Before anything, just want to say sorry for the long reply.

Firstly, no, I don’t think that’s per se the problem, IF, in the first place, it’s granted there’s such a thing as abstraction/conception.

For, as I’ve stated in my post which you’ve replied to, abstraction/conception, in general, can’t occur without the very principle of reason; again, if otherwise was possible, we could have examples of abstracts/concepts that violate the principle or condition of reason, &, therefore, are inherently contradictory, e.g., such as a square circle. Yet since we don’t & can’t, this suffices to show that reason isn’t an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts, as they don’t & can’t condition its rules, but vice versa.

Think of it like this, anything that’s an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts can be altered by them, such as a “pegasus” having wings made of carrots as opposed to feathers; yet whatever abstracts/concepts can’t alter, was never something which was an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts, such as their inability to alter a square or a circle into a square circle because neither a square nor a circle was an effect of or derived from abstracts/concepts but sensations (which are independent of them); this latter reasoning, again, of what they’re incapable of altering not being an effect of or derived from them, is to be applied to reason itself, thus demonstrating its independence from them (as sensible objects, like a square or a circle, are).

Now what the problem really is, as I see it, is how the materialist can demonstrate the being of abstraction/conception by purely physical means (& not per se how reason arises from the former [so let’s not get ahead of ourselves, as this is something to be explained only after the fact of demonstrating how conception/abstraction arises from physicality]). For, in the context of the mind, induction is an actual thing, i.e., thinking certain things about the future (for example, causal connections [a-la Hume & Kant]), yet no physical thing, such as a set of neurons, can transcend its present state & actually refer to the future in order to make claims about it. So, in my view, the problem of the materialist per se isn’t explaining reason arising from abstracts/concepts, but, in the first place, the latter on a purely physical basis.

Now, moreover, I agree that reason can’t appear to us without causality, yet this doesn’t necessarily mean that reason is an appearance, but only that our initial knowledge of it occurs by means of a conditional application of it to some object.

“And to say reason is merely one of two necessary human conditions doesn’t shed any light on its fundamental origin.” — Sure, but my opposition to the claim that it arises from abstraction/conception isn’t so much about what its fundamental origin is, as what its fundamental origin IS NOT, i.e., conception/abstraction.

I appreciate your approval, friend. Thank you. :up: :up:

No, my friend, yours wasn’t the fallacy of circularity; but that of inconsistency, or incongruity (to use a term that you’ve used).

The fallacy of circularity involves attempting to justify one thing, or set of them, by means of another thing, or set of them, while also attempting to justify this latter by means of the former, & then cyclically repeating (hence, the circularity of) the procedure.

For example, Y is “iff” X is, for when X was, then Y was too; & strictly since Y is “iff” X is, but only because when X was, then Y was too, & so on & so on ad infinitum.

Yet, this wasn’t what you did, since what you’d tacitly derived, i.e., the utility of reason, wasn’t what you’d presumed or presupposed, i.e., the uselessness of reason, but it was in direct opposition to it; so that your reasoning wasn’t circular, since, again, what you’d derived didn’t justify your presupposition, nor vice versa, but it was in direct opposition to, thus being INCONSISTENT with, your presupposition. Therefore your fallacy was that of inconsistency, not circularity.

Now, I don’t agree that logic is a rational method, for logic is the rational method. These two words, logic & reason, etymologically have ultimately one & the same meaning; the former being Greek in origin, the latter Latin. You actually affirm this, that “logic IS reason,” later in your reply.

Moreover, I don’t agree that logic or reason is an abstraction; as it’s a principle or condition for it, & therefore it can’t follow or be derived from it. This is provable on the basis of no abstraction being able to be in conflict with it; meaning that IF it was a production of abstraction, THEN abstraction could produce it in another way, i.e., whereby X could = -X; yet since it can’t, this should show one that it’s not a production of abstraction, but the condition or principle for it.

Sorry to intrude & intervene in your discussion, but I would like to reply to the question that you’ve raised in your latest post in this thread (about reason).

