Those different entailments rely on different interpretations of what is meant by"self' so they are not speaking about the same things. — Janus

No, as per my previously given example, they are (or at least can be) speaking about, or else referencing, the exact same thing via the term "self" - but from two different perspectives and, hence, in two different respects (both of these nevertheless occurring at the same time). Again, one perspective being the mundane physical world of maya/illusion/magic-trick and the other being that of the ultimate, or else the only genuine, reality to be had: that of literal nondualistic being. The validity, or lack of, of this Buddhist metaphysics being here inconsequential. As logic goes, here A entails both B and notB at the same time but in different respects/ways.

Is it not a given that we should understand A and B to refer to the same things in both? — Janus

No. We presume this to be so most of the time for good reason, but it is not a universal given.

Consider: the metaphysical understanding of reality, R, entails both that a) there is a self and b) there is no self.

If the entailment here referred to in regard to both (a) and (b) occurs in the exact same respect (to include relative to the exact same metaphysical or else philosophical perspective concerning the exact same reality/actuality - this even if various levels of reality/actuality were to be implicitly endorsed, e.g. the mundane physical reality of maya and the ultimate reality of literal nonduality), then it would be a flagrant contradiction and thereby a necessarily false proposition. One can of course argue that this is in fact the case, but one cannot thereby establish that this is what the speaker in fact held in mind and thereby intended to express. (Example: the speaker might have intended that in the mundane physical reality of maya there of course occurs the reality of selfhood, this just as much as that in the ultimate reality of literal nonduality no such thing as selfhood is possible - with both these affirmed truths being equally entailed by the very same R at the same time but in the different respects just mentioned.)

Promises entail a commitment to do all that is within one’s means to do to bring about the future reality of that promised so that it in fact becomes manifest. So that one makes a commitment to steadfastly intend that which one promises. Intentions in general, though, can very well change on a whim, if not also via deliberative reasoning, this without any commitment to in fact fulfilling that which is momentarily intended—such that here one merely involves oneself in a possible future outcome without in any way committing to it.

Why am I mentioning this? Only because I feel obliged to some hereabouts (no, not to you @Michaell) to share a good humored joke:

Q: What is the difference between the chicken and the pig in a breakfast of eggs and ham?
A: The chicken was merely involved; the pig was committed.

Hence, in its own equivocal way, clearly evidencing there being quite the substantial difference between mere involvement with possible future realities (i.e., mere intentions at large) and commitment to them (i.e., promises).

I think this argument sort’a works. Gives me reason to smile at least.

That said, I’ll be taking my leave.

In a context where you detect that "exist" is being used to talk about corporeal entities, would you agree that they don't exist? — frank

In such a strict context of corporeal entities, interpersonal relationships - such as friendships - do not exist either: a relationship cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, etc. and its attributes cannot be mathematically measured, and so is not corporeal. But for most of us at least, though we know them to exist, interpersonal relationships are never "changeless and eternal abstract objects".

It is just the case that if you murder then you will be punished. — Michael

Only if you're caught. Perfect crimes are never punished. Ergo ...

There is no need to imagine phantom abstract entities. — Michael

A "relationship" - which, as my previous post, can only obtain just in case there likewise occur one or more obligations between the parties concerned - is only a "phantom abstract entity"; what a worldview this must be like to live in.

As it stands, what they are hasn't been explained, what purpose they serve hasn't been explained, and what evidence there is for them hasn't been explained.

They just seem to be meaningless and superfluous. — Michael

As to what an obligation is: Obligation, from ob- (“to”) + ligare (“to bind”): the act or process of binding, hence limiting, hence determining, hence constraining possible future states of affair relative to relationship(s) between the psyches addressed—i.e., relative to the persisting interactions, both present and future, of the psyches in question (these persisting interactions being that which defines relationships (and not necessarily of a romantic kind)).

As to what their purpose is: To benefit either some or else all parties concerned. Issues of fairness and unfairness being at play here. E.g., the typical slave will consider their obligations to the slave-master unfair.

As to evidence for them: on equal par to evidence for interactions between different parties that persist over time.

