Say something about Jesus and somebody will disagree--maybe for good reasons, maybe not.

What do you take to be the core of Jesus' teachings? Please site a verse or two to support your view. — Bitter Crank

Can I do this without citing anything? Its “turn your other cheek”: a very worrier-for-peace mentality that was likely sometimes played out in blood by his associates … whose meaning has been badly mauled by the powers that be of history. See, you had a guy that was deemed an impudent infidel about to be slapped as an inferior by some Roman soldier. But being a Gnostic in Jesus’s camp (no Christian existed back in Jesus’s time; these came about much later after the trinity was invented), the Gnostic indicated to the tough Roman soldier “brother, hit me if you deem it just, but slap me with the other side of your hand like you would slap a fellow that's equal in worth to yourself”, this by turning his/her other cheek after having been slapped like a subhuman/slave/inferior. Which, given the way policing often works, likely got at least some of these Gnostics into a lot of trouble. And yes, I have no doubt that sometimes—as was the case with Gandhi’s crowd—it became deadly for the Gnostic who so stood up to the Roman soldier.

So, basically, “turn your other cheek” epitomizes his stance on humanitarian values, like the equality of intrinsic worth between people, etc. Well, as long as it’s interpreted the only way it could have been interpreted back in Roman times by anyone Roman.

OK: all this imo. and I acknowledge differences with scholars on this

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found the citation:

38 Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth:
39 But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. —  Matthew 5:38–5:39 KJV

In other words, intersubjectivity only happens within species, not between species. — Galuchat

Even if one’s definition of “intersubjectivity” would have it so, there yet occurs overlap in umwelts between species. As one example, no relation between a predator and prey, where the first chases the second and the second eludes the first, could make sense without this overlap in umwelts. This overlap, for example, will minimally regard the presence of the same solid ground underfoot, given that both predator and prey are mammals (OK, excluding bats, dolphins, etc.). Those organisms that can sense gravity will all have their own subjective awareness of gravity; they will thereby have a shared awareness of the same force external to them such that they act and react in accordance to it; yet, a plant’s roots don’t follow gravity due to the sensory apparatus of an inner ear, and so the quality of the awareness of the same external force will significantly differ between a plant and a mouse, for example.

Whatever this common awareness of external realities between differing species may be termed, it does occur. The result is that all life acts and reacts to the same external (or non-self) reality which we term the physical world … they do this in different ways with different qualia but the external reality is nevertheless singular relative to all life.

Yet, obviously, no two species have the same capacities for awareness of external realities. And if it needs to be stated, the total sum of information and meaning that a fish’s reality consists of is vastly different from that of a bee’s (etc.). But, then again, no two individual humans share a perfectly identical body of perceptual understandings and meanings. Yet we all address (else, act and react relative to) the same physical world … even if it is metaphysically conceived by us through the lens of some objective idealism, Maya, or something else of the like.

Why would you assume that life developed from non-life? Don't you agree that there doesn't seem to be any evidence to support this assumption? If we do away with this assumption then we don't have to bother seeking degrees of existence between non-living and iving. This whole line of investigation, which seeks to determine these missing links, degrees of existence between non-living and living, is fueled by this belief that life developed from non-life. But this belief is unsupported, because there is no evidence of these missing links. Why not dismiss this as misdirected speculation? — Metaphysician Undercover

In principle, I’ll answer my own metaphysical justifications by referring back to my last post—a loose outline of my justifications though it is. But to elaborate a bit, that life evolved out of nonlife is again only a secondary philosophical concern for me. This much like what type of solar systems exist beyond our own is for me of secondary concern to the nature of meta-ethics (which very much encapsulates value-judgements; which in turn informs politics and economics, this among other things devoid of which the existence of NASA would not be possible). The same overall importance is given to the issue of life evolving from nonlife being secondary in comparison to the nature of life and awareness itself. And my beliefs are clearly not those of physicalism.

As to the issue of evidence: In one line of argument, it consists of the same evidence that dinosaurs existed, or that saber-toothed cats existed (still can’t figure out how they could capture any prey with those teeth … but our reality evidences that they existed all the same), or—to be more fastidious—the same evidence that three generations ago existed. The metaphysical and epistemological justifications can become both debatable and difficult in their details, but, via one allegory, even if the world started last Thursday all evidence would yet indicated the existence of a last Wednesday as well. Last Wednesdayism would in turn indicate the existence of a last Tuesday, so on and so forth. What is today has a history in what was yesterday. Though an indirect answer, I hope this made some sense.

On the more empirical side, in review of what is likely already known, we have evidence that life once existed in the Precambrian period via fossils of very tiny creatures (one with five eyes on an otherwise bilateral body—which is about as alien a biological symmetry relative to what’s been on the planet since as one can get). Then we have no physical evidence of life on Earth prior to this. How did this Precambrian life on Earth appear? One could extrapolate a meteor or comet of some type which brought it over to Earth from somewhere else. But, even then, given the history of the universe which physics attests to, there was a time in the history of the universe when life was not possible … such as before the atoms required for organic molecules existed.

Due to this evidence, I uphold that physical life evolved from nonlife. But again, not due to or via a system of physicalism.

It is funny, but the truth is an ACTUAL free market economy could be a good thing IF the powers that be would really let it exist — dclements

I think you’ve hit the nail on the head: economy is always subject to politics. Otherwise stated on one of many, more concrete planes: shares of cash between beings is always subject to the will-driven self-interests of the beings involved and how these self-interests interact. Yes, money can buy our Politicians (with a big ‘P’, as they say in anthropology classes), but this money is itself the product of some other beings’ will, hence some other beings’ politics (with a small ‘p’).

Restated: If money/capital is various forms of sustenance, it holds no value beyond its sustaining of beings, thereby making economy dependent on the interaction of self-interests, aka politics. (as is already generally known)

Because of this, I find that there must first be a non-tongue-in-cheek checks of will/power that is so structure so as to produce a balance of will/power between different—and potentially competing—wills. Nothing new in this. Its rumored that the USA once upheld some such sort of concept. But nowadays it’s become horse manure. One easy, but acknowledgedly turbulent, example: good-ol’ guns rights. Why was it placed in the constitution to begin with? To ensure that the populace could overthrow its elected government via mutiny if the government should ever become sufficiently corrupt. That whole non-tongue-in-cheek “checks and balances of power” thing. Nowadays, one’s abilities to soot bambi at will, or a drive-by driver that pisses you off (one of many activities frivolous gun ownership within metropolitan areas can result in)—even if the weapon is fully automatic—fairs no chance against the arsenal currently available to the State alone. It wasn’t the same thing when everybody—the army included—was limited to muskets and bayonets (and a few cannons, etc.). The currently proliferating militia forces in the USA are, imo, out of touch with the capacities of the present government (not that I condone militias). A touchy topic, I know. But it’s not the only topic in regards to what checks and balances of power in a government of the people, by the people, for the people was ‘once upon a time’ envisioned to be. Or at least so I suppose.

