We are going to split hairs at this point because in theory, I have no preference for degree or kind. But the degree gets to be exponential once we factor in not just variation in culture, but the virtual worlds I am talking about. — schopenhauer1

I'm myself fully onboard with this notion: an "exponential" difference of degree. So maybe we don't have any major differences on this point after all. Again, my own view is that there is yet an evolutionary continuity despite the reality of this drastic differentiation - such that there is not metaphysical divide between lifeforms - but, as it now seems, that's neither here nor there in relation to the OP.

It is because of these "kinds" of capacities that we have that I think humans aren't necessarily "special" - not in the religious sense you were conveying with some elite status, but rather with existential burdens of self-awareness and self-motivational ways of going about the world. — schopenhauer1

I think this to be obvious, so I'm in agreement. In parallel, with great ability comes the burden of greater responsibility.

It is precisely when our brain "shuts off" that we seek the most value: "Flow states", "meditative states", "good night's sleep", "zoning out". — schopenhauer1

Interesting perspective. I find that being in the zone, or in flow states, is antithetical to zoning out. Yes, the questioning, chattering aspects of mind vanish in both cases, but in the first we are effortlessly (so to speak) accomplishing our goals. Wheres with the second we don't progress anywhere. For me, in an ideal case, all pondering and analyzing is to facilitate a smooth practice of being in the zone and so having "flow". Which, for me at least, is when life become most purposeful, for lack of better terms.

Other animals are already there. We have to constantly "get there" or "get caught up in something" to get there. — schopenhauer1

Here again I'd describe this in terms of degrees. Lesser animals can certainly feel anxiety, trepidation, lack of flow - this in due measure to their intelligence. But they certainly are nowhere near as prone to such unpleasant states of being as we humans are.

Reminds me of train of thought wherein ego is considered a in some fundamental sense a vice, lesser animals have less ego in due measure with their intelligence, and we humans - although having greater egos due to our greater intelligence than all other known lifeforms - endeavor for states of being that are evermore more egoless while yet maintaining the wisdom, or gnosis, that our intelligence gives us opportunity to obtain. To momentarily bring spiritual notions back into the discussion, notions of Nirvana or Brahman come to mind as just such egoless state of being which would be the pinnacle state of awareness to experience ... that is yet different in supposed quality from the reduced egos of lesser lifeforms.

Would this roundabout mindset be something that resonates with you?

Just remembered what I take to be another interesting tidbit. Gorillas might know how to use plants for medicinal purposes, though more research is required to establish that such plant use is intentional and ailment specific. But, if so, such knowledge could to my mind only be described as culturally transmitted. As a highlight from the link:

The most common medical problems that affect mountain gorillas are respiratory infections, diarrhea, and intestinal parasites. The main disease challenges for the local human population are similar. Surveys have shown that traditional healers who live near the park use up to 183 different plants, of which 110 grow wild in Volcanoes National Park and the remaining 73 are cultivated by people in their gardens. Of the 110 medicinal plants found in the park, 55 are known to be consumed by gorillas.
...
Researchers discovered, by using chromatography, that similar plant species contained a number of organic properties known to have positive effects against bacteria and parasites that cause diarrhea and respiratory diseases. These findings led to more questions for researchers: "Do the gorillas treat themselves by seeking specific plants, or does their constant intake of a variety of plant material end up being a preventive measure?" — https://gorillafund.org/uncategorized/do-gorillas-use-plants-as-medicine/

Yes agreed. But do other animals have this cognitively general processing unit? This kind is different not in its specialization but in its GENERALIZATION. It is this I'd like to focus on. This is quite different. We didn't get better at a set of innate things (echo location, egg flipping, great scent, etc.). We don't just have a set way we get the things we need to survive. But it's not just that, it is the fact that we have infinitely iterative ways of surviving. But not only that, it is based on the fact that as deliberative, language-based animals, we can create virtual worlds of internal culture, and personal value that we weigh our actions against, creating yet more exponentially different ways of being. This brain vastly plastic and continually iterative and learning from its learning about learning about learning. — schopenhauer1

We are the most generalist species that we know of by far. And clearly only humans communicate via the use of words. As to other animals having a lesser degree of generalized cognition ability than that which we have, chimpanzees immediately come to my mind. They exhibit an impressive amount of cultural variation in the wild. As one reference:

Abstract

As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation1,2,3,4,5,6,7. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation. This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans8,9,10,11. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted. Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds12,13. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures14 but previously unrecognised in non-human species. — https://www.nature.com/articles/21415

Boldface mine.

Bonobos, or pygmy chimps, have tmk been studied a lot less in the wild, thought they exhibit a more developed cognition than chimps in captivity, as in learned symbolic communication (interestingly, they're also far more comfortable than chimps in walking upright - and, unlike chimps, they can also smile when feeling pleased). And we know far less about elephants and dolphins which could also hold cultural plasticity and, at least anecdotally, give evidence of advanced communication skills.

False dichotomy. I’m not implying nor would I imply anything like that. — schopenhauer1

I didn’t presume that you were. I did however, however mistakenly, presume that you were exploring the possibility of some type of metaphysical divide between humans and lesser animals - to which what you quoted of my post was supposed to be an analogy … since it does present one such form of a metaphysical divide. This notion of a metaphysical divide (however it might be envisioned) being something never found in what I take to be non-Abrahamic mindsets; for one example, such as in typical polytheistic systems wherein lesser lifeforms can be considered kindred spirits.

At any rate, while I don’t presume you filter the OP’s question via a theistic lens, it so far does seem to ask whether there occurs a metaphysical divide between lifeforms. Am I wrong in this?

When is something in evolution a difference in kind and not just a difference in degree? — schopenhauer1

To first address this question, without getting into the philosophy of biology in which problematics emerge regarding how a species should be demarcated, from a relative distance at least: the most rudimentary difference in kind among lifeforms occurs when speciation occurs. All members of a given species are the same kind of lifeform, and are differentiable from other species, these being different kinds of lifeforms - even if they all belong to the same genus. Whereas differences of degree that are devoid of differences in kind will, tmk, only be deemed to occur within a given species.

So appraised, Homo Sapiens are a unique kind of lifeform. But then so too are all other species of life out there. And all species evolve, sometimes speciating into new kinds, given a sufficient period of time and given that they don’t perish.

At what point do you think that this general processing ability- whereby there is much plasticity in how we behave and thus plasticity in our ways of survival, makes this ability some thing that is a difference in kind not just a degree in evolutionary, biological, and psychological terms? — schopenhauer1

This question is to my mind strictly philosophical rather than being a biological or evolutionary one.

