Just trying to give one diagnosis to a bunch of people who have different ailments? — frank

What one diagnosis would that be?

That may be because of inappropriate generalization. — frank

What do you here have in mind?

they had to be careful to avoid seeming powerful, because they would come across as bitchy. — frank

More specific to this one example: is a so-called "bitch" an independent women who doesn't accept being subjugated despite being of female sex (which of course means she gets penetrated during sex by some male, here assuming heterosexuality) or is a so-called "bitch" the subjugated property of some pimp (this literally or figuratively)?

Then: which of the two is the more morally correct way for a women to be in society? Then: which of the two is however the more ethically correct way for a women to be in society?

This only so as to better illustrate what I claimed in my previous post regarding femininity.

But I'll add that while some understandings of "femininity" will be at odds with what goes by the term "masculinity", yet other understandings of "femininity" will readily accommodate a cooperation of power and leadership between the feminine and the masculine.

I agree with what you say in regard to femininity. There for example is this virgin or whore theme to femininity. A damned if you do and damned if you don't proposition where women are the ones giving birth to the next generation. As points out though, its a very murky terrain.

To me it in large part pivots on what "power" is supposed to be and who it's supposed to be carried out by. Culturally speaking, that is. And, in turn, all this ties into both morals (the mores - i.e., norms or customs - of the land) and ethics (as in, for one example, what constitutes a virtuous use of power and what doesn't). BTW, to differentiate between the two - morality and ethics - one can well uphold that female circumcision is perfectly moral in such and such culture, while nevertheless upholding that it is all the same utterly unethical.

And all this to me gets exceedingly complex when philosophically enquired into.

... man oh man, back to the "burning times" theme of witch hunts, devil's mark and all. Gotta hate that (mother) nature and those who deem it in any way divine. Spinoza then being here included. :roll:

What would this consciousness be conscious of, if not the "I" or object of thought? — RussellA

The "I" here ceases to be entwined with thought, emotion, or perception - but instead is said to become, or else transcend into, pure awareness devoid of any duality. Here accepting that one is not any thought one thinks of - these thoughts and emotions and possible percepts instead being likened to ripples on a pond which should be fully calmed till no disturbance of awareness occurs. This, at least, as I've heard the experience of such meditation described.

Heck yeah. What else is self-reflection but self-knowledge? — J

:grin: :up:

Later in the same essay, Ricoeur puts it even more clearly:

The cogito is at once the indubitable certainty that I am and an open question as to what I am. — 244 — J

The more mysticalish parts of me then associates this very issue with the well known dictum from the Oracle at Delphi: "know thyself". Or at least endeavor to best understand? :grin:

Among women? Never heard that one. I was under the impression that honest cooperation is entirely feasible among both sexes. — BitconnectCarlos

Given the context of what I expressed, this is precisely what I intended: among both sexes.

It's interesting that serious meditation practice, especially in Hinduism and Buddhism, makes this point vivid. My understanding is that an experienced meditator would agree that there is indeed no "I" remaining -- but this does not show that consciousness requires an object. For pure consciousness is said to remain, even in the absence of the "I" and its objects. Of course we're free to raise an eyebrow at that, but there's a lot of testimony to the validity of this experience. — J

Again, nicely expressed. As to the raised eyebrow, without the meditater's active awareness of this transient ego-death which can reputedly occur during meditation - which, as active awareness, is clearly not that of an I that can only occur in relation to something not-I, i.e. which is not a duality-bound ego - the person would have no way of experiencing, much less recalling, the occurrence. Often enough as something associated with a moment of bliss. I believe it's this non-dualistic ego of active awareness that remains at such junctures of transient ego-death which then gets addressed as "pure consciousness". Without it, one might just as well be entering and then emerging from out of a state of coma.

I am, but what am I who am? That is what I no longer know. — in The Conflict of Interpretations, 241-2

I love that! Yes indeed.

We each have our own experiences in life, not all of them good. As to men and women, as I previously said of my views, both (though obviously in different way) are capable of equal ability to accomplish, of equal power. As such both can be assholes of equal degree, just as much as both can be non-assholes of equal degree. Honest cooperation tends to only occur among the latter, though.

