To anyone who is in any way interested with the topics of this thread:

Having read through a good portion of this thread, I’m starting to lose my aesthetic for the terms “skeptic” and “skepticism”. Common modern notions—as easily pinpointed in dictionaries—associate these terms as antithetical to something real being, and to belief in reality. OK, nothing new to me about common modern notions … but on a philosophy form? I’m starting to question my use of this term …

So, my question: is there a viable, alternative, philosophical terminology—other than that of a newly invented word that no one else know of—for what most take to be this rather simple, commonsensical, epistemological stance: that of, “we as of yet have not demonstrated any proposition to be perfectly secure from all possible error”.

Note: this stance is one of unabashed certainty, not of doubt; it is also one of logical inference, and not one of supposition; lastly, it is one that implicitly affirms that truth—and, by extension, the ontic—does hold presence regardless of what people may claim or feel … with this specific, just underlined conclusion regarding human epistemology being itself upheld as an instantiation of such truths. Oh, and all this fully upheld, and entwined, with the commonsensical, self-evident truth that all the certainties we live by, aka subjective certainties (from the weakest to the strongest), are never contingent on some absolute certainty being first demonstrated by the intellect.

Whatever ready existent term for the aforementioned, underlined stance is in fact proper, it certainly is not that of “skepticism” as it has been used by at least half of the (philosophically learned) people of this thread. Uphold the stance previously underlined, and questions regarding things such as “how does one know (i.e., gain absolute certainty) that laptops don’t turn into seven headed evil demons that mock you behind your back every time you blink your eyes?” become exceedingly illogical … especially given all the justification for the contrary that has been so far provided.

Maybe this post comes off as off-putting. It’s not intended to be.

The underlined proposition above is logically valid, if not sound, given the arguments for it. To my knowledge so far, this commonsense position can only be termed one of skepticism. Hence, since so many people quite erroneously assert that global/philosophical “skepticism” entails lack of justified belief in reality, realism, etc. (nothing in the underlined stance justifies this) either a) there’s something quite wrong about the authoritarian biases of those who purport this entailment or b) there’s got to be a different philosophical term for the commonsensical, and quite ancient, philosophical position underlined above.

… eha, OK, maybe I’m not currently in the best of moods. Still, I find that the contents still hold.

got plenty of those myself

Yea, I see your point. And then it would be hatched into the wetness. Still, wouldn’t it as embryo still be wet given the fluid it’s surrounded by? (Same with the sperm and egg prior to the embryo being developed.)



... but I'm OK with either way, to be honest

I wasn’t expecting a serious reply. Maybe I should have been more serious myself, and likely should have first replied directly to Baden. To go back to what Baden’s reply to me was:

To soak something is to immerse it in water or to make it extremely wet. The fish is literally soaking in water when it is in the water. — Baden

I get what Baden is here saying; that “immersion in water”, or “being made extremely wet”, signifies that something is soaked--that something is soaking wet. Yet, by what Baden expresses verbatim, this entails that the thing addressed was immersed in the given liquid from a former state of not being so immersed, and was made wet--this in comparison to a state of non-wetness prior to being so made wet.

So, being serious about the matter: that a natural, living fish in some lake or ocean (etc.), which was birthed there and died there without any alteration to its context of water, was "soaking wet" to me strongly implies that at some point it was not. But this conclusion would be erroneous. It always was in the same state of being surrounded by water.

Were such a fish, however, to be taken out of its natural context, say by fishing, and then immersed into some other liquid, because this this other liquid would be a novel and impermanent context, the fish would then be “immersed” or “made wet” with this novel liquid. So, the fish now could be said to be soaking wet in the liquid because it was so made to be from a former state of not being so. E.g.:

“All fish are soaking wet in water”, doesn’t sound right to me (though I grant that English is my second language, I've never quite heard this term outside of this philosophy form, and I'm guessing the same applies for most).

“That living fish over there is soaking wet in ketchup”, though a bit sadistic, does to me seem cogent as a statement.

… but this is not an overall argument I have big stakes in.

Suppose one has a bottle of 100% isopropyl alcohol. It looks like water, behaves like water, but it isn't water. — Bitter Crank

Now, by my argument, a fish immersed in rubbing alcohol (or beer) would then be soaking wet in whatever you’ve immersed it in. Cuz, then it would be surrounded by something different than what in normal circumstances remains a permanent context. No?

So we might have moist liberals... — Banno

OK, with this part, unless we’re talking about sexuality in code and are refereeing to the female sex, I don’t yet know what you here mean. (maybe not important)

Presumably then it is possible that a fish in water is soaking, while one in the hand is merely moist? — Banno

Well, what I’m upholding is that the fish isn’t soaking unless it then steps out of the water somehow—this so as to compare soaking wet with being merely moist (maybe due to perspiration after drying off).

Oops. Moistness, yes, that's what I was getting at.

Well, with a tad more seriousness, “wet” can only hold meaning via “not-wet/dry”. So I agree with what Wayfarer said. Since fish live and die in water without ever (typically) being not-wet (not all fish jump out of water), it wouldn’t make sense to say that a fish in water is wet … unless you conceptualize the fish out of water as well.

Isn’t moisture a type of wetness? I say "yes", so yes.