For example, each individual organism is unique in certain respects, but this for most would be insufficient to declare that each individual organism is its own kind of lifeform. Similarly, should we declare the unique mathematical genius of a particular human, for instance, to be an intellect kind that is metaphysically divided from those of all other humans on account of its uniqueness? This rather than it being viewed by a difference in degree?

More generally, how can awareness, as an aspect of life, be deemed to not hold any continuity between different types, here meaning species, of lifeforms? With such an evolutionary continuity then also comes different degrees of magnitude of awareness and different degrees of quality of awareness. The ameba and the human then holding vast differences in their magnitude and quality of awareness despite there being a continuity between the two - such that the differences in their awareness could be deemed a matter of degree on a very extreme spectrum.

Philosophically, I strongly favor there being a continuity among the psyches of different species of life, including that of humans. But I don’t know how to convincingly make this point to somehow inclined to view humans via, for lack of a better analogy, a Biblical-like metaphysics wherein a supposed existential division of being occurs between soul-endowed humans and soul-devoid lesser lifeforms. (To me, either all life is endowed with an evolutionary continuity of soul/anima or else no life is endowed with soul - but I see neither evidence nor logical cohesion for there being a division between lifeforms with a soul and lifeforms devoid of soul.)

I greatly value the perspectives you’ve been sharing.

I should maybe preface my reply with one example of what I envision by a more perfect meritocratic governance. First, in a democratic society wherein all adult individuals are of relatively equal ability, public offices could be awarded via lottery for optimal fairness—as was in large part the case in ancient Athens. That said, in contrast, in a democratic society wherein individuals are not of a relatively equal ability, a “rule by merit” could be in part established in the following manner: for individuals to be able to run for public office they would first need to pass a number of pre-established tests in subject matter competency. Topics could include history, law, ecology, etc., and would be democratically established. If these general subject tests are not passed, one could not then run for public office—with citizens voting only among those individuals that evidence minimum background knowledge regarding the offices they pursue. One can consider this a small piece of a more general idea that intends to oppose what the satirical movie Idiocrocy alludes to (a comedy to which I find a number of unfortunate truths). In this proposed (fraction of a) work-in-progress model, there would be a political elite selected based on merit—to which all citizens would/should have roughly equal opportunity to pertain—whose evident privilege would be that of rulership for the limited terms that are democratically allotted to each public office.

This, again, in attempt to better depict what I envision as a democratic “rule by merit”. But, yes, devil’s in the details.

To push this point home, I’d say that if you do supplement your idea, or ideal, of meritocracy with conditions with respect to how the economy works—and you produce something like an ideal of social democratic meritocracy—then there is nothing much left for the idea of meritocracy to do, because what is crucial here is a vision of real equality of opportunity where merit is valued, and “meritocracy” is left merely emphasizing the -cracy, i.e., rule, which I know is not really the thrust of your concept.

If that’s unconvincing, then merely as a practical move I think it would be wise to abandon the idea, because of the way it functions in the real world. Meritocracy can be achieved only by opposing meritocracy. note — Jamal

A very valid point. I'll keep it in mind better from now on.

The good but difficult points I still have to answer concern the need to reward merit and the need for incentives. But I’ll leave you with this: a meritocracy is by definition an oligarchy of talent, so it is essentially anti-egalitarian. From this perspective, maybe what you are arguing for is not really meritocracy at all? — Jamal

Due to you're insightful critique I'm currently struggling with this question myself.

Thanks again for your views.

Thanks for taking the time to reply in such an in-depth manner. It’s appreciated.

As to discussions regarding capitalism, I’m not intent on engaging in disagreements regarding a) what capitalism is in our entrenched economic model (a system that when devoid of governmental regulations will gleefully make use of forced child labor and other types of either direct or indirect slavery) verses b) what capitalism could be in terms of a more humanitarian system comprised of, I will here stress, a healthy competition in relation to private ownership of means of production for gain (i.e., for profit in far more than a merely monetary sense). Here interpreting the sweat, tears, and/or blood of an individual in their labors to produce X in itself being “a means of production” that is “the private belonging and hence ownership (so to speak)” of the individual in question. I foresee this could easily get relatively deep into debates regarding the validity of certain notions about the human psyche that today's capitalism both depends on and also skews toward a (non-metaphysical) materialism wherein all prosperity is defined via a monetary value, and I unfortunately don’t currently have the luxury of enough time to engage in such debates in any meaningful sense. I’ll instead strictly keep to the issue of meritocracy.

Do correct me if I’m wrong about this but, in reading in-between the lines of your post, I gather that you deem Marxism opposed to compensation based on merit. This being the central motivation for my last post. That mentioned, to address some of your points:

Meritocracy is bad in two senses. One is that it works as a myth, so that the very idea of meritocracy hides the truth (this is like Marx’s attitude to the idea of egalitarianism). But the other sense is more profound: a society stratified by income and status on the basis of skill and work might not be such a good thing after all. — Jamal

As to meritocracy being a myth. Yes, the term “meritocracy”—just as “communism”—can easily become perverted so as to fit Orwellian propaganda. Communist states arguably were never communist—for, though all comrades were supposed to be equal in worth, some comrades were always deemed “more equal” than others and materially profited accordingly (sometimes, such as can be exemplified by Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu, to exorbitant degrees). In like manner, the myth of meritocracy which you’ve repeatedly mentioned can to my mind only consist of the roundabout notion of “this system we’ve got is the pinnacle of meritocracy in action—despite all appearances to the contrary—so don’t question the status quo and let those in power do their thing”. Otherwise, (a perfected) meritocracy is, and can only be, a target aimed at—from which we can gauge what needs improvement. To call this target a “myth” would be equivalent to calling any ideal that can be held a myth, including that of “health”. Is the ideal of “being healthy” valueless or a myth—here in the sense of being a falsity—on grounds that it is unreachable in absolute form? I take it that most would answer “no”; that all can distinguish better health from worse, and that we all would desire to be relatively healthy if we’re not—thereby making the ideal of health something substantial, even if unobtainable in perfect form.

In this light, I don’t view the concept of meritocracy as a myth but as an ideal worth struggling for—again, this as much as health (or, else, a healthy economy and politics) is an ideal that is worth pursuing. What I then mean by “a meritocratic economy” is not some Orwellian system that claims to so be while simultaneously not so being (requiring its double-think) but an economic system that—while not perfectly—does facilitate a functional meritocracy; one which thereby can become even more meritocratic in time, despite this being very gradual.

