If there are areas in regard to which humans are necessarily ignorant (which I believe is unarguably true) — Janus

Given an example of such "necessary ignorance" which should remain off limits to investigation?

This is not even remotely similar to the human tendency to simply "make shit up" in the face of the unknown. — Janus

Ha. Scientific hypothesis are "made up shit in the face of the unknown" which can be empirically tested for.

What "proscription of thought, debate and investigation" is going on here in your opinion? — Janus

See my first question. If we are necessarily ignorant of X than there is an implicitly affirmed proscription of thought, debate, and investigation as pertains to X.

Perhaps you could offer an example which is not merely the expression of a different opinion. — Janus

Funny. All I have are opinions of various strengths, some of which pass a threshold beyond which I term these opinions fallible knowledge.

The other point is that once one starts to talk about "ineffable knowledge" one has entered a realm where argument simply cannot go. Do you think that can that be counted as "doing philosophy"? — Janus

Where have I affirmed "ineffable knowledge" in any of this debate?

Did someone say that the Good is beyond being? — Janus

You haven't been following the discussion too closely, then. Yes, Socrates/Plato stated that the Good as Form is beyond being.

I think it ironic how often Socrates' claim of ignorance is ignored. As I read them both Plato and Aristotle are skeptics is the sense of knowing that they do not know. — Fooloso4

Socrates's being aware that he does not hold infallible knowledge of anything whatsoever does not equate to a state of him ignoring that which is the case (this act of either willfully or unwillingly ignoring being the state of ignorance). Quite the opposite. Otherwise one runs into equating wisdom to ignorance - wherein one again deems ignorance to be a virtue.

but when we do not know what we do not know and believe we do know we are no longer even in the realm of opinion but ignorance. — Fooloso4

Here we agree in full.

Were Socrates/Plato to have understood "being" within the linguistic and cultural contexts of their time as consisting of that which comes into being and goes out of being, then the affirmation that the Good is not that just expressed would make sense.

By comparison:

It too is something other than what is and what is not. — Fooloso4

You affirm this conclusion as though it is true, or else as though it is the truth of what Socrates/Plato intended. Yet how is this affirmation not equivalent to the nonsensical statement that a certain given is neither X nor not-X? Or do you find this affirmation in any way sensible?

I wasn't gonna comment, but:

Fools have always sought to fill the 'domains' of necessary human ignorance with their "knowing". — Janus

We seem to either be suffering from an absence of mirrors in which to see our own selves and conducts on this forum or else from a self-righteous arrogance of somehow being beyond foolishness. Or maybe both.

Because science and its paradigms does not seek to accomplish the exact same feat? Or any other field of human knowledge?

The proscription of thought, debate, and investigation on a philosophy forum by some is telling.

How much misery this has caused humanity is incalculable. — Janus

Pales by comparison to the view that ignorance is a virtue.

We can know nothing about whatever might be "beyond being". — Janus

The issue was how does one define, else understand, being - this, specifically, in terms of Plato's affirmations.

The idea is nothing more than the dialectical opposite of 'being'. — Janus

I happen to agree. Hence my contention that there is something lost in translation in saying that "the Good is beyond being". This would entail that the Good is not. Which is contrary to Plato's works.

If we cannot know the good then we cannot know that it is beyond being, or that it is the cause both of things that are and knowledge of them. — Fooloso4

As I previously mentioned via analogy of gravitational singularities, this conclusion is erroneous. Here's another example, Kant knew that he did not known what things-in-themselves are but nevertheless knew that they are, that they are not phenomenal, and that they are a necessary cause for our perceptions of objects. As this again evidences, to not know X does not mean that one does not know of X's occurrence and of at least some of X's properties (by which it can be differentiated from not-X).

My interpretation of 'beyond being' is that it means 'beyond the vicissitudes of existence', 'beyond coming-to-be and passing away'. — Wayfarer

:100: And I'm in agreement with your post in general.

So, we are still left with the issue, what is external? — Manuel

Not an easy issue, but it does revolve around “external to what?” Here’s an outline of my current take on this: Suppose idealism. Fine, but even here my mind will be located within that body of percepts (both extrinsic and intrinsic; with no pun intended) which I immediately know to constitute my physical body to which, for example, this keyboard I’m now typing on is external. But then what if the cosmos is all a dream? Fine, but even here the conscious minds of those who I perceive to inhabit different bodies to my own will hold contents (intentions included) that are foreign, external, relative to my own mind. Here, maybe we all share a foundationally common, universal unconsciousness from which the dream of the cosmos in large part results but our conscious minds will yet be other relative to each other. So, even if there were to be no notion of physicality—though physicality is intrinsic to the objective idealism of CS Peirce, for example—there would yet be other conscious minds external to my own with which I interact. But how can I know that they are in fact conscious? They apprehend what I do and at times react to what I do: this then signifying conscious agency, one apart from and independent of my own. I can at times imperfectly predict as best I can what their contents of mind will consist of, but I cannot know what their contents of mind have, do, or will consist of. These other minds, then, inhabiting what is relative to me the external world, i.e. the world which is external to my own conscious mind.

