The collection {things I like} is made up of anything I deem to be a member of it. It's nothing more than those things, it's not those things + the collection of those things. The collection {my body} is similarly made up of those components I deem to be part of it. It's not a thing in addition to that collection. — Isaac

Someone with alien hand syndrome might not deem his hand (or other body part) to be an aspect of himself. For this and other reasons, I still find you explanation of what the "I" references to be uninformative.

The point is that you are conflating the already given with the constructed. — Isaac

Experience, including that which is empirical, is directly present to conscious awareness. That experience can be constructed can only be inferential. Inferred from experiential evidence. But, as is already known, we don't share a common outlook.

We tell ourselves a story about the causes of what just happened based primarily on interocepted states. Sometimes a story involving 'willing' will be most useful. Other times a story involving 'involuntary' will. Both are constructions, when looked at at this level of analysis. — Isaac

Thank you for the explanation. I myself don't find it convincing. While it might work well enough on a philosophy forum, such outlook would likely be quickly deleterious in many a real-life context. And it does not explain many a medical condition, such as that of alien hand syndrome. But again, we hold different outlooks.

As was addressing, that no one can empirically observe the mind's eye so far seems to be well enough substantiated. If anyone believes they've come upon evidence to the contrary, I'll likely take a look. Otherwise, due to time constraints, I'll at this point likely be leaving the debate in others' hands.

Why? I'm not seeing any incoherence. — Isaac

There's a few aspects, but I'll start with this:

'I' refers to me, my body, whatever I deem to be part of that unit. — Isaac

This statement claims that "I" refers to both a body and to a unit of that body, this at the same time and in the same respect - thereby making a whole equivalent to a part of that whole. If you uphold this logical contradiction, it is incoherent. If you don't than your quoted statement is erroneous or, at best, very misleading; in which case, please clarify it.

As I said to you (part of the "word-salad" you decided was beyond you to understand), you are not here dealing with your experiences. The evidence you think you're presenting of the way your mind works is not direct evidence. — Isaac

As to the first sentence, it reads as though making the claim that I have no experiences which I can then address. Which is sheer fallacy. I do have experiences, and it is these that I'm addressing. As to the second sentence, it is equivocating the way my total mind works with the way my conscious experience works. Where it to instead read, "The evidence you think you're presenting of the way your conscious experience unfolds is not direct evidence" it would be nonsensical.

No I take 'willing' to be a post hoc construction of the working memory after the event of imagining the table. — Isaac

OK. Interesting hypothesis. How then do you distinguish behaviors - such as that of imagining a table - that are voluntary (which means consciously willed) from those that are involuntary (which means not consciously willed).

Different how? I imagine a table, that's different to the chair I imagine (one's smaller than the other). The 'I' is different in that sense. I'm referring to me, my body. I'm not a table. — Isaac

Different in this respect:

the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.

Does this in any way make sense to you? — javra

To which you've already replied:

Yes. — Isaac

I asked so as to confirm that this same understanding is there in your proposed expression of, "Things I imagine," but it doesn't appear to be.

So you deem the "I" addressed to be identical to you as body. And yet, the imagined table is only an aspect of your bodily processes, specifically of certain aspects of your CNS - the very same CNS from which this "I" results (at least as its typically understood; such that the I is one of many functioning process of the body - along with a multitude of unconscious processes of mind - but is not the body itself). But then in deeming this "I" identical to you as body there is grave incoherence in terms of what is being referenced in the expression, "Things I imagine".

Given this incoherence, again, in which way then do you deem what you refer to as "I" to be in any way different from the imagined table? (To emphasize: Both are functions of your body, which according to you is equivalent to the you which can imagine tables and the like. But then, again, how would this "I" be in any way different from the table it imagines?)

Clarification would be useful to further discussions.

one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed — javra

I don't think that's possible, but I'm willing to suspend that disbelief if it helps — Isaac

OK, so when one intends to imagine a table, you take it that one consciously holds awareness of all the table's imagined properties instantaneously to so intending, aka willing. My experiences affirm that when I want to imagine a table and proceed to do so, my unconsciousness fills in a lot of blanks so as to form a coherent image (also called "picture" in common English usage) of the table - such that my willing to imagine precedes the visual representation which I then apprehend as an imagined given, or thing. It's also not hard for me to suppose that one could want to imagine X but be unable to form a mental image of X. Worse things can happen in psychological processes. But, maybe, all this doesn't matter too much to the discussion.

I'll check in latter on, probably sometime tomorrow.

'Things I imagine' — Isaac

Do you by this expression intend that the "I" is different from the things it imagines?

If so, how is this "I" aware of what it willfully imagines?

(In philosophical speculations, one could for example will to visually imagine X without being visually aware of the visual properties of the given X so willed; the two processes - that of willing X and that of having visual awareness of X - are not logically entailed, as far as I can currently discern. But we could debate this if you'd like.)