Then there was the other theme of stratification resulting from meritocracy being a bad that works against egalitarianism.

This is a moral point of view but also a pragmatic one: social stratification leads to inequalities of not only income but also opportunity, thus it tends to negate the equality of opportunity that meritocracy ideally depends on. — Jamal

One key ingredient to egalitarianism is equal opportunity (imperfect though it might be). But we are, I think, addressing this in realistic terms: An individual cannot be a specialist in all societal fields simultaneously for the entirety of their lives—much less can all people of a society fit this just expressed model. So equal opportunity cannot be equated to the possibility that all people are actualized in all societal roles.

I think it might help if I were to address hunter-gatherer tribes—these typically being the most egalitarian societies we (or at least I) currently know of. Here, the abilities and efforts of some will see them specialized into hunters and others into gatherers as adults, and some can further specialize in other fields, such as medicine. Doubtless, within many of these fields, further specializations can occur. To my knowledge, more often than not, these tribes are informally democratic. Personal gain in the form of trust, respect, and material possessions does occur for individuals. But individuals typically view themselves as parts of a collective. So the wellbeing of an individual is viewed as in large part contingent on the wellbeing of the collective. What we formally have as taxes for the purpose of benefiting the democratic state and all people therein, these tribes simply hold to be the fraternity of giving to those in need or in want from one’s own resources. But one must first acquire goods (in the sense of food, knowledge, artifacts, and other valuables here not equated to moneys) in order to distribute them to others. Much like one ought first put on the oxygen mask in an airplane before assisting others with theirs, the collective tribe must first acquire goods by the abilities and efforts of the individuals within prior to having these individuals give to other members of the tribe. The medicine-man gains the opportunity to heal others of the tribe at expense of loosing opportunity to, for example, be deemed the best hunter of gazelles. But both medicine-man and best hunter of gazelles—while being respectively compensated based on merit for their respective skills and efforts in terms of trust, respect, and material possessions—will teach others of like ability and enterprise to be as good as themselves if not better. Here, equal opportunity implies that all children of the tribe are encouraged to maximally develop their own inherent skills—as contrasted to oppressing the potential of certain children so as to further the potential of others.

OK, I acknowledge this is a very incomplete appraisal. For starters I’m here focusing on male roles of the hunter-gatherer tribe (which as tribe can often enough be matriarchal). But this won’t be a dissertation, only a post intending to better illustrate my view on the matter: The relatively egalitarian societies of hunter-gatherer tribes are stratified in specialty of societal roles, but (at least as I interpret them) this in relatively meritocratic means that allow for a fluidity within tribal relations.

The ideal hear is that—while not all potential will be actualized by all members of the given society as individuals develop from children into adults—no potential will be systematically oppressed by members of the society so as to biasedly grant other members of the society greater gains (this, again, at the expense of those individuals whose potential is actively oppressed). That all peoples' potential be encouraged to develop as much as possible. And in this, I find a pragmatic approach to the ideal of (a perfectly) equal opportunity for all members of society.

If the society were to be honestly meritocratic, then, to my way of seeing, an ever increasing proximity to equal opportunity for all in the sense just described would be enacted, this despite the resulting fluid stratification of roles and their respective compensations.

In other words, even for a society of equal opportunity, where ideal meritocracy might work, I want to ask: why should those who are naturally more able or inclined to produce useful things gain any privilege at all? That they should gain effective positions and the concomitant authority: that I can see; but I can't see why they should gain better, richer lives, or even higher social status, unless perhaps the production of life's necessities is generally precarious and we need incentives (this is why communism is sometimes said to depend on a post-scarcity economy). — Jamal

For the same reason that, for example, the hunter which provides for the tribe has a better, richer life than the fellow tribesman whose leg was bitten off by a lion and who depends on the hunter for sustenance. Here, the two-legged hunter has greater privileges than the handicapped tribesman in terms of providing for the tribe, maybe in term of prospective lovers, and so forth. This, however, does not make the handicapped tribesman's life insignificant. If the latter, for example, is a good story (to not say myth) teller at campfires, or does his best to assist the tribe in the ways he can, then he too gains his own role-specific privilege, which is also based on merit.

As to incentives, don't we all require incentives of some form or another to do anything? The very notions of pleasure and pain come to mind, these being rudimentary incentives to all life. Why would someone invest well over a dozen years of intense study (and go into extreme debt) to become a doctor if their compensation at the end of it all would be indistinguishable from that of a warehouse worker's? I would agree that financial wealth might not be the most ideal of incentives for a doctor to so become, but I deem that there will need to be some benefit to being a doctor, such as prestige, that serves as incentive for all the effort required.

I’ll take a breather at this point. Feel like apologizing for length. Suffice it to say, it is easier to post as written then to spend time editing for brevity. Fingers crossed that a sufficient amount of clarity in what I intended to express is nevertheless there.

"He took that position for specific political reasons and I don’t feel the need to follow him in that, but it does contain the insight that rights are not enough in a world where material reality doesn’t allow for the full flourishing of every individual."
— Jamal

I'm in agreement with this.
— javra


Like I say, maybe we're not so far apart on this after all. — Jamal

I tend to think this might be true as well—even if we might hold different perspectives on certain topics.

Marx would have said that egalitarianism just is the false belief that a capitalist society can be the kind of society I just sketched, hence he rejected egalitarianism along with all talk of rights and justice. — Jamal

Interesting again, thanks.

As background for a, maybe all too naive, question on Marxism:

Speaking from a common folk understanding of capitalism, as I’m so far aware of it, the term can mean different things to different people (I’ve bumped into more than a few that reflexively equate it to democracy, for example; something I sharply disagree with). As for myself, though, I can’t find any other succinct label for a meritocratic economy other than that of “capitalism” – all the technicalities and history to this term aside. What I mean by this is that those who put in more effort into and have better skills at X become economically compensated for engaging in X more than those who do little if anything, lack knowhow, or both when engaging in X. As a theoretical ideal this may seem straightforward enough, but it would require societal movements toward a cessation of nepotism (be it racial, of economic class etc.); equal educational opportunities for all children, regardless of their parents’ background, to allow those who put in the greatest effort and hold the greatest knowhow to flourish … the list can go on.