I'm not claiming that abuse of women was in those days non-existent. But then neither am I claiming that abuse of men also did not on occasion happen. Tribal societies only began changing with the advent of animal domestication and their herding. Till then, there of course were occasions of inter-tribal warfare, in which one can well presume the "abuse" of others from different tribes. Still, overall, there is no indication pointing to hunter-gatherer tribes not being of a largely egalitarian ethos.

I don't know a single person who could take this as anything other than an insult to their morality (restrict this to males I know). — AmadeusD

Sorry to hear you so say. I, for one example, am in no way insulted by the question,

no direct evidence — flannel jesus

I take it by this that you weren't there yourself. OK. Neither was I or any other living person. But then the same applies to all history a century old or longer.

Can you then reference any academic paper as "indirect" evidence for what you've affirmed?

I do think it's pretty likely that violence in general, and sexual violence against women in particular, was more common the further back from "societies" we go. — flannel jesus

Hunter-gatherer tribes are "societies". Otherwise you are by no means alone in this perspective, but where is the actual evidence for this perspective when it comes to the hunter-gatherer societies of the past? Other than what @Outlander has addressed as being pure imaginings.

then what were preventing these tendencies in the past (prehistoric times) if there were no police, law enforcement, or laws protecting their livelihoods? — Shawn

The egalitarianism-oriented social cohesion of the tribal societies, this in regard to hunter-gatherer tribes of the past - just as much as it pertains to, and based on what we know of, the hunter-gatherer tribes of today.

What gives me the right to say that the "I" causes thoughts, as if the "I" is separate to the thoughts it has? — RussellA

Long story short, most typically, the "I" decides upon which thoughts to uphold and then upholds these, with such options of possible thoughts to uphold being "caused" (which I find to be an ill-suited term, but all the same) by the unconscious mind rather than by the "I".

I agree that the "I" is not separate to either its perceptions or thoughts. But what are the implications of this? The implication is that perceptions and thoughts are an intrinsic part of the "I". — RussellA

I did not claim that the "I" is not separate from its perceptions or thoughts, I only asked you to clarify what you mean by "separate". This, to be honest, because so far it seems as though you are reifying the mind and its components (e.g. individual thoughts and percepts) into having similar characteristics to physical things in the external world, which can indeed be separated givens.

Here's one example: if the "I" is not (in some non-physical way) separate from either its thoughts or percepts, then how can thoughts in any way of themselves be separate from percepts? Yet to see a house (a percept) is indeed utterly separate from contemplating the concept/thought of "house". And one does not need to see a house when so contemplating the concept, nor contemplate the concept when seeing a house.

But, I would still question your assumption that — Outlander

Man, I offered you two links which, I so far find, directly evidence my affirmation. Do you question the verity of the references linked to? On what grounds if so? (each has references of its own to academic articles and the like)

Otherwise, again - other than what you yourself "imagine to have once been" - what rational or empirical evidence do you have to support that the hunter-gatherers of today - which tend to be egalitarian in their ethos - are any different from the hunter-gatherers of prehistoric times?

If the "I" is separate to its thoughts, the question is, how can the "I" be privy to any thoughts at all? — RussellA

I'm no sure what you mean by "separate". The "I" for example is not separate from its perceptions in so far as these perceptions are only so because they are perceived by the "I" - being in fact contingent on the "I"s awareness. Same with all thoughts. And we seem to agree on perceptions, at least, being doubtable all the same.

As to the question you ask, the answer I offer is: via its faculties of awareness.

Or, would the experience of the thought itself mean that you could not doubt the content of the thought itself?

E.g. There appears to be a conscious thought of "I believe I am watching a sunset". Why would that thought be free from any form of doubt about its existence as a thought? — Kranky

Come to think of it, you might(?) be here referring not to the though/belief itself but the very experience of the thought/belief. If so:

While we can come to doubt the content of what we experience (be this an experienced perception or an experienced thought/belief) that we so experience at the given present time will likewise so be "a strongest form of fallible certainty'.