Stating that “reason is useless” involves a contradiction not because of circularity, but because of inconsistency; for, to use reason to disprove reason already PRESUPPOSES its veracity, in direct opposition to the conclusion that you've seemingly drawn about it, thus this is self-defeating or contradictory.

In other words, asserting apriori that reason is useless can’t, by definition, be proven by experience or empirically, thus reason itself remains to prove it; whereby you’d be using reason to do so, presupposing the very fact of not being useless (thus contradicting or self-defeating the original assertion). Now, retorting that the assertion is advanced aposteriori, & not apriori, e.g., by referring to an instance or instances of flawed reasoning, can’t help you, as this doesn’t actually prove that reason, in general, is useless, but only that someone’s particular reasoning is incorrect.

The inability to answer this question only arises if one presumes that its identity can be EXTERNALLY demonstrated; which is precisely what Descartes opposed. A “thinking thing,” i.e., a mind, according to Descartes, has nothing outside of itself to which it can directly point & say, “this is thinking” — whence arose the problem of solipsism.

So, the identity of thought isn’t to be externally sought for &, thus, revealed, but it’s to be discerned by way of personal observation; such that observation or perception, in general, is what Descartes identifies as “thinking,” rather than just conception in particular (which is what a lot of people get wrong about Descartes). As Descartes himself put it, in the ninth article of the first part of his “Principles of Philosophy,” “I take the word ‘thought’ to cover EVERYTHING that we are aware of as happening within us, and it counts as ‘thought’ because we are aware of it. That includes NOT ONLY understanding, willing and imagining, but also sensory awareness.”

In my view, “time” is defined as the form of any possible or actual change. Time & change are synonymous; which is precisely why whatever truth that’s regarded as being eternal, i.e., an eternal truth, is considered to be so, on the basis of its incapability of changing. For example, a logical one; such that the incapability of a thing to both be & not be what it is, is regarded as holding eternally so, exactly because its truth is considered as being incapable of changing.

“that we could get by without the whole ordeal to start with.” — When have you known this to be the case, if ever at all? Or is this just something that you imagine?

So you advise to teach children no rules for behavior & interaction? They should simply just act how they wish without any correction or consequence? As another person has already said, seems like you’re pushing for anarchy, which would create as much oppression or chaos, the physically strong ruling over the weak type of a scenario, as you claim that contractualism leads to.

Sure, not the technicalities of jurisprudence, but are you saying that children shouldn’t be taught rules of behavior & interaction at all? Moreover, this necessarily doesn’t imply fear but caution & moderation, which isn’t a bad thing.

Sure, I don’t deny that modern “contractualist” states can over do it, but that’s not an objection to contractualism, per se; but just to how certain modern states have employed it, which I’m not against objecting to. So my point has more so to do with contractualism in principle, as opposed to how it’s practiced by certain states nowadays, which, again, I don’t deny that it can be, in these cases, unfair or downright corrupt.

What? Can you please rephrase the question. Do you mean, “WORK in our modern-world with 1000's of laws to abide by”?

Perhaps by the victim; or by people in a society who’ve agreed on upholding “social contracts”, that is, in order to be a citizen of the state, you’ve already agreed to uphold certain rules, & you’ll suffer the consequence(s) for it if you violate said rules. So that such a punishment, in making you reevaluate your appreciation of what was taken from you, will prevent you from repeatedly committing such an act, in fear of being again deprived of what was taken from you.

I don’t agree with that, as I believe in the maxim of, “you don’t know what you’ve got until it’s gone.” So that, in principle, the most effective way to make a person appreciate, or at least miss, a certain thing, is to deprive them of it. Although I don’t deny that the justice system has or can quite unjustly impose such a consequence onto some people; nonetheless, there are times when it’s justified & has the desired effect.

“I think it boils down to retaliation towards some perceived threat” — Right, as I’ve said in my first post, “negative reinforcement”, or just a negative reaction; &, sure, this can include inaction or a negation of one’s ability to do certain things, as this is case with the “‘holding’ cells” of jail or prison.

