From a few days past:

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An old thought just came to me, one can apply issues of phenomena on an impartiality spectrum—such that most partial is fully limited to what is for the individual and only for the individual and what is most impartial equally is for all sentient beings regardless of type, degree, and quality of awareness.

At the most partial level, it is the phenomena I perceive. Less partially, it is the phenomena which we perceive—and the inclusivity of this “we” will indicate the degree of impartiality relative the the most partial perspective of the “I” when solely addressed. For example, this "we" could be one and one’s buddy, one’s group(s), one’s total species, all mammals, etc. Lastly, that which is equally applicable to all sentience is most impartial relative to any particular sentience.

Replace “impartiality” with “objectivity”—as can be quite validly done—and you can then address objective phenomena … as long as this objectivity is not addressed in terms of an absolute but, instead, in terms of being relative to the inclusiveness of all sentient beings addressed.

From this, we then can validly address objects as objectively manifesting and as holding objective phenomenal properties relative to the human species. Whichever properties are present to other species of life will then be more impartial/objective … until we arrive at things such as natural laws that address without any contradiction why things are as they are--such as why the moon’s presence needs to be even were all sentience to be sleeping due to the many causal factors which the moon manifests upon everything else, from ocean tides to, if I'm not mistaken, at least some circadian rhythms which occur even when we’re sleeping.

This, of course, in some ways might be contradictory to what many/most? nowadays understand by “objective reality” … but I find that it yet holds validity as an interpretation of objectivity, hence the objective world, and, consequently, of physical objects.

Via this interpretation of "objectivity as impartiality", one then can cogently address things such as the objective certainty of objective phenomena; e.g. it is objectively certain (and not my illusion) that the tree with green leaves is taller than the gray tree next to it which is devoid of leaves.

Also, from a Kantian point of view, such an understanding of the the objective world, when addressed from a fully impartial pov, would strictly consist of noumenal givens which our mind re-presents to us via mind-dependent/created phenomena.

If there are intrinsic errors found in this reasoning, please let me know.

You’re quoted statement seems to me to only be an incomplete statement. Imo, more completely stated, “Phenomena are mind-caused re-presentations of the mind-independent noumena regarded”. This where mind is readily understood in the commonsense fashion and where phenomena and noumena are understood in Kantian manners—who after all popularized the concept of phenomena within our modern lexicon, tmk [though, like Wayfarer, I’m preferential to the ancient, original understanding of these two terms; e.g., a word on the tip of one’s tongue is a given (a particular known meaning) apprehended by the mind (nous, hence noumenal) devoid of any phenomena (i.e., appearances, either visual or auditory), making the meaning of this word at the tip of one's tounge a purely noumenal apprehension in the ancient sense of these terms… this, however, being a foreign interpretation to our modern Kantian understandings of phenomena and noumena ... and I'll here stick to the Kantian meaning of these terms]. At any rate, as per Kantianism, members of the same species will share common mind-caused phenomena to re-present the same noumena, which will be independent of the individual or collective minds pertaining to members of the given species. The more different two species are, the more different their mind-caused phenomena in relation to the same independent noumenon will be; yet all species—trees, ants, humans, etc.—will perceive the same noumena in terms of its solidity and location, for example (where it to be a solid, e.g., a boulder [trees do perceive/sense boulders and react to them in their root growth).

To me at least, the phenomenal is mind-dependent, as MU states ... but not the Kantian noumena it re-presents to the perceiver.

Also, experienced phenomena (contra abstract understanding of phenomena at large) will always be experienced as a direct presentation of what is, as gurugoeorge states … but this does not of itself make phenomena when abstractly addressed non-representational of what is regarded.

BTW, don’t have much to argue in the being/process debate. Still, whether it holds any inkling of ontological value or is strictly a poetic metaphor unrelated to the ontic which it addresses, I’ve always found it interesting that the being/process dichotomy within metaphysics can be easily compared to the particle/wave duality in QM—such that whether it is being or else process/working will be to a large extent dependent on contexts of observation. Though of in one way a rock is a bundle of ever-changing processes; thought of in another way a rock is a (relatively) changeless thing; but you can’t think of a rock in both ways at the same time and in the same way. You can maybe differentiate aspects of it in this way, such as its atoms and their activity—neither of which would then be the rock as gestalt entity/process—but then these atoms too are either things or processes, and so on ad infinitum. Same then applies to whether a machine is a set of workings or, else, a thing, imo. But again, since I don't now know how to evidence that this observation has any ontological value, I wouldn't know how to debate it.

If it’s of any benefit to the effable/ineffable divide, this to me is in parallel to the rational/arational divide … where “arational” is that which occurs beyond, or outside, the realm of conscious reasoning (and not “irrational”, meaning erroneous reasoning).

Our immediate comprehension of a directly perceived object is always, of itself in the very moment of experience, an arational occurrence—for it happens in manners that do not consist of consciously occurring explanations, provided causes, or provided motives for the immediate occurrence of awareness. In other words, our immediate awareness of the object is an instance of that which occurs beyond or outside the realm of consciously occurring reasoning.

This however, does not entail that our immediate awareness of objects, which of itself occurs arationally, cannot be rationally accounted for. It occurs be-cause of this and that explanation, cause, or motive. The provision of which will make our experiences rational (and the belief in the potential to so provide reasons for will then imply the belief that everything is rational without exception … although glitches such as that of “why being rather than nonbeing” might occur).

Same then with what’s ineffable—hence, beyond expression in words. It always holds the potential to be expressed via words, however imperfectly or improperly, but first the ineffable given must be to some extent commonly shared. We can’t, for example, properly convey what experience is to anyone who has never held first-hand awareness of experience (as in, to a philosophical zombie … can’t think of other examples). What experience is will then of itself be beyond expression via words—you’re either endowed with nonlinguistic knowledge of it via acquaintance or you’re not (aka, or you’re a p-zombie).