I’m mentioning this because I so far find that an egalitarian society needs to be meritocratic (economically as well as politically) if it’s not to succumb to vices that undermine its long-term preservation. And this in turn would then result in certain societal hierarchies, fluid though they'd be. An authority (not to be confused with “authoritarianism” or authoritarian interests) in some discipline is then to ideally be trusted, respected, and economically compensated more than a trainee in the same field, for example – this, again, ideally based on due merit – with the further ideal that such an authority in a field works in good faith to best optimize the flourishing of those who are not as experienced in the given field.

Yes, this would, I believe, require a much more elevated moral compass of all citizens/members of an egalitarian society. But my main point to this is that an egalitarian society, to be successful in sustaining itself, can only result in a meritocratic specialization / stratification / hierarchy of roles (in large enough societies, each with its own due degree of economic compensation that in part roughly correlates the individual’s degree of societal responsibility toward other(s)) ... a hierarchy which, again, would be dynamic rather than static in nature.

Feel free to disagree, of course. But I do find this ideal to be a far cry from the capitalism of today, which does not check and balance itself against such things as monopolies (economically) and oligarchies (politically); with these in turn stopping those who hold potential to improve things via innovation from so doing; hence, with these ending meritocracy. To not here evoke today's capitalism essentially being a global pyramid structure which lacks the infinite resources it is modeled on. A different issue, though.

I only know of Marx and Engels indirectly, and have not read their works. So, the naive question:

What do you gather was (more aptly, would have been) Marx’s stance on a meritocratic economy? (The term “meritocracy” wasn’t coined until recently, and even then it was initially used as a pejorative label … this to argue against the very type of healthy competition and fluid stratification I was endorsing above as a needed aspect of any healthy egalitarian society – be it tribal or the prospect of one that is global.)

At the very least, he did hold that labor merited more than what it was getting. But I'd like better insight into the matter: would he have been opposed to people being compensated based on merit?

(BTW: Coming from a communist Stalinist background – I immigrated to the US from Romania as a preadolescent – the backlash against communism as ideology from many of those I’m close to stems, not only from the Stalinist, totalitarian surveillance-state mechanisms and the like, but also form the everyday experience that many who were lazy and inept benefited greatly on account of nepotism while those who worked hard and had much to offer where often not treated very well … especially if the latter were not members of the communist party. I should also add, I’m personally all for community-ism – which is how I rephrase my current understanding of the communist ideal when it comes it being theory on paper. Though, again, I don’t have much of any expertise in firsthand readings.)

He took that position for specific political reasons and I don’t feel the need to follow him in that, but it does contain the insight that rights are not enough in a world where material reality doesn’t allow for the full flourishing of every individual. — Jamal

I'm in agreement with this.

Are there other forms of idealism which are not antirealist? — 180 Proof

As I've mentioned, C.S. Peirce's objective idealism comes to mind. (the Wikipedia page isn't in-depth, but it does evidence the point)

Perhaps many of our fellows here on TPF feel the same? — Moliere

From what I recall reading in the thread, there are a few other forum members that do (that feel the principle choices between realism and idealism offer a false dichotomy).

The thought being that each thought should be treated individually, and feeling that our beliefs cannot fit the cookie cutters? — Moliere

:up: If I'm understanding you right, I for one endorse that. My own impression is that @Banno is a bit peeved that those who lean toward idealism haven't voted for idealism ... but, again, the dichotomy between realism and idealism can well be viewed as false. A kind of entrapment into mislabeling oneself.

The ultimate telos in Buddhism (if there is one) would be karma I think. — Janus

I've always thought of it being Nirvana: the point of the eight-fold path. Karma, from this vantage, would then only be a manifestation of either getting closer to Nirvana or further away from it based on actions of all kinds (mental as well as physical).

Does entanglement inherently involve consciousness or mind? — Janus

Not to my current thinking.

Anyway I'm still stuck in the inability to parse the notion of telos, without incorporating purposefulness. — Janus

I can see why. All teloi we are consciously aware of and motivated by in our day to day lives provide us with purpose, this by definition, I think.

But again, as concerns our discussion of metaphysics, more importantly for me is the issue of whether a metaphysical system can incorporate just such day to day intents into its structure of understanding.

Or are you making the stronger contention that those who did choose should engage in more critical thought? — Moliere

No. We all have our own mindsets and beliefs and critical justifications for these. Mine just don't fit the cookie cutter alternatives presented when one is taken to exclude the others, that's all. I wanted to emphasize that the "trepidation" interpenetration for not choosing "idealism" is a wrong conclusion for at the very least some of the forum members.

So, I'm wondering how we can conceive of an "ultimate telos" without thinking of it as being purposeful. If it is just an apparent general natural tendency like entropy, I don't see why that could not be incorporated into a physicalist model. — Janus

As to entropy being the ultimate telos of all things, if we're both interpreting him right, that's more Apo's neck of the woods. While not wanting to push my own agenda, I don't look at it as being purposeful. More like that ultimate end of all spatiotemproal being which, as ultimate end, occurs as existentially fixed potential, and which either directly or indirectly teleologically drives all existents, be they animate or inanimate. (Again, though, don't here want to get into the details of my own views out of concern that they might bring about more confusion then clarity when expressed via the soundbites of a forum). Point being, imo, even if the ultimate telos were to be intimately associated with psyches, it still would not need to be envisioned as being purposeful (and definitely not a psyche itself ... just as with Nirvana not being a psyche nor a realm of psyche/"I-ness" while still being the end result of psychological being in Buddhist thought).

... on second thought, don't know if this much helps, but I'll leave it in all the same.

Or perhaps this is just a way of coming down firm on "trepidation" as an explanation for the difference. — Moliere

For amusement I’ll say this again in fuller terms. Speaking for myself at least, since choosing one of the three alternatives implies a rejection of those not chosen, I, for one, would be false to my own beliefs in choosing just one. Consider:

- I am a skeptic in the sense of ancient skepticism to which Marcus Cicero et al. pertained (in modern parlance, I am a diehard fallibilist … which has absolutely nothing to do with (Cartesian) doubts).
- I uphold there being a real external world for which there can be no rational doubt.
- And, when not in a neutral-monism set of mind, I likewise consider myself an idealist, with many affinities to the idealism of C.S. Peirce.

My own not partaking of the poll is not “trepidation”. It’s critical thought. :nerd: :wink:

Something like this is how we think of the evolution of apparently designed biological forms due not to any "transcendent designer" but to natural selection.