I know there likely are questions/issues that could be raised of the just stated outline, and I'll be grateful for hearing of them. But if one is in search of infallible certainty, I’m as certain as I can be that such does not occur. For anything and at any time. (This likely being a different issue regarding fallibilism.)

If there is a Form of the Good but we do not know what the Good is, what can we say about it that we know to be true? It is not that it is difficult to know but that if only what is entirely is entirely knowable and the Good is beyond being, beyond what is, then it cannot be known. — Fooloso4

That A cannot know what X is does not imply that A cannot know of X's occurrence and of certain properties by which X is delineated.

By analogy, we know that no one knows what takes place within a gravitational singularity and, hence, of what a gravitational singularity thereby in this sense is. Despite this, we do know via inference that gravitational singularities occur - with one such occurring in the center of the Milky Way - and likewise know of certain properties by which they are delineated (e.g., black hole event horizons that lead toward the black hole's gravitational singularity wherein all notions of spacetime break down). A gravitational singularity of itself is thereby an entirety which is not entirely knowable.

Suppose Socrates/Plato in fact had no inferential knowledge of the Good's occurrence as Form (which is other than having knowledge, of any type, regarding what the Good is as Form). Do you then take all of Socrates/Plato's accounts (dialogues) regarding the Form of the Good to be entirely BS (if not outright deceptions)?

As to the Good being beyond being, while I don't speak Greek, much less Ancient Greek, there seems to be something lost in translation. For example, when appraised via modern English, in claiming that "the Good is beyond space and time" the Good is nevertheless postulated to be (although this not in any manner requiring any type of distance or duration).

This latter aspect, however, might just remain a matter of disagreement. But if you can evidence to the contrary, I'd be interested in the evidence you'd have to present.

I'm not entirely sure what point you're making. — Tom Storm

I’ll give it one last go: We all appraise ourselves as being better than some others in some respect, including that of comprehending something which these others seem hindered in grasping; but this does not entail that we thereby deem these others’ lives as being of lesser worth to our own or else in any way beneath us. This lack of entailment will then likewise apply to those philosophers - previously quoted - who have grasped something which the average man has not; something which is thereby esoteric to the masses. Hence, that a person A deems themselves better than person B in some respect doesn’t then necessitate that A finds themselves to be superior relative to B (such that B is then deemed inferior to A by A). In short, being “better than” does not entail being “superior to”. And we often want others to be better than us - this while likewise wanting that they not put themselves above us. Socrates, for example, was better than the masses in many respects but this does not then mean that Socrates found himself to be superior to the masses. The manner of his attested to death speaks to this. And, in for example addressing the Forms, Socrates had a lot of esoteric knowledge which he did his best to impart: by all appearances, he comprehended things which the average man was hindered in grasping.

So, yes, some philosophers are better than us in knowing things which we do not - things we have a hard time in grasping - but this betterness does not then necessitate they they're pricks which deem us as being beneath them.

Between what is entirely, the beings or Forms, and what is not, is becoming, that is, the visible world. Opinion opines about the visible world. But the good is beyond being. It is the cause of being, the cause of what is. It too is something other than what is and what is not. — Fooloso4

Can you expand on this? It so far seems to me to be contradictory: From my understanding, the Form of the Good is supposedly the most real of all givens that are or could be. As such, irrespective of how difficult the Form of the Good might be to know, the Form of the Good necessarily is and, hence, necessarily holds being (although of course not of a physical kind). This seems to me in part evidenced by your previous statement:

But as any reader off the Republic knows the Forms are presented as the fixed unchanging truth. — Fooloso4

It feels to me as if people in the past had some modicum of honour. It was possible to respect, and even love, those that wanted you dead, because you also wanted them dead, so it was that history pitted us against each other. Or maybe I am romanticising the epics of the past. — Lionino

Hard to say how much truth there is to its scenes of battle, but I greatly liked, and still greatly like, Homer's Iliad on this very count.

↪Fooloso4
I hear you; for a lay person this just sounds like a more academic version of, "I'm better than you because I know secrets". Essentially this:

Philosophers are traditionally and for the most part elitist. They regard mankind as children that they must hide the truth from. — Fooloso4 — Tom Storm

I’ll exaggerate this to make the intended point clearer: Who among us does not presume themselves better than all lesser animals in knowing something that is unknown by leaser animals? Be this something systems of mathematics, conceptual understandings of reality, the capacity to experience sublime beauty in life, or so forth.

Appraising ourselves as being better and worse than others in some respect is, it seems to me, intrinsic to our being.

Now, where the sh*t hits the fan, does one then equate being better than another in respect X to being of greater value than the other addressed?

Speaking for myself, if one can excuse the immodesty, I once risked my wellbeing by aggressively driving away an adult bulldog with no leash in a playground from my at the time puppy which the bulldog wanted to kill. (At hearing the scuffle, the owners came and took the bulldog away and that was that.). But my point being, I didn’t then deem my dog worthless and expendable on account of me knowing maths, holding conceptual understandings of reality, having the capacity to experience beauties, etc., all of which my dog was and could only forever remain fully ignorant of.