Taking politics into account, then, there can be no free market (in a non-Orwellian sense) devoid of an honest checks and balances of power. And since economy is now globally organized, this checks and balances of power would itself need to be somehow global (laugh at this; I’ll understand) before a free market can ever manifest locally. Such as one where regular folks—including some who live in poverty—do not provide welfare to corporations that should have been selected out of being due to their behaviors … but instead, due to this welfare, have now become even more too-large-to-fail than ever before.

Well, that is one relatively ignorant person's meager thoughts on the subject. I don’t pretend to be all that knowledgeable about the specifics of economics (especially those founded on the premise of infinite growth) and current political affairs … other than what I gather from here and there.

Your comments are very much appreciated.

I think it's presumptuous to say: life evolved from non-life, or noumena arise from phenomena, either vice versa, or that both arise from something else entirely. Peirce held that phenomena and noumena are two aspects of one substance. I don't know enough to say even that, preferring to maintain my species-specific common sense, and only say that physical things and mental things exist. — Galuchat

As to my presumption that life evolved from nonlife, if I’m allowed to indulge in my own metaphysical views for a moment: I should first say that this supposition is, for me, of secondary importance to the system of metaphysics I’ve been working on. I’m for now strengthening its foundations, as time allows. Yet, inevitably, two systems of objective reality result from it (given that objectivity can, in part, be loosely translated into impartiality): one that is equivalent to what we term the physical (and phenomenal) world, and a second that is metaphysical (and purely noumenal), which, among other parallels, can be likened with Aristotle’s teleological cause. While it is the latter type of objectivity that is pivotal to this philosophy as a whole, the latter’s presence entails a) the presence of the former and b) that the former physical objectivity is the closest mutually shared reality we hold in our proximity to noumenal objectivity. Thus, as always, the very conclusions of the philosophy I’m working on entail that what our physical world informs us of at a macro-scale (thing such as laws of nature; as compared to the way that particular leaf over there just moved due to wind) can unveil truths that—given our current subjective biases—bring us closer to the stated noumenal objectivity. It may be of help to mention that our physical world, in this philosophical approach, is metaphysically understood as an intersubjective reality equally applicable (or equally real) to all co-existing awareness (including, for example, that of individual, metabolizing/living cells)—and, thereby, necessarily consists of givens such as space, time, and representations relative to, and equally applicable for, multiple awareness-endowed beings/selves. Overlooking the details of all this: Then, while some inferences of science (such as the way the universe will end) can be understood as our best, collective, bias-endowed guesswork, other inferences of science (such as that physical objectivity clearly informs us that physical life on this planet is predated by a time when no life occurred) can, I believe, only be interpreted as what is most objective in relation to life’s presence relative to our current understanding. Again, given the very tenets of the metaphysics I’ve working on, this objective appraisal that life evolved from nonlife—were it to be properly understood philosophically—would better enlighten us toward obtaining states of awareness in closer proximity to an eventual awareness of what noumenal objectivity is [In case this may be of interest, this noumenal objectivity would not be nothingness but something more along the line of infinite awareness devoid of boundaries (such as those that phenomena impose)]. Now, no expression can be considered perfect (e.g., to accurately and fully convey to all possible audiences that which is intended); but, if the gist of all this is roughly understood: this stated metaphysics then entails that there should objectively be a bridge between the behaviors (and properties) of inanimate matter and animate matter. But I as of yet have no cogent understanding of what it might be.

That stated, a philosophical skeptic as I am, I’m of course aware that mistakes of reasoning might have been made somewhere along the way.

So why would I use the term "semiosis" in my definitions of life? Because "semiosis" is a term that's understood (if not universally accepted) and used within the field of biology (which is best suited among the sciences to define "life"), and is general enough to include endosemiosis, psychosemiosis and cultural semiosis. — Galuchat

Agreed.

I can only confidently place the functions of interpretation and modelling within an awareness context (i.e., one where perception, cognition and intuition occur), and so hold that semiotics applies exclusively to mental (not physical) things.That said, I would be interested in any functional explanations which connect thinking with non-thinking, and living with non-living, domains (much as chemistry provides a functional connection between other natural sciences). — Galuchat

Again agreed. As to my own reasons for the supposition that there is a connection between the two, they consist of my metaphysical justifications for presuming that life evolved from nonlife, as previously mentioned. Though, again, I currently lack knowledge of any functional explanation for such a connection.

Though I'm for some reason weary of unnecessarily stirring up more waters ... My current thoughts concerning semiotics are in some ways at a crossroad. I can somewhat expound on the primary problem I see, but can’t yet be of much help as concerns any resolution.

On one hand, both physically and metaphysically, I find reason to uphold that meaning (hence signs) can only occur within lifeforms. On the other hand—again, both physically and metaphysically—I find reason to speculate that there is a hidden cline that bridges the behaviors of inanimate matter and animate matter: thereby resolving how life evolved out of nonlife.

I note that both positions, however, require a distinction between life and nonlife.

As concerns semiotics applicable to replicating nucleic acids, when the latter occur as parts of a metabolizing system it is, imo, the anima of the metabolizing system that is endowed with meaning and meaning recognition—not the individual physical components of the metabolizing system when taken in isolation form the holistic process of metabolism (again, else conceived, from the respective anima).

So, in agreement with commonsense, an isolated strand of RNA is not itself alive, though it consists of organic matter, and so is not itself endowed with any awareness—thereby making it devoid of inherent meaning and meaning recognition. In the fields of semiosis this is often termed an umwelt, loosely definable as “a self-centric body of meaning regarding i) a self distinguished from non-self and ii) this same self’s context”. A metabolizing system, which empirically minimally consists of a living cell, does however have an umwelt—and thereby does engage in semiotic processes.

But again, this is at a crossroads with the hidden cline of behavior between nonlife and life which, for example, is required to explain how life could have developed from nonlife. The pansemiosis which Apo likes to address is one approach toward eventually discovering what this hidden cline is. And in this pansemiosis view isolated nucleic acids do engage in semiosis—as do individual rocks.