But this doesn’t mean that we can’t imperfectly address this commonly shared given via words—which will either conform to or deviate from this commonly shared, otherwise ineffable given (i.e., words that can either express truths or falsities in relation to what phenomenal experience is). Then, as previously mentioned by others, not all experiences are commonly held. We can talk about certain complex emotions or certain obscure concepts at length; this doesn’t then mean that a) we can obtain an adequate understanding of what is addressed strictly via words in all such cases (especially where we cannot related due to lack of shared emotions or concepts) or b) that the word(s) used will be perfectly equivalent to that which it specifies (thereby making that specified beyond expression via words, at least in some ways, which is in itself significant). E.g., the heck did Gnostics have gnosis about, anyway? Elephino. Or, could Van Gogh [Goya had his own issues] express via words what he felt and thought when he deprived himself of that one ear? Nope, not to me at least; I don’t care how long his essay on this might have been.

Well, it's an interesting question. I'd say the ball is an external object knowable as your phenomenal state. I don't deny external reality and consider a dream state of a ball distinct from an awake state, not in terms simply of clarity, but in terms of the former being of an objective thing externally. — Hanover

A distinction could be made between phenomenal experiences obtained via the physiological senses and those phenomenal experiences obtained via the imagination. “(Phenomenal) experiences obtained via the physiological senses”, or something shorter to the same effect, would rule out dream states, I'm thinking.

Partook of this discussion, so I won’t bail out of it as time allows.

So what exactly that primordial experience consists in; what the necessary conditions must be for its possibility and for its actuality can become metaphysical questions. Is it fundamentally akin to what we think of as physical: some sort of blind energetic or virtual process that gives rise to this world and the beings that experience it) or is it fundamentally akin to what we think of as mental: a spiritual and/ or intentional process. Or is it somehow both at once and/or neither? — Janus

Good questions. Along with the typical answers that so often lead to as of yet irresolvable conflicts between differing groups, there are also the affixed beliefs (which can be true of false) regarding the nature of causation. I so far do not know, for example, of many physicalists that accept even as remotely possible any causal mechanism which would be required for non-illusory agency. Would be grateful for any references to any established physicalist who does accept metaphysical freewill—although I know there’s been at least one physicalist here about on the forum who upholds top-down models of causation along side panseimiotics. To better illustrate these affixed convictions, unlike what was tmk first proposed by David Hume, modern day compatibilism is really a causally deterministic physicalism dressed up in fancy language games which yet preserve the ontology of causal determinism. Name it soft determinism, it's still causal determinism without exception. Hume, btw, rejected both causal determinism and causal indeterminism on logical grounds, while acknowledging that both are in some way required for life to be as it is—however, he did not go so far as to provide a causal alternative as regards mechanisms. Still, this form of causal compatibilism proposed by Hume has been for the most part utterly forgotten in today’s philosophical discourse, unfortunately, to my mind. This to me is then in parallel to the issue of what the stuff of reality really consists of. Open mindedness is not always a bad thing.

[...] I am merely pointing out that, once you lose the lingering Cartesian dualist presuppositions, it is not inherently a self-contradictory view, as many of its critics seem to want to claim it to be — Janus

Yes, it is not an inherently self-contradictory view, since it only upholds those believed truths applicable to eliminativism and denies other experientially given facts which would contradict eliminitivism—such as that there needs to be some given to which illusions appear in order for there to be illusions in the first place, as Wayfarer has repeatedly mentioned in better ways than I just have. We’re culturally accustomed to the stance, and our so being accustomed psychologically grants it an authority of being true not held by novel ways of interpreting reality, even when the later are not self-contradictory. This, or itself, however fits in with the illusory truth effect.

That said, so too is the flat Earth theory not inherently self-contradictory—since it too only accepts those logical arguments and experienced data which do not deny the stated worldview which is maintained—and I’d venture that it too starts with different premises than what the rest of us start off with in discerning the shape of the planet. It is only self-contradictory to those who more impartially take into account data which flat-Earth theorists reject as being true.

So the eliminitivist view being coherent given its axiomatic premises does not place it on equal footing to other non-eliminitivist theories that more impartially take into consideration facts ignored by eliminativists—such as the requirement for awareness to be in order for awareness of anything (including of a theory of eliminativism) to be. It is after all not incoherent to be a non-eliminativist physicalist, for example (this having nothing to do with my potential dis/agreement with such ontological models in part or in whole). Some such are common enough frequenters of the TPF, such as in addressing physicalism from a vagueness and symmetry breaking approach (this at least to the degree that I properly understand Apo from former debates).

The question I'm interested in is the one ProcastinationTommorow clarified: do such mental phenomena provide counterexamples to theories of mind that require all mental phenomena to have objects? Is it that the investigation of the causes of the state will reveal that it actually has an object after all, despite its superficial "lack" of a target? — jkg20

Mind consists of both conscious and non-conscious processes. The interplay between the two is greatly debated in many different fields. Since it’s of pertinence, one of David Hume’s innovations in philosophy was his bundle theory of self/mind wherein the mind is considered to be a commonwealth of agencies. His model of mind, however, was impoverished by a lack of (at least explicit) acknowledgement concerning the unitary though ever-changing nature and presence of a first person point of view.