Because it seeks explanations in terms of physics, in which the notion of reason in the sense of ‘the reason for’ is excluded. — Wayfarer

Very much so. And it likewise also fails to account for the basic principles/laws of thought upon which all formal systems of logic and the supposed coherency of modern day naturalism (here being a full synonym for physicalism(s)) are necessarily founded - this as though these very principles/laws of thought ubiquitous to all sentience (consciously so or otherwise) were to themselves be in some way utterly unnatural (but instead strictly artificial, as in being a human artifice) due to not being themselves accountable for in terms of modern day physics.

And this un-naturalism of basic principles/laws of thought will equally apply to traditional materialism and to all modern-day variants (e.g. those making due with information theory, thermodynamics, and the like).

This logically derived un-naturalism of laws of thought can in turn be found to undermine the very reasoning by which this derivation is obtained as being a factual state of affairs - at the very least in so far as this very derivation (necessarily, via laws of thought) makes all reasoning perfectly, or else radically, relativistic.

And it likewise stands in stark contrast with interpretations of natural-ism such as those I've previously alluded to here:

[...] natural-ism as intepreted by ancient Stoics via their notion of Logos, to which even the polytheistic gods, were they to occur, are necessarily bound—this, for example, as expressed by Cicero in his The Nature of the Gods, which I deem far more accurate than any modern day rendition of what Stoicism used to be and uphold [...] — javra

For, in this just quoted example, the laws of thought are part and parcel of the very Logos from which the world is both built and construed - and, hence, are an integral part of what is deemed "natural" (aka, in-born, hence innate, and this relative to the cosmos itself) in the fullest sense of the term. (But, as noted, this latter ancient Stoic notion of natural-ism fully accommodates the possible reality of, for example, polytheistic deities as being aspects of Nature at large, to not here get into the notion of "spirit", as in its place relative to the anima mundi (aka, the "world soul").)

Do (A entails B) and (A entails notB) contradict each other? — bongo fury

Only if (A entails B) and (A entails notB) occur in the exact same respect (and, obviously, at the same time), which I find is most often the case.

I think issues like the cat are simply mistranslations and over simplifications. The statement should be something like:

The cat is sitting across the threshold of the house, therefore some of the cat is in the house and some of the cat is in the house. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't find

A = a cat is sleeping outstretched on the threshold of the entry door to a house. — javra

to be physically impossible. With a quick whimsical online search, found this pic: https://www.instagram.com/atchoumthecat/p/C5ddrTwLzR6/

In this one pic, the 4-month-old cat's tail is partly inside and some of its whiskers are outside, and the threshold is to a sliding door rather than an entry door, but I think it amply illustrates my point: given a sufficiently wide threshold and a sufficiently small cat, A as I described it can in fact obtain. This as a real-world example.

Yes, this is similar to ↪Count Timothy von Icarus
's vampire argument. — Leontiskos

Yes, I forgot to give Count Timothy a mention. Thanks for pointing that out. I thought the example of the cat to be more “real-world” than that of vampires in that it is something that can physically happen in our world, and most likely has. But yes, it’s the same general issue in respect to logic.

As to polyvalent systems of logic, I’m one to find the notion of “partial truths” to be quite applicable to the world we live in. One of the most immediate and commonplace examples of this can be that of what one is seeing at any moment M. We generally say, “I am looking at …” to implicitly specify what we are willfully focusing on visually. But to specify what we are seeing is a quite different matter; such as, for example, were a judge to ask one “what did you see that night?” In such a context, it is literally impossible to give a “full truth” regarding what one saw or else sees: from the issue of needing to describe everything one is aware of occurring within one’s peripheral vision to that of needing to describe all the minute details of what one witnesses in one’s focal point of vision. A book would be required for this, and even then the telling would still be incomplete. Partial truths, such as that of what we are seeing, could then be contrasted with each other for degrees of fullness; such that what results, as one example among others, is the comparative attributes of some proposition being more true (or truthful), else most true, by comparison to some other proposition (and this without necessitating any falsehoods being expressed). In contrast, I find that falsehoods in the form of lies will always contain some (at least background) truths in order to be in any way believed by those to whom they're told. And in all this I find extensive interest. But maybe all this talk of partial truths is too far afield for the current thread. Although it certainly entwines quite well with most if not all systems of polyvalent logic.

All the same, thank you for the thoughtful reply, the "edit" portion of it included. Yes, my other post regarding "yes and no" was poorly formulated for the context; other such possible answers can include "it is and it isn't" and "they're the same but different" (which I do find interest in as pseudo-contradictions of sorts); but yes, they don't quite address implications.