Still, I again note that—in keeping with the themes of this thread—there is a ‘crisp’ distinction between life and nonlife. (Physically addressed, it can be pinpointed to the presence of metabolism—which is a holistic process that some specify as autopoietic).

The same generalized crossroads regarding semiosis can be addressed from the vantage of species. A given species is not of itself an awareness-endowed being … but concepts such as those of pansemiosis would take into account the manners in which species interact, etc.

So, though likely not of much help, these are my basic current views regarding semiosis and life.

I’ve been hesitant about posting this, but, then again, to some unknown reader it might be a worthy thing to address.

Hypothesize a suicidal person. Lots of different types of personalities can be suicidal. We all acknowledge the following personality type to be disturbingly psychopathic (I very much would like to believe) and so bad/wrong in his actions: a person who takes out cohort X prior to committing suicide.

A question whose very placement is emotively absurd on grounds of the answer being commonsense, but whose rational justification is not very easy to pinpoint: Why is it a tragedy when an individual massacres his family prior to blowing his own brains out?

So, given that life necessitates suffering and that there is no suffering in not being alive (or some such twofold perspective), why is a man that puts a bullet into his wife’s and children’s brains prior to putting a bullet into his own wrong in so doing? [cuz’, typically it’s the hard, unemotional, self-professed rational men that perform such deeds … though women are not fully exempt - imo]

To better ensure that the unmentioned details don’t derail the pivotal question: hypothesize that all killed by the given person are shot without their knowledge, in the back of the head, and die instantly without any suffering. Also hypothesize that those killed by the suicidal person are not vile monsters, or some such.

I believe the answer given to this offered hypothetical—whatever it may be—should suffice in answering what the tragedy would be if all human life were to cease existing.

Else, what differentiates the nonexistence of some human life that currently is from the nonexistence of all human life (that currently is)?

I know this is a very difficult question—and I can’t presume to assist in answering it for those who view physical death as equivalent to absolute nonexistence of being.

And for those who find the contents of this post disturbing: its been posted because I find it disturbing that those with a certain (im)moral mindset (who furthermore associate death to absolute oblivion of being) will kill off innocent people prior to attaining their own salvation of absolute non-suffering via suicide. So, intellectually addressed in what I hope to be a rational enough manner, again: why is this action a tragedy if the nonexistence of life equates to salvation from all suffering?

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To answer the OP, my own justification for the tragedy relies upon a belief that physical life, though it changes form, will always be present to—or, else, will always re-manifest within—existence. In short, I believe in the reincarnation of being. Oh yea, and that life has a teleological end which, once obtained, exists beyond phenomenal, spatial-temporal realms of being. This view makes the existence of physical life a bit like the movie Groundhog Day: e.g., were our sapient species to go extinct a new sapient species with the same tribulations will undergo the same vast timespan of suffering and eventual development to arrive at the same place of understanding we are now. Empathetically addressed, why all the additional suffering to be at the exact place we are now? Hence--skipping a whole spiel on one man’s person metaphysical beliefs (which I currently have no interest to delve into as concerns details)--my belief is that suffering of the magnitude we experience and have already collectively experienced will repeat itself until the time we progress onward to means of existence and interaction that are less base. If this is the metaphysical macro-perspective, the same perspective can be applied at the micro-scale of why suicide is generally not OK (not to even invoke the murder of others).

I’ve answered the OP in fairness to its question—though I have no interest in engaging in a step by step justification of my beliefs--and am certain that other potential justifications can be expressed. But, personally, I’m far more interested in how the action previously hypothesized in this post can be justified as wrong if death—or the nonexistence of life—is deemed equivalent to an absolute lack of suffering.

Hey, blushing here. Thanks, though. You got me thinking some more about life and reproduction. From previous arguments and examples, I obviously uphold that reproduction is non-essential to life as life applies to individual lifeforms. That stated, and while it is still stringently upheld by me, on the physical plane reproduction is however an essential aspect of generalized-life’s preservation given the fact of death. Wanted to acknowledge this latter aspect of the situation as well.

Biology is replete with its own intense philosophical questions. Such as in questions of identity as pertain to the underlying given(s) whose preservation matters to the sustainment of life in general. We typically think in terms of individual lifeforms. Yet many individual lifeforms depend upon a biological context of species. Hence, one can easily take the perspective that a species’ preservation is paramount in relation to that of one of its individual members. And a species preserves itself via a gene pool comprised of all individual reproducing lifeforms of the species. But then individual species—much like individual genes—are human devised abstractions that no longer neatly correlate to reality once the details are gotten into (obviously when addressing what we conceive as closely related species; for example, such as when the offspring of two species can itself successfully reproduce [as one example, this has recently happened on the East Coast of North America between coyotes and wolves, in part due to scarcity])

Eh, for those who are interested, this line of philosophical thought addressing biological themes can extend in myriad ways.

Basically, however, wanted to acknowledge the importance of reproduction to the continuation of physical life in general. This, again, while denying reproduction to be an essential property to individual life.

Still, imo, to better understand the metaphysical significance of biological reproduction (where one so inclined to enquire) it is good to first understand that reproduction is not essential to the presence of individual, naturally occurring, physical lifeforms.

Natural Life
1. The natural condition extending from cell division to death, characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, respond to stimuli, mature, reproduce, and adapt to the environment through semiosis.
2. The duration of an organism's natural existence. — Galuchat

Worker bees serve as another example of life that does not reproduce. Less genetically predetermined but nevertheless real is the non-reproduction of most wild canids that are not themselves alpha mates.

Would such examples then not constitute natural life within this system of classification?

So there’s agreement that tornados are not alive, and are thereby literally inanimate, since they don’t have that which is essential to defining physical life: a metabolism. This just like animated cartoons are literally inanimate—though we term them animations and say they are animated. Language can be an ambiguous thing, granted—especially since so much of it is metaphorical.

As to the metaphysics of what life is, from past discussions I presume you already know we disagree—mainly in the metaphysics of causality and selfhood. We reduce things to different holistic properties.

Er, no. — apokrisis

Glad to have sorted this one out then.

What your monadism implies, my dualism (which in fact unfolds to a hierarchical triadism) seeks to make explicit. — apokrisis

Groovy; so then there’s no disagreement that metabolism—again stated, regardless of its underlying metaphysics—serves as the essence by which life is defined.