The conscious self can be stated to emerge from the unconscious self (e.g., that which holds presence while one sleeps); I’m myself preferential to the conscious self being a gestalt-like form emerging from various agencies of the unconscious mind which serve as its constituents. This is of course debatable, but serves as at least one illustration of what could be the case. Logically analyzed, however, to the degree that the conscious self holds agency, so too do those aspects of mind which are not part of consciousness yet with which consciousness is intimately entwined. One relatively easy, though in some ways extreme, example of this is that of the conscience. You take a shortcut and some sensation we term conscience conveys to you—typically in manners lacking phenomenal characteristics of the physiological senses, i.e. lacking in auditory, visual, tactile, etc. attributes ( … unlike children’s cartoons where there’s a good and bad angel on each shoulder whispering things into one’s ears)—again, conveys to you that it would be prudent and wise to not take this shortcut which you as a conscious self are momentarily intent on taking. Here, your conscience is an agency of your mind that—despite apprehending the same context in which the conscious you finds yourself in—is other than you as a conscious agency, for it holds different intentions (and along with these, perspectives) regarding what should be done in relation to what is. We lack proper terms for these both mundane and oftentimes beneficial experiences, as is the case with the presence of a conscience: this conscience of which you become momentarily aware of is not you as conscious agent which decides whether or not to act as one’s conscience informs is best; yet neither is this conscience a subconscious or unconscious process of mind at the time it is experienced, for it makes up part of one’s consciously apprehended mind of which one is consciously attuned to. Less extreme examples are emotions which drive, motivate, and tempt—these too are often “felt” rather than being a unitary enactive aspect of one’s being as a conscious self, and these too, I'll maintain, hold context aware aims of which you as a conscious self is not always consciously aware of. At any rate …

Long story short, what can consciously appear to be an activity of mind lacking intentionality, such as that of an unfocused anxiety, can nevertheless hold intentionality from the vantage of those unconscious processes of mind of which one as a conscious self is not consciously aware of. These activities of mind can, for example, be learned reactions to stimuli that play out at unconscious levels of mind—thereby yet holding objects of awareness (i.e., the stimuli, which can be as much of the external world as they can be of the internal realms of one's total mind—see again the example of one’s conscience holding one’s conscious self as stimuli for its activities/processes) and, hence, can all be process of mind that hold intentionality.

Again, this is very reminiscent of David Hume’s bundle theory of mind/self—flawed as his model of mind was on account of lacking the unitary presence of the first person point of view, if for no other reason.

As Ying points out, there are numerous different psychologies of mind which often address such troublesome unconscious processes differently. Yet, as regards philosophy of mind, examples such as the one you’ve provided do not contradict any model of mind in which it is accepted that there is such a thing as unconscious processes whose agencies are not identical to that of the conscious self (cf., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconscious_cognition).

(In wanting a sabbatical from debates, this will be my last post for a while, I think.)

In thinking about the evolution of language—which has many examples, such our tendency to trust “The Bank of Billy” more than “Billy’s Bank” and other such often aesthetic factors that play out in which words fall out and which become popularized—wanted to address the word ejaculation: expressing brief and abrupt statements. Just checked with Wiktionary and this definition is not even outdated, and also includes thus expressed prayers. The term can be found in older novels, as in “the person ejaculated many things upon the others” … was copiously used in books such as Withering Heights in such manner. So here we are, ejaculating concepts to each other all the time on TPF … both men and women. No wonder we can on occasion gain new conceptions of things. :cool:

What is a charade? :joke: — Purple Pond

A more recent US president now renowned about something to do with head underneath tables can be famously paraphrased as asking, “What is is?” This can be a very philosophical question, for what is is is still a matter of debate, and can get to the core of many a philosophical issue … but it wasn’t within the context in which he posed the question. His so asking in the context he asked was a good example of a charade. :yum:

Thank you :razz: :blush: All the same, interesting research you've pointed out in previous posts, such as that of direct brain stimulation.

First, let there be a distinction made between suicidal intentions and altruism—simplifying this by overlooking our inevitable various degrees of ignorance as concerns forethought. The person who jumps on a grenade because he’s sick of life is not the person who cares for his fellows and innately senses her/his duty to safeguard. And of course, there are vastly less extreme examples of unwittingly reciprocal altruism; give a child a present it cherishes and the child will later on in life hold warmer feeling toward you and those like you than otherwise. That said, giving a child a present with this reason consciously intended is, to my mind, a bit sociopathic; nevertheless, the pleasure one receives from so doing (to not address less common instances such as giving a few bucks to a homeless person on the streets) is one of assisting others with a sense of self-esteem or empathetic pleasure as reward—a satisfaction that serves a utilitarian purpose of reciprocity, even if in only the most abstract of ways.

The just mentioned can obviously be argued against—and once one accepts that altruism is real in a good number of people, explaining it is riddled with complications.

Still, to address the proposition that there is no true altruism on account of selfishness: To the persons who feel anything from a) lack of remorse otherwise present in not fulfilling an innately sensed duty to b) a sense of eudemonia in benefiting others, their actions will of course be out of self-interest and, loosely worded, thereby selfish. But their self-pivoting interests (whose intentions would they be otherwise) are those that strive for and become emotively rewarded by closer proximity to an ideal state of selflessness—at least in respect to those one cares for. There are of course those who take advantage of this, those who do not share the same goal of selflessness as their own self-interest. Sadly, a joyful coward will live to reproduce whereas a firefighter that dies in the burning building will not. Nevertheless, altruism—however further debated to be—can only be a behavior engaged in due to the intrinsic values held whereby others are deemed to hold their own intrinsic value, rather than merely holding instrumental value to oneself, here a type of value that is thereby disposable when no longer of use.

So the upheld fact that we are all selfish, with which I technically agree, does not then do away with altruism being at times a real aspect of humans.

Some species of animal, btw, are far more altruistic on average than humanity when addressed as a total species. Meerkats serve as one good example. They too behave thus out of their own self-interests.

My own perspective is that if we learn from the time we’re young that the only way to obtain satisfaction is by taking without giving and by domination (rewarded temper tantrums and the like), then we will likely behave in such ways as adults. But if we learn from our most important education—that of our social surroundings during our preadolescent years—the joys of sharing, of fairness, or compassion, and the like—even if we only acquire a taste of this joy—then we’re far more likely to be altruistic-leaning as adults, maybe most especially in times of need as regards those we care for.