If a fish is in water, is it wet, — Posty McPostface

Yes, but only on the inside.
-------
Now that I’ve read Wayfarer’s post, come to think of it, you could have a dry fish in water … I’m thinking along the lines of smoked salmon. Which only further substantiates my position.

We take our most fundamental criterion in a blindly passionate sort of way. Because what's so great about being logical? We can't use logic to justify this, since the authority of logic as a criterion is what's at stake. On the other hand, something like being logical is experienced as a self-justifying value. It's 'aesthetic' in some sense.

[...]

I understand the charm of fine-tuning arguments. Still, I think the most revolutionizing speech often involves a strong new metaphor --an analogically shifted paradigm, etc. — ff0

Hesitantly—and kind’a encouraged by the last quoted statement—I’ll be a bit creative in this post’s expressions so as to condense an otherwise hard to communicate concept:

I sometimes liken logic (logos as it was addressed in Ancient Greek) to itself be a universal metaphor—in the sense here intended, a metaphor for pure being as it is and as it, in all its existentially divided parts, operates via process of becoming. This can probably become a multifaceted stance—and maybe you’ll agree that poetic speech might be both helpful for conveyance of meaning between some while simultaneously being a hindrance as regards meaning-conveyance among others. Still, relying on the Ancient Greek concept of Logos: logic, reasoning, ratios and rationing (or, partitioning this from that; appropriating relations between; proportionality; etc.), rationalizing, and language itself—among other concepts—were all interlinked in the concept of Logos. Are all interlinked, I’d say. Our inability to get behind language—which you’ve previously mentioned—is then, from certain vantages, one and the same with our inability to get behind the logos within which we dwell and of which we are in large part composed … and—like the fish’s lack of awareness of the water within which it swims, which you’ve addressed—quite often of which we can’t help but be utterly unaware of. IMO, due to our inability to get behind all the logos that is, we in some ways then cannot ever get to the pure, non-linguistic, being that is—for which we as beings use logos to address.

That perspective briefly mentioned, logic—in the form of the principles of thought being consistently applied—then serves as our common, human, universal language—or common meta-language if one prefers. (For my part, the particulars of formal logic then follow suit, but are not as universal as the principles of thought themselves.)

To cut to the chase, what I’m here trying to make the case for is this: imo, the optimal metaphor would be one that consists of a logical expression readily accessible to all—such that the meaning holds the potential to become commonly understood by (as extremely overreaching an ideal as this is) all people. Since all people share the aesthetic for consistency in what is and what is deemed to be—otherwise said, all are subjects to the principle of noncontradiction—all could then in principle come to understand such logos-bound expressions.

… or so I’m currently thinking. And waxing a bit too poetic at that, I imagine. (Heck, not all poetic verse is good even from the vantage of its author.) But I trust that some of this can come across in a comprehensible manner—though maybe not to everyone.

If God exists, does God have a purpose for existing? — Qurious

I’m assuming that this will not be a novel idea. The referent to the term “God” is not singular among those who use the term—irrespective to these being theists or atheistic, and most especially across different cultures and different times.

If God is deemed to be a deity (something endowed with any form of psyche), then its/his/her drive toward some outcome will logically hold presence, and, hence, God will be purpose-driven. If, however, God is deemed to not be a deity, then there is no logical requirement that God, in and of itself, be purpose-driven.

One can find the same roundabout conundrum in the question of “if God is omnipotent can he create a rock too heavy for him to lift?” If one presumes the referent to “God” to be a psyche, the answer becomes irrational regardless of what it might be—this though the question remains cogent. However, if—as one example—one presumes a pantheistic God—such as that of Spinoza’s—the very question itself becomes an irrational strawman—hence, one for which, naturally, no answer could ever be derived.

Current mentality commonly associates, first-ness, to that which is an ultimate precedent. In this contemplation, first cause has—to my current understanding—nothing to do with Aristotle’s final cause (final telos) as the unmoved mover. If, however, one associates first-ness with preeminence, then Aristotle’s final cause can be consistent with also being termed the first cause.

So, to my best current understanding, were one to assume an Aristotelian final cause as the first cause in the sense of preeminence, and further equate this notion with the label of “God”, then God is that which endows purpose without itself being purpose-driven. As to why some might ascribe the term God to this Aristotelian final cause, a) it would be present/real in manners that evade the principle of sufficient reason, b) it would be the final state of being (the Omega), and c) it would be a prerequisite for all that manifests (the Alpha). Notice how there would then logically be no imperative for worship or prayer, no “talking to God who talks back to chosen ones” … well, it’s a long list, I’m thinking.

Nowadays, any such view of God—much as was the case for Spinoza and his conceptualization (though his was a different system than that of Aristotle’s)—will in all likelihood be deemed theism by atheists and atheism by theists. So I’m thinking it would be a bit of no man’s land.

I don’t have anything to prove here. But this is my current understanding of the main issue which the OP addresses: It’s not only an issue of if God is real, but of what one is referencing by the term, specifically either a psyche as other relative to all of us or, to be less theistic in terminology, an ultimate limit on everything which can be which pervades everything, including ourselves.

Interesting questions on causation, btw. I’ve here only wanted to address the issue of God being or not being purpose-driven, hopefully from the vantage of a relatively non-dogmatic logic.