Tom, I doubt that you deem your views to be on a par in value to those views you vehemently disagree with and thereby are averse to. Neither do I or anyone else. But this being better than another (here addressing humans) on account of knowing something the other doesn’t does not necessarily entail that one then deems oneself as superior in value as a life relative to the life of those one debates with.

Neither ought this to be the case for a parent relative to their children, nor ought this be the case for a teacher relative to their students, nor ought it to then be the case for one of them elitist philosophers that @Fooloso4 was addressing relative to their audience of folk who don’t yet get what the philosopher supposedly gets.

Of course, what often enough does happen in reality-bites scenarios is not this stated ideal but a sense of authoritarian entitlement, wherein one does then deem themselves superior in value relatively to others who lack those insights which one personally has. This leads to bad parents, bad teachers, and to what I’d then appraise as bad philosophers. Same can also be said of bad scientists, bad leaders, bad doctors, bad presidents, etc. I'll even say bad pet owners, at least when it comes to more intelligent pets.

To sum things up, I damn well want my parents, my teachers, etc., and the philosophers I read to be better than me in terms of what they have, or had, to teach. And they ought to confidently known this before attempting to impart lessons to me. But if any were to think of me as an inferior in terms of the value of my life, they could then stick it where the sun don’t shine as far as I care. And I expect no less from those I interact with on this forum and whose views I at times disagree with.

A maybe messy and touchy topic, but there it is.

Thanks.

Metaphor, however, is not synonymous with esoterica. — 180 Proof

Metaphors we all commonly know, like being "lighthearted" or like having "feelings", will in one sense not be esoteric to us. In other ways, because their precise meaning (which we all typically get intuitively) will be difficult to express in literal manners, this in a philosophically satisfactory manner, they can yet be appraised to hold hidden (and in this sense esoteric) meanings.

Other metaphors - the ouroboros comes to mind as an example - will be esoteric in that we do not feel comfortable that we intuitively grasp what they, as metaphors, intend to convey. Or, as is the case with the ouroborous, at least what they intended to convey in past times when they were quite commonly utilized and portrayed in certain populaces.

That said, sure, metaphor is not equivalent to esoterica. But I do find that the two are entwined.

Metaphorical thinking may sometimes be dismissed at the cost of deeper understanding. Some may see the basics of logic as the most encompassing understanding, but it may lead to its questioning, and what are its limitations? — Jack Cummins

I'll venture to say that those who so dismiss metaphorical thinking can only be hypocrites, for - as per my initial post - they live and breathe in metaphorical thinking just as much as anyone else does. As to basics of logic, these to me strictly consist of the laws of thought, which by their very nature we all abide by whether we like to or not. These same laws will hence apply to metaphorical thinking just as much as they will to literalist thinking.

I get what you're saying, and in many ways I agree. As one example, in the absence of transparency and clarity, many who are unscrupulous will use the very notions of authority which they find others heed toward self-serving and unscrupulous ends. But this will apply as much to religions as it will to the sciences - with politics making use of both. I've too often heard of the label "scientifically proven" employed in circles which have no idea what the empirical scientific method is (being inductive, for one example, science always further evidences but does not ever conclusively prove, although it can conclusively falsify) ... and, as a result, a selling and buying of snake oil ensues. And of course, religion is often used as a facade for gaining advantage over those one dislikes or else deems to be in some way weak, etc.

That said:

The esoteric can on the whole not be tested so how do you propose we demonstrate its efficacy and how do we determine the good from the fallacious? — Tom Storm

The same will apply for a plethora of other things: ranging from the more ubiquitous notions of goodness, and justice, and the aesthetic to far more concrete things such as whether the romantic partner that states they love you in fact so does.

Not finding these many other issues either inconsequential or else somehow unreal, I then don't find this test-based reasoning to be sufficient in justifying a renunciation of the esoteric (in any of its various senses).

Its like saying the world should denounce all fables because on the whole we cannot test their contents and moralities, we cannot demonstrate their efficacy as guides to morality and how life should be best lived, and we cannot determine those that are good in this regard from those that instill fallacious morals and ideas.

Metaphor runs deep in our thinking: from being light-hearted to being on top of, and hence superior to, to having feelings, these not being tactile but instead being emotions one touches upon in one’s own total self rather than actively enacting as a consciousness (e.g., feeling a pang of envy rather than being envious)—a very long list, actually, with many examples not being as easy to express—all these convey a deeper sometimes hidden (esoteric) meaning relative to that which is literally affirmed.

As with the arts, some sometimes find metaphors to be the optimal means of conveying deeper, sometimes hidden (esoteric) truths. This then works well for conveying these truths to others who already are of a common enough mindset in many other respects. But it will backfire whenever others hold different foundational semantics, for the latter will at times drastically misinterpret what was intended to be conveyed.

Then there’s the analytic approach to philosophy. The leading benefit to this method of conveying truths is an improvement in clarity as to what is being addressed. But this comes at the cost of dryness, which serves as a big impediment to conveying what was intended. And, unlike the former method, it also limits what is conveyed to concepts that are already commonly known, making it that much more difficult to convey new ways of understanding or else realities that are not already publicly accepted and acknowledged. Here, then, the metaphors employed will be static in already being common standard, rather than being dynamic and new.