The question doesn't make sense. I don't 'picture that which I imagine' I just imagine. Imagining something involves a picture, it doesn't make sense to talk about a picture of it, that would entail a picture of a picture. — Isaac

So far your reply doesn't make sense to me. Maybe you could help me make sense of it.

When I engage in the process of imagination I can imagine various things - granted, this as thought I were looking at them (maybe this is a personal quirk though). But, importantly here, the things I imagine can readily change as distinct images whereas I remain constant in so far as being that which apprehends information in the form of the things imagined.

Does this in any way make sense to you? If so, how would you linguistically express the difference between me as as that which is constantly taking in, or processing, imagined information of various types vs. those imagined givens that are disparate relative to each other?

And no, the conversation is not over. — Isaac

OK. I'd like an answer to the following so as to gauge were we currently stand:

Question: Can you visually imagine things? If so, is your ability to picture that which you imagine real or unreal? — javra

If you want to stick your fingers in your ears and say, "La la la, I can't hear you.", then I don't have more to say. If you change your mind this article on visual cortex filling the role of the 'mind's eye' might be worth a look. — wonderer1

I'm quite familiar with such articles - and fully acknowledge their worth. You however appear to not have understood what I expressed.

Hm, because taking text out of context is supposed to be ... ?

As far as this conversation being over, as you wish.

My apologies, but for the most part your reply for me enters into word-salad territory. We appear to disagree on the referents which words address - this if we even agree that the words expressed, such that of "a mind's eye", reference anything at all. You, for example, maybe for this reason have not replied to the questions I've asked.

If you are visually imagining a table, due to your eyes being directed towards and focusing on an illuminated table, and you have the binocular vision typical of humans, you are seeing the table from two different perspectives and your brain is synthesizing what you imagine to be a table seen from a singular perspective but with a depth which is due to the binocular origins of the imagining under consideration. — wonderer1

Firstly, I/we don't visually experience that which we imagine via our physiological eyes (e.g., one can so imagine just fine if not better with both eyes closed).

Secondly, as I previously commented in my last post: because we are here strictly addressing first-person awareness, the processes of one's unconscious mind (its synthesizing of information very much included) are fully irrelevant to the issue of what is factually being consciously experienced (this by first-person awareness).

And that experience isn't evidence because...? — Isaac

Where did I claim it isn't?

I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. — javra

One does not 'see' percepts though. A percept is the result of seeing, you don't then 'see' it, otherwise what results form that process? Another percept? A percept of a percept? — Isaac

I never stated that we do. Please read more carefully.

I'm struggling to think of an example where I obtain knowledge directly from my senses without any inference. Perhaps you could provide one? — Isaac

I already have: knowledge of the keyboard I am typing on. Such as "I know the keyboard I'm typing on is black" (not because I've inferred it to so be, but because I've seen it to so be)

Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers. — javra

What difference would that make, even if I were to agree? — Isaac

Example: To infer X from empirically observed A, B, and C is not to empirically observe X.

The 'mind's eye' is just a made up term at the moment. — Isaac

https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mind%27s_eye

Its not a made up term.

You're trying to establish it's a real thing (but not material), I'm trying to establish the opposite (not real, but if it were anything it would be in the brain). — Isaac

You're again bringing metaphysics into this. I am here avoiding ontological inferences but am addressing direct experience.

Question: Can you visually imagine things? If so, is your ability to picture that which you imagine real or unreal?

we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. — javra

We're not. You've declared the mind's eye to be the sort of thing that cannot be empirically observed. That's not a discussion it's a lecture. — Isaac

No. It is, again, a falsifiable proposition which - because I both believe it to be true and to be sufficiently justified - I then assert as a (fallible) knowledge claim. As per the initial post to which you responded with illustration of the brain, this proposition remains substantiated till falsified.

When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). — javra

No, you don't. You see several perspectives, you see aspects of the table that are behind and shaded, aspects that are out of focus, or moving. Part of the process of 'seeing' involves inferring these details. — Isaac

Those aren't different points of views - aka perspectives - but different aspects of what is seen from a singular point of view (i.e., perspective). And, again, they are not conscious inferences. We are not here addressing the unconscious mind but only the conscious mind - this since we are addressing the first-person awareness of an imagined table.

In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. — javra

What? You say it's singular, so therefore you know it's singular? That doesn't make any sense, and I know it doesn't make any sense because I just said it doesn't — Isaac

You are equivocating an experience with reports of the experience.

I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination — javra

Of course you aren't. There's no such thing. A 'cognitive perspective' can't 'see' anything — Isaac

I'll reword this if it helps: a cognitive first-person point of view (in contrast to, for one example, a camera's point of view) - to be clear, this where "cognitive" addresses all conscious aspects of an intellect, as in "cognitive science". Are you yet claiming there's no such thing? Or, else, that a cognitive first-person point of view can't see (i.e., visually cognize) anything?