That said, there would not seem to be any way to conceptually incorporate the notion of a transcendent designer into a physicalist model, so if that is what you mean then I think we agree. — Janus

:smile: Want to clarify this: "Transcendent designer" entails there being a transcendent psyche ... that designs. Yes, physicalism can't incorporate this. I was however addressing an ultimate telos as unmoved mover of everything that is not a psyche and, hence, not a "designer". So far don't think physicalism can incorporate the latter either ... even if it does not in any way address the presence of a deity. Wouldn't mind someday being proven wrong about physicalism's aversion to teleology, though.

As to the rest, I respect your views.

This is a very human way of understanding human motivation and creativity, but do we have any warrant for projecting that onto the cosmos? — Janus

My own idiosyncratic inclinations aside, the issue as I see it is whether the metaphysical model of the world we endorse (e.g., physicalism) can allow for the existence of final causes within the cosmos. Humans are undeniably within the cosmos. So whether or not final causes can apply to things such as rocks, the question still is can the metaphysical model acknowledge that they apply to, at the very least, humans?

Would an illusory perception be non-existent, though, or rather would it be a perception of something non-existent? — Janus

I was aiming to affirm that we cannot in good faith in any way doubt that perceptions, illusory or not, occur (in the world). I'm hoping that makes better sense. But to answer your question, the second.

They cannot be accommodated within eliminative physicalism perhaps, but I don't see why they cannot be accommodated within physicalism tout court. — Janus

All I know is that the reality of final causes were rejected along with rejection of Aristotelian thinking in the history of ideas (not tout court, but by in large), leading to the metaphysical doctrines of materialism and, later on, physicalism. For my part, I will only affirm that physicalism would drastically change as belief system where it to uphold the reality of final causes operating in the cosmos. As one maybe blatant example, if final causes do occur, this then opens up the realm of possibilities toward an ultimate final cause as unmoved mover (not a psyche as unmoved mover, but an ultimate telos ... in the way you've presented Apo's views, entropy would then be just this ultimate telos of all things in his philosophical views). The physicalism of today does not allow for the possibility of such ultimate telos as unmoved mover (of everything that is).

Are you referring to collapse of the wave function? Otherwise I'm not familiar with the idea. — Janus

I tend to associate it with events such as the delayed-choice quantum eraser, but there is an SEP article on it if you're interested.

Although the OP expresses the central thought of conservatism, conservatism actually offers an alternative that’s a bit more hopeful than a “homeostasis between good and bad that never progresses in either direction,” namely gradual, organic change produced communally.*

Of course, this change would merely avoid the most egregious evils of inequality and oppression, and never result in the banishment of social hierarchy. To the humane, optimistic conservative, hierarchy and inequality don’t have to be bad—they’re natural and we should do our best to live with them. — Jamal

Thanks for that perspective on conservatism.

All the same, if the "humane" form of conservatism you address does intend to progress toward somewhere, isn’t it incrementally progressing toward an more egalitarian society (contra progression toward the authoritarianism of a fascist state, for example)?

Maybe a root issue here is what is meant by “egalitarianism”. Does the term intend something along the lines of an equality of fundamental rights for every citizen (e.g., a CEO gets ticketed just as a janitor will for a parking violation despite the stratification of economic class between the two … to not bring into the conversation more complex issues, such as healthcare) or does it imply the absolute equality of all people in all ways?

I think all can agree that the latter interpretation is an absurdity through and through. Brings to mind Kurt Vonnegut’s short story "Harrison Bergeron":

In the year 2081, the 211th, 212th, and 213th amendments to the Constitution dictate that all Americans are fully equal and not allowed to be smarter, better-looking, or more physically able than anyone else. The Handicapper General's agents enforce the equality laws, forcing citizens to wear "handicaps": masks for those who are too beautiful, earpiece radios for the intelligent that broadcast loud noises meant to disrupt thoughts, and heavy weights for the strong or athletic. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harrison_Bergeron#Plot

Not all people can be of an exact equal height, kind of thing.

With this in mind, I so far don't view egalitarian causes being incompatible to hierarchy / stratification. I've so far interpreted the egalitarian ideal struggled for to be one where people of different ranks, abilities, talents, intelligences, etc. are yet valued as people irrespective of their placements on these metrics. This in contrast to certain authoritarian ideals wherein a subset of humans will deem and treat others as less than human, or some such.

You're looking at the issue very moralistically. — frank

To keep things simple (I never mentioned "evil"), you could have mentioned this the first time around instead of replying:

Yes. That's exactly what I was saying. — frank

For what its worth, then, from my vantage: egalitarian interests such as those of democratic governance cannot work in the absence of an honest checks and balances of power. The more these are eroded the more the governance becomes authoritarian - this with or without Orwellian propaganda that affirms otherwise. However, this doesn't imply that democratic governance must "always fail".

It's like saying that, because good interpersonal relationships (friendships, of romance, etc., which tend to be egalitarian intending) are always susceptible to becoming rotten - because one or all parties can do bad things to each other - one then should shun all good interpersonal relationships ... this because they will always fail.

Fair enough. For the record, to state the obvious, the bad (those who endeavor to get away with wrongs) incur plenty of suffering in life as well. More like a choice between which kind of suffering one wants to experience - that which comes from pursuing good or that which comes from pursuing bad - one can add to this "types of pleasures" as well.

I'm not sure what you mean by asking whether our reasons for acting are real.or illusory. — Janus

Here, I didn't mean via particular examples but as a form of determinacy that either can or cannot occur in the world. If final causes can and do occur in the world, then they are real determinacy types. If final causes cannot and thereby do not occur in the world ... then the awkward conclusion that all our teleological reasons (e.g., goals/intents) for our actions are illusory/nonexsitent.

Yes, in terms of particulars, goals can be both real and illusory; same can be said, in short, for any perception of some object: it can be real or illusory (e.g. mirage or hallucination). But few, if any, would doubt that perceptions occur within the world - i.e., would sustain that perceptions per se could be all be illusory and thereby nonexistent.

Thing is final causes, such as our goals/aims/intents, cannot be accommodated for within physicalism, and the empirical sciences cannot empirically observe them (this as physical existents can be observed) ... or at least so I last gathered.

Beside which, even efficient causes (what we today commonly simple express as causes), though easily understood from a distance, become problematic logically in numerous ways when investigate up close. As one easily expressed example, some have proposed backward causation - wherein the effect occurs before the cause - in attempts to explain some aspects of quantum phenomena. This, though, is not scientific reasoning but metaphysical reasoning about what science has discovered - whether its good or bad metaphysical reasoning being another matter all together.