They mythical (and, by extension, much of the religious) can thereby be interpreted as the metaphorical, with Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell coming to mind in this field of study. Hence, as attempting to convey deeper, and at times hidden, truths or else realities.

These are my preliminary thoughts on the matter.

aiming to achieve the absolute emptiness, viz Absolute Nothingness, — Corvus

Again, our semantics are too different for me to engage in meaningful discussions with you on this particular topic. But I will point out that there is a distinction in Buddhism between annihilation (which I would again myself term nonbeing) and Nirvana as absolute bliss (which I would myself term being and, hence, not nothingness).

In annihilation, there is no bliss to be had; in Nirvana, however, this absolute bliss does occur.

For those going in different directions on this question I suspect the OP wasn't in the proper form to begin with as he calls it oxymoronic and contradictory. — Mark Nyquist

Well, to affirm that, "nothingness once was" is a contradiction in terms when nothingness is equated to nonbeing.

The term "was" is the past tense of "to be". Hence, the affirmation then claims that there in the past was a time when "lack-of-any-type-of-being held a type of being". Which can be logically contradictory contingent on semantics: At the same time and in the same respect, both a) nothing is/was (entailed by lack of any type of being) and b) something is/was (entailed by their being or once being a state of nothingness).

The only contention here would be if this is strictly due to our linguistic constraints of speech which do not accurately capture metaphysical possibilities or, else, whether our linguistics accurately conveys a logical contradiction in any such metaphysics.

Thank you for the relatively in-depth reply.

But when one believes in the existence of past life, and afterlife, then the existence could be named as non-being. One has lived in the past or existed as some other being in the past before birth, but there were changes of the being via change of time, or some event, the being in the past has gone through transformation to non-being. Then the current being has come to existence. — Corvus

The semantics the two of us use for being and non-being are significantly different. Because of this, I think we would be talking past each other in using these terms, and, by extension, the notion of nothingness. For one example, to me, iff ghosts were to be real and not merely constructs of some humans’ imaginations, then I would label ghosts as spirits or souls that hold actual being in the cosmos. This rather than labeling ghosts as non-beings (noun) or else expressing that they do not hold actual being (in verb form) in the cosmos. I’d hold the same for past lives and afterlives. So, in my use of words, neither ghosts, nor past lives, nor afterlives would pertain to nothingness or else nonbeing. And I would instead affirm that all these are different forms of being.

But again, this is more an issue of how we express ourselves rather than the content which we intend to express. Its just that without uniformity in the former, it is difficult toward impossible to find agreement on the latter.

I am not very knowledgeable on QM, and QM is not my first interest in my readings, but I feel that for the whole universe to exist, there must have been absolute space first. Without absolute space as absolute nothingness, no physical objects, motions or changes are possible. Time itself is from changes of the objects, hence without space there are no motions, no changes hence no time would be possible either. — Corvus

As a technical detail of the theory of relativity via which any linear model of the universe can be established (a linear model here being one in which the universe had an absolute beginning that progresses toward an absolute end), neither time nor space occurred prior to the Big Bang. The here assumed gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang is stated to have occurred is affirmed to be spaceless—this because space, just as much as time, becomes meaningless in a gravitational singularity. In the linear model just described, then, both space and time are stated to have started only upon this cosmically singular, initial gravitational singularity’s explosion, this being the Big Bang. As reference:

A gravitational singularity, spacetime singularity or simply singularity is a condition in which gravity is predicted to be so intense that spacetime itself would break down catastrophically. As such, a singularity is by definition no longer part of the regular spacetime and cannot be determined by "where" or "when". Gravitational singularities exist at a junction between general relativity and quantum mechanics; therefore, the properties of the singularity cannot be described without an established theory of quantum gravity. Trying to find a complete and precise definition of singularities in the theory of general relativity, the current best theory of gravity, remains a difficult problem.[1][2]

[…]

Modern theory asserts that the initial state of the universe, at the beginning of the Big Bang, was a singularity.[7] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_singularity

But again, I myself would label this initial singularity as something rather than as nothing(ness).

So that its known, rather than a linear model of the cosmos, I instead favor what could in summation be termed a cyclical model of the cosmos, a Big Bounce rather than a Big Bang as the labels go, which can also be established via the theory of relativity.

A handy concept in your pocket to explain the possible state of the universe before and after its existence. — Corvus

I can very much see this application for any linear model of the universe (as previously described). But again, I'm one to favor a more cyclical model of the universe and, because of this, I personally don't find use for this notion of before and after the universe's being.

As long as you have arguments with possibly some evidence, we are interested in looking into the ideas. — Corvus

This "we" which you here reference, they'd be "interested in looking into the ideas were arguments with possibly some evidence" to be provided by me for the way that the term nothingness gets interpreted by you in your arguments? I don't get it.

I made it clear what my background presumption in this respect was. To be clearer: Do you or do you not interpret nothingness as equivalent to non-being in you're arguments, this as I've explicitly stated I so far assume you do (with emphasis on this being an assumption)? Else do you take non-existence to be something other than non-being? If so, how are the two concepts different to you?

There is no one correct answer here. But the answer you provide will have significant baring on how the issue of nothingness is commonly addressed.