For example: you are seeing a pink elephant. You can come to doubt whether or not you are in fact so seeing a pink elephant in the external world or else are hallucinating a pink elephant in the external world. But the fact that you so experience visually at time X remains a fact regardless.

Does anyone know what he means here? Why does "immediate" contradict "certainty"? — J

I can only presume that what he intended by "immediate certainty" was something like "a certainty that is prior to any reasoning or empirical, else experiential, evidence". In this manner thereby being what can then be termed "infallible certainty".

I'm in agreement with all your comments, btw. Maybe FN's key objection to the cogito was to a possible reification of what the term "I" references that might have been typical in his day; here specifically thinking of the Cartesian "res cogitans" and "res extensa" distinction (such that FN might have disagreed with this dichotomy?). My best guess, at any rate.

It is more likely that "I" is the thought rather than it is the "I" that is having the thought. — RussellA

Doesn't this entail that with each change in thought thunk there will then necessarily be an ontological change in the "I" addressed? If so, how can the same "I" be privy to different thoughts?

I have some questions about certainty.

I understand that our senses can be doubted. E.g. Everything I 'see' could be an hallucination or an illusion etc.

But I have read lots about the certainty of thoughts.

If I have a conscious thought/belief that I am seeing something, could that thought/belief be doubted? — Kranky

My own two cents:

If the certainty you’re in search for is that of infallible certainty – a certainty that cannot be wrong in principle as well as in practice under any circumstance whatsoever – I will fallibly affirm that no such thing can occur.

As to thoughts being doubtable, I’m preferential to the bumper-sticker affirmation of, “Don’t believe everything you think”. After all, via judgments, such as those regarding what is and is not real, one will tend to select one of the multiple thoughts and discard all other options as false thoughts regarding the matter. Example 1: is my laptop real? One option available to you will be endorsed and all others rejected upon arriving at a conscious decision regarding the matter. Example 2: I think Earth is both necessarily solid and approximately spherical. And I can of course come to doubt this by consciously asking myself for what justifications I in fact have to think this. (Troubles tend to start when one, for example, thinks the Earth is flat, or else hollow on the inside, and in no way doubts this thought irrespective of the evidence to the contrary.)

As to, not infallible certainty, but “the strongest form of fallible certainty that can be had”:

Given that one can come to doubt both one’s own perceptions and one’s own entertained thoughts, can you then come to in any way rationally doubt the following proposition here placed in quotes?

You – here strictly entailing “a first-person source of awareness (i.e., an aware being, else an occurrence of first-person awareness)” – will be, i.e. occur, for as long as you are in any way aware of anything whatsoever (to include being aware of doubts regarding your perceptions or else the thoughts which you are momentarily aware of).

I could try to rationally evidence why this proposition cannot be an infallible certainty - even if it’s not possible for you to in any way cogently doubt - but so doing would take a considerable amount of reasoning to express. Notwithstanding, I do find this quoted proposition to be an example of “the strongest form of fallible certainty that can be had”.

(BTW, in case this might be in any way pertinent, this specific “strongest fallible certainty” just specified will in no way then provide either rational or empirical evidence to the effect of there not occurring similar aware beings in existence at large other than yourself.)

Well, for starters. nature itself as can be witnessed today is a pretty brutal if not outright savage environment. One could assume, if we slowly became set apart from this environment, and were once immersed in it knowing nothing but the sort, for how could our lesser evolved predecessors possibly have, things were quite, as they say, savage. Makes sense, no? — Outlander

Seems to me that, in order for this to make any kind of sense whatsoever, one would need to presume that the hunter-gatherers who live in “nature itself as it is witnessed today” are significantly unlike the prehistoric hunter-gatherers who lived in “nature itself” as it was in prehistoric times.

What evidence, rational or empirical, do you have for this?