In my view, we work with a persuasive speech that is both logical and feeling-tinged. For instance, I might ask you what it is for logos to convince logos. What is this being convinced? Is this not something like a feeling about the way that sentences hang together? A good feeling that approves? (I realize that this stress on feeling drags along the specter of irrationalism. ) — ff0

Yea, you’re of course correct that there is no such thing as emotion-devoid logic. Logic is, I very strongly believe, strictly a tool via which our cherished emotions (e.g., sense of well-being) are safeguarded, embellished, and so forth. Hence, our emotive experience of being is primary and our logic (or even wisdom) secondary—thought the first is strongly dependent upon the second. Yet, even in this, merely so saying will not be enough to convince someone who deems logic to be the superlative faculty of intellect to which, ideally, all emotions (including those of desire and sense of satisfaction/comfort) then become subservient slaves of. So, while I agree with you, I still personally find the fine-tuning of logical arguments to be very worthwhile. Then again, there’s wisdom in how one best goes about conveying what one intends to convey, this again addressing the emotive aspects of what is expressed … and I’ve so far found myself direly lacking in this department. But I’m aiming to fail better next time around. :)

So, "nonsubjective reality" is your term that could include both the Tao and objective reality, as a way to avoid pointless argument about terminology. Is that correct? Off the top of my head, have no problem with that, although I'll think about it some more. Wherever I finally come down, I appreciate the effort and understand the impulse. The problem for me is that the really interesting issues are found between the two concepts. This is a fight between the Tao and OR, not one where they join together like a Power Ranger to create a mighty Nonsubjective Reality to fight for truth and justice. Wow, that's some metaphor. I'm really proud of that. — T Clark

Very cool. To my mind, if it could be agreed upon (else, logically demonstrated) that nonsubjective reality holds presence, this would then simplify a great deal of ongoing arguments—mostly dealing with at least some issues of what can be labeled subjectivism. Then the concerns become solely focused on what in fact is nonsubjectively real. A lot of disagreements would yet occur, but at least we’d all agree that there is something real which underlies all that we otherwise imagine to be—maybe even including a strictly subjective opinion that there is a logical contradiction to the Tao and OR co-occurring. (Maybe.)

OK then, so my resolute stance is then one of nonsubjective realism. (Just trying to get used to expressing this phrase … still weird to me, but I’ll be using it.)

The philosophy with respect to which I am 'anti-' is just the bloodless stuff that wants to be a depersonalized armchair science. — ff0

As to philosophic justifications, while I hold deep empathy for pathos given outlooks that provide wisdom, I’ve come to believe that only logos can convince logos. This, then, does lead toward one of those dry, analytic forms of argumentation … at least this—I guess unfortunately—is the formal approach I’m taking in putting together whatever philosophy I’ve got.

There's a world outside of me that contains me and I share it with others who are also in this world. I was just at the memorial of someone I've known for twenty years. I have their dog now. The world survived their passing. — ff0

Condolences, and may things work out for the best.

It's up there with love not as a duty but as a self-justifying higher pleasure. — ff0

I’d use the word “happiness” for, to me, this concept encompasses that of pleasure. All the same, I like the way you’ve stated this. Hence, then, the supposed pinnacle of love—that of absolute, selfless love—is not an issue of duty but one of attraction toward a self-justifying highest (or deepest) happiness of personal being (by which I take for granted the love of other; interpreting one’s proximity to this pinnacle to be proportional to the degree—dwelling at least within individual moments—to which distinction between self and other fizzles away … be this relation one of romance or otherwise). Anyways, nicely worded.

I do like non-subjective actuality. — ff0

:) Thanks for so saying. I’ll begin to make use of it, then.

Of course we know how to do things, but there's something like a massive ignorance that (in my view) we mostly ignore. Yet this same ignorance when experienced is wonder itself. — ff0

See, it is this very aesthetic that makes philosophical skepticism so wonderful a stance for me. Somehow always feel the strain in saying this from those who are Cartesian or else interpret skepticism from a Cartesian stance of “doubt”—now common fare culturally. Nevertheless, this (occasionally felt) experience of beauty in there being unending wonder and unending discoveries is to me part and parcel of what philosophical skepticism is all about.

Hello, and thanks for a reply.

I’ve got nothing against direct experience. Most who’ve begrudgingly come to know a little of my philosophical stances would likely claim that I give way too much importance to experience. And yes, to me flow is good. Philosophy, then, to me, is about the theories and discoveries which facilitate better experience of flow—at least in the long term, if not in the short.

As an apropos, when you say “anti-philosophical” I intuitively hear “anti-interest/love for wisdom (Sophia as she’s been called)”. While I do uphold that wisdom concerning life is not the truth of experience/life itself, that it is the map and not the terrain, I nevertheless deem wisdom of great value. At any rate, I take it you have something else in mind when you use the term(?).

But, in relation to my previous posts on this thread, here’s my sole, hopefully cordial-ish, rebuttal:

Trying to say what it is to be there and being sensitive and open to poetic failure is what, in my opinion, leads to statements that the true way cannot be spoken. — ff0

In the statement “the true way”, either “true” is referencing a path that is regardless of what anybody might say or believe or, else, it is not. If it is, then the Tao that can’t be spoken which is inextricable from life and experience is—ahum—a “non-subjective actuality” (just made this term up, but I’m hoping it’s understood given my recent posts on this thread). If it is not, then the Tao is as subjective a reality as is one’s preference for ice-cream, no more metaphysically significant than the clothes one chooses to wear on any particular day.