[Edit: given that there are unconscious agencies of one’s mind capable of perceiving that which one consciously doesn’t (e.g., such as is inferred to occur in subliminal processing of stimuli), these unconscious agencies can easily be further inferred to hold unconscious first-person awareness of stimuli. Hence, for clarity, from the perspective of oneself as a conscious awareness, these could either be described as one’s total self’s cognitive but non-first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is here meant to address a total mind) or, alternatively, as one’s total self’s non-cognitive first-person instantiations of awareness (if “cognitive” is – as expressed in the above paragraph – here meant to strictly address one’s own conscious faculties of mind). Yes, language can sometimes be unclear in expressing that which one intends to convey by it’s use. Still, hopefully this will better clarify the above paragraph.]

I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle. — javra

Yes, and we're all waiting for an actual argument to back up that claim that isn't self-referential. — Isaac

You have this backwards. The impetus is on you to falsify this (fallible) knowledge claim which, as of yet, remains substantiated both by evidence (no one here has so far seen a mind's eye) and reasoning (such as that provided in my last post regarding constituent parts and the whole which you have so far not addressed).

Can you think of any knowledge you have at all that isn't inferred from evidence? — Isaac

Certainly. That I am right now looking at the keyboard I'm typing on is knowledge that is not (consciously) inferred by me from evidence - but, instead, is knowledge of direct experience. For instance, I might be hallucinating, be a brain in a vat, etc. but my knowledge of seeing what I am seeing as a percept at the current moment remains utterly unaltered by these and all other possible stipulations. And other such examples of non-inferential knowledge could be provided.

Why is being inferred from evidence suddenly being treated with such suspicion? — Isaac

Our empirical precepts are not conscious inferences. Inferences are one aspect of reasoning-based knowledge (deduction, etc.). On the other hand, empirical data - i.e., data obtained via the physiological senses - are one aspect of experience-based knowledge (the experience of one's own confidence being non-empirical in the modern sense of the term). Yes, the two are intimately intertwined. But they are nevertheless utterly different.

It's not about suspicion for inferences. Its about inferences not being empirical data, or empirical information if one prefers.

If you think the images I've shown you are not 'the mind's eye' then you'll have to come up with a better counter argument than "that's not what I was expecting it to look like" — Isaac

This illustrates your utter misconception of my position; simply: one cannot see the minds eye because it has no look whatsoever. See below.

your proposition attempts to rule our physicalist/naturalist interpretations. It doesn't merely rule-in dualism. We're not here arguing if dualism is a possible way to think about consciousness. You're arguing that physicalism isn't. To make that you have to show that this view is incoherent, not that it doesn't match the way you like to think about things. — Isaac

This, again, is completely mistaken. I made no metaphysical claims. We are not discussing metaphysics here. Instead, we are discussing whether or not the mind’s eye can be in any way empirically observed. A mere epistemological claim as to what is the fact of the matter.

Your counter regarding p-zombies to me misses the logical implications by focusing on ontological commitments. Nevertheless, I fully grant that the issue can easily become confusing. So, I’ll offer a different, but much less concise, way of addressing why I’m not seeing the mind’s eye in the illustrations:

When I visually imagine a table, I see the table from one singular perspective (rather than, say, from 12 different perspectives simultaneously). This, to me, is an experiential fact of the matter. To clarify, I know this to be the case experimentally in non-inferential manners; and - as with my visual percept of the keyboard I am now typing on - this experiential knowledge is steadfast. I'm not claiming this knowledge is infallible, but I am claiming that I can be in no way uncertain about this experiential knowledge regardless of inference I might entertain or be informed about - this on account of it being precisely what I experience.

In keeping with common language, this visual perception of an imagined table I then term my seeing an imagined table with my mind’s eye. So I experimentally know in non-inferential manners that my mind’s eye is singular. Whether it’s a singular entity, process, both, or neither is here fully irrelevant to the actuality of the experience (and could only be an inference extrapolated from the experience's occurrence).

In contrast, the illustrations you've presented all depict multiple brain processes that are located in different portions of one brain (over a dozen different locations in each illustration last I looked). We can of course infer that these visualized brain processes depict aspects of the physiological brain which in whole constitute that process of me seeing an imagined table. Nevertheless:

I am not seeing the perfectly singular, cognitive perspective which sees a spatially-extended table in its imagination via its non-physiological sight (by which I simply mean, sight which does not occur via the use of one's physiological sensory organs). Of course the person whose brain is illustrated likely imagined something different, but I'm addressing a table to keep things simple.

Just as strictly observing the empirical constituents of a rock cannot be equivalent to seeing the rock itself, so too with brain and awareness: to empirically observe the brain processes on which first-person awareness is dependent cannot be equivalent to empirically observing first-person awareness itself. The multiple constituents of a whole are not equivalent to the singular whole which is addressed.