In other words, good never ubiquitously prevails because there is bad in the world. Therefore, we should shun a striving for that which is good; instead favoring either the bad or a magical type of eternally unchanging, self-sustained, homeostasis between good and bad that never progresses in either direction.

Am I missing something significant in this interpretation of the issue?

Heck, to each their own. Hence the myriad conflicts of life.

I wouldn't count causality as metaphysical because I see causality as intimately tied with, indispensable to, the understanding of the physical, and I don't think we have any idea of causes which are not physical. I mean we can think the possibility of non-physical causes, but we have no grasp on what they would "look" like. Same thing with time and space; what could time be without physical existents, can we imagine a non-physical space? What changes if not physical things? As to identity I think that is a logical, not a metaphysical, notion.

So, again I think these notions are all intimately connected with experience of the physical or with logic. — Janus

The questions you ask seem to presuppose physicalism. To answer your questions via counterexamples: Final causes (teloi) are not deemed to be physical causes; e.g. the goal/telos of replying to you caused me to write this post as written (or, Q: “what on earth caused you to do X” A: “I wanted Z”). Are teloi real or illusory? Not a question answerable via the physical - regardless of how one answers. Nor do teloi/intents have a certain “look”. Not that I in any way endorse either, but, since they’re easy pickings, the alternative worlds of heaven and hell are temporal, comprised of befores and afters, devoid of physical existents though they are - so the occurrence of time does not logically entail physical existents. As to nonphysical spatial relations, for one example, a paradigm which is composed of ideas is larger (which can only be a spatial attribute) than a single idea it is composed of - in this case presenting spatial relations between whole and part that are nonphysical. Consciousness constantly changes despite remaining the same consciousness (maintaining the same identity) over time - and it is not tangibly physical. As to the last affirmation, metaphysical study is logical - the bad logic that sometimes results notwithstanding, just just as bad logic can permeate the empirical sciences at times.

Of course all of these examples are debatable, some more than others, but they intend to illustrate that the metaphysical subjects of causation, time and space, change and identity, etc., are not strictly contingent on the physical (nor, for that matter, on a physicalist worldview: physicalism simply affirms everything real to be physical based on underlying metaphysical presumptions … I say this though I understand you don’t label yourself a physicalist).

I doubt this will in any way resolve the matter, and presume it will raise certain eyebrows. But your asking of questions motivated me to answer them.

As I previously said, we differ in our understandings of what metaphysics entails.

Nice quote, btw.

My definition of what qualifies a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

I would agree that it is true that science evolved out of a context of metaphysical dogma, but I don't see any reason to believe that the continuing practice of science relies on any metaphysical beliefs. — Janus

It then seems that we hold different understandings of what constitutes the metaphysical. No biggie.

To me, generally speaking, the metaphysical signifies that which is but is not tangibly physical - the notions of space and time thereby being metaphysical subjects, for another example. At any rate, metaphysics as study is not to me defined by dogma but by the best inferences upon enquiry, and is always fallible. In my understanding, since science assumes the truth of causality, of identity and change, of time and space, etc., with certain understandings of what these signify, science then always relies upon metaphysical beliefs.

We cannot help understanding the world in causal terms, even animals do. — Janus

In a certain way, sure. One could argue that at least some lesser animals can discern things via the use of what we term other metaphysical subjects as well: being and nonbeing, identity and change, space and time. I'd even go so far as to offer that in some rudimentary way even unicellular organisms, such as ameba, discern the world via at least some metaphysical givens - else they could not survive. Still, only we humans can consciously comprehend these as abstracted concepts which we can then ponder and investigate for cogency and explanatory value. It is the latter which I intended by "metaphysical understanding".

As one example, only we can grasp the extrapolated notion of a cosmos/universe of which we are a part of; resulting issues such as whether the cosmos is infinite or finite are not an aspect of lesser animals' cognition.

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BTW, in regard to:

My definition of what qualifies a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

Since idealism claims all things to be either directly or indirectly dependent upon psyche, wouldn't that then make idealism a non-metaphysical construct? :razz: (kidding)

I think metaphysics is a valuable study, for its imaginative and creative interest, I am only rejecting the idea that truth may be found there. — Janus

I find things to be more complicated then this sentence presumes.

The empirical sciences would be nonexistent without the philosophy of science upon which they are founded, which in turn could not obtain without a philosophy of causation, and causation is in turn a metaphysical study. Hence, all modern science is founded upon metaphysical understandings, causation as one such. Hence, by logical derivation, if there can be no metaphysical truths, such as that pertaining to the reality and nature of causation, there could then be no scientific truths (the fallibility to the latter notwithstanding).

Are you indirectly advocating for general Pyrrhonism in regard to all existential truths?

In a sense I get what you might mean: metaphysical speculation can be a curse far more often that a cure. But then, what else but an awareness of metaphysical issues (such as that of causation), and the existential truths we thereby accept, sharply distinguishes the intellect of the human species at large from those of lesser lifeforms? Tool use, medicine, basic math skills, communication, comprehension of symbols, normative behavior in relation to what is given and taken (morality in this sense), all these can be found among lesser animals. But not metaphysical understandings.

Hey, for the record, I, as with most people, uphold the reality of causation. This then being one example of a metaphysical truth I subscribe to.

Yes, that is how I characterise the unknown - by reference to the known. Because there is no other character I could conceivably give it. And hence no particular response it can evoke, except by association with something known. — unenlightened

Yes, but in reference to your initial claim that we fear the loss of knonws (by which I initially understood: this via the presence of the unknown):

There are ample cases where the unknown, once experienced, only adds to that which is already known - rather than doing away with ready held knowns. The empirical future, for one general example, is replete with unknowns. But when knowledge of what tomorrow holds in store is acquired via immediate experience this does not, typically, dispel the empirical knowns already held. The unknown does not necessarily present a loss of knowns, in other words.

The unknown of what death is existentially - for those who don’t hold a belief of certainty regarding it - can conceivably be just such a type of relation between the knowns of today and the unknowns of tomorrow, so to speak. Hence, if death is an unknown, it will not thereby logically entail a “a loss of knowns”.

Only if one considers death to be a known state of nonbeing will death necessitate the loss of knonws.

So if one arrives at a fear of death, it can only be by associating it with something known and feared - a fear of abandonment perhaps. Which is the loss of relationship. Whenever one imagines one's death, one imagines being alive to it, and that is where fear can arise. — unenlightened

I translate this into a fear of suffering upon death and subsequent to it (rather than prior to its occurrence) - which, by the way, is a given in ideologies such as that of reincarnation.