You could also put this a different way and say that while the propositions ((A→(B∧¬B)) and (B∧¬B) have truth tables, they have no meaning. They are not logically coherent in a way that goes beyond mere symbol manipulation. We have no idea what (B∧¬B) could ever be expected to mean. We just think of it, and reify it as, "false" - a kind of falsity incarnate.* — Leontiskos

Here’s a possible real-world example (which I think is common knowledge in some circles, though I don’t now recall where I picked up the example from):

A = a cat is sleeping outstretched on the threshold of the entry door to a house.
B = the cat is in the house
notB = the cat is not in the house

In this example, how does A not imply both B and notB in equal measure?

It so far seems to me that one can then affirm that, due to A, both B and notB are equally true. Furthermore, the just specified can then be affirmed with the same validity as affirming that A implies both B and notB to be equally false.

This, however, would still not be a contradiction, for while both B and notB occur (else don’t occur) at the same time as a necessary consequence of A, they nevertheless both occur (else don’t occur) in different respects.

As I so far see things, this addresses the principle of the excluded middle. But the fault would then not be with this principle of itself but, instead, with faulty conceptualizations regarding the collectively exhaustive possibilities in respect to what happens to in fact be the actual state of affairs.

This same type of reasoning can then be further deemed applicable to well enough known statements such as “neither is there a self nor is there not a self”. This latter proposition would be contradictory only were both the proposition’s clauses to simultaneously occur in the exact same respect. Otherwise, no contradiction is entailed by the affirmation.

Asking this thinking I (as a novice when it comes to formal modern logics) might have something to learn from any corrections to the just articulated.

And if you think they do contradict each other, does that mean they can't both be true at the same time? — flannel jesus

Haven't read through all the posts so far. Still, to given one answer:

They'd contradict each other only if they are claimed to occur both at the same time and in the same respect. This irrespective of what "imply" might be taken to precisely specify.

For example, to the question "Is that song any good?" can validly be replied, "Yes and no," without any logical contradiction. Here, yes and no at the same time but in different respects: such that yes, the song is of substantial quality and thereby good and no, the song will be unable to make any revenue and is thereby bad.

Hence, here, song A implies (is taken to hold as a necessary consequence) quality B (here that of "goodness") and song A implies notB - this at the same time, but in different respects, and, hence, in perfectly non-contradictory manners.

Maybe this isn't the best use of the term "implies", but the same principle remains.

Aristotle has it that the Prime Mover must be an intellectual nature. Where Neoplatonism saw its most expansive development was in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic tradition, and there the One was always a person (or three persons of one substance). — Count Timothy von Icarus

As an apropos to this:

Although maybe not with as much detail as you might be, I’m of course aware of the historical evolution of concepts in relation to Plotinus’ the One and the Abrahamic (in many a way, biblical) notion of God—whereby the two otherwise quite disparate concepts were converged, tmk not by the Neoplatonists but by Abrahamic philosophers.

Tying this in with parts of my previous post, while I’ve so far upheld the possibility of global purpose sans a global creator of such purpose, I’ll now do my best to make the far more stringent argument that the ancient Neoplatonic notion of the One is logically incompatible with the Abrahamic notion of God as an omni-this-and-that “I-ness”, hence “ego”, hence “psyche”, hence (given the incorporeality and absolute supremacy of the aforementioned attribute(s)) “deity”.

For the sake of brevity, I’ll here simply address all these differently termed attributes mandatory to an (I should add, non-mystical) understanding of the Abrahamic God as “the supreme deity” or “SD” for short.

This will be contrasted with the bona fide Neoplatoic notion of the Good which was also termed the One in Neoplatonism, which I’ll here address as “TD” for short.

(Not that I hold the acronyms "SD" and "TD" in high regard, but maybe their use will dispel some of the connotative baggage that might, for some at large, cloud the intended logic with emotive overtones.)

All this will assume reasoning via logic, and thereby dispel any notion of SD being this way and that way in manners that are beyond, and hence unconstrained, by basic laws of thought. In other words, the affirmation that SD is beyond all human comprehension but is nevertheless the way that such and such interprets (obviously, human written) biblical scripture, even when these interpretations of the bible are blatantly contradictory logically (e.g., that SD is literally omnipotent but was however not in control of the not-yet-slithering serpent’s doings in the garden of Eden; else, that SD is omnipresent but was nevertheless limited to bipedal form separated from the earth upon which he walked when walking through the garden of Eden; etc.) will here be fully eschewed in favor of upholding a stringent logical consistency.