How does (healthy) metabolism not imply the presence of homeostasis and repair?

Can empirical examples of the first devoid of either of the latter be provided?

The confusion arises from your criticism of metabolism being the essence of life; more specifically, from your statements that there is a duality between metabolism and replication required for life to obtain. With my justifications previously expressed, I still find reason to uphold that metabolism is a sufficient definition of life (granted that it includes the self-generation of the metabolizing self which, in part, requires nucleic acid replication, obviously).

The code-matter duality you address was for me something removed to the barebones hypothesis I’ve put forward. And you have yet to make the case that life requires something other than metabolism--whatever the metaphysical underpinnings of metabolism might be.

In truth, to my knowledge, one of the harshest criticisms of autopoiesis regards its implied metaphysics of causality: autopoiesis is impossible within a system fully comprised of efficient causation. Nor can it be stated to be causally indeterministic. And teleological causation on its own seems insufficient to explain it. But this metaphysical topic regarding non-classical forms of causation (here: the origination of effects) seems best suited to a different thread.

Eppur si muove. (Galileo intended this for planet Earth, but the quote also works for life’s movements via self-generating, negentropic, holistic, metabolic processes)

Found the book online. Thanks.

Not surprisingly, the major criticism that theoretical biologists would have of autopoiesis is that it undercooks the informational aspect of dissipative structure. It doesn't account for the repair or replication aspect by which an organism is able to maintain its existence [...]. — apokrisis

Accounts such as those of Evan Thompson in the book Mind in Life (2007) have it otherwise.

So a balanced definition of life - such as to be found in the works of Rosen, Pattee and Salthe - stresses the complementary duality of metabolism and replication, or the material processes and the informational constraints. — apokrisis

If you are addressing nucleic acids replication, isn't nucleic acids replication part of metabolism to begin with? Such as in the production of proteins, etc. It is as far as I know.

Makes it sound as though you are addressing reproduction in general. But, then, mules would be non-living organisms by definition--to list just one example.

Apparently, trees send within themselves, electrical messages, similar to the nerves of animals but they travel much slower. They are communicate through there roots and networks of mycelium which intertwine with the roots — Metaphysician Undercover

I’ve come across similar information in passing—though I haven’t paid close attention to it. Apparently the consensus is that it’s a plant’s roots which most likely serve as the decision center of the plant.

I think most biologists would agree that some types of life have no mind (e.g., plants). — Galuchat

This consensus by most biologists is most likely real. Still, some burgeoning fields of biology do uphold plants to have intelligence and, therefore, plant-minds.

An internet search on “plant intelligence” brings up any number of articles on the subject. An easily appraised example—because it is so visual—is that of what is commonly known as the “dancing plant”. You can find videos of it on youtube. Its leaves will move in response to sounds in timespans that make the motion visible to us. The big deal is multifaceted: its mechanisms for the perception of sound are a mystery; then there’s the reaction aspect: why and how do individual leaves move in certain ways when sound is present … say, as compared to all its movable leaves moving at once in response to sound? But other harder to visualize examples of what some uphold as plant intelligence abound. I more recently saw a documentary where, as far as I recall, a certain tree species in Africa was discovered to collectively kill off herbivores that ate its leaves during times of drought: when its leaves were over-grazed it reacted by a) increasing the tannins it otherwise naturally produced, now to the point of lethality, and b) appearing to somehow convey information for an increase in tannin production to nearby trees of the same species.

Plants are weird lifeforms, though. For example, their selfhood as unique beings is poorly understood (if at all ever philosophically contemplated): such as when one root system gives rise to what above ground appears as multiple individual plants. Is it one lifeform or many that are intertwined?

I’ve mentioned this only because I’m in favor of upholding plant intelligence: imo, if it’s alive, it has some form of mind. This gets back to metabolism and autopoiesis as mentioned in my previous post. But I’d welcome learning of alternative definitions of what mind minimally is.

A biologist would stress that what is definitional is replication and metabolism. Respiration releases energy, but life also requires the ability to direct some of that into work - the work that rebuilds the body doing the respiring. — apokrisis

The reference to reproduction appears to allude to biological fitness. Still, for a given to have biological fitness, it must first be living. Life, of itself, is not defined by its replication—though replication is an empirical reality of life. But consider an organism that has never reproduced during the entirety of its lifespan; it would hold no biological fitness but would yet have been alive. And, at least as concerns humans, biological fitness seems to be lacking in some ways: Michelangelo had a far more significant impact on our species—on how our species has adapted to environment—than any contemporary that gave birth to say over twenty offspring. This obviously addresses replicability of phenotype and not of genotype.

On a different note, fire both replicates and releases energy—but it does not metabolize (hence does not engage in respiration as part of a metabolism). We can metaphorically describe fire as alive but it is not—it is not negentropic.

Also, as you likely well know, the process of metabolism is far more complex than a simple, linear chain reaction. It requires a type of holistic interaction, and integration, on the part of that which metabolizes—be it a bacterium, a plant, or a human. This holistic interaction—together with all that it entails—is what Francisco Varela termed autopoiesis, i.e. self-generation. There is a bridge between autopoiesis and mind: to metabolize is to, in part, a) delineate self from non-self via behavior and b) to act and react relative to context in manners that best sustain the negentropy of self (one, for example, must find ways of obtaining that which is required for the releasing of energy). So, the autopoiesis of metabolism could be argued to imply some form of at least rudimentary mind—this as some of Varela’s crowd do uphold. While metabolism unfolds on a physical plane, autopoiesis can be contemplated on a metaphysical plane. The latter, in turn, could then be potentially applicable to the Cosmos. But I as of yet haven’t thought out this perspective of the Cosmos’s autopoiesis in what is to me a satisfactory manner--this to have any informed opinion.

[It’s interesting to me that while the Latin term for soul is anima, mind is termed animus. Both anima and animus refer to the same underlying process that facilitates breath. Again, given our modern knowledge, this addressed underlying process is respiration, an essential aspect of metabolism. And metabolism, as just mentioned, can tie into Varela’s et al.’s concepts of autopoiesis and mind.]

Wanted to throw this out there:

First, there’s a distinction between a) physical life and b) a set of non-physical, mystico-poetic concepts of life—such as “I only feel alive when […]”, “they’re dead inside”, or things like “the hills are alive with music”. Not that the second concept of life doesn’t have value to the human condition—and I believe it is itself worthy of contemplation and debate—but it doesn’t correlate well with the reality of life as it pertains to the physical world.