Either way, we’re being selfish in seeking to obtain that which we cherish and value.

You yourself exhibit concern for the issue of humanity. Selfish as this concern might be, it is yet a concern that intends toward the wellbeing of others and, hence, is altruism leaning.

To decry that the altruism involved is not perfect misses the point of true instances of altruism. No one, for example, has ever experienced a perfectly true love in whatever form one wants to contemplate the term, yet there are instances of non-deceptive love all the time.

We can either foster these self-centered interests toward selflessness in ourselves and in others or, else, not foster them and instead seek purely egotistic interests. Can’t think of any other way in which there might be an altruistic future for humanity than by engaging as best we can in the first alternative in a fair and just way.

As far as our species goes, the future is contingent on our present actions.

However, phenomenologists, Husserl, Zahavi, Henry, Sartre and others have argued convincingly in various ways that pre-reflective (non-thematic) self-awareness must be inherent to conscious experience. In that sense we do experience our experience, our consciousness and our self-awareness. — Janus

You raise a good point. But I find that it doesn’t need to be evidenced by very complex arguments. We know of our own happiness or assuredness—to not mention other examples—strictly via self-referential experience of that which is experiencing—such that, in cases such as these, the object of our awareness is ourselves as the subject of awareness, as the first person point of view (e.g., “I am happy/confident/uncertain/curious/etc.”). In such core experiences upon which all other experiences are dependent upon, the “I” is simultaneously both subject of awareness and object of awareness without there being any experienced differentiation between the two.

This is different from experience wherein a) we are perceiving a percept via our physiological senses, this being the strict realm of modern empiricism (be the percept internal such as a full bladder or else external), or b) perceiving percepts of our own imagination (e.g., an imagined apple), or c) sensing a sensation such as that of a temptation in the form of an emotion we choose to either embrace of shun, or d) understand a meaning to something like an sign or an abstraction (the latter three not occurring via physiological senses but through experiential apprehensions of the intellect/mind by the first person point of view). In all four of these cases, though, there’ll be an object of awareness that is qualitatively other than the subject of awareness which is apprehending.

But again, in cases such as that of being happy/sad, the subject and object of awareness are one and the same given—which, via its perpetually changing being as such, then apprehends percepts, sensations, and understanding as other than itself which perceives, senses, or understands.

Interestingly for me, in this core type of experience, the object/subject dichotomy breaks down, such that it is both and neither. Making it into an object doesn’t fit the bill, for it is not. This non-duality of being might make little if any sense outside of direct experience; yet experience attests to it.

To get back in the main subject of this thread: To deny this experientially evidenced ontic given is to make use of this same ontic given so as to theorize in very abstract ways that it is an illusion, that it doesn’t exist. If this were true, everything else would be illusion by default; not here indulging contradictions of reasoning—for everything else we can be aware of is contingent upon this ontic given being non-illusory … and only secondly upon that which we are aware of—laws of logic included—being non-illusory.

But that’s not to say that there is no physical or that our minds’ processes are not directly correlated with our brains’ activities. Experience, if nothing else, evidences that there is such a thing as physicality and that the correlation holds, irrespective of what causal mechanism might be at work. Worst comes to worst from a materialist’s pov, the physical is what Pierce termed effete mind; doesn’t change the fact that it’s still physical in a common sense perspective of things.

Some people say that the thing we both believe is a proposition. For various reasons that scenario is suboptimal. What's the alternative? — frank

The meaning, rather than the proposition. What we both believe can be expressed or represented with a proposition, but is not the proposition itself. — Sapientia

But then propositions don't get to have meanings; they are meanings. — Srap Tasmaner

To further confuse the issues:

Someone says, “I’m feeling happily excited,” and this sentence has a proposition to it such that its underlying meaning can be true or false. My dog wags its tail at assuming I’m about to take him for a walk when I pick up his leash and thereby communicates to me that he is feeling happily excited; the dog’s tail wag is not propositional because of what reason?

Its meaning can be true or false. The more intelligent the animal the more capable it is of deception. While it’s rational to assume it is nearly always a communication of what the dog is truly feeling, with a sufficient amount of intelligence what is communicated could also be false. A human’s smile will illustrate this. And some dogs have been known to at least try to intentionally deceive—thereby holding a meta-awareness of what their behaviors convey … and with this, beliefs of what their behaviors impart in the understanding of the other.

(See for example: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2124087-dogs-use-deception-to-get-what-they-want-from-humans-a-sausage/)

More likely it is not propositional because the tail wag is not an underlying meaning to word-based concepts, I presume. But this would imply that propositions, while being the underlying meaning to word-based languages, are all the same contingent upon words. And prioritizing signs over their meaning to me doesn’t yet make sense; a sign that bares no meaning will be little more than white noise.

I’m among those who try to avoid the term “propositions” for reasons such as this, but then maybe a proper noncontradictory denotation for the term could be arrived at.

So as a self acknowledged Taoist of the form you’ve just prescribed, all reasoning is an illusion to you (see the link Ying posted: it's made up of words). I think I get it now.

Not to repeat myself too often, but: As you say …

the Logos, "in the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the Word was God..." — Bitter Crank

I don't recall Heraclitus ever mentioning that. Oh well. As you say ...

Thank you. A very nice reading.

The Tao does not exist. — T Clark

and:

Return is the movement of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao. All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — T Clark

To me the Taoist quote implies that the Tao is that which returns us the the last mentioned "non-being", such that the Tao which is mentioned, or named, exists as this process. The nameless Tao is then the "non-being" to which the Tao we address brings things closer to. So the Tao does exist in this view (though not in the "stands-out" semantics of "exists"; and again, "non-being" to me here seems mistranslated, such that it is not in fact nothingness, though being no thing).