Then why couldn't you call an isolated empty space as absolute nothingness? Because they share the common qualities for the concepts and existence. Absolute space is also a physical entity demonstrated by Newton in his bucket experiment. — Corvus

Because an isolated empty space occurs relative to givens, such as its surroundings, and is thereby not absolute nothingness. (absolute does mean complete without exceptions).

As to the video you've linked to, it seems to me to pose a trick question from the get-go. By the very concept initially specified in the video, an "absolute empty space" (whose very cogency my addressed contention questions) cannot contain a bucket of water, never mind distant galaxies and starts, for the occurrence of any of these things would make it other than an absolute, i.e. a literally complete, empty space. Besides, Newtonian conceptions of absolute space have been debunked some time ago by the theory of relativity, no?

I will think about this point, and get back here for update, if I can come up with any idea either for agreeing or disagreeing. But here is a good article on the topic in SEP. — Corvus

That's perfectly fine, but I want to point out that my post, or else contention, was in the form of a question, and not in the form of an argument one then can agree with or disagree with: Again, in what sense can space occur, and thereby be, in the complete absence of distance(s) between givens?

When you say Absolute Nothingness, it would be the space with absolutely nothing in it, not even a particle of air. The total vacuum state of the space can be called Absolute Nothingness. — Corvus

I take it that by "absolute nothingness" one means absolute non-being rather than being which is devoid of things and hence thingness. Nirvana, as one example, is reputed to be devoid of any thingness while yet being, hence not being nothingness.

If so, in which sense can space occur, i.e. be, in the absence of any and all distances?:

Distance is always relative to things - even if they're construed to not be material (e.g., the distance between two psyches: two psyches might be very far apart, this being a distance, strictly due to their differing views ... if, that is, one were to not take this example as being purely metaphorical). At any rate, here is my contention:

If there are no things between which there is distance, then there is no occurring distance period. And if there is no occurring distance, I so far fail to see how there can occur any sensible understanding of space. Again, what does distance-less space signify?

(The quantum vacuum state yet has distances between particles that appear out of it and disappear into it, for instance.)

This sounds a bit like "consciousness is consciousness of" which is Sartre. I always liked that. I am conscious of a cat, so the cat in a consciousness can also be called me being conscious of a cat, or just summed up as a particular moment of me, of self. — Fire Ologist

There is a logical equivocation in what consciousness is when implicitly stipulating that one’s (consciousness’s) being conscious of the cat is equivalent to the (percept of) the cat being an aspect of one’s consciousness. The first is consciousness in the sense of “that which is conscious of”; the second is consciousness in the sense of “all of which a conscious being, aka consciousness, is conscious of”.

For example, when affirming, “a memory brought into consciousness,” or else, “a conscious memory (rather than an unconscious memory),” one will implicitly stipulate the just mentioned second sense of “consciousness”. But when affirming, “I am conscious of memory X,” one will be implicitly stipulating the first just mentioned sense of “consciousness”. A conscious memory will hence never be a memory which in and of itself as memory holds awareness of other (the first sense of “consciousness”) but will instead always be a memory which one as conscious being is conscious of (the second sense of consciousness).

If interested, I clarify this distinction in the following chapter of my ongoing work: Chapter 12: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part I—Intentions (specifically, section 12.2). But, so its known, I do make use of several newly coined terms—many of which were introduced in previous chapters—so as to be able to adequately demarcate that which is being addressed.

My main point being, the “I” (or else "self" when thus interpreted) addressed in the thread cannot (or at least should not) then be consciousness in the second sense of “all that a conscious being is conscious of”. It can (or should) only be consciousness in the first sense of “that which is of itself aware”—be this an awareness of its very own self as that which is aware (e.g., I am (aware/conscious of being) content and intrigued as that first-person point of view which is aware/conscious and is thereby aware/conscious of other, such as of a memory) or else be this an awareness of other than itself (e.g., I am aware/conscious of a memory regarding what happened to me a week past—this memory being other relative to me as that which is aware/conscious of the memory).

↪javra
Nice icon. — Banno

:grin: Just saw this. A sincere thanks!

Btw, if you're still interested, can you offer any references in philosophical literature to the notion of change occurring sans time, i.e. in the absence of before and after?

I so far still can't wrap my mind around "change that occurs in the absence of any 'before the stated change' and 'after the stated change'" ... but I know enough to know that I should never say never when it comes to philosophical proposals.

--------

Sorry @Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though.

The main problem with your argument there is that it introduces elements that does not follow out of the science. — Christoffer

The occurrence of consciousness doesn't follow out of the science either. Unless one here wants to deny the reality of consciousness on these very same grounds, then this problem you here express is in no way an impediment to the logically valid supposition of a deity-inclusive physicalism, one accordant to laws of nature both currently known and unknown.

It should also be mentioned that - while the scientific method is contingent on the occurrence of a singular, universally existent, physical reality - the scientific method is in no way contingent upon physicalism. As previously noted, one can logically maintain the same singular, universally existent, physical reality within the objective idealism of C. S. Peirce - for one example of an idealism that supports the physical, replete with its natural laws.