“If people knew how many people actually DON'T get away with crimes, things would shift so dramatically.” — Exactly my point, only if people KNEW, then things would change, but they don’t, i.e., they’re ignorant of the improbability of getting away, so they proceed with their action(s) in ignorance of what’s more than likely going to come their way; but, again, if they did know, most of them would’ve never tried to commit what they did.

I guess that I would it explain by saying that the perpetrator doesn’t view/experience the consequence as being something negative, or just doesn’t know, ahead of time, what negative consequence(s) will accompany his action(s), i.e., either by impudence or ignorance.

For example, one steals another’s car & sells it, now they may not view/experience this as being something negative but rather positive ‘cause of how it monetarily benefited them, so they’ll proceed in committing such a “criminal action”; but, say, if they were to get arrested & lose more money in legal fees than they originally gained by selling that stolen car, which wasn’t expected, & if they were to knew that this would’ve happened ahead of time, then they most likely wouldn’t have committed such an action in the first place.

So, I guess, that’s how I would explain a perpetrator’s crime in relation to an either unexpressed or understated negative consequence; either in it not being not something which is viewed/experienced as expressly negative, i.e., impudence, or in it not being known that something negative will be a consequence of it, i.e., ignorance.

If you can you give an example of such a scenario, I’m sure that I’d be able to better answer your question.

LOL :lol:

”But, does this have to be demonstrated in act only?” —... for beings without a higher cognition, like dogs or other animals, I would say, yes. For example, you can’t explain, in principle, to a dog why going to the bathroom in the house is bad, e.g., due to germs/potential illnesses from it, uncleanliness, odor, so one can only execute a demonstrable negative consequence in action, as a response to their undesirable behavior, if you want to establish a negative association in their minds, which should arouse their aversion or inhibition to committing that action again.

Yet for beings of a higher cognition, like humans past adolescence, not necessarily. For example, the consequence of “hell” or an “underworld” is indemonstrable on earth, it as an ultimate consequence to certain kinds of actions cannot be demonstrated on earth; & yet it has prevented plenty of people from committing certain kinds of actions due to the conceived or imagined threat of it, even if its consequence has never been demonstrated to follow from those certain kinds of actions.

So, in my opinion, negative consequences have to be demonstrated in response to undesirable behaviors for beings without a higher cognition; yet not necessarily for beings with a higher cognition, as they can conceive or imagine of certain kinds of consequences without these actually ever being demonstrated as such.

“What is the deeper point towards punishment”? — In my opinion, “negative reinforcement”; by associating something negative, or undesirable, with a given act, one will, usually, cease to commit that action due to their aversion of the consequences accompanying it. Very simply put, the dog learns to stop going to the bathroom in the house only ‘cause of its aversion to the negative consequences accompanying such an act, e.g., shouting, being put in a cage or timeout, spanking, etc.,; without that, it would continue in its way without any inhibition.

Lol, his philosophy as a system is very much open to criticism; only on a superficial or surface level does it appear to be too well done, but it’s actually quite illegitimate & reverts back to Cartesian dualism if properly understood.

Spinoza’s whole philosophy depends on the basis of his definition of “substance”; & if this is shown to be illegitimate, the entire edifice of his philosophy crumbles; so let’s focus on that.

Spinoza defines “substance” as “that which is in itself.” Yet, in stating this, he doesn’t actually explain what “that” is “which is in itself,” surely he doesn’t mean the word “substance,” insofar as being “in itself” isn’t an explanation of “what” a thing is but only “how” it is; also, replying that “that which is in itself” is “that which is in itself” is illegitimate as well, as this is merely tautological & likewise provides no knowledge of what “that” is “which is in itself” but just that it is as such; &, therefore, his foundational definition is an empty one & leaves us without a clue as to what “that” is “which is in itself” (again, surely he doesn’t mean the word “substance”).

Thus Spinoza’s empty foundational definition renders his whole philosophy just as void, & it’ll revert to Cartesian dualism if one speaks of “eternal attributes.”

Excuse the late reply, as I’ve been quite occupied lately & haven’t had the time to check into my account. Yet, to the point...