I’m running on the presumption that we are strictly addressing Homo Sapiens. Wouldn’t make much sense to call a female chimp or a female bonobo a "woman”, for example. Still, for the record, all current indications point to hunter-gatherer societies being around for far longer:

Hunting and gathering was presumably the subsistence strategy employed by human societies beginning some 1.8 million years ago, by Homo erectus, and from its appearance some 200,000 years ago by Homo sapiens. Prehistoric hunter-gatherers lived in groups that consisted of several families resulting in a size of a few dozen people.[10] It remained the only mode of subsistence until the end of the Mesolithic period some 10,000 years ago, and after this was replaced only gradually with the spread of the Neolithic Revolution. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-gatherer#Archaeological_evidence

emphasis mine

------

Your former kumbaya-like sarcasm aside, I so far don't find any reason to affirm that my initial assertion was not, generally speaking, spot on. Again, this from what I know regarding what is known at large.

Perhaps you simply forgot and omitted the oh-so-forgettable "I imagine" preface in front of your ideal description of the world. — Outlander

Any particular reason you hold to presume things were any different prior to written history commencing? To be clear, this in hunter-gatherer tribes.

Really? I mean. Okay. Based on what information? Were you there or something? :lol: — Outlander

The first paragraph in the subsection "Social and economic structure":

Hunter-gatherers tend to have an egalitarian social ethos,[26][27] although settled hunter-gatherers (for example, those inhabiting the Northwest Coast of North America and the Calusa in Florida) are an exception to this rule.[28][29][30] For example, the San people or "Bushmen" of southern Africa have social customs that strongly discourage hoarding and displays of authority, and encourage economic equality via sharing of food and material goods.[31] Karl Marx defined this socio-economic system as primitive communism.[32] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunter-gatherer#Social_and_economic_structure

There's a lot more to read to the same effect, with most of it being well-enough referenced.

do you think this was something that during prehistoric or ancient times was also commonplace among our ancestors? — Shawn

If by "the distant past" you're willing to go all the way back to when everyone was of a hunter and gatherer tribe, all indications seem to suggest otherwise. As far as I know regarding what is known at large, not barring exceptions to the rule, these tribes tended to be (and tend to be) very democratic in their leadership by our modern standards.

The caveman with club in hand knocking over the dame on the head so as to take her back to his cave ... its one of those stories that is more a reflection of the tellers than it is of what actually occurred in prehistoric times.

[...] but I don't see much awareness of the fact that [...] some of the 'crisis' of masculinity can be perceived as a preference for 'female' values, by females, in feminized spaces. — Jeremy Murray

The present move away from cooperative leadership is... regrettable. — Banno

I’ll add that both global and national percentage differences between male and female populations, though not perfectly equal, are so negligible as to pretty much round out to equal standing in most, if not all, cases. (reference)

If we in fact honor power of leadership by representation in our culture, leadership ought then be just about equally divided between males and females at all levels of governance, without any glaring exceptions.

So, given the yet occurring disparity in this leadership by representation, and in acknowledging that women have made some progress over the years toward this just mentioned ideal:

Can anyone explain to me how the fear of (else the roundabout concern that) “women are taking over and are destroying the core of masculinity” is in fact not a communal projection of personally held aspirations by a certain male faction in society, one composed of individuals that themselves desire to be domineering over all others - women very much here included as those whom they deem themselves entitled to subjugate? Entitled by Nature, by God, it doesn't much here matter.

(I don't mean for this question to be insulting. It's quite sincerely asked. To maybe make this more clear: Such that this one male faction of society might typically hold a belief in something along the lines of, “the weaker sex needs to be barefoot and pregnant with mouths closed in obedience to whatever 'the man' says”. While this might in no way depict you, it is a paraphrased sentiment I’ve, again, unfortunately often enough encountered. The majority of rapes in the world, after all, are perpetrated by men on women; men who often enough hold this or a similar enough mindset in respect to women at large.)

It doesn't much matter for the purposes of the discussion if masculinity and femininity match biological gender. — Banno

:smile: OK, you, I'll take you're word for it. All the same, I can't escape the hunch that many, if not most, tend to disagree with this. "Power" being often strictly equated to control and dominance over other, and in this way with the capacity to domineer, with this capacity tending to be seen as what ought to be a strictly male characteristic, which most term "masculinity".