Emergence doesn't mean "anything goes", we don't see a pool of bacteria spontaneously conduct magic because such emergent property "just happened", we still see it as a causal line of events, but engaging in extreme complexity. The emerging property is still dependent on the composition of the underlying systems and parts and limited by their physical composition. Such limitations may also play into the emergent properties. — Christoffer

In respect to emergence, one cannot via current knowledge predict novel cases of emergence. The stipulation of emergence is in no way predictive - but, instead, is always an ad hoc (to the purpose (of accounting for)) explanation for that which is observed or else postulated to be real, and this always after the fact of said observations and/or postulates (hence always also being post hoc).

If emergence is accepted, there is then nothing about the intrinsic properties of emergence that preclude realms of emergent reality wherein deities dwell resulting from supervenience on the consciousness of humans and lesser life forms. (As one can claim that science shall one day figure out consciousness, one here can just as validly claim that science shall in the further future still some day figure out the workings and operations of such corporeal-consciousness-emergent incorporeal deities.)

-----

As I initially wanted to illustrate, physicalism endeavors to rationally conclude tacitly maintained convictions - but the proposal of emergence as a physical account of (some aspects of) reality does not of itself successful confine physiclaism to that which is tacitly maintained. With the case in point being a logically valid metaphysical possibility of a deity-inclusive physicalism.

For all the reasons just mentioned, emergence is then a red herring in the attempts to validate physicalism as it's commonly understood.

Yet I think the real question is how fruitful is the assumption of reductionism itself? I view physicalism as one general answer to reductionism. The physicalist is happy to stop somewhere and waive off else in philosophy as near nonsense. Brush everything else off with accusing others of talking about spirits. Or at least something that isn't so important. Has this consequences?

Basically naive reductionism leaves us to ask about the foundations of everything from physicists, as if they somehow would have the cradle of knowledge about everything. Yet the fact is that even if a complex system is a sum of it parts, just looking at those parts individually don't answer much about the operations of the complex system itself. A metallurgist just looking at scraps of metal cannot answer how a jet aircraft flies, just as a microbiologist looking at cells has a hard time to explain our current societies. — ssu

:up:

As I tangentially alluded to in another post, were reductionism to be a valid means of explaining - and thereby gaining knowledge of - all that is, we then ought to be able to explain all that is via strict analysis of the omnipresent quantum vacuum state in and of itself. As in, I'm currently motivated to write this post because the quantum vacuum did this and that. One then could even neatly replace the "God did it" answer to everything that explains nothing with a "the quantum vacuum did it" answer to everything that explains nothing.

Just want to second your observations with this. And of course there's other means of approaching the issue of reductionism.

I've decided that ontologies are a lot like impressionist paintings. They look better from far way. :rofl: — Count Timothy von Icarus

For my part, I applaud this sentiment. :grin:

Emergence of individual minds from, and their supervenience on, the physical can be in principle explained just five via certain versions of idealism, such as that of Peirce’s objective idealism.

But I here want to mainly illustrate that this emergence and supervenience route of argumentation is a red herring avoiding the very issues concerned in respect to what physicalism is:

There is no logical reason why spiritual realms—replete with forest and house fairies, ghosts, angels, and less than omnipotent deities that can thereby conflict with each other—cannot all be hypothesized to exist via emergence from, and supervenience upon, that realm of reality consisting of corporeal consciousness, awareness, and mind applicable to life in general—with the latter itself being affirmed to emerge from and supervene on physical particles, fields, and the like … ultimately from and upon the omnipresent quantum vacuum state.

Yet, point being, this supposition would be antithetical to physicalism for tacitly maintained reasons—something to do with an aversion to spirituality as expressed. Physicalism though it would yet technically be given the premise of emergence and supervenience.

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As to rejecting these here hypothesized apparitions on grounds that they are not empirically verifiable, neither are consciousnesses (the philosophical problem of other minds attests to this), whose reality no one here is debating. So lack of empirical proof isn't much of a rational argument against the deity-inclusive physicalism just expressed.

On the other hand, asking me "how" and "why" questions regarding this hypothetical is akin to me asking any physicalist "how" and "why" questions regarding gas atoms (two hydrogen and one oxygen) comprising a liquid when a grouping of H2O molecules are at room temperature. I have no good answer to give, no more than the physicalist does.

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No psychobabble here included or intended, but if by this presented argument one would want to project upon me some laughable fear of annihilation upon death or of some such other physicalist proposition, I’ll then duly project upon the stated physicalist the phobia of an afterlife … together with psychologizations of the deeds in their life which might make this fear so potent.

I'm hoping replies to this post, if any, don’t lower themselves to such speculative and ad hominem rebuttals. If replied to, I'd much rather be rationally evidenced wrong in the argument just made.

You've misinterpreted what I meant by "physicality in total". In the context used, I intended that physicality of which we are a) directly acquainted with via direct experience (this being concrete physical reality of which we know via our immediate physiological senses) and b) that physicality which we infer to have been, to currently be, and to be in the future - with an example of the latter being physicality before life emerged from nonlife within the cosmos.