1) Either SD behaves (does things) in a) fully purposeless manners or else in b) at least partly purposeful manners. (There can be no “in-between” state of affairs relative to these two options.)

2) If (1.a.), then SD is in no way governed by any telos which SD pursues in anything that SD does. Because here there is never any intent (this being one possible form of a telos) actively held onto and pursued, this further entails that SD never does anything intentionally. Because SD then does not engage in any intentional behaviors whatsoever, SD cannot then design anything whatsoever. Here, then, SD cannot impart any type of purpose to anything.

3) If (1.b.), then SD is governed by at least one telos which SD deems worthy of fulfilling (i.e., deems beneficial and thereby good). Because it is a telos (which SD understands as good), this strived for end cannot be yet actualized by SD while SD holds it as intent and thereby purposefully behaves. Moreover, and more importantly, this intent via which SD behaves purposefully cannot have logically been created by SD for, in so purposefully creating, SD will necessarily have yet been striving toward some telos (a yet unactualized future state of being) which SD deemed to be good. A purposeful SD will hence, logically, at all times be moving toward that which is (deemed to be) good without yet having actualized it as SD’s intent/end—a moved toward intent/end which is logically requite for SD to create anything purposively (very much the creation of so termed “everything”) and, hence, which cannot be the (purposeful) creation of SD. Hence, in (1.b.) one then logically obtains the following necessary consequence: SD is forever subject to (and constrained by, hence limited by, hence determined by) an intent which SD deems good which SD nevertheless in no way created.

Here assuming (1.b.) for SD, contrast this to TD as defined by genuine Neoplatonism:

TD is that end which, directly or indirectly, ultimately determines all things (including all psyches, with this terminology yet grounded in process theory understandings of “things” and “psyches”, and, as reminder, with all deities being by definition incorporeal psyches, very much including SD) without being in itself in any way limited, hence without being in any way determined by something other—such as, for example, some telos which it itself approaches.

This, in and of itself, I so far take to logically demonstrate the incongruity of the two notions: that of the Neoplatonic TD and the Abrahamic SD.

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Somewhat related to this, TD is take to of itself be the metaphysical pinnacle of intellect—this only in so far as intellect is addressed in the sense of “understanding”, but is in no way an intellect in the sense of that which understands, or else holds any capacity to understand, other. The latter notion of intellect can only pertain to an I-ness/ego/psyche, something that can only occur in a duality to otherness—and something which by entailment applies to SD in variant (1.b.), for, here, SD holds of an understanding of the intent which SD deems good which SD seeks to eventually actualize, and end whish is thereby logically other relative to the creating/designing SD. Whereas TD as the absolute pinnacle of understanding is utterly devoid of any and all otherness—i.e., is completely and perfectly non-dualistic—and so cannot logically be a psyche/ego/I-ness.

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All this was written in relative haste. But I wanted to post this now, just in case it might be replied to. In short, as far as I so far find, the distinction between the Good and the (non-mystical) Monotheistic God (for mystical notions often enough do not assume God to be a psyche, i.e. personhood) is amply clear—and this in manners that make the two notions logically inconsistent with each other. Unless, maybe, one would like to assume some form of a Demiurge as SD which is itself yet bound by TD, i.e. to the (uncreated) Good.

If logical inconsistencies in what I’ve just written are found, I’d be grateful for being shown where these logical fallacies might occur.

p.s., as to the issue of natural ends of naturalism, I’m again unclear on what “nature” and “natural” are here expected to signify outside of s straightforward materialism/physicalism—which I, as always, disagree with.

This is why I keep going back to the question - does the assertion of the existence of purpose (or design or intention) in nature, necessarily imply that there must be a purposeful agency other than human agency? Because it seems the inevitable entailment of such a claim. Likewise, the requirement that Dawkins has to deny the intentionality of design in nature stems from his atheist philosophy. — Wayfarer

Again, my best current appraisals:

I honestly felt no need to read much of Dawkins beyond a thorough reading of The Selfish Gene, in which it is clear to me that he values the immortality of existent being as an end-state above all else, for he equates that which is most immortal existentially (in his interpretation, this being genes) with that which is most quintessential to existence … hence, in at least a metaphorical sense, the very selfishness of existents by which this immortality is deemed obtainable (obviously, in his writing, this by genes alone; which, in his perspectives, serve to determine all aspects of life).