Yet, taking at his word, he doesn’t believe in the possibility of suffering subsequent to death but yet finds death potentially fearful on account of losing awareness of all pleasant experiences acquired throughout life as an ego (by which I here merely mean an “I-ness” that experiences other). Something which I take to be more inline with loss of knows upon death (as I initially interpreted you as saying).

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BTW, as to fear of death as an ultimate unknown: no human is perfectly good; all have willfully done wrongs in life; this is a given. Some then fear the unknown of death in terms of how they will be judged by some form of what they might consider to be universal justice - ranging from notions of karma to notions of God. Of course though, again, this possibility will strictly apply to those who don't consider death to be the known state of nonbeing.

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As an aside, I guess in all this discussion the distinction should be made between “not wanting to die” and “fear of death”. All life lives by avoiding death and thus by either consciously or unconsciously striving against death, i.e. not wanting to die. Whereas the want to die to me borders on suicidal ideology.

All the same, one can well want to live in attempts to live life to the fullest without holding a fear, i.e. anxiety, about someday dying (regardless of how one interprets death: be it an unknown or else the known state of nonbeing).

BTW, , I forgot to link my post to you. (it was intend as a reply to the OP rather than to unenlightened per se)

What I think one can more successfully fear is the loss of the known, which seems to be more or less in line with Vera Mont — unenlightened

Interesting. Thanks for the perspective. Might I in good faith ask why?

For me the known too comes in a wide variety of flavors. Some knowns are quite pleasant while others are the converse. Learning to forget, from where I stand, can be an important aspect of life. Of course, at issue here from my vantage is that not all knowns are of beneficial value. Deep insights, acquaintances with beauty, and the like one one hand; grotesque violence as intense qualitative experience can serve as one example of something best left behind. As to holding on to the past, we typically do so only to better serve our future. Which is to say I find empirical knowledge to always be of instrumental, rather than intrinsic, value. So why fear loss of knowns if it comes via the form of nonbeing?

Maybe I rambled a bit. All the same, in honesty, if the presumption is that death equates to nonbeing, this has never bothered me as a possibility; nonbeing would be an absolute liberation from all ills were it to be real. Still, I don't currently take this scenario of death to be certain; I nowadays find it rather unlikely, personally.

Non comprendo. — unenlightened

Yea, me neither.

I've always thought that fear of death - for those who are so afraid - largely consists of fear of the unknown ... with death being the ultimate unknown. As in: "if death is not an absolute nihility of being, then what awaits given who I've been?"



At any rate, as a slight spin off: why should those who don't fear death on account of their conviction that it in fact is an absolute nihility of being thereby want to not be?

Doesn't jive well with the way humans are.

I am no psychologist, counselor, self-help wizard, or anything to the like. Wanted to however comment:

Although not everyone, many – both hereabouts and in the world at large, myself as no exception – are to large extents self-righteously arrogant, unknowingly ignorant, and ignorantly callous. Which is to in part say that most could hardly give a damn about those in need if they don’t have some material or social capital to gain from it – to not even get into cases where there's a potential loss of either such capital for doing what one can to help. It’s also to say that most people argue not to better discover that which is true but to further fortify their own ego, which in part consists of ready-constructed presumptions about oneself and the world upon which one’s selfhood depends. Such that anyone who significantly differs from oneself is by default deemed wrong and, to varying extents, unfit. This dislike for others emerging irrespective of the other’s moral character and existential innocence.

Neither philosophers nor those who spend time philosophizing are, as cohorts, exempt from this competition of ego.

Life can be rough, this in more than just a few ways. Especially for those who don’t partake of – or who cannot even find any means of relating to – the dog-eat-dog aspects of the world. It's not the whole of humanity, but it is a significant portion of it.

I get some of what you mean by associating the experience of pain with acquisition of new truths. Though not always, there often for me as well is a sting to the ego involved in a new existential discovery. A bursting of a bubble kind of thing, wherein one acknowledges that what one has so far upheld has been wrong all along. This occasional association between pain and truth, however, does not mandate that all new existential discoveries be uncomfortable to oneself. Nor that pain is somehow equivalent to strength. Heck, some intuitions and inspirations that lead one to see things anew with greater clarity can be downright pleasant intellectually, to say the least. And these pleasant occasions can provide a great deal of strength.

All of that briefly touched upon, I think at least part of you is on the right path in learning to think for yourself. This as evidenced by your questioning certain authority figures whose conclusions make little if any sense to you, such as what you’ve done in this thread. There’s something to be said about not following the dictums of authority figures blindly; in understanding that no human is infallible, not even those who are specialists and who most look up to. It's in no way about universal doubt, but about bearing in mind that ego most often prevails – or is at least in part always entwined – this irrespective of philosophical position. Reasoning things out for yourself to the best of your ability is certainly an important part of this. While I’m at this "question authority and think for yourself" motto, engaging in random acts of kindness can be a noble endeavor as well.

As I said, I know of no panacea – and I’m not pretending to. It’s a struggle – for everyone at some time or another. Some treat life as a joke; other’s take it seriously. But everyone suffers during portions of it. One simply has to find the optimal means for oneself to face the storms when they come and battle with them – or, better said, through them. Hopefully findings ways to hold onto integrity – to an ethical heart – in the process.

The answers you seek to your most important existential questions will, imo, likely not come from others, but from within yourself. Even if there is no success, there will still be dignity for yourself you will find in taking on the strife: in the noble battle with whatever obstacles you have to face.

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Any way to make it stop? — Darkneos

Again, not as any type of professional but as a fellow imperfect human being dwelling within an imperfect humanity, I wouldn’t address complete strangers with such questions. Too many sharks in the seas to make such open questions profitable to you – most of the time at least. People at large typically aren’t as compassionate as they profess to be. Still, this isn’t to say that good souls don’t occur in the world.

My own best, though imperfect, answer, is provided in what I've already typed. There is no stopping life's strife; there's only doing one's best to deal with it. And the personal pride that ought to accompany this.

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Hopefully at least some of this post will resonate with you. If not, kindly disregard it. Best of luck to you either way.

p.s. I in all likelihood will not have anything further to add on this matter. Again, I'm no professional on the subject.

I only skinned through the article, short though it was. To be charitable to the guy, his argument could be deemed to boil down to "there's more to us than what we physiologically perceive via our sense organs". For one easy example of this, we are endowed with things such as emotions and goals ... none of which are thus perceivable.