“Ideally too though, it does not exclude what it does not involve; it is simply just not within its ethereal purview. On it we can as a concept preclude what we do not understand and in doing so know what it is. Then it's just a matter of abstracting your way through living.” — Actually, its essential identity, a-priori, does exclude what it doesn’t involve (as this is precisely what enables us, in the first place, to possibly distinguish it as an individual thing); although the states of this being, that is, the identity of its states rather than the identity of its being, can contingently involve other things in relation, such as a perceived relation to lights, sounds, impressions, etc.,.

Correspondingly, absolutely speaking, to say that “this” involves “that” in relation, such as this observer presently involves that colored object in relation to it, is equivalent to saying that “this” isn’t “that”; & as the lack of an empirical observation of the non-relation of things which are involved in relation to each other, such as the lack in one’s lifetime with congenital cataracts of an empirical observation of the non-relation of their vision to those visibly blurred forms involved or included in relation to their vision, doesn’t mean that these things can’t possibly be not related to each other, asserting that we haven’t experienced the self excluded from things which its identity doesn’t involve, is no proof or argument that it can’t actually exclude what it doesn’t involve, neither empirically or logically.

“There is no means to a matter - so to say. Boundaries are not my thing.” — It’s not a question of what’s your thing, but what’s the thing really? & surely this isn’t determined by what you favor.

Heraclitus himself, in fact, produced a manuscript of his own that was entitled, “On Nature”, which he submitted to the historically famous “Artemisium”, &, therefore, he wasn’t merely remembered as having voiced opinion “x, y, & z”, so, try to bear in mind that all of his extant quotations come from people who had access to & directly cited his personal manuscripts; which is why we only have fragments of his work, since no respectable author ever quotes an entire body of work of another author, but only parts, bits or fragments of it.

Therefore, to be clear, the quote in my O.P. is literally in Heraclitus’ own words, it’s a direct quotation from him; so I’m not merely discussing hearsay about his philosophy, that’s a direct albeit short passage from his personal work.

Ok, now that that’s cleared up, even though all of that was & is pretty irrelevant to the matter at hand, let’s get to the point. In my view, Heraclitus meaning in that short passage is quite obvious; & my interpretation of his meaning, here, isn’t far off, if at all, from the general understanding of what his philosophy is intended to mean, imply or suggest, which is that of ceaseless change/ impermanence.

Are you denying that, in the aforementioned quote in my O.P., Heraclitus is maintaining that a person or self, a “man” (in his words), cannot exist for more than a moment or instant?

There’s no equivocating, I’m using the word how it’s commonly understood; even how Spinoza understands it (in a general Cartesian sense). Moreover, you have no point, after claiming that “substance” & conception are no different for Spinoza.

There’s nothing else but substance to conceive of substance, sure, but the point is that there’s nothing else but substance to be conceived of as being independent of everything else, i.e., as being that which is in itself. Derp. This all went right over your head.

What does it mean for an “attribute” to be “necessary”?

My point in the post of mine which you’ve quoted, is, that, merely stating that it “has” them, without explaining, how it has them? Or that they’re “in” it, without explaining, how they’re in it? Plus that it’s independent of them, i.e., not conceivable through them, provides no positive knowledge or information about the identity of that (“substance”) which has or is independent of these attributes. Our knowledge of it, in this way, is entirely negative; since it’s only known or recognized as being something that’s not any attribute, or, which is not dependent on any attribute.

Accordingly, you’ve asked what would a negative relation of something to an attribute look like? Nothing, it doesn’t have to look like anything, in as much as concepts are invisible, even if, they’re not imperceptible; & therefore the idea of it only involves the thought of the negation of certain distinguished attributes, without any image for it, as the idea of death only involves the thought of the negation of certain distinguished attributes, without any image for it. Correspondingly, as I’ve stated in the paragraph above, negative determinations provide no actual knowledge or information about identity apart from relatively distinguishing itself from the negated; & so are empty & void by definition.