Same would apply for the Tao being the source of all that is: either it would be the non-subjectively actual source of all that is or, else, it would strictly be so believed to be by some without any real bearing on what the source of all things is.

So far, I very strongly presume Taoism to be addressing the former and not the latter.

So it’s known, I too am no expert on Taoism, but I hold affinities to the outlines of it that I pick up on.

Also, I’m not trying to make the case for what in fact is “non-subjectively actual”; I’ve only been trying to make the case that something “non-subjectively actual” is—whatever it might in fact be. The affirmation of the Tao then being an example of a concept specifying its referent to be non-subjectively actual.

X-) No problems. Thanks for the reply.

Right.

Still, any advice on how I/anyone who’s interested in philosophical issues (even at the expense of current cultural norms) should then specify that which I’ve intend in my previous posts?

“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”.

So, if either of you feel like offering your opinions on this, could “nonsubjective actuality” be cogently understood to express this stated meaning? Such as in the proposition: “that the first person point of view holds presence while it is in any way aware is a nonsubjective actuality”. (this being the first example that comes to my mind)

Transcendentals may be thought of as 'real but not objective', as they are prior to the division of subject and object. — Wayfarer

Yet this depends on how one uses language. For example: Transcendentals are themselves the objects of awareness of any subject which is so aware of them--thereby here constituting objects within the subject-object divide. But yes, of course current cultural norms would have it otherwise, even though the linguistic use of "objects" or "object-hood" I've just engaged in to me currently seems philosophically valid.

Edit: on second thought, please overlook this second remark to you. Just realized that I’ve here addressed the idea of transcendentals and not transcendentals themselves. While the idea is an object of awareness, the transcendental itself—like the a priori understanding of causation, I presume—is not. My bad.

When you say "this statement" do you mean my statement about the Tao? — T Clark

yes

If so, in my understanding, it has nothing to do with objective reality. In a sense, the Tao is the opposite of objective reality. It's an idea, an experience, that I find much more useful then the idea of objective reality. It's much more in line with how I see reality. — T Clark

Hmm, as I previously tried to specify it from the perspective of metaphysical realism: “objective” in the sense of “impartial to, or independent of” personal preferences; “real”, I’ll now add, in the sense of what is “actual” and not fictitious, etc. So this definition of “objective reality” does not strictly relate to the physical world; although, by definition, it can well relate to the physical world. (and, for the materialist, strictly to the physical world)

Think, for example, of Platonic realism: it is not materialist naturalism (personally find the natural world an exceedingly important component to what is objectively real, but not the only component; I do also hold belief in an Aristotelian-like final cause as itself being objectively real); yet, despite not being materialism/naturalism/scientism, it yet upholds an idealistic type of reality to be in manners independent of personal preferences. Hence, it is yet a worldview that upholds the presence of an objective reality—this as I’ve just expressed it.

So, in the sense I’ve previously denoted, “the Tao which cannot be expressed” is, then, a reference to what is here taken to be objective reality. (It is not a mere whim of fancy or a fleeting emotion—though, I take it affirmed by Taoism that it can nevertheless be experienced and, in this sense, simultaneously both felt and cognized)

If you do find fault with my way of interpreting what objective reality signifies, can you explain why? I can’t now think of an alternative terminology for what I’ve herein referred to as “objective reality”.

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. — T Clark

To get back to the question of objective (bias-impartial) reality (be it physical or not, or both and co-related):

This statement to me is one that attempts to specify to the intellect an objective reality. It is not what may be termed a subjective reality—such as which flavor of ice-cream tastes better—but, if the statement indeed corresponds to what is objectively real, a statement conveying an otherwise purely noumenal objective truth.

For instance, one can say the same of the neo-Platonist “the One”: “the One” is a phenomenal item (a word written and read, or a sound, or a tactile structure) that is not itself that which is addressed: a purely noumenal, unified/part-less, non-quantity, superlative state of being that, hence, is perfectly devoid of all phenomena, for phenomena ratios. … Something like this at least.

BTW, I discovered a way of embellishing my former logical argument for objective reality, but I’ll save it for some other time (given contingents).

It looks like we’re at an impasse.

As you reaffirm grounds for doubting that we can ever be aware of each other’s intentions/will, I again reaffirm that our interactions—including our capacity to in any way communicate on this forum via words—is in part always continent on our ongoing awareness of each other’s intentions/will. And, at this point, I don’t much know what else to add to the conversation.

I’ve not addressed your statements of not believing in freewill because I’ve so far found the issue of the will’s metaphysical freedom to be irrelevant to the issues at hand—though, of course, as with most everything, it is in some ways interconnected.

Also, (for what its worth) wanted to mention that in my own experience the official term for lack of belief in freewill is one of “(causal) determinism”, this being an incompatibilist stance.

Lastly wanted to mention that--to my mind at least--you seem to be spot-on about my own internal will/intentions in regard this this issue of will’s metaphysical freedom: I due uphold that both (limits-bound) freewill and (a less then absolute) causal determinism co-occur, and my intentions are those of arguing in manners that conform to my current beliefs regarding the reality of freewill. To me this is due to our innate abilities of awareness regarding other’s will/intentions; and is not a mere coincidence.

