The Naive Theory of Consciousness
What am I not grasping?
Like any grammatical modifier the word “conscious” lends us information about another word in the sentence (say, a man) and therefor applies to whatever thing in the world that word signifies (the conscious man). The word “conscious” signifies that thing and must be a direct 1-to-1 ratio with that which the word describes, or else the modifier is false.
Adding the suffix “-ness” to the adjective “conscious” turns the subject of analysis from the conscious man to “the state or quality of being conscious”. What is it that is being conscious? The man, but men are physical, so we abstract out the man. This slight linguistic maneuver might provide us with a new subject of abstract thought to analyze absent what it used to signify, but unmoors us from the world, entering us into the paradox of a state or quality of nothing in particular, and leaving us with a noun which signifies neither person, place, nor thing. Our theory of consciousness has quickly been inflated to include new nouns and new nothings.
It’s all in the grammar. Chalmers almost exclusively uses noun-phrases like “consciousness”, “experience”, “mind”, which grammatically signify a person, place, or thing. He could say “I’m just being abstract about the conscious man”, and that would be the end of it. But that would refute his own theory, men being physical, biological, and all that. Rather, he posits these nouns and whatever it is they signify as fundamental features of the world, ontologically independent of physical properties.