He notoriously concluded this same thesis by affirming that, “We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.”

Also stipulating things such as: "We can even discuss ways of cultivating and nurturing pure, disinterested altruism, something that has no place in nature, something that has never existed before in the whole history of the world." … Wherein one can quite clearly find an implicit affirmation of an ontological dualism between “nature” and “us”, this even though “us” is deemed fully determined by the underlying “nature”.

And all this, on a logical and hence rational level, is utter rubbish. Our innate nature in totality is X as determined in full by our set of “selfish/immortal” genes, but we must then “rebel” against this very innate nature which materialistically determines all that we do and hold the possibility to do so as to be or else become ethical. How so? Rationally speaking. What one ought do or become cannot be logically obtained in any way whatsoever if it is not in any way allowed as a logically possibility in the very metaphysical principles one endorses.

So far, upon first reading, it seems to me that the issue of intentionality (here only addressing intentioning) you bring up regarding Dawkins' views directly parallels this same type of erroneous reasoning that he makes in the Selfish Gene, resulting in what to me is an absurd worldview.

-------

I'd also like to point out that there can often occur much equivocation between “design”, “intention”, and “purpose”, this among so called experts (such as Dawkins) and layperson alike. May I be corrected on any of this if need be:

Design, in one way or another, always pivots around the notions of “de-” (in the sense of “from” or “of”) and “sign”. As one example, a designed table will de-sign-ate the intention(s) of that which designed it – at least to those others capable of understanding these intentions. And, so, designs are always intentional. (Hence, a non-intentional design so far to me makes no sense.)

Intention, on the other hand, will always imply a straining, augmentation, and/or effort of some given X to actualize an as of yet unactualized future intent/end—hence, X’s effort to make real something that is not yet real as the end pursued in the given intentioning.

Lastly, purpose is of itself merely the end toward which something moves in an Aristotelian notion of “movement”. As one Aristotelian example, the seed’s end is that of fully developing into a mature adult.

Hence, while all designs will be intentional and all intentions will be purposeful, this in no way entails that purpose must consist of intentions or, else, that intentions must result in designs. E.g., the purpose of a heart is to pump blood, but this in no way then implies that nature intentionally brought about the occurrence of a heart—and, hence, one cannot then validly affirm that “nature (necessarily, intentionally) designed a heart” for the purpose of pumping blood. Moreover, say that one’s intension (hence motive; hence reason) in moving leftward at a crossroad was to most effortlessly arrive at the market one wants to make purchases at—but this in no way implies that one thereby necessarily designed anything in so intending to move leftward.

So, that all design necessarily stems from some intentioning psyche (that thereby holds some intent in mind and, hence, some purpose/end/intent in so designing) will in no way then entail that all possible forms of purpose are necessarily designed (this by an intentioning X, where X is almost always understood to be a mind-endowed-agency).

Therefore, at least when logically appraised, nature can well be globally purposeful without this purpose having been in any way designed by anyone or anything.

--------

I’d also be grateful for clarity as to what precisely differentiates modern metaphysical naturalism (as compared to, say, natural-ism as intepreted by ancient Stoics via their notion of Logos, to which even the polytheistic gods, were they to occur, are necessarily bound—this, for example, as expressed by Cicero in his The Nature of the Gods, which I deem far more accurate than any modern day rendition of what Stoicism used to be and uphold) with modern metaphysical materialism.

More to the point, from what I so far gather, modern metaphysical naturalism rejects the very notion of ontologically occurring purpose—this just as materialism/physicalism does. E.g.:

Further, this sense of naturalism holds that spirits, deities, and ghosts are not real and that there is no "purpose" in nature. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalism_(philosophy)

(But to be forthright, I so far find that “naturalism is to nature” as “objectivism is to objectivity”. Meaning that, so far to me, it is as wrongheaded to assume that nature ought to be defined by the tenets of (modern metaphysical) naturalism as it is to assume that objectivity is in any way adequately defined by the tenets of (the obviously modern notions of) objectivism.)