That said, I'll endorse your statement: yes, plenty of women are domineering and in this sense alone masculine. Moreover, though, plenty more feminine women and masculine men are, despite their gender differences, alike in being neither submissive to domineering factions nor attempt to domineeringly subjugate others. But this regards a type of power utterly different from that just specified.

So here we are. Sounding off topic.

Edit: Having read a couple pages now, I see nothing reasonable was going to come out of this. Sigh. — AmadeusD

OK, going back to the OP in addressing the problem of masculinity:

Is the occurrence of "masculinity" of itself contingent on there existing "a weaker sex"?

(Examples such those I linked to in my previous post indicate otherwise. Nevertheless, this seems to be the implicit assumption of most - at least most I've been acquainted with either directly or via media.)

-------

To be upfront about my own stance, as a heterosexual male who values my own masculinity, I'm an egalitarian at heart, and thereby view the power (ability to accomplish) of both sexes/genders to be both of equal ability and of equal value in at least principle - though not always in practice, modern culture playing a large part in this. I also uphold that "if there will be a war between the sexes, there'll be no people left". This pretty much summing up my own view.

Not something which homophobic attitudes will much enjoy, but all the same:

This seems to conflate happiness and eudemonia with pleasure. — Hanover

It doesn't. Pleasure has as it's opposite pain. Happiness has as it's opposite suffering.

My response here is just a push back on the comment regarding the ubiquity of happiness seeking by all life forms. — Hanover

OK. Still, that wasn't the pivotal issue addressed.

Gesundheit. Need a hanky?

Dudes and Dudettes, were gender to be fully biologically determined, empirically verifiable examples such as these would never occur:

Some of the most compelling evidence against a strong biological determination of gender roles comes from anthropologists, whose work on preindustrial societies demonstrates some striking gender variation from one culture to another. This variation underscores the impact of culture on how females and males think and behave.

Margaret Mead (1935) was one of the first anthropologists to study cultural differences in gender. In New Guinea she found three tribes—the Arapesh, the Mundugumor, and the Tchambuli—whose gender roles differed dramatically. In the Arapesh both sexes were gentle and nurturing. Both women and men spent much time with their children in a loving way and exhibited what we would normally call maternal behavior. In the Arapesh, then, different gender roles did not exist, and in fact, both sexes conformed to what Americans would normally call the female gender role.

The situation was the reverse among the Mundugumor. Here both men and women were fierce, competitive, and violent. Both sexes seemed to almost dislike children and often physically punished them. In the Mundugumor society, then, different gender roles also did not exist, as both sexes conformed to what we Americans would normally call the male gender role.

In the Tchambuli, Mead finally found a tribe where different gender roles did exist. One sex was the dominant, efficient, assertive one and showed leadership in tribal affairs, while the other sex liked to dress up in frilly clothes, wear makeup, and even giggle a lot. Here, then, Mead found a society with gender roles similar to those found in the United States, but with a surprising twist. In the Tchambuli, women were the dominant, assertive sex that showed leadership in tribal affairs, while men were the ones wearing frilly clothes and makeup. — https://socialsci.libretexts.org/Courses/HACC_Central_Pennsylvania%27s_Community_College/ANTH_205%3A_Cultures_of_the_World_-_Perspectives_on_Culture_(Scheib)/12%3A_Gender_and_Sexuality/12.04%3A_Gender_Variability_and_Third_Gender

I saw a documentary of the Tchambuli back in university days. Quite telling to so see first hand. And there are many, many other examples as well. In the west, there are stories of the Amazonian women who, for example, were stated to partake in the battle at Troy in the Illiad (Troy no longer being a mere "myth"). With burial mounds of Scythian woman worriers quite possibly aligning to the purported tales of Amazonian women having traveled north.

Culture plays a heavy role in what genders are expected to be. For better or most likely worse, with the "weaker sex" motif being quite central to today's typical western culture.

I’ll be away for a while, but in case this comes up:

Though I can imagine how what I mentioned in my previous post might sound uncouth to some, so interpreting - as per Genesis I - the creation of humankind on day six (this rather than on day seven) to me is the only way I can find of making sense of the age old question of how Cain got around to having children: Here, Cain did not have children via some form of immaculate conception nor did he have his children with Eve, his mother, but instead coupled with a women created on the sixth day when humankind at large was created. This union thereby giving rise the Jewish peoples.