But I can agree to disagree.

Return is the movement of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao. All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — T Clark

I’m presuming something was lost in translations with this last sentence. Take the relatively well known Buddhist concept of Nirvana. It is not made up of things—be these physical, mental, or any other category. Yet, in English parlance, it is not non-being but the very opposite: it is the essence of being, what the no-self doctrine is in large part about, tmk. I so far maintain that the same applies to what this last sentence of Taoism is addressing: birth of what holds presence/being despite not being anything phenomenal and in any way separated, for lack of better terms (what we normally associate with "being"). Don’t know if this is worthy of a debate, but I wanted to mention this perspective.

In agreement, though ... given such (re)interpretation.

Doing a Nietzsche thing by saying something intended for no one and everyone: even if politely replied to, a series of ambiguous declarations assumed to be sound without justification or clarification does not an argument make. Or else we speak different language games, and I’m not interested in playing. Enjoy.

Do not confuse yourself.

When one communicates, it is done intentionally. It requires shared meaning. Shared meaning is language.

All communication requires shared meaning.
All shared meaning is language.
All communication requires language. — creativesoul

When animals express themselves—such as a rattlesnake’s rattle—they do so without intention? If someone answers yes, a large bias is showing—if only in terms of the evolution of the CNS/brain and its associated behaviors. I’ll leave the philosophy of mind component out of this. But I’d be interested to hear of the argument for animals behaving unintentionally, if there is one that doesn’t by its own standards then equally apply to other humans.

The bear to which the rattlesnake rattles does not share the meaning of what the rattle signifies with the snake? Takes a philosopher to argue that there is no shared meaning between the two, typically via the argument of “if I cannot explain it in my own terms then it must not exist even though all empirical indications present it as so”. The bear would be dead otherwise—leading to only those animals being alive that can share the meaning with the snake. That stated, the bear can understand the snake's intentions just as well as the snake in this one regard, and the snake can understand the bear’s intention (to attack or to leave it alone) just as well as the bear. This is a shared meaning between species.

So we answer “no” to both these questions: animals behave intentionally and animals can share meaning across species via their behaviors. Given this:

Therefore, the rattlesnake’s rattle is linguistic???

Personally, I’m OK with all information (of which sentient beings are in any way informed) being conceived of as language in a very broad and poetic sense, as in the Ancient Greek concept of Heraclitian Logos, but even I acknowledge that so upholding is not in keeping with common standards.

Have a look at communication (exchanging information between entities; this definition coming right after that of things such as the communication of smallpox) and language (words and ways of combining them) ... granting that there is significant overlap in subsequent definitions, notably in definitions 4-8 of "language".

More importantly, what does this have to do with belief? — creativesoul

Well, I was replying to a “WTF???” comment made by you know who in relation to what I intended by the term “state-able”.

That being said, this issue of language and communication might well have significant implications on what propositions are. A dog’s and a cat’s moving of the tail hold different meanings (at minimum to dogs, to cats, and to humans); are their tail movements conveying different propositions held by each animal type when so moving their tails? Were the behaviors linguistic, the answer would seem to be a necessary "yes". Were the behaviors only communicational, it would remain an open-ended issue contingent on how one first defines propositions.

Might be helpful to use a word like "development" for changes an individual undergoes during its lifespan, and reserve "evolution" for populations. — Srap Tasmaner

In biology, an individual’s conformity to environment is specified as acclimatization whereas a populace’s conformity to environment (to that which is ontic) over generations is specified by adaptation.

Fitness—which to my mind could, as previously alluded to, be more metaphysically addressed as conformity to the ontic over time (how well something fits into that which is ontic; more concretely, one’s environment)—could then be hypothetically addressed in terms of acclimatization of individuals or cohorts within a specific generation or, else, in terms of adaptation that occurs via numerous generations within a populace (species). I suggest this while strongly emphasizing that “fitness” in current practice within fields of biology is tmk strictly shorthand for “evolutionary fitness”--hence not (always?) encompassing acclimatization (haven't read up on this in a while). Still, to me widening the scope of fitness to include fitness of acclimatizations is in keeping with a lot of our common usages of the term (e.g., that there person is quite fit (in mind as well as body), kind of thing). But, then, there is no such thing as being “more evolved” in biological fields either; all co-existent species are technically always equally evolved--equally selected upon given their ancestral time span. [edit: this not to say that all species are equally fit] Though we all understand what we mean when we say that we are more evolved than bacteria, for example.

Anyway, if any of this is of use ...

Hurricanes, sand dunes, and rivers, for example, are 'replicated' all the time given the right atmospheric/geological/hydrologic conditions [...] — StreetlightX

When thinking about this my preferred subject has been fire (I forget where I first read of the parallel): it can be “birthed” of heat or sparks, for example; can have an “old age” and “die”; it needs to consume energy from outside itself in order to persist/be (i.e., for self-preservation); and, here most relevantly, it can reproduce itself via buddings that travel to new locations. The question here pondered by me being, “what then makes fire a non-living entity (doing away with the limitations of organic compounds as a necessity for life)?” Thought I’d mention this since it might be relevant to future discussions. (So it’s mentioned, my best current answer is that it is entropic rather than negentropic and, hence, autopoietic—I find that the latter two mutually entail each other.)

So at the very least what distinguishes life from other, natural, self-organizing systems is a mechanism of heritability and an ability to self-maintain - the two key components of autopoietic theory. Of these two components, I'm fairly convinced that the universality of DNA as a replication mechanism is, despite it's universality, a contingency due to shared ancestry, rather than an intrinsic component of life itself. — StreetlightX

I am very much in agreement that we shouldn’t prejudice ourselves to life necessarily consisting of the organic chemicals we know it to consist of on Earth—at least when engaged in abstract reasoning concerning the denotations of life and of evolution.