But yea, when it comes to Eastern notions of Maya, I in this case far more respect your instincts than trust his awards.

It doesn't mean not real in BUddhism, it's more complicated than that. — Darkneos

Precisely.

Kudos. Sounds in keeping with C.S. Peirce's point of view. Though something tells me you'd disagree with his pragmaticist conclusions of objective idealism. :smile:

Loosely speaking, the OP is about what is real. I agreed with BC's point that humans are meaning making creatures who invent stories to help manage their environment. (Richard Rorty holds a similar view.) Some of those stories work better in some texts than others. And some of those stories, like the one in the OP, might be borne out of having too much spare time. — Tom Storm

Right. Here's a more pithy question. What then is real rather than invented story?

But this question has the potential to lead one down the rabbit hole of philosophical enquiry. With plenty of potholes along the way.

Ok, I'll cease and desist then. :wink:

I don't think even he really knows what he's talking about — Darkneos

I was addressing not so much the OP's link but the OP's quote.

All the same, in reference to the OP's link, from where I stand, this assessment of yours sums up the situation nicely.

I would include scientism as one of those bedtime stories. — Tom Storm

Curious: would you also include in this list of illusory/delusional bedtime stories the metaphysics of materialism/physicalism?

I ask because the OP’s quote isn’t about scientism - its conclusions are devoid of anything that is empirically demonstrable, which is what science tackles - but instead addresses perspectives directly derived from a materialistic/physicalist platform. Its argument, in a nutshell, is that because there is no significant distinction between life and non-life (due to all life being inferred fully emergent from non-life), and because all that is real is material/physical (which is non-living), then all life is illusory rather than real.

I’ve already addressed some of the reasons for why this argument is lacking in a previous post.

The current point being, the conclusion that “life is an illusion” is not a product of scientism - but a product of the materialism/physicalism on which scientism is typically founded.

As an interesting tidbit in terms of Darwin’s ethics, he is well enough known for his anti-slavery/abolitionist stances. A far cry from what we often interpret by survival of the fittest. For example, here’s an excerpt from his autobiography:

Fitz-Roy’s [the captain of the Beagle, the ship on which Darwin traveled to the famed Galapagos Islands] temper was a most unfortunate one. It was usually worst in the early morning, and with his eagle eye he could generally detect something amiss about the ship, and was then unsparing in his blame. He was very kind to me, but was a man very difficult to live with on the intimate terms which necessarily followed from our messing by ourselves in the same cabin. We had several quarrels; for instance, early in the voyage at Bahia, in Brazil, he defended and praised slavery, which I abominated, and told me that he had just visited a great slave-owner, who had called up many of his slaves and asked them whether they were happy, and whether they wished to be free, and all answered “No.” I then asked him, perhaps with a sneer, whether he thought that the answer of slaves in the presence of their master was worth anything?

To my way of seeing, getting the captain of the ship you are a guest on (in the middle of a vast ocean you could easily fall into) angry by questioning his moral character takes, should I say, a great deal of gall. Kudos to him.

But it might be interpreted metaphorically to signify a quality that living organisms possess. I think a way of conceiving it might be along the lines of the relationship between meaning and the symbolic form in which meaning is encoded. — Wayfarer

I agree.

Another prominent factor I find of interest is that of intentions (teloi). Life is overtly intentional, goal-oriented. Whereas non-life is either fully devoid of intentionality or - if interpreted through certain ancient philosophical perspectives - can potentially be deemed covertly intentional only in so far as it abides by the logos' (universal reasoning's) laws in progressing toward an Aristotelian final cause as prime mover. Although I grant this latter option is very offbeat. Still, either way, I do find that life is fundamentally different from non-life; that there is a "vital impetus" intrinsic to life that is missing in non-life.

At any rate, I deem this a better perspective than declaring life to be illusory. :wink:

It is interesting that none goes for idealism yet. I remember debating in some threads with members who were Platonist. — javi2541997

I myself waver between idealist and neutral monist, but I’d vote for “the alternatives provided in the poll are too unclear to answer” - which, unfortunately, is not an alternative provided in the poll.

If philosophers categorize “non-skeptical realism” then there should also be such a thing as “skeptical realism”. Both of these are to me very muddled concepts in need of further clarification. Assuming this is possible.

Then the categories of “idealism” and “realism” are presented as though they were somehow incompatible when it comes to an external world. C.S. Peirce’s views serve as one clear-cut example to the contrary. Posing idealism against realism is about as philosophically astute as would be posing realism against materialism. Muddled, or at least so I find.

Once we have the leisure to roast domestic rabbits, we start spinning out interesting ideas about gods, illusion, Maya, the Trinity, Karma, and so on. Some of this thinking is not illusory, it's delusional. Our - perhaps - overly intellectual brains seem to need a certain amount of delusional thinking to put up with life. Otherwise, some people find reality terrifying. — BC

We certainly seem to need and cherish our bedtime stories. — Tom Storm

I so far don't understand how any of this is relevant to the OP.

The elephant in the room in this thread is vitalism (not specific variants which oddly enough sought to measure the immeasurable as though life were itself somehow a physical property, but simply as the general idea that life is fundamentally different from non-life). If, as is commonly believed today, vitalism is false such that there is no fundamental difference between life and non-life, and if all that we deem life is emergent in all respects from non-life, then - as per the OP quote - life can be deemed an illusion rather than real. One of those delusional bedtime stories we tell ourselves and our children: that we are alive.

Consequences of materialism 101.

Don’t know about others, but this way of thinking gives me a good laugh. Still, for the typical materialist, it’s nowhere near as worrisome as the prospect of vitalism - wherein the reality of life becomes, for the materialist, something to be scared about.

I want to know how accurate this view is. — Darkneos

From what I’ve read in the OP, life is here considered illusory on account of being emergent (in this case, from non-life). In here granting a materialist’s general perspective, first, on what logical grounds does an emergent property necessitate that it be illusory rather than real? The properties of water are emergent from the properties of two gases - hydrogen and oxygen - when the latter’s atoms are covalently bound together; ergo, the properties of water are illusory? Secondly, from a materialist perspective, what existent would not be in any way emergent from something else - other than, maybe, the quantum vacuum field and/or some free-floating natural laws and the like?

Seems to me that this same argument for life being illusory offered in the OP quote will, by its own reasoning, also conclude in affirming that everything else we commonly appraise as real is likewise illusory - for it is all in some way or other emergent. That a materialist can be fine with entertaining this while in the same breath deploring notions such as Maya is, to me, something of wonder.