In relation to the mystic this and mysticism that discussion, and in the vein of Deep Thoughts by Jack Handy:

Is anyone attracted to the aesthetic truths of the song “Into the Mystic” by Van Morison then a person whose underlying aesthetic and related beliefs are mentally disordered, aka insane? Or is one’s likening of this song’s theme only a brain fart? Wait, maybe even something more substantial, such as a brain defecation. Conversely, would liking of this song be due to the biologically determined, evolutionary functionality of understanding and relating to propositional attitudes expressed by statements such as, “we were born before the wind”?

Besides, what are the psychotic rants of bona fide mystics such as William Blake’s “Auguries of Innocence” supposed to mean anyway? And I quote, “To see a world in a grain of sand, and a heaven in a wild flower, hold infinity in the palm of your hand, and eternity in an hour …”. A more irrational convulsion of category errors can hardly be imagined! It’s like, what?

With all due sobriety and sincerity though, myself, I prefer to admire the Mystery Men. They are mysterious too, yes, but I, personally, find it much easier to relate to most of them—including that guy played by Tom Waits who as a weird scientist only manufactures weapons of mass disruption. (to be used strictly for good, of course)

To those who quite understandably don’t know, Mystery Men is the single greatest superhero movie of all time, imo. This being a self-evident fact, QED.

If it doesn't exist already, I can put together a trout/turkey in about 1/2 hour. There's a store down the street that sells both. I don't know any nearby source for lions or eagles. — T Clark

Dude! The local zoos! But then the bribery required for it would likely be astronomical.

Hell, and I’m actually a tree-hugger empathizing environmentalist who disdains bribery, including when legalized in the form of government lobbying ... so … never mind.

What counts as a simple is utterly dependent on what we are saying. — Banno

Wouldn’t they likewise exist if we weren’t to say anything?

Turducken is a dish consisting of a deboned chicken stuffed into a deboned duck, further stuffed into a deboned turkey. [Wikipedia]

If Turducken exists, then a trout/turkey must. QED. — T Clark

So, then, griffins exist too? QED?

Do they taste good too or are they less filling? Ya know, as far as exotic foods go.

(my offbeat sense of humor … no, I don’t actually believe that hawk-lion soup is less filling)

To your direct question first, I'm afraid the answer is no, although I realise such a fundamental shift in axiom might end this otherwise fascinating conversation. As I mentioned earlier, I'm a compatibilist, so I don't even really believe in free will, but I certainly don't think morality requires it. All I'm interested in is how to guide people's behaviour to help bring about the society that I firmly believe all people (of sound mind) would want to live in. — Inter Alia

And you maintain that this interest is devoid of your intention/will? I find it hard to believe that you do.

The discussion is so far pleasant to me as well. Been thinking about it and I can’t overcome the sense that you’ve been equivocating the meaning of “will/intention/volition” in you previous posts—to paraphrase, in some stating that there is a multiplicity of intentions/wills in each being and in other stating that there is no will. Because of this, I’m having a difficult time making out what you mean.

Yet this reminds of a case in point scenario: the interpreted meaning of words we use to express beliefs is itself contingent on our appraisals of the speaker’s intentions. As one example of this, whether the speaker is sincere, very subtly sarcastic (such that we don’t notice while others do), or (successfully) deceptive in what they say is not contingent on the phenomena commonly available to both speaker and interlocutor; instead, it is at least partly contingent on the non-phenomenal intentions of the speaker (and, partly, the abilities of the interlocutor to discern these intentions). BTW, unpleasant (or, at least at times, unethical) as the latter two possibilities of sarcasm and deception are, they nevertheless do occur in some human interactions. As another example: Whether “senses” in the one phrase, “good senses are quintessential to a moral life,” addresses a) “the physiological senses via which perception of phenomena occur”, b) “the intellectual capacities for understanding—which was once termed as nous in Ancient Greek, form which the term noumenal is derived”, c) “pragmatic worldviews otherwise expressed as perspectives of common-sense”, d) “the capacity for interpersonal emotive faculties such as those of empathy, i.e. for feelings (but not of the tactile kind) which are interpersonal (as in, “I feel you”)—or e) even a conflation of all these previous meanings—will be fully contingent on i) what the speaker/writer intends by the word “senses” and ii) what the listeners/reader interprets the speaker/writer as intending by expressing this word.

Other examples are possible.

Whether will (intention) is metaphysically describable as “free” or not: How does one justify any interpersonal interaction if the issue of intention is to be completely done away with? (… this both on the part of all others and on the part of one’s own self—as in, one’s own momentary intention to further interact in a pleasant discussion)

I’m hoping this subject matter might better pinpoint our own stances in regard to will/intention.

Can anyone interested—be they Humean, Kantian, or some other—explain how the stance of “innate instinct for causal relations” differs from an “a priori understanding for causal relations”?

To me, not only is there no contradiction, but they’re one and the same metaphysical stance; only that the latter Kantian stance gives a detailed metaphysical account whereas the former Humean stance only gives a generalized, superficial metaphysical account (I remind everyone that genetics and the like were not know in Hume’s time, hence “innate instincts”, while commonly used to describe animal behaviors, were not yet understood in the neo-Darwinian sense of modern cultures).

Otherwise asked: While the Kantian stance is justified in in-depth manners and the Humean account is only offered as the only consistent explanation which comes to mind, how is an a priori understanding of the cognitive faculties as regards causation not itself an innate instinct of the same cognitive faculties?