In other words, I am not seeing the mind’s eye in the illustrations. At best, all I am seeing is a multiplicity of certain disparate constituent aspects of it.

--------

Again, I'm not claiming that the mind's eye has a certain look that hasn't yet been evidenced. I am claiming that the mind's eye cannot be empirically observed in principle.

My name keeps being brought up. — apokrisis

As the empirically obvious evidence shows, not by me.

You so far haven't made any mention of the charading, posturing, lying accusation I just made against you. Curious to witness it.

To be blunt, I see no sane reason to reply to you at this point.

But I am quite tiered of this interplay. Enjoy. — javra

So this is goodbye. :party: — apokrisis

Oh, yea. There was also this.

You waved goodbye. But I keep getting tagged. — apokrisis

So stamp your feet and splutter away. But I’ve lost interest. — apokrisis

And you keep on telling untruths. Why should I bother again?

:blush: Eh, we'll see how things go with the argument at hand.

Your arguments in no way address the stipulation that we do not empirically witness the mind's eye.

Besides, wasn't it a "goodbye" between us?

Unlike my seeing a moving hand when I look at it, I’m not seeing a mind’s eye in the brain images provided.

What I am seeing are individual slides empirically depicting a certain set of a brain's functions which are inferred to correlate with empirically evident self-reports concerning something that might or might not in fact be. For instance, were philosophical zombies to be real, one would expect exactly such empirically physical processes to occur in the philosophical zombie’s brain despite the philosophical zombie having no such thing as a minds eye. In short, I am not seeing the mind’s eye in the illustration.

A less complex way to address the same conclusion: to affirm that one is seeing the mind’s eye in these illustrations of a brain is in full parallel to affirming one sees in these illustrations what the mind’s eye is focusing on and thereby seeing. Both are brain functions; therefore, both ought to be seen in these illustrations. However, neither are empirically witnessed by us.

In other words, these illustrations of a brain’s functioning so far do not falsify the proposition which was provided. The proposition therefore so far remains substantiated.

The substantiated position is that consciousness is not empirically observable — javra

Substantiated how? — Isaac

Since I don’t want to start this debate from scratch, here’s a different, albeit terse, argument:

A proposition: No one can in any way see that aspect of themselves which visually perceives imagined phenomena via what is commonly termed “the mind’s eye”.

This proposition can be readily proven false by any empirical information to the contrary (which, as empirical information, can thereby be verified by anyone who so pleases).

Till the just given, falsifiable proposition is proven false, it remains substantiated.

:grin: I like that: converging with one's Jungian shadow in manners that benefits one's own intentions - preferably both short- and long-term.

I connect this with the ferryman in Hesse's Siddhartha and 'nothing human is alien to me.' — plaque flag

I find this is a good ideal to live by. But, of course, it's never perfectly actualized by any self. I've often enough thought that an important aspect of this otherwise quite elusive, maybe even mystical, term "wisdom" consists in being able to simultaneously entertain different perspective such that one's thoughts and actions satisfies all these otherwise disparate perspectives with the same breath, so to speak. But yea, a detective, for one example, likely wouldn't be worth squat without this ability or relating and understanding other - including that other with which one is in an antagonistic relation to.

Need to take off for now. But really good chatting with you!

If you like Jung already, you'll probably enjoy it. — plaque flag

Cool. As to my liking for Jung, yea, so so. Some of his concepts are interesting to me - and, maybe even pragmatic in certain contexts for some - but, notwithstanding, not analytical enough for my general tastes. Notions such as that of synchronicity and the universal unconscious come to mind. Well, this when considered from a panpsychistic perspective; or, at least, something close enough to it. As I said, interesting but in no way definitive.

You ever looked into Finnegans Wake ? — plaque flag

No, not yet at least. I tried Joyce's Ulysses but - just as with Virginia Woolf - though I recognize the genius in the work, it so far hasn't spoken to me. Maybe I'll check out Jung's analysis though, sounds quite worthwhile.

The person who doesn't believe in a world that encompasses us both and a language we can discuss it in is (if somehow sincere and actually thinkable) simply insane -- cannot even count as a philosopher. In short, the very concept of philosophy implies/assumes a encompassing-shard world-language, exceeding individual philosophers (else it's just mysticism or something.) — plaque flag

Fair enough! Still, there are some who do maintain that the philosopher, as an individual subject (subjected to the very same world of objects and logic to which everyone else is an equal subject of), is strictly illusion ... a view which, once analyzed, I so far find leaves the universality of this shared world in shambles. This though such philosophers wholeheartedly disagree. What can one say. One tries as a self-purported and always imperfect lover of wisdom to discern what is true from what isn't as best one can.