This being a philosophy forum, thought I’d mention this perspective. This, again, just in case what I previously mentioned might have sounded cross to some. (Hard to tell how others interpret it.)

There's a lot to unpack here. And rules go back all the way to Eden. — BitconnectCarlos

Would you then agree that, from within an Abrahamic perspective, the same “rules” of ethics would minimally go back to Gensis 1’s so-called “sixth day” (which I so far interpret to represent “the sixth cycle of events” given that there were "days" prior to a solid earth's occurrence)?

The sixth day being the day in which the “we” therein addressed – which I interpret as being Elohim (this rather than G-d, this due to G-d's entailed divine simplicity, which thereby could not be a plurality in any sense of the word) – created both man and woman, woman and man, in Elohim’s very own image likeness. This, then, necessarily before Eve was created from Adam’s rib; and so long before the Cain and Abel event ever took place.

I ask (in my previous post) because to my way of understanding, this so called "pivotal intent" of maximizing eudemonia (which can be translated as "well-being" just as much as "happiness"; and to which suffering is the opposite) is of itself ubiquitous to absolutely all lifeforms and, hence, all sentient (aka, subjective) beings.

So the question regarding ethics at large is then not "whether or not so doing is of itself good" - it can't help but so be, and is in a way the missing link to all ethical considerations bar none - but, instead, it's the question of "what is the best approach to so doing".

It's consequentialism. If happiness is not the consequence you wish to achieve, what is? — Hanover

Ok, so maximal eudemonia is the goal or else consequence pursued. The pivotal intent, so to speak. Doesn't the exact same apply to all theistic peoples out there?

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Basically, power is within the law and the usage of law. — Ludovico Lalli

Not one iota. Power is strictly in the enforcement of the law. Human laws are in effect nothing more than dictums, statements - which as statements can be used in any number of ways (such as lawyers and judges make use of these statements). But without any power of enforcing such human law, the law of itself becomes or else is powerless and so impotent.

Me, too. So we agree on that... If we disagreed, there would be more to say.

Does that make our agreement subjective? Is our agreement relative? Or is this talk of subjective/objective relative/(...absolute?) just fluff? — Banno

The answer to this question is contingent on how these words get defined and thereby understood.

Suppose that among its other attributes “subjective” necessarily entails that that specified is a) partial to only some aspects of all that is real and b) is subjected to aspects of all that is real toward which it is not partial to.

Further suppose that among its other possible attributes “objective” necessarily entails that that specified is a) not partial to some aspects of all that is real and b) not in any way subjected to aspects of all that is real toward which it is not partial to.

These two attributes then being necessary but insufficient definitions of each term.

Then, if there is an objective Good, all subjective beings will necessarily be subjected to it – irrespective of whether they are partial to it or not. Here, one need not have an affinity toward the Good to be subjected to it. More extremely, if all subjective beings were to have a repulsion toward the Good and thereby be in full agreement that the Good is in fact bad, sooner or later the Good would end up biting them in the ass – not because the Good is a ego-endowed selfhood which judges them but, instead, because here the Good is an objective aspect of reality at large to which all subjective being are thereby inevitably subjected to. Like gravity, given that it likewise in fact is objective, one might detest being so constrained and might want to fly off a tall building by flapping one’s hands, but gravity will have its (metaphorical) final say in the matter all the same. Agreement on what is good is here agreement on what in fact is an objective aspect of reality at large.

If there is no objective Good, then goodness is fully subjective: If enough people agree that murdering is good, murdering thereby here becomes good for the people in question. And there is no objective realty by which to measure this goodness of murdering. In parallel, using gravity as example again, if enough people were to agree that gravity is not a universal law and further agree that it is then possible to fly by the flapping of hands – given that there is nothing objective about gravity – then within these cohorts people would then begin flying by the flapping of their hands.

Other definitions of subjectivity and objective might well yield different results. But the question still gets answered based on how the terms specified get to be understood.