Secondly, an idea that seems to me both commonsensical and indisputable: Physical life can be defined by the ‘essence’ of metabolism. Metabolism always minimally consists of respiration, which can be either aerobic or anaerobic. Respiration always entails the conversion of nutrients or, in the case of anaerobic respiration, inorganic matter into cellular energy. Metabolism is a vital principle to everything known to be negentropic and is absent in everything known to be entropic. The breathing of multicellular organisms via lungs is for respiration at a cellular level, though other multicellular organisms, such as plants, respire in the absence of lungs. That stated, the multicellular organism engages in its own metabolism and the individual cells of its body engage in their own cellular metabolism.

One can then bring this hypothesis of life being defined by metabolism back into the realms of mystico-poetic ancient concepts: ancient concepts of soul—such as anima and psyche—are almost always founded on the process of breath. Breath is what we do to engage in metabolism, this so as to sustain our negentropy. This process of respiration now better known to us via science can readily translate into what was once termed soul—again, such as in anima or psyche ... from which we also now have the terms animate and inanimate. To be clearer, in this interpretation the soul is not the breath that occurs but that intangible holistic aspect of being which produces the occurring breath. When that which produces the occurring breath is no longer present, the being is no longer living but dead—and its physical matter changes from being negentropic to being entropic. (Though, granted, this interpretation likely won’t make much sense to at least those who interpret soul through an Abrahamic lens, be they theists or not.)

Once one gets into notions such as that of the anima mundi, or more modern variants of it, one again slips into obfuscation between metaphysics and metaphor: the world, for example, doesn’t engage in the process of breathing so as to sustain its own negentropy. That stated, I don’t believe concepts such as the anima mundi—or some of its modern variants—are necessarily false; but, for example, the anima which would be addressed is clearly something different than the anima which pertains to animate beings.

The tangential about the soul aside, as concerns the hypothesis that the essence of physical life is defined by metabolism—something that dogs do and rocks don’t—it’s an opinion I currently fail to find any fault with.

Going back to the OP:

I don’t believe any visual field content could be experienced if fully devoid of a simultaneous convergence with some sensed meaning. By “meaning” I don’t necessarily intend a significant conscious value available to linguistic contemplation; instead, I intend any sensation of qualitative nature that is relative to context. And this context always includes the respective sentient being aware of the given phenomena.

The sensed meaning will not obtain from the phenomena one is immediately aware of. The tree, for example, does not innately hold within it “a place to mark territory” for a feline, canid, or bear, “a place to live and find food in” for a squirrel, or “something hard to avoid while skiing” for a human. Acknowledgedly, what has been listed are only a few of the more explicit meanings that pertain to only a few different types of sentient being.

Instead, the sensed meaning obtains from the respective sentient being innately. Even when it is developed through past experience, this past experience has itself gained value from interaction with the innate mental propensities of the sentient being concerned.

One could take a Kantian-like approach as regards at least the most generalized innate meanings, could rely upon genetic inheritance of innate cognitive processes, or, as I uphold, could view the two aforementioned perspectives to be metaphysically co-dependent to a large extent.

With that stated as background, my resolution then is that the sameness of the tree is an apriori meaning in humans (as well as some other lifeforms) that obtains given the right stimuli. But this meaning of sameness is a cognitive meta-process that applies to the particulars of less abstract meanings and phenomena. Hence, this sameness of tree as object, while being apriori, has no bearing on the concrete instantiation of a tree experienced in the visual field—the particularities of the latter being a posteriori.

To me this resolves the issue without affecting the stance of indirect realism.

X-) ... with a little bit of LOL.

It's an issue of taste: I for one in high school always wanted (not realistically mind you) an international naked for a day day. That way we all get to discover that everybody else is imperfect as well and get over all the "posing" by realizing that we're all posers of one type or another. Not being realistically intent on this, though, I acknowledge I didn't think through this global nakedness day all too well. Still like the motif to Catcher in the Rye, though.

Don't have much else to add. Oh, yes, its "duly" and not "dully". And, though I hear its a nice place, haven't been to the British isles yet.

Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye dealt a great deal with the concept of fakeness. Fakeness, then, is the antonym to authenticity.

I don’t have a nifty philosophical proof that some people are more fake than others in that which they purport to be. Beggars or ruling class included—and artists could be placed in there somewhere.

Lacking this logical proof, I yet experience that some get the fakeness issue as was, for example, addressed in the Catcher in the Rye, together with that of its opposite notion, authenticity—the two of which form a cline of potential being. A mathematical binomial of all or nothing, to me at least, is a misrepresentation of reality; there would be different contexts and differing degrees between the absolutes of fakeness and authenticity.

I acknowledge that I belong to the set of humans to which Salinger’s aforementioned novel made some sense in its treatment of fakeness/authenticity. It’s not something I believe myself capable of rationally convincing others of, however.

But, for argument’s sake, the fable of the emperor’s new clothes would to me and many others make no sense were it to be devoid of the concepts of fakeness and authenticity of being. Do you then find the fable nonsensical, or, if not, how do you make sense of it as story?

---------

Edit: BTW, all this isn’t to say that fakeness and authenticity cannot be used as labels and that, as labels, they can’t be misused by spin-mongers for some sort of political gain (including politics with a small “p” as is stated in anthropology). The same applies to many other labels, however. For example, dropping the “evil” term on a community of people—say, for example, liberals, or Buddhists, or some such—can and will be done by some. This does not then miraculously so make it true—nor does it then result in the properties of good and bad/evil being devoid of actual referents.

To the extent that the fakeness/authenticity dichotomy is understood to address something real about human character, the same applies to these as labels. This, though, is a different issue than that of some people being more fake than others in terms of what is. And hey, if its of any consolation, I dully acknowledge my own lack of authenticity in many a way ... though I aspire to not be fake in the way I live.

Well first, "authenticity" is a nonsensical concept with respect to the arts. The attribution of "authenticity" is subjective and doesn't consistently correlate with any objective facts at all. Surely some people who use "authenticity" as a metric for whether any particular music is worthwhile or not are basing their attribution on some reaction they're having to the music--some way they're interpreting the music, some way it makes them feel, but it's not at all clear just what that reaction is. — Terrapin Station

Say you’re in a movie theater watching a movie: you can be authentically enjoying it or not. If you are, you get lost within the story while it unfolds. If you’re not, you have an itch to check the time; you keep on being critical of the overall color choices made by the people who made it; etc. Same with music, imo.