We'd probably agree that it feels bad to be cruel or petty. So the person aware of 'insane' freedom tends even to be nice. A sense of the infinite puts one in a good mood. I speculate that maybe even the Buddha saw such freedom but didn't bother talking much about 'the dark side of the force.' — plaque flag

Yeah, Nietzsche's golden passages are transcendent and joyous and sweetly wicked. — plaque flag

Couldn't help but given a joyful smile at this. Something about Nietzche's own aphorism of a beast of burden which, upon taking too large of load, transmutes into a predatory carnivore fighting off the monster or "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not" which, upon liberating itself of this monster, again transmutes into a babe newly birthed into the world ... one of his insights that has always stayed with me. As far as I know, it certainly fits the mythos of the Buddha underneath the tree in the wilderness. And it doesn't strike me as the only mythos to which it could apply.

I think many philosophers have tried to establish a safe base of operations, a relatively certain center from which to speculate.

My suggested 'core' (which I think is what Karl-Otto Apel was getting at) is what you seemed to accept also.

"Communication that intends truth assumes (tacitly) a single world that encompasses all participants, and any relatively private subspaces (personal imaginations, maybe qualia) that might be allowed to them, as well as a set of shared semantic-logical norms." — plaque flag — plaque flag

Yes, there most certainly is agreement here. If I were to nitpick, I’ve at least so far found that addressing the totality you've just outlined leaves one with few options to then proceed in formulating conclusions from this - what we both find to be - sound premise. Such as in manners that could stand up to those who find doubt for the given affirmation, in part or in whole. That said, to each their own paths in enquiry just as in life.

In relation to this, although maybe coming out of left field: Though I don’t have tremendous respect for the person who said it, I can jive with the aphorism, “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law.” It’s just that, in the non-solipsistic world we in fact inhabit, I find this implicitly entails that there are consequences to everything we will – sooner or later, in one form or another. Hence, action and consequence; cause and effect. … But this isn’t pivotal to the topic at hand. Still, I do like the aphorism. In a way, it reminds me of the better aspects of Nietzsche.

In other words, I vote for open-mindedness within the limits of telling a coherent story and recognizing and avoiding pseudo-explanations. I think we agree on an awareness of ignorance --on keeping the darkness visible. — plaque flag

In agreement here as well. And very well said.

It occurs to me that any such sketch is aimed at describing the world. Your words are understood to be relevant to me. Communication that intends truth assumes (tacitly) a single world that encompasses all participants, and any relatively private subspaces (personal imaginations, maybe qualia) that might be allowed to them, as well as a set of shared semantic-logical norms. I see all this as a unified phenomenon. — plaque flag

Yes, precisely so.

More on this here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/13308/our-minimal-epistemic-commitment-fixing-descartes-cogito/p1 — plaque flag

There’s a lot to the link you’ve shared. Descartes was a man in search of infallible knowledge. I’m one to believe such cannot be had. This ala Cicero et al. – the very folk Descartes wanted to disprove. My fallible reasoning for upholding fallibilism? Our lack of omniscience entails that no one can ever prove that, in the span of all remaining time, no one will ever find valid reason for why some proposition X which is currently held by us as true might, in fact, not be true – thereby mandating that proposition X can only technically remain liable to being wrong, this irrespective of what it might be: including “I am” and “1 + 1 = 2”. But this is not to deny that our fallible knowledge comes in a wide array of different strengths: that “1 + 1 = 2” is not on a par to “it will rain tomorrow” (both of which can well be knowledge claims).

At any rate, this epistemological issue of fallibilism vs. infallibilism aside, there remains this question:

If there are universals among, at the very least, all human beings – to include identical aspects of our cognition as a species, the occurrence of other humans, and the reality of an objective world commonly shared by all – how might these universal truths be discerned or discovered without any investigation into what is in fact actual relative to the individual subject? This such as that which Kant engaged in in his discovering of the categories.

And for this, the individual subject must first be evidenced to in fact be.

Get it straight if you want to claim to have a basic grasp on logic. I’m asking you to define what you might mean by circle. And yes, that is conventionally done in counterfactual fashion. So a circle is not a square for these particular reasons. Anyone with a compass and straightedge can demonstrate the Euclidean proof of the assertion. — apokrisis

You’ve addressed my analogy via a literalist interpretation of its parts. And deem this a rational argument against the analogy. Remarkable.

The substantiated position is that consciousness is not empirically observable and you insist that it be defined in an empirically measurable way to be taken into consideration in the first place - because circles can so be. From your previous comments, this via "counterfactual definitions" - whatever that might mean to you.

Aren’t you weary of your own failure yet? What keeps you going and going? — apokrisis

My failure? As in to convince you? You must take yourself to be the sole arbitrator of the situation. But I am quite tiered of this interplay. Enjoy.

I asked for your measurable definition - the one that would make sense to a scientist wanting to get on with their scientific inquiry. — apokrisis

Yes, apo. You're asking me to define circles so that they have four sides. My very point from the very beginning. Glad we've finally come to an agreement.