(To be clear, I personally uphold a Kantian metaphysics when it comes to causation but also find that Kantianism only builds upon Humean understanding in at least this one regard.)

You may not like this evaluation: But I'll say it anyway:

That there is no mathematically precise denotation of when particles of sand become heaps of sand is, by all evident accounts, a solid given. So it can’t then be intrinsic to that observed.

When do accumulating particles of sand take on the cognitively perceived/understood unitary functionality of a heap? There is an in-between fuzzy zone where individual humans (to whom the concept of heap applies) will strongly disagree. Yet, most all humans will agree on extremities: that one particle of sand is not a heap and that a hundred thousand particles of sand structured in a certain way does constitute a heap of sand.

But this resolves the objective presence of heap-ness via the common consensus of a given cohort of minds. It’s Kantian like in its appraisals. Yet it still holds to issues of (perceived/understood) unitary functionality as delineating individual wholes … and, by extension, individual identities.

It’s my current take on the Sorties paradox at any rate.

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Just read Qurious's post. So, I find myself in agreement with this statement:

Anything we consider separate from something else is only separate within the scope of human perception. — Qurious

... with the following amendment: within the scope of sentient awareness, inclusive of both a priori and a posteriori understandings (rather that strictly human perception, this as defined by the functioning of the physiological senses)

That still fails to explain how we came up with the concept of causality. Saying that it's a habit of mind is not explaining how the concept could form.

And since Hume was an empiricist, he has nowhere else to go. — Marchesk

It’s been a while since my reading of Hume, and I’m not about to reread his works to present this. And yes, given my heavy alignment with Darwinian evolution, I may have misinterpreted his writing at the time due to this bias.

On a few rare occasions, Hume drops this bomb-word of “instinct”. Long-term memory sometimes being faulty, till I find out otherwise I’ll uphold what I remember: on even fewer instances he mentions this (you’ve got to place him in his proper time) rather heretical hypothesis that we humans share instincts with lesser animals. (I bet some will find it heretical even today on this forum.) And I recall his explanation for why we develop habits of (causal) association being just that: its instinct.

… OK, for what it’s worth just found this one summary online after a brief search:

Section IX of the Enquiry is a short section entitled "Of the Reason of Animals." Hume suggests that we reason by analogy, linking similar causes and similar effects. He suggests that his theories regarding human understanding might then be well supported if we could find something analogous to be true with regard to animal understanding. He identifies two respects in which this analogy holds. First, animals, just like humans, learn from experience and come to infer causal connections between events. Second, animals certainly do not learn to make these inferences by means of reason or argument. Nor do children, and nor, Hume argues, do adults or even philosophers. We infer effects from causes not by means of human reason, but through a species of belief, whereby the imagination comes to perceive some sort of necessary connection between cause and effect. We often admire the innate instincts of animals that help them get by, and Hume suggests that our ability to infer causal connections is a similar kind of instinct.

From: http://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/understanding/section9.rhtml

This often (but not always) occurring competition of vying intentions in one single mind is very well explained by David Hume in his Bundle Theory of the Self. It’s a theory I’ve deeply abided by since I first read his works back in University days. Yet one must recognize that health is greatly dependent on there being a unitary functionality of mind, of the mind’s total bundle of intentions. The further one deviates from this, the unhealthier the mind is (typically) appraised to be. While this is a very complex issue, I do modify Hume’s theory to include a singular first-person point-of-view—the “I” its often labeled—which at times engages in its own chosen intentions and which—I would argue—is itself, at least in part, a dynamic, unified composite of the mind’s lesser intentions. It’s a big topic though, at least for me.

In terms of how we would then use will/intention to judge ethical issue, we’d judge what the first-person point of view either actively choose (here, between alternatives) or else engages in (here, by not rejecting its unconscious mind’s intentions—e.g. emotions which goad—but, instead, becoming unified with these intentions; e.g., one feels pangs of envy and, instead of rejecting them as wrong, one then becomes envious and acts out due to so being).

At the end of the day though, this enters into an entirely different topic: that of how the mind works. So we can find a working common base, are we in agreement that ethics is contingent on the presence of will? If not, please furnish examples where this is not the case, so I may better understand.

OK, thanks for the clarification. As to logically inferred innate mechanisms that account for, and thereby justify, belief in realism, one can take a Kantian approach or—if a strict materialist—can strictly focus on consequences of biological evolution. In the Kantian approach, sentience holds within it aprior understanding of causation in the abstract, thereby facilitating belief that things causally continue to be even when not perceived or thought of. In a strictly evolutionary approach, were intellect-endowed sentience (sapient or otherwise) to not have evolved unconscious aptitudes for discerning how things continue to be when not perceived or thought about, the given sentience would perish; lifeforms would either be, for example, quickly killed by stealthy predators or predators would quickly starve to death. This cognitively evolved set of skills then became more pronounced in human beings--the most aware/intelligent lifeforms currently known to our own selves.

I presume you could find objections to one or the other accounts, or a need to further embellish and clarify them so as to convince those who are doubtful of realism. Nevertheless, both accounts provide that which has been now asked for: logically inferred innate mechanisms that account for belief in realism.

I am not sure that there is anything that favours the evil demon hypothesis over Realism. But we are presently looking for some reliable source for the belief in Realism, and this question has no bearing on that. — PossibleAaran

Yet, to me, this is the pivotal issue for any philosophical skeptic.