Is there a way we could distinguish between laws of thought being laws of nature, and 'laws of thought' being incorrigible intuitions related to language and regularities in nature, that have developed in us from a young age? — wonderer1

I will answer yes: rationally. If laws of thought develop from physicality, then, prior to their development, physicality would not be in any conceivable way bound by them. I'm here primarily thinking evolutionarily. This would then differentiate them from laws of nature.

Yet, in favor of the point I intended to initially make regarding some form of idealism, we nevertheless require that physicality in total be intelligible via laws of thought in order to infer that laws of thought in any way develop from physicality.

The arguments for physicalism as the OP asked are best when we simply limit the definition of existence to only something material. Concepts, language, ideas, mathematics, logic, all of that can then simply be said to be something else. Perhaps true and logical, but not something that exists.

Of course some can argue that this just is circular reasoning and isn't very useful as we do need all those concepts, models etc. to say anything relevant about what does exist materially in our universe. — ssu

I view things to go deeper than that.

Question: In what way can the basic laws of thought either rationally or empirically be evidenced to not in and of themselves be basic laws of nature writ large—such that that which is logically impossible is then deemed to be part and parcel of physical reality?

If laws of thought govern all that is physical, then it is irrational to hold that these very laws of thought emerged (via supervenience or otherwise) out of that which is physical. Instead entailing that the physical itself is contingent on the occurrence of laws of thought—with laws of thought being commonly taken to not be in and of themselves physical unless they were to emerge from the physical.

This then directly points to some form of idealism (an omni-this-and-that deity not being in any way required for its occurrence).

(Quantum weirdness—such as the delayed-choice quantum eraser—is no man’s land in terms of proper interpretations. And these interpretations commonly regard what is metaphysically possible rather than logically so. So quantum weirdness in itself will not evidence what I’m here asking for.)

I get the sense there is an assumption at play that has not been articulated with physicalism that you are concerned is problematic? — NotAristotle

I'm not sure it's worth debating, merely provided you with an answer to your initial request. But as to this second question, I have addressed it here:

It’s worse than circular reasoning: it’s reasoning that the cart pulls the horse forward. — javra

... where the cart is the ill-defined "the physical" and the horse is the very laws of thought and value-structures previously addressed which are prerequisites for any conclusion.

Can someone spell out to me what is being reduced and why this is a bad thing? (Because if the answer is subjective experience, I don't see in what sense physicalism is a "reduction"). — NotAristotle

Off the top of my head, all things pertaining to laws of thought and to all aspects of value theory (including the metaethics of what “good” is) is in physicalism reduced to the physical—this when laws of thought and value per se (such as one’s valuing of truths or of correct reasoning or of objectivity—or else not) are prerequisites of arriving at any conclusion whatsoever, including that of physicalism wherein everything is reduced to the physical. Moreover, a clear definition/demarcation of “the physical” is wanting to begin with. It’s worse than circular reasoning: it’s reasoning that the cart pulls the horse forward. I’m a great supporter of the scientific method, but science (when thus understood) cannot address these issues in principle.

Let's assume for the sake of the argument that 'finite' is not included in the definition of 'person' (henceforth also called 'subject', so that it may also imply supernatural beings), so it does not figure a logical contradiction. If an infinite subject is that which encompasses the whole universe, it is metaphysically possible that this subject exists. If by infinite however we mean something that spans not only its world but all worlds, then it is not metaphysically possible because we know at least one world which he does not span: ours. However, I would say that by then, the definition of infinite is twisted to mean something that actually reflects "necessary (in all possible worlds)", after all. — Lionino

Infinity itself is a tricky concept. I once started a thread on the topic and got brutally pummeled by less than charitable mathematical folk for the terminology I employed. So I’ll here employ different terminology for it.

We often enough think of infinity in terms of quantity. Even Cantor’s Absolute Infinity, for example, is postulated to a number bigger than any other quantity. Going back to its roots, though, infinity signifies that which is devoid of limits and boundaries. In this sense then, to be bound, for example, to any aspect of space (distance), time (duration), or number (quantity) is to be finite, this rather than infinite. The Ancient Greek notion of Anaximander’s Apeiron gives one example of this latter notion of the infinite.

Most infinities we can think of are thereby in some respects bounded and only in some others unbounded. For example, Cantor’s Absolute Infinity is yet bounded to, and hence limited by, quantity. For the sake of convenience, I’ll here label these bounded infinities, or else the boundedly infinite—and contrast these to unbounded infinity, or else the boundlessly infinite. A line, a geometric plane in Euclidian space, and Cantor’s Absolute Infinity are all then bounded infinities; whereas the Apeiron is one example of that which is boundlessly infinite.

Given all that, what then does the phrasing of an “infinite subject” intend to imply?

I presume that “a subject” entails being a subject of awareness, which I further take to entail being aware of other. If so, all subjects are boundedly infinite in some regard—for one example, their/our awareness can, I think, be safely deemed infinitely divisible in principle. For instance, I see a rock + background: the rock has infinitely many aspects I could address in principle (variations in color, texture, curvature, etc.; relations between these; similarities and dissimilarities to other things I could be aware of; etc.)—given that I don’t get bored in so doing and that I would so address for all eternity. And this is not to yet get into the rock’s background.