My own novice experience with music creation is that you, the musician, can either be hypnotized (so to speak) by that which you’ve brought about or you can focus on technicalities concerning this or that. When you, the musician, become hypnotized by your own produced sounds, the music is authentic—and you, the musician, become at once both creator and audience entranced by that which is created. Repeatedly plucking one string in the right timing and intensity can be sufficient; and of course it can also be as complex as hell; it doesn’t much matter. It speaks a truth to you and, therefore, to all others that are like you in a certain set of particulars. Thus the same music will now likewise entrance that portion of an audience who shares the same eye for beauty/the aesthetic. You can sense this same thing occurring in performers on stage: these too can be authentic or not in what they play/sing—either becoming entranced by that which they produce (authentic) or going through a routine for public recognition (unauthentic, like the prototypical wedding singer).

As with different people enjoying different movies, so too with different people enjoying different music. But we all know what it’s like to be stuck in a move theater watching a movie we’re not captivated by—then to politely nod our head when our friends sing its many praises … to be unauthentic in what we like. The notion of authenticity as regards the arts then holds significance to all of us. That stated, I can appreciate many musicians that I sense to be perfectly authentic, as just expressed, whose works don’t resonate with me. But I can’t think of a single musician I like that is unauthentic in what they produce; for the most part, these do not gain public recognition to begin with.

So I’m saying that, while the notion of authenticity may be multilayered and hard to pinpoint, authenticity is by no means nonsensical, nor unimportant.

An aspiring musician who seeks to be authentic many not be as technically savvy in the short-term by comparison to one who pursues technical knowhow, but their technique will grow around an authentic aesthetic—and it is the latter which we most appreciate and enjoy listening to.

Ps. Though not my argument, maybe it’s the authenticity to music that is the very thing which could be argued eternal, outside of space and time, unwavering regardless of the musical phenomena it is clothed in.

Understanding holds the etymology of “inter-standing”: e.g., that which is between the two or more folks that understand the same given referent.

For those non-sexually-obsessed folk, inter-course, such as verbal intercourse, has this notion of inter-standing built into it. [And for the same folk, so too does sexual intercourse; so it’s stated.]

For any non-physicalist, non-epiphenomenalist stance, there minimally is the justifiable possibility of their being some form of metaphysical freewill via which effects are causally produced by us--this as we experience them to be. Decision, thoughts, the words expressed, etc., can all then viably be effects which the respective being metaphysically originated--as we directly sense and as we communally express.

Hence, in a conversation such as that which this thread pursues, there is an inter-path between interlocutors whereby each can affect the other via their choices--such that an inter-path, or an under-standing, is perpetually manifested and built upon.

We focus on disagreements. Yet for any disagreement to be in any way cogent there must first be a broader understanding as platform. For example, were one to write their thoughts in Japanese and the other in Spanish, with no understanding of the other’s language, no cogent disagreements could be addressed. Likewise, where there to be no common understanding of what mind, body, planet, and world signify, no cogent disagreements could be addressed regarding these.

Wherever experiencer 1, 2, 3, etc., interact, there will then be a common underlying set of understandings between all that will be taken for granted by all. There then shall also simultaneously be a common, underlying phenomenal world apprehended by all given interlocutors. Again, we focus on our differences in debates. But for these differences to manifest there first needs to be an implicit agreement of what the differences hold as referent, as one example regarding conversations.

I don’t believe this resolves anything of significance in terms of metaphysics; nor does it rely upon any particular metaphysics. But to me it currently does entail that there can’t be such a thing as solipsism, multiple or otherwise. All experiencers, as you term them, would be in some way entwined with the same, experienced, phenomenal world--and, by extension, with each other while interacting--although we may each hold different rationalized interpretations of this commonly shared phenomenal world: of our ubiquitous under-standing, so to speak.

The portions of our mind that is private to ourselves is just a common sense means by which we all intuitively and experientially know that we each have our own unique minds—regardless of means used to explain this. So the listing you’ve given of phenomenal world 1, 2, etc. is then only a representation of our own unique minds. But again, between these there occurs a common, underlying understanding of what is: a singular phenomenal world shared by different selves.

I’m aware of the Nim project and of his biting of assistant’s faces, etc. I'd say that chimps will do things in times of war amongst themselves that the most torturous human could hardly conceive—but, then again, humans have more imagination, as our history evidences.

Just so it’s said, there are plenty of theistic beliefs that don’t view an evolutionary continuum of life as contradictory to spirit. Most nowadays are aboriginal, but not all. It’s not a matter of denying that humans are vastly greater in degree of emotion and intelligence; it’s a matter of not divorcing being a human from nature on a metaphysical level. Oddly enough, this metaphysical division is often enough made even by atheists; Dawkins as only one example. Myself, I find that there is a continuum.

Still, my point was that it’s possible to try to teach apes such as Kanzi and Koko terms for the concepts of life and death. They already hold concepts of self. Then to ask and see if there is awareness of one’s own mortality. It would be disheartening if it were ever attempted, akin to asking a four-year-old if they’re aware that they will someday die. Only that apes have a great deal more strength if they get upset or dismayed. Not something I endorse. But it is possible to attempt.

There was a really poignant story published about 4 years ago, about some high-flying academic who adopted a chimp and raised it as a human, convinced he could teach it language. He used to dress it and gave it meals at the table with his own children. After a few years he was getting nowhere and he lost interest. The poor creature ended up back in a lab in the midwest, with all these other lab animals. When a journalist found out, he went and saw him, the chimp was frantically signing, as if to say 'get me out of here'. He died not long after, it was a very sad story. — Wayfarer

In case this is still of interested …

Chimps can be the most violent lesser animal I know of. Last thing anyone would want to do is live with one.

I was thinking more in terms of Koko the gorilla and Kanzi the bonobo (benevolent species for the most part). These three youtube videos aren’t exactly philosophically minded, but they illustrate apes’ ability to understand language.

“A conversation with Koko”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNuZ4OE6vCk (I think this is a trailer for a documentary; Koko knows sign language)
“Kanzi and novel sentences”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Dhc2zePJFE

Kanzi communicates with pictorial words, not sign language, e.g.:
“Kanzi’s 1st phone call”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJ_3l1z5r0s

↪Wayfarer
Meaning? — Agustino

We certainly have a harder time forgiving and forgetting …

Perhaps it's a human prejudice to think that we, as linguistic beings, are the only animals capable of abstract thoughts such as 'I will die'. Can we imagine any way in which such a thought could occur to a non-linguistic being? — John

No lesser lifeform has a narrative of what pain is, yet they all react to it the same way we do. So doing requires some degree of non-narrative thought on their part—this in terms of deciding between alternatives. I'd argue that choosing between alternatives is not possible without some type of forethought, i.e. best means of attaining a desired end (in conjunction with some type of memory—with which to form a contextual structure of limitations).