Please indulge me for a moment: To thoroughly distance myself from modern day equivocations of what skepticism is I a long time ago choose to label my stance of philosophical skepticism one of “radical skepticism”. You see, when one is skeptical about everything—i.e., holds that no proposition can as of yet be demonstrated to be perfectly secure from all possible error—the very notion that “one is skeptical about” this or that in particular becomes aberrantly nonsensical. To a philosophical skeptic of the ilk I’m describing, one becomes dubious of something, not skeptical of it—for to such person not everything is dubious though everything is appraised via skepticism (in the inquisitive sense addressed). Likewise, for another example, there can be no such particular thing as a “skeptical hypothesis”--for all hypotheses of the philosophic skeptic are equally skeptical—including that of “I think therefore I am”. Of course, due to prevailing modern day connotations, this label of radical skeptic again became misconstrued as the position of one who is bogged down in the mires of irresolvable doubts. Bullocks. But I’m back to labeling myself a philosophical skeptic and going against the flow when it comes to what this signifies. Point being, a (philosophical) skeptic by logical consistency cannot be skeptical about any particular thing. They can only have various degrees of doubt/uncertainty regarding any particular thing—and this because they hold certainty regarding others. (For that matter, only non-skeptics every claim to be skeptical about this or that—and guess where they pirated this term from. And next, as Wayfarer commented, they go about calling themselves skeptics.)

Thanks for entertaining my views so far. My basic point here being, if you present the possibility of an evil daemon as nullifying the truth to realism on grounds of philosophical skepticism, for this to be in any way rational from the vantage of philosophical skepticism, there must be justification for why the presence of an evil daemon is to be deemed credible.

Otherwise, this has nothing to do with issues of philosophical skepticism.

My first thought is that a (living) trout-turkey wouldn’t make a functional, i.e. purposeful, whole and, thus, could not exist. The head would be equipped for swimming and the body for walking, etc. Everything that we take to be a whole, however, holds a unitary functionality. From rocks, to tables, to living beings. So two items placed together would not constitute an new whole unless the composite now held a unitary set of behaviors—be these entropic or negentropic. Molecules, like individual proteins, are thereby wholes constituted of lesser wholes (atoms).

Thank you for your answers. We’re in accord about not everything thought of being necessarily true. This, then, includes the thoughts of an evil daemon (bogeyman?) messing around with you.

What makes realism more plausible than an evil daemon? One element to this is as follows: Conviction in realism is how I and a majority of the world’s populace—both greatly and poorly educated (education being a separate issue from that of intelligence for me)—navigate the world most pragmatically, for it facilitates an optimal flourishing of awareness in regard to worldly givens. The evil daemon hypothesis, however, presents a lack of reliable predictability as to what will be, and posits no way of reliably establishing what is—and, because of this, is debilitating to the living of life.

My former, yet unanswered question to you was “what justifies the favoring of an evil daemon as true at expense of realism being true?” An answer would now be appreciated.

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The title of this thread is “what is scepticism”. In your reoccurring arguments you overwhelmingly favor Descartes’ branch of skepticism, even though in your OP you thoughtfully point to different branches of belief that likewise go by the label of skepticism.

To me, Descartes warped the notion of philosophical skepticism from one of it being a path toward greater wisdom—cf. the Ancient Greek skeptikos, “thoughtful, inquiring”; Platonism standing out as one Ancient Greek example of this—to one of it being a ridiculous, endless stream of debilitating doubts in search for some inexistent grail of absolute certainty.

All philosophical skeptics throughout history were other than the typical modern strawman of “someone overcome by irresolvable doubts”; all philosophical skeptics that I am currently aware of held certainty of varying strengths in relation to how the world works, and all were realists.

BTW, Cicero, a philosophical skeptic, favored Stoicism in his “On the Nature of the Gods” … if this is of any interest to anyone. One point to this being a further illustration that philosophical skepticism is not about the rejection of plausible claims on grounds that they cannot be proven with absolute certainty. Cicero, it should be said, was religious … epitomizing a very distinct relation to that of philosophical skepticism and the commonly upheld dogmas of Abrahamic faiths.

I was more interested in discussing what philosophical skepticism logically signifies rather than debating against an endless stream of arguments about hypotheticals which can neither be disproven nor proven with absolute certainty—i.e., with perfect security from all possible error. This because, to my knowledge, no proposition can be successfully demonstrated to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Not even Descartes’ “(I doubt, therefore) I think, therefore I am” … nor the proposition that absolute certainty is impossible.

This, again, is not to deny that certainties of varying strengths always occur. The inductive conclusion that absolute certainties cannot be demonstrated, though not itself an absolute certainty, is nevertheless considered by me to be a (less than absolute) certainty of superlative strength. For another example, to doubt is to doubt what is real; thus, it is to in itself be in possession of certainty that something real is.

At any rate, if you seek solace via some promise of an absolute certainty—be it that realism is true or that some evil daemon concept one is momentarily entertaining is false—I’m not one to be of service in this regard.

I wonder if I really believe what I just said. I might. I need to think about it some more. — T Clark

Cool. I'll take a breather too.

"Objective reality" is a name we give to a set of perceptions, observations, ideas. — T Clark

Objectivity—the state of being objective—holds multiple definitions (confer with Wiktionary, for instance). One of which is that of being just/impartial and, hence, unbiased. Objective reality is then either a repetition of synonyms (objective objectivity; the really real) or, to my mind, the affirmation of a reality not clouded by, hence impartial to, hence independent of, personal preferences (etc.).

