latter we certainly don't have, which militates against the heedless extroversion of the optimist.

You may be right, Willow. Thanks for the post. I do tend to think "non-representational art" is an oxymoron.

However, I don't agree with the following distinction:

Non-representation art functions in a very immediate sense; it is not about displaying some obvious or clear representation through the painstaking work of the artist towards perfection, but rather living the moment of the artwork itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think representational art is immediate, in that it transports us into a timeless realm of Ideas. The particular scene on the canvas is a means of communicating something universal.

As a general comment, since jamalrob brought up my favorite cantankerous bachelor from Frankfurt, I would be willing to admit that what is called "conceptual art" (and literally everything) theoretically has the possibility to affect the aforementioned transportative experience, but all I'm saying is that it doesn't do this for me and that it is a mistake to call it art.