So going back to the question of agency, the question is: where can we locate it? There are - on the outline above - three possible places (at minimum). (1) At the level of sheer reproduction (hurricanes, etc); (2) At the level of the mechanism of heritability (DNA expression, epigenetic processes of methylation, etc), and; (3) At the level of self-maintainence processes. — StreetlightX

I’m of the mindset that (3) is both necessary and sufficient for agency. And again, other planets in other (edit:) universes galaxies might hold self-maintaining agencies/agents that make use of something that is neither nucleic acid based nor protein based. I’m not asserting this as a fact but merely as a possibility I currently find no reason to conclude invalid.

Complications arise when it becomes clear that one can't cleanly and analytically separate (2) and (3): in order to heal a cut, they body draws upon DNA in order to grow new skin to do so. So the question is: it is analytically necessary that processes of self-repair draw upon mechanisms of heritability? What is the modality of the connection between (2) and (3)? — StreetlightX

But when it comes to the question you’ve posed, boldfaced by me, I’ll argue that it is necessary, given the following modification to the question: “that process of heritability draw upon processes of self-repair” (thereby making self-repair and self-maintenance primary and heritability an outgrowth of this primary aspect).

My reason for this is as follows: For evolution consisting of replication to occur (the orthodox current understanding of evolution), there necessarily needs to be inheritable variations among the givens considered. Otherwise, regardless of quantity of qualitatively identical givens which replicate, with a sufficient change in context (here loosely used to specify both external and internal conditions relative to each given) all givens will perish and none will survive (such as to further reproduce). And I take it as a given that changes in context always occur. The process of self-maintenance then, will also need to be to some extent capable of creating relatively random changes in that which is self-maintaining—i.e., capable of creating mutations (some of these will be beneficial, some deleterious, and some inconsequential, at least at the time of mutation). It is the self-maintenance processes that mutate, these encompassing the maintained process of replication. That stated in summarized form, for the non-deleterious mutations to be inheritable—thereby producing naturally occurring variations within the populace—they will need to be bound to the same process utilized in self-repair/self-maintenance (homeostasis, for example, is most commonly not self-repair though it is self-maintenance). Hence, as conclusion the just argued, the processes of self-maintenance and heritability will then need to be interrelated somehow.

In short, my own conclusion is that agency is required for reproduction as an aspect of evolution--something to which fire, I currently find, is for example not subject to (fire does not change its constituency over time).

To be clear about this, I do not desire to stifle interests in evolutionary processes extending beyond the realms of the biological; I’d rather encourage these interests. But I will again uphold that such abiotic evolution will need to reinterpret evolution in manners in which it is not partially contingent upon givens replicating themselves—such that biological evolution becomes a particular variant of a more general, if not universal, process. To this effect, for example: Evolution of language (a very interesting topic), to the extent it holds replicating givens (such as concepts and their expressions) a) is yet driven by (biotic) agency and b) yet holds naturally occurring variations in the givens addressed (again, concepts, their expressions, and the like).

Missed the sarcasm. Needed a :wink: — Hanover

(palm to the face emoticon) Got it. Wasn't being sarcastic, though. I really did like the post's contents; "thumbs up". :smile:

... I'm off the the night.

I was being humorous, in my way at least. I agreed with the contents of your post and communicated/expressed my agreement with you're post's contents without using words/language.

Since when is language limited to only verbal? — creativesoul

So a person's smile, a dog's growl, and a snakes rattle are all linguistic? Some might disagree, such as those who uphold that language is properly speaking the conveyance of words, be these auditory, tactile, written, or via sign-language ... So next question: what is language?

Not following. The belief isn't the behavior. — Hanover

What's that got to do with all behavior being communicative to any other being that has a even a remote similarity of behaviors?

So it doesn't go unexpressed, :up:

All communication IS language.

WTF??? — creativesoul

Try expressing this to all the research that goes into non-verbal communication, ya know, facial expressions and the like. Whistling down the wind.

I simply mean to say that the fact of evolution is indifferent to the mechanics - it only requires that there be some/one; but once there is one, it's specificities will have, at it were, retroactive effects upon the actual workings of evolution. I hope that's clear). — StreetlightX

No, this is clear, and I agree with this. Nevertheless:

I was wanting to avoid directly addressing the issue of agency. Autopoeisis is a nice way of expressing a particular type of agency capable of causing effects in and of itself--top-down causation as its often enough termed. To use the example of cellphones, by what agency do they replicate? It's a rhetorical question to me (by human agency), but maybe you hold a different answer in mind.

To then rephrase my previous question: Can replication occur in the absence of agency? I hold the presumption that abiotic givens do not hold agency--instead, that they behave entropically by following paths of least resistance toward absolute entropy. Don't know the extent to which we might agree here or not. Then you get into the metaphysics of identity: What replicates if not the identity that is replicating itself (hence why I used self-replication to make this explicit).

OK, a ton of questions ... yet to me they still point to a universal evolution that encapsulates biological evolution needing to be more general in manners that don't include replication.

That doesn't work. One might be inspired by art to believe this or that; the this or that is expressible, — Banno

(Saw creativesoul's post just recently; all the same:) I didn’t use the word “expression” but “state-able”, i.e. being expressible via language. Communication/expression is not limited to language. Lesser animals communicate/express things to themselves all the time, both intra-species and inter-species (as in a pet cat’s meowing a human for its lunch).

I by definition take art—even linguistic art such as poetry and to a lesser extent literature—to express things otherwise not expressible via language (via ordinary language when it comes to language based art)—thereby making what art expresses non-propositional at root, but only partially expressible via language subsequent to its non-propositional expressions having been picked up on. A picture tells a thousand words, but those thousand words will not perfectly depict the picture.