Let’s see. You’re laughing because you, in contrast, have certain knowledge of what consciousness is and isn’t in an empirically measurable way. This while at the same time holding that whether the proposition “I am conscious of this text” can hold a truth-value is unanswerable. :up:

As I previously expressed: Good luck with that!

An unorthodox hypothesis to address your concerns:

Suppose that two or more – hence, at least two – instantiations of individuated awareness co-occur. In other words, suppose solipsism to be false. (This shouldn't be that hard to hypothesize.)

The awareness-resultant time and space (one could add causality to the list as well) that is requisite of these multiple instantiations could then either be a) strictly relative to the instantiation of awareness addressed or b) equally applicable to all instantiations of awareness that in any way interact.
That space, time, and causality which falls under (b) would not be partially applicable to any but, again, would be equally applicable to all concerned. It would hence be completely impartial – objective in at least this sense – such that its occurrence would be fully independent of any one instantiation of awareness.

The process by which this objective space, time, and causality manifest could not here be that of causality. I would instead need to be the outcome of material causes in Aristotelian terms. In this case, where the ultimate constituents are these very instantiations of awareness: in this hypothetical, the cosmos’s prime matter. Its not a relation in which that which determines occurs before that determined – as causality is – but instead is one in which the two necessarily occur simultaneously.

The greater the quantity of these individuated instantiations of awareness, the more stable would their commonly shared objective world of space, time, and causation be. For example, in presuming that only humans are awareness endowed, there currently co-occur over 7 billion instantiations of awareness on Earth. Assume all life is so endowed and … one gets the picture.

In such a universe, there would then be an objective world that is perfectly impartial to the whims of any one instantiation of awareness – that is in this sense perfectly independent of individual minds. Nevertheless, this very objective world could not however occur in the absence of Kantian categories.

That said, in such a world, that which is objective would then necessarily inform each individual instantiation of awareness – skipping over a minefield of details, such that in humans the objective human brain informs, and in turn gives form to, the instantiation of first-person awareness we term our conscious selves. No brain, no instantiation of awareness; yet awareness at large, when globally conceived, remains to keep such a universe going.

--------

This is only a very rough sketch of just one possible account regarding Kantian categories and the objective world. Other accounts might also be possible to envision such that they make sense of the two. All the same, though there obviously would be innumerable details to yet work out, I so far don’t see any self-contradiction in the hypothetical just provided.

I’ve provided it only to illustrate that ways of accounting for both an objective world and the Kantian categories are not impossible to devise.

You just switched from “conscious of x” to “first person awareness”. Are we talking about a thing or a process, counterfactually speaking here?

I was talking about a process. — apokrisis

And how is any awareness of which we can be in any way aware of not a process? Even none-empirical experiences such as those of our own happiness and sureness (as two examples) are process. Never mind our awareness of percepts and, hence, of empirical data.

Besides, as I’ve previously expressed, I make no inferential speculation as to awareness being an entity/substance, a process, both, or neither. Period. That unknown, or uncertainty, or vagueness as you term it, is part of my stance.

So what is first-person awareness? One should intimately know via one's own experiences.

And then when you make claims about consciousness of x - as something more than attention+reporting - is consciousness of the presence of a colour the same as consciousness of some bit of text? And is consciousness of a lump of rock the same as consciousness of a bit of text? — apokrisis

I've already addressed these questions here.

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Yes, you do need to back to the drawing board and do some work on your definitions so that there could be a less amateur discussion here. — apokrisis

From our exchanges it so far seems to me you want to win arguments by vanquishment – as though philosophy were a zero-sum game. It isn’t. You might want to ask more questions of those you disagree with, answer those questions you’ve been asked by them, and address the replies you've already been given.

This since we're so candidly exchanging advice on what the other should do.

Capable of being wrong rather than not even wrong. — apokrisis

How can something entirely nonsensical be wrong instead of not even wrong?

Still not even an attempt to define your use of consciousness here then? You had many chances now. That says you can’t do it. — apokrisis

Back to the drawing board: What’s wrong with “first-person awareness” as a definition for consciousness? Well, unless one finds the given definition to be entirely nonsensical.

Let me insult you again. You continue to weasel your way out of the requirement to provide a counterfactual definition to fit your counterfactual proposition. Technically, your position becomes not even wrong, simply vague. — apokrisis

He replieth!

Counterfactual conditionals (also subjunctive or X-marked) are conditional sentences which discuss what would have been true under different circumstances, e.g. "If Peter believed in ghosts, he would be afraid to be here." — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_conditional

What on earth are you talking about??? Other than your ego's need to insult - which does hold semantic value - your expressions are entirely nonsensical.

That "I am conscious of this text" is not a counterfactual proposition, no more than is "the cat is on the mat".

Your turn.