At least one zoo-kept elephant has been known to enjoy placing pain on canvas. Octopuses are very efficient as solving puzzles. Other examples can be given. As to communication, our common associates, cats and dogs, will communicate by tail-waiving and teeth-exposure (among a number of other means, ear-direction, body-posture, etc.). These are communications that we as humans comprehend just fine though not of a spoken narrative—and, through anecdotal evidence, I know that dogs sometimes can even (try to) deceive via their communications. Communication requires thought, such as regards the interpretation of another’s intentions/state-of-mind. The only explanation for the aforementioned is that non-linguistic, abstract thought can and does occur, imo.

Once this is accepted, then the difficulties reside in figuring out how. This “how” obviously will itself be on a cline of complexity—from less intelligent to more intelligent lesser life forms.

But, as to awareness of death:

Imo, no lesser lifeform suffers from an existential angst of what live and death signify. Many, if not most, are aware of when some other is alive and when it is no longer alive--as known via reactions. Some are aware of personal loss when another of their cohort dies, as is exemplified by signs of morning/depression/etc. And the instinct of self-preservation is built into everything that is alive—though it often enough doesn’t take the form of “my importance is greater than that of everyone else’s” (e.g. during parenting and within social species). And there’s certainly aversion to that which leads to death. Oddly, whether great apes are aware that they are mortal can be tested: this by attempts to communicate with them via sign language, etc. (Though I’m not comfortable with such attempts being recommended, this on ethical grounds.) But, as to contemplations of whether life in any way continues on after mortal death (or not), we do not have any indication of this till we arrive at Neanderthals (which buried their dead with flowers). This species of hominid, however, likely had more complex means of communication that the non-verbal communication of lesser-animal species: hence, they likely had some form of linguistic narrative.

As regards the historicity of the yin/yang, this makes sense to me. Thank you.

In your view, is all this talk about strength/weakness—as the terms are interpreted in western cultures—historically accurate?

For example, just because Earth is receptive I wouldn’t call Earth weak.

As to the “we all have some masculine and feminine within us” motif … our perceptions are all receptive; our tongues are creative. Yet I wouldn’t consider perceptions a weakness, for example; nor does a guy who never stops talking represent strength. Rather, imo, strength emerges from a proper balance between listening and talking.

I esthetically prefer the view that yin and yang represent different strengths, and simultaneously different weaknesses.

It’s how I then come to interpret the balance between the two to be strength; imbalance between the two as weakness, regardless of which of the two the imbalance favors. This perspective also to me chimes true with many Eastern appraisals of the Middle Path.

But I lack knowledge of how accurate this perspective I’ve just expressed is historically. (The perspective that men are the stronger sex and women are the weaker sex can certainly be found in many cultures both Eastern and Western, for example.)

[...] but it just demonstrates that dualism is necessary in order to properly understand the existence of individual entities. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear about my personal stance, the duality I uphold is other than Cartesian. It’s not easy to adequately define in a few words, but it is akin to a view of self holding within it a holistic substance that is not the self of information, be this information of the mind or of the physical. Both of the latter to me are different aspects, or manifestations, of the same substance. This holistic substance—that of a form which holds potential to be, to exist, devoid of the information by which it gains its manifest-form within time and space—I in some ways liken to the selfless being which Buddhists term Nirvana. Hence, while I personally don’t disagree with dualism, my view is not that of substance dualism in terms of a duality of information. (This, of course, is not to deny different aspects of this same substance of information.) All this to be upfront about my own dualist stance.

That stated, in the modern sense of substance, even if one were a substance dualist, there would via material identity alone be found no means of discerning between different givens of each of the two substances. One idea would be indiscernible from another due to both being of the same material identity. One physical object would be indiscernible from another physical object. Etc.

Material identity to me only makes sense due to the functionality of the individual materials addressed. For example, a wooden X is different from a metal X only in so far at the wood holds different properties of functionality from the metal.

I have to admit that I didn't understand your argument for identity from purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hopefully this won’t further confuse matters: Functionality as I interpret/intend it can be readdressed as the context-specific role of the given. This context-specific role of the given is one of kinetic and potential interactions with other(s). I’m very aware that such metaphysical approach can become confusing devoid of an entire metaphysics to support it. Nevertheless, to me it’s intuitive that one rock is, in part, different from another due to its context-specific interactions, both kinetic and potential—in short, due to is context-specific role or, else stated, its functionality relative to its surroundings. One rock’s presence (even if it is statically placed) will be different from any others, for example, in terms of what its removal from the given environment would causally signify. This perspective, then, takes into account causal relations between givens, locally and globally. Still … this isn’t the place to attempt to properly justify this perspective. I’ll address more particular examples below.

I don't see this as an argument for identity, I see it as a way of defining a term. You say that an object must fulfill certain conditions before it can be called a flower, so this is to define what it means to be a flower. But I understand the act of identifying to be the inverse of this. Rather than saying what it means to be a flower (that is defining rather than identifying), we take a particular object and say what the object is, that is identifying. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m thinking of identity in terms of discernibility: If we can discern X than we do so only with the backdrop of not-X. Any discerned X then, for me, holds identity to us which discern; i.e., we identify X the instant we discern there being X--though we many not necessarily fully understand that which we've identified/discerned. This approach doesn’t rely upon narrative; rather it relies upon perceptions, sensations, and understandings. Hence, lesser animals can discern X from not-X as well—say, predator from not-predator, etc.—though they do not use narrative (words) to do so.

Being of this perspective, I’m not having an easy time interpreting you’re position. For instance, I can discern a broad quantity of givens at any particular moment thought I don’t use narrative to so discern all the givens that I do. Rather, I use narrative to convey that which I discern—either to myself during reasoning/thinking or, else, to others. To me then, discernibility is primary; narrative about that discerned secondary.