We might by the just stated then affirm—in a rather bizarre formulation—that all subjects (of awareness) are thereby infinite at all times for as long as they occur. This on grounds that their awareness of other, by which they are principally defined, can only so be. (I might add, I can’t yet fathom of anything spatiotemporal that can’t be deemed to be boundedly infinite in at least one respect; as one example previously mentioned for an “infinite dog”, the mapping of anything physically spatial via geometric points leads to an infinite quantity of geometric points constituting whatever it is that is being addressed, thereby making the thing boundedly infinite. But if all items in a set of items are infinite in the same respect, this characteristic ceases to be any difference between them: an infinite apple then equals a plain old apple, so there then is no reason for the adjective of “infinite”.)

So no, when thus understood, an infinite subject would not be a logical contradiction—thereby allowing for metaphysical postulates wherein infinite subjects of awareness are interpreted to hold an awareness that encompass this world or that. (Don’t we as subjects of awareness in at least some ways encompass the very possible worlds we are aware of?)

But so construing all subjects of awareness to be infinite is intuitively odd. We typically by “infinite” want to convey something more. I venture that oftentimes (if not always) this something more will turn out to be logically contradictory: as I find to be the case with an omniscient, else omnipresent, else omnipotent subject (of awareness).

At any rate, the notion of “a boundlessly infinite subject” can only be a logical contradiction: at the same time and in the same respect that addressed is a) bounded to being a subject of awareness (entailed by being a subject) and b) is in no way bounded to being a subject of awareness (entailed by being boundlessly infinite). To use the same example I previously mentioned, the Apeiron cannot logically be a subject of awareness which thereby is cognizant of things which are other than itself—for, if for no other reason, this would then limit the Apeiron to so being a subject of awareness, which contradicts the Apeiron being perfectly limitless in all respects. (While I question Anaximander's notion of the Apeiron on logical grounds, another possible to conceive of boundless infinity is that of Nirvana without remainder, this among yet others, such as the Ein Sof; none of which are subjects of awareness that thereby dwell in a duality between self and other)

(In a bit of hurry at present so I’m not double checking the just written. If there’s glaring mistakes in it I’m sure someone will let me know.)

Got it. Just wanted to reply to with a :grin:

I'm saying that 'substance' is a poor choice of words, for the reasons I gave. — Wayfarer

Aristotle himself made use of the term ὑποκείμενον (hypokeimenon) and demarcated it in the following way:

Aristotle defined a hypokeimenon in narrowly and purely grammatical terms, as something which cannot be a predicate of other things, but which can carry other things as its predicates.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon#Overview

The term "hypokeimenon" can well translate into fundamental, or else metaphysical, “substrate” - which could be interpreted to be synonymous to “substance” as it's now commonly used but avoids the issues which you’ve addressed in regard to the latter term’s technical philosophical meanings.

Of additional note: the Wikipedia page specifies "material substrate" but, going by Aristotle's definition alone, one could also conceive of a mental substrate - or else some other type of metaphysical substrate as might be the case with neutral monism.

As to usage (this as most will commonly interpret things nowadays): Mind - or else, maybe, something mental, such as consciousness - is the metaphysical substrate in idealism; matter is the metaphysical substrate in materialism; and both are metaphysical substrates of equal importance in Cartesian dualism.

Do you see any flaw with the term “metaphysical substrate” as it’s just been made use of?

Edit: in my haste, I replaced "substratum" with "substrate". But they are synonymous, and the second does sound better to my ears (so far at least).

Does a causation chain have being? It does if there is a dog at its end. — jgill

Yup, philosophical issues 101. Which some will doubtlessly want to be spelled backwards, no less.

Because contemplation is passive. — Banno

We inhabit two very different minds. I'm always active in what I contemplate. You claim not to be. OK.

You know, Einstein and the moon. — jgill

Ah shoot, gonna turn this thread into one about best understandings regarding an objective idealism ontology?

I'll pass on that for now. All the same, the piece of wood or metal can well occur were all humans to somehow disappear this very instant, as would the moon - as would also persist the signs we humans would leave behind, as in both a) lines representing the idealization of a perfect inch and b) the word "money". These physical things would yet occur but - in granting no other equally or more advanced intelligence in the cosmos - these physically occurrent things would be utterly devoid of the meaning we deem them to hold. They would be utterly meaningless to dogs, bacteria, etc. But again, I don't want to turn this thread into one regarding ontologies.

They still lurk, but haven't posted in months. — Banno

One again wrong in your presumptions. Tis me (formerly "evolog" on the old website, don't you know).

It might be better to think of inches and dollars as something we do rather than something we contemplate. — Banno

Because contemplation is not something we do?

Does an inch exist on a ruler without someone looking at it? — jgill

An inch no more exists without anyone contemplating it than does any word (such as the word “money”) exist without anyone contemplating it. In other words, it doesn’t. It is 100% a socially constructed and established unit of measurement - whose actuality as such is fully contingent on that cohort of minds (and their individual process of thought) which accept it as commonly established construct. Same is true of a centimeter, and so forth.

Long ago, one of the regulars here insisted that Mount Everest did not have a height until it was measured. — Banno

And I bet they still maintain this bit of advanced philosophical thought.