That that perspective aside, I’ve already acknowledged that the topic of aesthetics is a fuzzy example. One person’s aesthetics is another person’s urinal—and the first most often finds it impossible to express the aesthetics to the second.

Why pick on an easy target and not address the issue of belief concerning what God is? The word is meaningful even to an atheist—though maybe not ever to two atheists/theist in exactly the same way. Yet the concept as belief causes actions.

What is a motive? A desire, or a belief in a way to bring about that desire? Or both? — Banno

Without heading into philosophy of mind/self issues, a motive is tmk defined as “a reason for sentient behavior”. If one holds motive X one will trust/believe that X is beneficial to obtain or else realize—thereby (teleologically, I'd argue) causing one’s actions of obtaining or else realizing X.

A desire can most commonly be defined as a drive that holds a motive—and, thereby, a belief-that some X is beneficial—for its impetus. Otherwise, the desire is enactive, i.e. is one with (perfectly unified with) who one momentarily is … “I am desiring to whistle,” rather than something along the lines of, “I feel tempted to whistle (this later instance being an inward drive one feels in some way, akin to how one would physiologically feel an object, rather than a drive which one momentarily is actively being). [Yes, a contentious proposition, but again, I’ll shy away from philosophy of mind/self. Still, you asked, and this is my best current reply.]

That said: Do you disagree with motives being beliefs-that?

If yes, give your own understanding of what a motive is ... such that it does not consist of believing that some given is beneficial to obtain or realize.

But hey, if you don’t want to interact by not overlooking significant portions of what I post, no gripe on my part. We can just leave it here.

I already did: beliefs of what is aesthetic to individual works of art and belief of what God is. Art can inspire revolutions due to its conveyed aesthetics (rarely, but an example does come to mind) and beliefs of what God is ... well, in the world I live in, these motivate people galore to all sorts of actions all the time.

But I'm not clear on where you stand. Do you disagree with motives being beliefs-that?



... been procrastinating on doing, well, what I've got to do. Will get back eventually if replied to.

What's that, then?

A belief that cannot be placed in the canonical form B(a,p)?

Or just an unstated belief? — Banno

Obviously describing what a non-propostional belief is via linguistic concepts could not evidence such belief being possible, since it would be here linguistic in all cases. So we need to point our fingers at examples, so to speak.

My example was that of motives, such as in our motives for partaking of this forum, or this discussion, or for the words we use to express ourselves. Not all these motives are propositional at the moments first held and acted upon ... though most if not all can be expressed to varying degrees of accuracy after the fact.

Animals, for example, have motives in what they do.

B(a,p) can, to my mind, of course be used to express all non-propositional beliefs--just as you've previously mentioned. But this is conditional on our suppositions of what an animal's beliefs, for example, are being in fact true; i.e. correlating to the actual non-propositional belief of the animal.

As to "unstated beliefs" I find it possible that some beliefs might not be state-able, at least not in mean that comprehensively express the belief in total. I'm preferential to beliefs concerning the aesthetics of artistic works. A less fuzzy example might well be people's belief of what "God" entails (regardless of whether they are religious or atheistic).

Well yes, in part. Where the partial disagreement emerges from: I hold that motives acted on are often non-propositional beliefs ... and that all of our actions are contingent upon motives. Hence, because all motives we act on are our beliefs-that (edit: be these beliefs propositional or not), I'm maintaining that beliefs in general do determine actions. This conclusion then being in disagreement with your original post on the matter.

Uhum … (strictly propositional) beliefs explain but do not (always) determine actions

A person might act in ways contradictory to their propositional and abstract beliefs if she holds vying and less abstract beliefs that doing so is to her benefit … otherwise her behaviors would be ontically random (?).

To hold a motive upon which one acts is to hold a belief-that upon which one acts, even if this belief is non-propositional, i.e. not linguistically experienced at the time held. So too with choices made; e.g. choosing A rather than B given motive X.

Doubt this will get a reply … but, just in case, please be so kind as to explain why the just stated is incorrect in your reply. Generally speaking …

And that means that what we thought was in our heads, isn't. — Banno

I fully grant there being interpersonally shared concepts. What of those non-interpersonal concepts experienced and sometimes newly gained via dreams?

So while self-contradiction might rule out a possibility, contradicting some belief or beliefs of ours does not. — Srap Tasmaner

I'm in agreement. While this isn’t a formal argument, one could I think devise an argument against BIV along these lines for example: BIVs are a possibility of what ontically is resulting from all first-hand experiences of what ontically is; yet the BIV hypothesis contradicts the reality of all first hand experiences in fact being of that which is ontic; hence, either BIV or not-BIV where BIV results in logical contradictions and not-BIV does not. Therefore, not-BIV is justified whereas BIV is not. Anyways, something along these lines would make, I believe, possibilities such as that of BIVs invalid. (if there are rebuttals to this informal argument, I'm not going to try to more formally uphold it)

what is important are the minimal ingredients needed for any evolutionary process to take place (to restate: (1) a population, (2) an environment, (3) a reproductive mechanism), and none of those ingredients implicitly - that is, by necessity - entail life. — StreetlightX

Going by the orthodox qualifications of evolution which you’ve stipulated, evolution necessarily in part consist of self-replication. Can you provide any example of a non-autopoietic given which self-replicates? For a given to be autopoietic is for the given to be alive. Viroids, prions, and viruses require an autopoietic host to replicate, so a) they don’t technically self-replicate and b) could not be in the absence of autopoietic beings. In the case of robots, for them to be autopoietic would be for them to be strong AI. A sci-fic concept as of present, one of life artificially created from out of inorganic materials (self-replicating nano-technology robots of organic compounds would by definition be living (edit:) biological things, so these don't count as strong AI)

For a universal evolution that is not limited to life, you’d have to do away with the self-replication requirement—simplifying the process to sometime like “adaptation to, or conformity with, environment over time”. But this would no longer be the same as biological evolution as currently understood, though it would encapsulate the process of biological evolution were it to be true.