“Yes, we do claim states otherwise. He outright states substance is conceived through itself.” — The point is, though, him stating that “substance” is conceived through itself doesn’t mean that he’s saying the same thing about (any) conception; for, indeed, in his view, it’s dependent on “substance”, as a mode, & so (by essence) it cannot be as such. Correspondingly, please show me one, single time, just one, in any of his writings, where he states or claims that conception is that which is in itself, or that his “substance” is a conception? You won’t & can’t.

“You just keep on misconceiving ‘conceived through itself’" — I’m not misconceiving anything of the sort. Spinoza clearly only ever asserts “substance” to be “that which is in itself”, & not any conception (do you claim Spinoza did otherwise?); even if, its conception is formed independently of any other conception, this isn’t the same as the conception being in itself, as being independent of every other conception isn’t the same as being independent of everything (a fundamental distinction that your friend can’t seem, or doesn’t want, to wrap his head around).

I didn’t equivocate, if anything, you did in the wording of your own question. How you don’t understand the difference between a thing & a conception is beyond me. “Substance” & conception are no more the same than the sun is with our conception of it (are you claiming that they’re the same thing)? Your whole objection & opposition is foolish, to say the least.

“Equivocating is when an author is using two different senses/acceptable uses/definitions of the same term in the same argument.”— Lol, I was only reusing the terms that are included in your own question which you raised to me; so if there’s any equivocation, it stems from your own question.

How is distinguishing between the thing of which one conceives, &, the conception itself, e.g, the sun is different from my conception of it, equivocating? So, yea, no equivocation on my part, you’re just being really difficult, borderline dumb at times.

Anything besides direct quotes from Spinoza, for fuck’s sake, is irrelevant. You thinking otherwise is quite telling.

Being conceived counts as an instance of conception, but the thing of which one has a conception doesn’t. Very simple.

Nowhere does Spinoza speak of conceptions being self-caused (in the same way that the conception of eternity or an eternal thing isn’t itself eternal, the conception of a “self-caused” thing isn’t itself self-caused); again, you’re making stuff up in your head. Have you ever actually read “The Ethics”?

Such your cheerleading self up, lol. You should get yourself some tutus & pom-poms from Walmart while you’re there picking up a personal copy of “Spinoza for dummies.”

I’m not denying Spinoza’s definition, in as much as you’re just misunderstanding them. “Substance” isn’t a conception, in Spinoza’s philosophy, nor can ever be; no one that I’ve known as held such a view about Spinoza, you’re all by yourself in the minority here (so your personal interpretation holds no weight).

“Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?”— When dealing with realities, the thing of which one has a conception, or conceives, i.e., that which is conceived, is independent of the instance of the conception of it, but the conception itself isn’t. Thus “substance” isn’t a conception. You’re completely overlooking the point.

You haven’t made any case, you’re also making that up in your head, too, as far as I’m concerned; so rest or no rest, I’m carless either way. Moreover, I’ve already addressed you, over & over, you’ve just ignored my responses; in Spinoza’s philosophy, “substance” isn’t a conception, & cannot be understood as being the same thing, now whether or not you comprehend what that means isn’t my problem but yours.

“By substance, I mean that which... ...is conceived through itself...” — “Substance” is that which is conceived through itself, but it isn’t the conception in which it’s (supposedly) conceived through itself. What’s so hard to understand about that? Do you insist on understanding “substance” as a conception, to thereby contradict the basic views of Spinoza?

“.., and as such is a conception”— Substance isn’t a conception; this fact alone is enough to contradict your beliefs in regard to Spinoza.

The conception can be formed independently of every other conception, not independently of every thing, such as “substance”; thus there’s a distinction between conception & “substance”, & so the former cannot be that which is in itself, as the latter is, according to Spinoza. Lol, nowhere in your quoting of Spinoza’s definition of “substance” does he state, let alone suggest, that its conception is also something which is in itself (making for two things that are in themselves, both “substance” & its conception [which is completely wrong]). You’re making things up.

Very strictly speaking, it’s ineffable, sure, but not imperceptible; so, as I’ve mentioned to the other fellow in one way or another, the words that are employed in metaphysical cognition don’t, per se, convey the truth of it, this only being achieved by the thoughts or conceptions which they occasion within us.