So from my perspective, why do you think that your definition of "flower" is more "real", or states more precisely what a flower really is than another definition? If objects don't have a real identity which is proper to themselves, how is our naming of them anything more than arbitrary? — Metaphysician Undercover

I interpret you as enquiring into the objective identity of things. My best resolution so far is to rely upon universals of psyche. This approach doesn’t create crisp thresholds between all things. For example, between when a flower bud is a flower bud and when it is a flower (a temporal distinction); or between when a heap is a heap and when it is not (a spatial distinction). What it does do is solidify X and not-X for all members of a populace … this in manners that do not always mandate an excluded middle (such as in the two examples just given).

As to what makes that discerned as flower—by us humans, by hummingbirds, by bees, etc.—more real than merely an arbitrary concept by all concerned: I would again largely found my arguments on the flower’s causal role/purpose/functionality relative to its context, as previously addressed. Hence, as I currently construe things, the role of a flower will remain more fixed than its shape or material content. To address one of Heraclitus’s better known analogies via the just stated: one cannot step twice into the same shape or material content of a given river; yet the river as context-dependent role will nevertheless remain the same (identical over time). Clearly there’s more to the river than just context-relative purpose-form, and its context-relative purpose-form too is in flux, yet this context-relative purpose-form is what remains stable relative to ourselves as separate process-bundles. The context-relative purpose-form is the gestalt which is “the river” and not any of its parts. Though not the only element involved, it plays an integral aspect in our discerning the given river to hold an objective identity. Devoid of this, there no longer is discerned “a river” but, maybe, any number of the river’s parts—each with its own context-relative purpose-form. These context-relative purpose-form, to me, are then ontic—as ontic as any river, flower, etc. is.

On a more psychological train of thought: This context-relative purpose-form of things is something I believe we all intuitively apprehend. And, as intuitions go, they’re more sub/unconsciously reasoned than consciously reasoned.

No worries if there are disagreements. I mainly wanted to better clarify my position regarding functionality and identity.

The point is that we just name the material "A". Then the material continues to just be "A" no matter which form it has, the ship, the cabin, or the other ship, it is always just A. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless one endorses substance pluralism, wouldn’t everything then hold the material identity of A? This then would make individuality indiscernible.

The real problem with material identity is in deciding what does and does not constitute the material of the entity. So if a part is taken off, and replaced by a new part, or just if a new part is added, what determines how the old part ceases to be, or the new part becomes, part of the material entity? Like when you eat, and defecate, how is it possible that you gain material, and lose material, yet you maintain the same material identity. So "change" is like a coin, we look at it from two sides, form, and matter, but both sides give us difficulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

The contents of the digestive tract in vertebrates don’t to me seem a good example. The contents are not part of the physical being … only when some of it at the molecular level enters the bloodstream to feed the individual somatic cells of the body can it become argued part of the physical being. But, even then, contentions could be raised in terms of—by analogy—a fire being other than that which fuels it. To say this more simply, we are not that which we eat; we assimilate portions of that which we eat into ourselves. The contents of the digestive tract—wherever found—will hold a different identity from that which it is digested by.

Is it due to disagreement that you’ve bypassed my argument for identity resulting, in part, from purpose/functionality?

I’ll provide another example. Take something organic like the flower of a fruiting plant. We could give it any other name but it will still be that which it is. At which point in the bud phase does it become a flower? And, how many petals must wilt off before it ceases to be a flower? My argument is that it is a flower between a young bud and before the beginnings of it being a fruit (if pollinated and if of a fruiting plant) due to its functions/purpose as a flower. This both conceptually and physically.

Logical identity taken to its extreme will not apply. Neither will identity via material content—for the flower, being organic, undergoes a perpetual change of material content. Yet it will nevertheless be a flower somewhere between being a bud and a fruit. How so if its functionality is considered completely irrelevant or nonexistent?

Again I don’t maintain that purpose is the only element to identity; rather that it is an integral element of identity among others.

This same argument for the functionality of that considered then would also apply to the identity of a physical being as addressed by you in your example of digestion.

No, that doesn't change that fact, but that doesn't imply that the past exists and contains things.

It's not that the past isn't independent of the present--of course it is, as it doesn't exist any longer. — Terrapin Station

I am forgetting: you’re a materialist/physicalist. If I understand you properly, the past no longer exists materially.

My current label of choice is that of an "objective neural-monist". So, to me, just as a thought hold’s presence—exists in this way—so too does the past exist: as information that holds presence. Only that it’s a lot more complex than a mere thought that one is having.

I say we call it Dutch. X-)

* I'm also pointing out that all of this stuff occurs in the present. It in no way suggests that a past still exists . . . and I have no idea why anyone would take it to suggest that, as it seems like quite a bizarre thing to believe in my opinion. — Terrapin Station

We’re again talking past each other.

If Joe (say, via some form of conscious or subconscious self-deception that occurred yesterday) now honestly remembers that Betty wore a blue shirt yesterday, does that then change the fact that Betty wore an orange shirt yesterday?

I say “no”—this for reasons I’ve already in part previously addressed. The past contains facts that remain unchangeable and, in this sense, the past exists independently of the changing present (this with a heads up to a great deal of potential complexity that, due to universals, nevertheless ends up being the same thing for all intended purposes).

But the onus is on you to clarify what you’re implying.

Then also address this part:

And if those things [the doctors' memories ] also are, then isn't there a commonly shared past independent of the individual's memory? — javra

"There being things they remember" is all that is. — Terrapin Station

So the things that the doctors remember isn't?

And if those things also are, then isn't there a commonly shared past independent of the individual's memory?

Amnesia is a memory problem. — Terrapin Station

Yes, I’m aware of what it is and its mechanisms as much as any other.

The issue is in expressing the different between there being a past for the person prior to amnesia, after which the person’s past no longer is.

Again, all this is in reference to your remark that the past does not exist.

I'm not sure what you want me to embellish. It seems very straightforward to me. Obviously I'm not saying that we don't have present memories, but that doesn't amount to the past existing. — Terrapin Station

I’m not sure how to do this without dreary examples, so I’ll use forth-person: One is fine up until the day one gains amnesia. When one is fine there is a (nonexistent?) past. When one gains amnesia, this (nonexistent?) past is no longer existent within one’s duration of the present moment.

(a) Correct this wordage so that when one is fine there is a past relative to oneself.

(b) Then, using this corrected wordage regarding the past, how is the past which applies to one and all not existent (i.e., devoid of being; aka. “is” not)?

Before we get lost in what (b) intends, resolve (a).

Talking about changing the past, then, is talking about changing changes that no longer exist. — Terrapin Station

But hey, no cheating: what about your claim that the past doesn't exist? Care to embellish this some.