Actually, Cusa's knowledge (or gnosis) is basen on an experiental ground too. He describe it as a "divine gift" of profound experience during his journey back from Constantinople in the winter of 1437. Maybe we can compare it with the "activity of theoria" in original sense contained in Aristotle's Metaphysics (recourse Hadot's works). — Pacem

I'm not familiar with Cusa, but I find myself interested. Thanks for bringing it up.

What about the chair I'm sitting in? Is there a vanishingly small but non-zero chance it will disappear as I sit here, or turn into pudding, or whatever? Maybe? — Srap Tasmaner

I so far find the concept of possibility to be very obnoxious. To me it seems to be equivocated all over the place within realms of philosophy but, like so many others, I haven’t been able to satisfactorily make peace with it on a philosophical level—i.e., to figure out how it is equivocated.

To illustrate (via what to me a semi-humorous example): Is it possible to be struck by lightning during the time when bit by a shark while holding a winning lottery ticket in one’s pocket? This form of possibility to me is a different beast than that of a vanishing chair. I can’t come up with any contradictions involved in such a thing happening. Yet, without crunching numbers, the improbability of this first mentioned occurrence is so extreme as to make the occurrence utterly noncredible. So here I conclude it to be a justifiable but noncredible, existential possibility. There’s so many of these that it’s not worth mentioning.

With the vanishing chair, however, I’m venturing that contradictions between believed truths would need to occur for this possibility to be valid. But this would falsify at least some of these believed truths (a set likely including laws of nature, etc. together with that of the vanishing chair possibility). Therefore, such conceivable possibilities might likely be invalid due to contradictions.To me this comes close to the BIV hypothesis being upheld as valid possibility by some; though not by me and I presume not by most others.

In addressing a lottery ticket on its own, that there is some possibility of winning a lottery—as MU has argued—is justifiable (a lot more so than the possibility of lightning + shark + lottery ticket, since the former is more probable than the latter). But then we venture into the likewise nebulous world of credibility. Whether or not the possibility of winning a lottery ticket is credible will depend on the character of the individual. Las Vegas is all about people finding such possibility credible.

Here, you can have a series of premises stating "it is credible that ticket n might (/will?) win".

Don't know how the altered premises would work out. I mainly wanted to draw some distinction between possibilities which we appraise to be validly noncontradictory and those conceivable possibilities which stand a good chance of being contradictory if enquired into deeply enough, this apropos the vanishing chair example.

But be careful, Cusa don't put forward a mystical or irrational context, he has an understanding of stratified reason, but quite different from Aristotelian sense; there is no cosmological reference. — Pacem

Darn it, going back on my word about not posting today so as to make this one exception (imperfect me :cool: ):

Going by connotations, I’ve always understood gnosis to be something whose experiential evidence cannot be ubiquitously shared in principle, kind of (examples below). Knowledge, on the other hand, holds justified beliefs of givens whose justifications are readily accessible to all, as well as the either empirical or conceptual nature of that which is believed.

So, as what I take to be an unorthodox example of gnosis, when a person senses in the atmosphere that it will rain (by what can best be described as the smell of the air; not due to knee joints or some such), believes it will thereby rain, and can justify this belief based on past experiences of this same sensation being followed by rain, this justified belief, if true, will then be more toward gnosis than toward knowledge.

But to my knowledge, more commonly gnosis is exactly about what is today often termed mystical experiences—the ancient Gnostics as an example. Yet this doesn’t make the gnosis irrational to the gnostic (lower case “g”) ... if it were, would they still believe it? Don't know. But a good example is the attested to gnosis of the Buddha while he sat under a tree otherwise starving to death. The knowns he gained are something that cannot be ubiquitously shared by pointing fingers to things or by use of concepts pre-established within language. Nevertheless, here granting that the Buddha actually obtained gnosis, he then was quite able to justify his gnosis to others within his culture, albeit in what at times were somewhat esoteric ways (as a well-known example: neither is there a self nor not a self). And Buddhism, for good reason, touts itself as being a reason-based faith … the four Noble Truths and the like.

But of course anyone can bullshit (wittingly or unwittingly) about having gnosis just as readily as one can bullshit about having knowledge. And with gnosis it’s that much harder to establish non-(self/)deception because it’s that much harder to validate. Far easier to believe knowledge of what the satellites picked up on in terms of potential weather than to believe some other’s gnosis/knowledge gained from it smelling like rain today to them, for example.

True enough, and if the very notion of species is not clear cut then the notion of speciation would be all the less so. — Janus

Man, there some degree of uncertainty everywhere if you look for it intently enough. We do our best to map out the reality we live in all the same. There is no doubt that a bacteria is a different species from a human, cat from dog from bear, etc. even though they all branched out from common ancestors. (not here entertaining biological evolution deniers)

Will be logging out for the day ...

Some goodness is genetic, some badness is genetic, and a lot of it is mediated by culture. — Bitter Crank

Eha, I'd argue that we are the most behaviorally plastic species on earth. The only genetic component to ethics, for me, would be our innate self-interest in warmth, more non-phyisical than physical, with which we're birthed. Then, via interaction, we gain methods/heuristics with which to best safeguard this warmth--from utter selfishness to the opposite tendency.

Its why I don't uphold a position of fatalism as concerns our mores.

There is a skeleton of either a very early homo sapiens or neanderthal who was quite deformed, but who reached adulthood. — Bitter Crank

Very interesting.

Not so clear cut: — Janus

Akin to what does and doesn't get added to posts, the very notion of species isn't clear cut to begin with. What to do?