Going back on my word to myself and taking the time to post:

Hmm, I was under the impression that @Janus was strictly concerned with how it might be coherent for global purpose to occur without a purposer’s imposition, to not say creation, of a global purpose in the world. Very much akin the Watchmaker argument as concerns “God making a purposeful world (which would not be purposeful in any way sans a purposive God)”. In an attempt to further address my best current understandings of this:

In here assuming the reality of the Good in a strictly Neoplatonic framework, as example, is the Good/the One the (purposeful) creation of some creator (which thereby holds an altogether different end in mind in so creating the Good) or, else, an uncreated and imperishable, else metaphysically immovable, end that applies to all at least corporeal beings—this just as much as it would apply to all incorporeal beings (from ghosts/apparitions to gods) were the latter to in any way occur?

Furthermore, is not the Good within this framework expressed as that which either directly or indirectly determines all that does and can exist? Hence not only all of life’s evolutionary transformations and behaviors but all that is deemed to be purely physical as well?

In a Neoplatonic framework, that a rock might here have purpose (an ultimate end toward which it moves, however incrementally) does not then either entail that the rock has any form of intention or that its purpose (hence, end toward which it progresses) in the grand scheme of things was intended by anyone—be such someone either corporeal (human) or incorporeal (god).

Human agents have historically held onto myriad types of final ends for their own being: e.g., from the nihility which corporeal death is supposed to bring, this as the final end pursued by those who seek to free themselves of their suffering via suicide; to the notion of immortality in the form of a literally perfect (and hence eternal) self-preservation as that end to be striven for (with some transhumanist ideals as one modern example of this); to the yearning to become the uncontested top-dog, so to speak, of all that is and surrounds; or, as one here last given example, the eternal paradise of a Christian Heaven wherein one eternally dwells as unperishing ego devoid of any and all suffering, maybe with a harp in hand, under the omnipotent guidance of a superlative ego as creator of everything that is. But then, these many human-devised concepts of a final end to be yearned for and pursued—this together with that Neoplatonic notion of an absolute unity/henosis with the One—are most often logically contradictory. Such that, logically at least, not all of them can be true, else real, else correct, and hence right (not at least at the same time and in the same respect).

Of note, it is human’s evolved intellect which facilitates humans abilities to envision the many such disparate final ends of personal being. Frogs don’t do this too well (or rather at all). So it seems that the greater the intelligence/sapience, the greater too the ability to either align to or else deviate from that which is—in a Neoplatonic framework—a fixed final end and an absolute good (to one's personal being included). In parallel, frogs can’t willfully deceive others and their own selves anywhere near as much as humans can—but then, neither can they apprehend as many truths regarding reality.

So, to my best current understanding, in a modern and more analytically cogent model yet upholding the Neoplatonic understanding of the Good as final end, the Good would then need to account in one way another for all these discordant various final ends which human agencies can, and at times have, aimed toward. This while also holding a cogent explanation for why these various other conceivable ultimate ends are in fact untrue, else unreal, else incorrect, and hence wrong—and, so, are in fact bad ends to pursue or else progress toward. This while furthermore likewise making sense of why the physical world as we empirically know it occurs. Hence, the Good—just as ancient Neoplatonism maintains (and as was at the very least linguistically echoed in Aristotelian metaphysics—must then be the unmoved (undetermined and, hence, unlimited) mover (determiner; else, in Aristotelian terms, final cause) of all that in any way is and can existentially be. Itself, as the final end yet to be obtained, being beyond both existence and nonexistence.

And yet the Good in this Neoplatonic framework (as in so many others) cannot be a purposer (at least not as I take the term to have been so far implied by Janus: an ego which purposefully creates and thereby endows purpose): it hence is in no way an ego that can be disappointed or happy in its attempts to bring anything about by striving to itself obtain some end. The Good as final end is of itself not purposeful, but instead merely is. And, in so being, it reputedly endows purpose to everything else both sentient and insentient via any number of means. Via at least some of these means, this will then logially need to include all false final ends that intelligent enough sentience might seek to actualize.

It seems that this is where one starts philosophically questioning what in fact is the genuine and good final end that one ought to do one’s best to pursue/intend/remain aligned to (for one's own benefit of minimizing one's overall suffering). This just as one deliberates between going leftward or rightward at a given crossroads – but, here, regarding metaphysical notions of final ends to one’s existence that maximally, if not fully, satisfy all of one’s wants (and, hence, all of one’s intents).