You do a lot of weaselling to avoid supplying a definition to the term that I must give a yes or no answer on. — apokrisis

You belittling insults aside (yes, that apes win by posturing is a fact of nature), how on earth could I when you address the proposition of "I am conscious of this text" as neither having a truth-value nor being without one. Weaselling, huh. Nonsense pure and simple.

I’ll help you out. Do you mean something more than attending and reporting if I agree I am conscious of the text? If more, what exactly? — apokrisis

And here it is. In assuming that "I am conscious of this text" can be true (what a stupendous presumption on my part; for who knows if this proposition can in fact be true, after all. Right?):

The addressed "I" is not identical to the text it is being conscious of. The text is other to that whose occurrence is addressed by the term "I", which holds awareness of the text. Fast forward to what I've previous said in this thread, and that which is addressed by the term "I" holds conscious awareness of empirical givens without itself being an empirical given - either to its own conscious being or to any others. Of note, even though the addressed "I" can only occur in a duality to other which it observes and thereby constitutes a self, it is never identical to that which it observes. Again, it is thereby other in relation to all empirical data. An AI program attends and responds to information - as does an alarm clock - but is not endowed with a conscious being which we term "I" in propositions such as that provided.

Yours is a denial of those truths whose consequences are not useful to you - that of consciousness's occurrence very much included. I don't much admire your approach, for the same reason I don't admire the approach of Young Earth Creationist among others.

Try to insult me in a wiser way the next time around. That way, you end up having the last word.

Alright, my bad if I was a bit smug in my reply. But cool.

What is your theory of truth? — wonderer1

My own theory of truth in a nutshell: that which conforms to what is actual is true. Prior to you then testing out any and all possible ways this might not hold - but do if you so care - the question I asked apo was not based on "my theory of truth" but on his, regardless of what it might be.

I gave you the answer. Your question suffers from logical vagueness. Affirming yes or no would make no useful difference. — apokrisis

Honesty is important. For trust and the like. No, you only just gave me your answer right now. Its value here overlooked.

It remains up to you to define consciousness in terms that pragmatically means anything measurable if you are indeed talking about “the science” of it. Or even just it’s metaphysics. — apokrisis

To precisely demarcate what personal conscious is is not to define one's personal consciousness in ways that are measurable. Nor does metaphysics mandate that what is shall itself be measurable. I'll here point this truth at your own worldview, which infers the Apeiron to be a required aspect of what is real: The Apeiron by definition is immeasurable, and yet it is still what your metaphysics relies on at a basic level of explanation.

So I’ll let others explain their own views as best they can, — javra

You did a splendid job of misrepresenting what biosemiosis claims. :up: — apokrisis

Either the extrapolated worldview of the cosmos you endorse is not one of biosemiotics or I stand by what I previously said - so far finding nothing that contradicts my statements.

Besides, this is between you and @Gnomon.

Unless you want to bring me into it. But then, in this thread about the science of consciousness you’ve so far been unable to address the rather basic question of whether “I am conscious of this text” is a truth-baring proposition. Not much of anything to go on here. So I’m not inclined to participate.

you may be able to enlighten me about Biosemiotics (BS). Which has been proposed as an alternative to Panpsychism (PP) as a mechanism for the emergence of Mind from Matter. — Gnomon

I won’t be much help, and this because I so far find this very quoted affirmation to be nonsensical. Bio-semiotics is the semiotics of life – it addresses the meaning transference of lifeforms and all this entails. To apply biosemiotics to a former cosmos devoid of life from which life emerged will either necessitate a panpsychistic cosmos by default or, else, again, it will make no sense: the semiotics of life, i.e. biosemiotics, applied to processes of non-life in attempts to explain life’s emergence and all aspects of life, thereby explaining the semiotics of life. It’s circular reasoning consisting of a great sum of allegories and metaphors that utilize poorly defined words (if they are at all defined: e.g., life, meaning, etc.) that – after all the smoke and mirrors pass by – ultimately explains nothing: we start with biosemiotics to explain biosemiotics via a very fancy loop. Or, more simply, we use premise A to explain A. And then call it a done deal: everything explained, including the very issue of A which we were principally focusing on.

I have nothing against the study of biosemiotics. But using life to explain life from the vantage of a non-living (else, life-devoid) cosmos, again, to me so far does not make sense. Philosophically speaking. But that’s just fallible me.

So I’ll let others explain their own views as best they can, if they so wish.

I'll have to think about that more. It seems to me that the "end" does not exist until it is actualized. Thus, God's desire is posterior to the existence of the end. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The end never occurs, exists, as an actualized end until the moment its actualized, if this moment ever manifests, true. But the end one pursues will occur as that for the sake of which one does what one does; i.e., it will occur as a telos. As an actively held telos, it will then limit or bind what one generates to its own self - for all which one brings about will be so brought about for the purpose of transforming one's telos into an actualized endstate (at which juncture the telos vanishes). This, at the very least, is my take on the more basic premises of teleology.