All the same, how does the logic I’ve previously expressed not hold?

(Should clarify: since, as previously illustrated, to uphold a lack of objective reality is an instance of contradictory reasoning—one where both X and not-X occur at the same time and in the same way—it is a fallacy of reasoning.)

Hold on a bit there. Change the referent from one of perceivable world/reality to one of logical inference. As regards logical possibilities, either a) there is an objective reality or b) there isn’t. Here, the law of excluded middle holds … and A and B are contradictory positions—so only one of the two can be true. All this has no bearing on what this objective reality actually is; one can be strictly spiritual about it (such as in upholding the neo-Platonic presence of “the One”, for example, as being thee only true objective reality) or strictly materialistic about it (upholding the vacuum field as the true objective reality? or at least something to the like … pick your stuff). Nevertheless, the same logical conundrum holds all the same: either we dwell within an objective reality (that is even when not perceived or thought of) or we don’t.

So, now, there’s an unavoidable contradiction to claiming the absence of an objective reality: to uphold the absence of objective reality is, in and of itself, to affirm what reality consists of when objectively appraised … i.e., is to uphold the presence of an objective reality.

Therefore, I’m quite comfortable with the logical conclusion that we dwell within an objective reality … details of what it actually is here set aside, it nevertheless is.

Hello. I’m having a hard time understanding your position, at least as things currently stand.

Taking things one step at a time, as regards intention: My reading of your post(s) leads me to presume you disassociate intention—i.e., volition, or will—from sentient action … be these actions of the body or solely of the intellect (e.g., the planning out of bodily action). Action devoid of will, to me, equates to inanimate, entropy-driven (this at least at the macro scale) activity. Were a large bolder to hit a loved one due to extreme wind, I do not find the bolder culpable precisely because the bolder did not will this to be. Where a human (to me, a will-endowed being) to hurl a large bolder toward a loved one, I would then find the human culpable precisely because the human did will this to be.

How can ethics—of any variety: virtue ethics or otherwise—be upheld when the element of volition/will/intention is not considered paramount to the issue?

As a more precise example, to me, a will to anything, happiness and/or flourishing included (i.e., will to eudemonia) necessarily holds will—hence intention—as a prerequisite. Eudemonia in the absence of will to me is nonsensical. If there’s belief that eudemonia does not require will for its being, how then does one make sense of eudemonia in the absence of intention to both better optimize it and maintain it?

I’ll address issues such as those of forethought in light of both short- and long-term durations after I can better understand, hopefully, this perspective of ethics not grounded in intention/volition/will.

You posit the evil daemon to be inconsistent to realism—the latter, by your definition, being the stance that one or more things can hold presence when not perceived or thought about.

To understand your “skeptical” point of view better:

Does the evil daemon hold presence when not perceived or thought about?

Secondly, is everything that one thinks true (here, correspondent to what is real)?

BTW, it wouldn’t make much sense for me to answer your questions when mine are not first answered … since I’d have little if any understanding of your own stance.

good discussion. — Sam26

Ditto.

We differ on how much of a person’s behaviors we deem to be intentional. Acts of passion—I think they’re legally called—could be deemed acts of lack of thought that hold harmful results. The guy who kills his significant other when finding them cheating is, thus, to me, guilty of an immoral act due to his choices—regardless of how guilty he feels afterward. To some lesser degree, a heated argument while driving could be considered an instance of these acts of passion. Again, I personally find the individual culpable for the ensuing harm due to the choices made and, thus, the intentions held. In the case of the driver, the car could have been pulled over, for instance—especially once the argument gets out of hand. Still, I again acknowledge it’s a murky area. To concede a little, at some unfortunate instances a momentary lack of attention (say, when reaching over for a water bottle while driving … minor instances of non-attention which we’ve all been involved in at one point or another) can result in a lot of harm (like a kid just then running out into the street before you chasing after a ball).

I’m personally OK with there being a difference of opinion in relation to how much of this ought to be considered intentional (by which I mean volitional). I again was nitpicking.

The same is true in my above example, you know that if you don't pay sufficient attention to the road you can cause bodily harm to another, but you ignored this important point. — Sam26

Nitpicking here. To me this example presents a choice between two alternatives. One alternative is that of paying attention to the road, which you know to be ethical, at expense of short-term loss of ego’s pride (or something to the like). The other is that of focusing in on an argument at expense of being attentive to where you’re driving. The individual, given the presence of this choice between now momentarily sensed alternatives, is culpable for the decision made. This is so strictly due to the willed intention to pursue the second alternative at the expense of the first. So we find the individual at fault for vehicular manslaughter on grounds of what the individual intentionally chose. As you say, same enough with drunk driving, or with talking on mobiles while driving, etc.

I think something without intention would be running over a person due to a momentary instance of vertigo, or epilepsy, etc., that was unforeseeable. While proving that such was the case can be exceedingly difficult, were it to in fact be proven to have been the reason for the momentary lack of attention given while driving, would the outcome then still be considered an immoral act by the driver? Here, there was no conceivable intention on the part of the driver that could have been alternatively acted on which would have prevented the accident.

Likewise with a blown tire that deviates the car’s trajectory.