While I don’t in this post want to write a thesis on my best current understandings regarding a Neoplatonic notion of the One/the Good, in short, there obviously are different final ends which people can both envision and actively choose to pursue – this as a guiding factor to our more immediate (needless to add, intentional) decisions. But, logically at least, this array of contradicting final ends we can envision as a humanity then necessarily consists of at least some erroneous conceptualizations of where our being ends. And in assuming there being the Neoplatonic the Good as fixed final end, the Good, aka the One, then necessarily needs to account for all end/purposes that can in any way existentially occur—both those pertaining to sentient beings (deities included where they to occur) and to insentient physicality, both those aligned with the actualization of the One/the Good and those which deviate from this.

Of course, deny the very possibility of the Good/the One being real and all this goes down the toilet. Obviously. But where the possibility is entertained, there will then necessarily and coherently be a global purpose which occurs in the absence of anyone or anything producing and hence creating this global, or else cosmic, purpose - but instead being in one way or another, consciously or unconsciously, bound to it.

My current best two cents worth regarding this issue of a possible global purpose sans global purposer.

Janus, my bad. In haste, I mistook what thread I'm on. Still, the logical issues I've so far addressed remain.

At any rate, I'll sign off for now.

Explain to me how the notion, not to mention the imputation, of purpose makes sense in the absence of an agent that purposes. — Janus

There is a post on another thread which you've so far not addressed. Still, as to explanation: if there is an un-created and imperishable ultimate end for the sake of which X does this and that, then there will be purpose that was not created by a purposer. BTW, this ultimate end can be a grand "heat death" just as much as it can be "the Good". If all things mover toward their end, then purpose occurs.

I'll in turn ask, how can a purposer bring about a purpose A in the absence of an end/purpose Z by which the purposer is teleologically determined in so bringing about purpose A. Would not any such act be instead utterly devoid of purpose, hence intent/end-pursued and, hence, in no way intentional/purposive?

A better question is: have you been able to shape your world so that it's a paradise you roam in? Or is it a hell you constantly fight against? — frank

This where Nietzsche's aphorism of, to paraphrase, "my heaven/paradise is in the shadow of my [two sided] sword [which cuts/effects me just as it cuts/effects the other, if not the astral/abstract/above]" might be seen to come into play, depending on its interpretation. At any rate, all life shapes the world in part, be this in line with consciously willed intentions or not.

:100: I've been reading about the ideal of the mind's conformity with actuality and the distinction between 'conforms with' and 'corresponds to'. Compare with the Platonic principle 'to be, is to be intelligible.' See Eric D Perl Thinking Being. — Wayfarer

Thank you kindly. Yes, though in some ways subtle, I find the distinction quite important, both ontologically and epistemologically - in many ways related to the notion of forms/eidoi and their relation of either accordance/harmony or the converse (whereby conflict occurs in some measure). Thumbs up to the Platonic principle you quote.

I've so far gotten a "404 not found" in the link. I'll check back in later.

The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile? — tim wood

As to what purpose is, I here take it to be that end for the sake of which an action, else movement, occurs or for the sake of which something is—with the latter (things) being subsumed by the former (processes) in any process theory.

That said, for the kick of it, I’ll offer an extremely pithy premise regarding the universal purpose of biological evolution—within which context our own individual cognitive purposes unfold—which I’d love to see falsified on either logical or empirical grounds:

• The steadfast global purpose to the evolution of life is that of life’s optimal conformity to that which is actual and, hence, real. *

For better clarity, this irrespective of the detailed means, e.g. via optimal biological fitness relative to individuals and groups, via occurrences of genetic drift, and via the many almost innumerable other detailed means by which biological evolution is currently known to occur. Adaptation to an ever-changing world then being one less abstract facet of this just stated purposeful process. Such that that life which sufficiently deviates from optimal conformity to what is actual/real ceases to be while the life forms which maintains such optimal conformity to what is actual/real persevere.