For a common example, Alice intends to go to the store. Her having gone to the store doesn't yet exist - and might never exist if, for example, Alice becomes barred from so doing due to an unexpected friend's call that she deems to be more important to prioritize. Here, suppose nothing bars her from so going to the store. "Going to the store" is her intent, her telos - which will occur (non-physically) as that which guides all her ensuing activities aiming to fulfill this telos (i.e., to make it an actualized endstate). This very telos, then, in this sense alone, serves as a determinant of her actions. In the complete absence of all teloi - both conscious and unconscious - Alice's behaviors could then all be perfectly random.

As a more abstract example, many conceive of all life seeking optimal self-presertavion. Here tentatively granting this, optimal self-preservation will then be the at least unconscious telos of all life: one can never perfectly fulfill this telos while living. It does not exist as might some actual object exists; nor does it exist as a completely fulfilled endstate. It, here, nevertheless is deemed to be the intent (telos) that guides, motivates, teleologically determines all behaviors enacted by lifeforms. One that is not of lifeforms willful creation.

In these two examples, while we can select certain teloi to be thereafter guided by, we do not select - much less create - inherent teloi such as that of pursuing optimal self-preservation. And to select any one telos (e.g. intent) from two or more alternative possibilities, we in this very activity will need to be guided by teloi (else our behavior is random). Due to this - if I've explained things well enough - we ourselves cannot choose, much less create, all the teloi which determine our behaviors (both cognitive and physical).

Then, as an example applicable to the notion of an omnipotent deity: Does the omnipotent deity abide by that which is good or, else, is this deity the creator of the very ideal of the good? If the former, then the good here is a telos which guides, motivates, teleologically determines this omnipotent deity toward a potential endstate has not yet realized in full and which the deity did not create.

Hence, here, either the good as telos is an existentially fixed aspect of reality (which simply "just is") that either directly or indirectly governs the activities of everything, very much including those of this omnipotent deity - in which case this deity cannot be all powerful, for he is limited or bounded by the good which is not of his creation - or, else, this omnipotent deity is the very creator of the good.

Its the latter interpretation that I take logical issue with: to create entails intentional creation which, in turn, entails intents/teloi. One could for example ask: for the sake of what (i.e., with what telos) did this omnipotent deity create the good? If he deemed this creation good, then he didn't create the good. And one can argue this line of thought more abstractly: There is an infinite quantity of creations - always with some telos that determines the creations of this omnipotent deity (for otherwise the creations would be random) which this omnipotent deity neither created not chose but is instead guided by and, hence, limited and bound by.

OK, now that I've written this - tough I'll post it any way - I realize that it might be hard to understand or maybe poorly expressed. In which case, at this point, maybe it might be better to leave things where they're at? Inconclusive though things might be.

Not super relevant to the topic at hand, but I think it would be interesting to unpack why this strong tradition of seeing God involved in sustaining all things, filling all things, came to decline in favor of the "divine Watchmaker," or a God who mostly doesn't act in the world and only sometimes intervenes, and who always does so supernaturally. — Count Timothy von Icarus

FWIW, these are the views I so far hold: in the history of mankind, there has repeatedly emerged the notion of a certain uncreated given that "just is" on which everything we know of is dependent. For materialists, this given is matter. For those who are often labeled spiritual, this given has either been an individuated psyche with superlative abilities in all respects (i.e., a deity, replete with the deity's requisite abilities to perceive things and to hold agency as a psyche) or, historically preceding this concept, a certain something that by its very properties cannot be an individuated psyche. Both these notions can be addressed by the term "God". Plato's "The Good", which later morphed into the neoplatonic "The One", serves as one example of God as non-deity. So too does the Judaic notion of G-d which takes the form of the Ein Sof. So too the Eastern notion of the Brahman.

In Western culture, polytheism (including henotheism) converged with philosophical notions of the absolute (e.g., Neoplatonic notions of "The One") to create the notion of something that holds the properties of the philosophical notion of the absolute while at the same time being a singular deity of superlative powers - a singular absolute deity which can hear your thoughts/prayers and act as he (intentionally) wishes in turn.

There's quite a lot more, obviously, both in terms of this very issue and in terms of the wide array of spiritual and theistic belief structures that occurred in the history of the West. I'll here add that the non-deity understanding of God can at the very least be amiable to certain interpretations of pantheism and panentheism - and, therefore, to nature and naturalism (e.g., as aspects of the Stoic-like logos which this absolute in one way or another entails) - whereas the God-as-deity understanding requires that the deity stands in contrast to the nature which he creates and/or created. And, as per your example of the Gnostics, one can hold onto this uncreated, existential aboslute while also upholding the occurrence of deities (in this case, that of the Demurge as a prime example; also of Sophia as that deity which leads toward this very absolute that dwells beyond the Demurge and his creations).

I very much doubt we'll be able to arrive at any definitive conclusion on the matter, but this is a basic outline of my own best current appraisals.