------

* As to some of this pithily expressed premise’s implications: The same relationship of “conformity to that which is real/actual” can well also adequately define the attribute of truth—such that when this conformity becomes complete, hence absolute (here tentatively entertaining the hypothetical that it in principle can), life then obtains a state of being wherein truth and reality/actuality become one and the same: here maybe better expresses as “Truth” with capital “T”. Also of note, as it’s been just specified, this global purpose of life will then occur in the absence of any superlative ego’s (i.e., God’s) so intending things to be—with the very notion of a purposing God being superfluous to the state of affairs specified (a God who'd furthermore also need to be subject to some end in order to act purposely, different issue though this is)—instead, here purpose in the form of ultimately becoming one with global Truth is a staple aspect of existence; i.e., it becomes a brute fact of the world. So, in a likewise somewhat informal expression, the purpose of life is here taken to be that of not only eventually discovering the quintessentially genuine (“true” in this sense) actuality/reality of being itself but of also becoming one with it. Add some measure of indeterminacy and free will into the equation and, we via our own freely willed choices then (at least at times) stand in the way of this grand end being actualized, or at least further approached; this, for one example, by preferring fictitious accounts of what is and of what will be over truths regarding the same (truths which at times can be at least initially unpleasant to accept). Other implications could then follow, such as the provision of why lies in general are to be deemed bad: they further the whole from the very end here addressed (which I might add could also be labeled as "the Good").

All that said—with all these implications being not perfectly expressed—what I’m primarily curious about is, again, any valid argument against the pithy premise regarding the global purpose of life (this via the analysis of biological evolution’s purpose/end) which was previously specified.

P.s., While I’m anticipating some degree of discord on the matter if I’m at all replied to, I likely won’t be around to reply for a number of days.

[edit: some typo's corrected]

In the singing birds song, is he saying, "another world" : perhaps a Garden of Eden? — Gnomon

Yes, he's saying "another world" - ultimately concluding with this other world being a place where "nothing ever dies". Which I think supersedes even the notion of a Garden of Eden. This is not what everybody deems to be the ultimate good - Buddhist notions of Nirvana without remainder as one (counter-)example, Plotinus's the One as another, in both these cases there being no world to speak of, but only pure being devoid of any existence (here in the sense of that which "stands out"). Still, to me at least, the song does get an emotive point across, an emotive point that many enough do share: we (most at least) do secretly want, or at least yearn for, more than the world makes possible to have even in principle. I suppose to a Buddhist, this however being indicative of not following the middle-path.

Still, at the end of the day, it's just one song among many, and I don't endorse a good portion of its perspectives. Just the part about the world being neither fair nor unfair.

My philosophical view is that the physical/material world is Monistic : a single dynamic causal force (amoral energy) that can have positive or negative effects, depending on the individual's me-centered --- or we-centered --- interpretation. That's why the Buddha preached a No-Self perspective, and the Stoics focused on self-control. Fairness & Justice are not of the world, but in the mind of the observer. The cosmos is what it is, but humans can imagine what it could be. — Gnomon

I get that, and as I've previously mentioned, my own philosophical view is not one of materialism (i.e. a monism of physicality/materiality). Yet, do you find the "mind of the observer" to be any less real than the physicality which it observes and thereby knows? And, if not, are not both then equally real aspects of that which constitutes "the world" as-is.

If so, then I find that fairness & justice (together with unfairness & injustice) are as much of the world as are the minds of observers to which these notions are requisite. This doesn't then make the world of itself either fair or unfair in total. Nor does it address that by which fairness and unfairness is determined. Yet it does seem to avoid the inconsistency of a dualism - namely, between a) fairness/justice (and of the observers to which these properties often enough apply) which is claimed to not be of the world and b) the physical world itself - occurring within an upheld monism of materialism/physicalism, this however the latter be interpreted.

:smile: Nice to hear. As the the ass so choosing, I think the disagreement between the two of you was as to whether the choice is consciously deliberated or not and, hence, whether it is a conscious choice. And it's this which I wanted to address. In sum, the ass as a total being makes the choice, yes, but the ass as a conscious agent makes no choice whatsoever since it does not deliberate.

This no more than I or you are consciously deliberating on which words to use in our expressing ourselves most of the time. Our conscious choice most of the time being strictly limited to whether or not we ought to express those concepts which we hold in mind. Nevertheless, the specific words we use (and their placement, etc.) still being chosen by us as total beings, this subconsciously.

Maybe for entertainment, as a somewhat different perspective on this matter: Most of our volitions as conscious beings—though willed freely, here in the strict sense of there being no obstruction to our consciously willing, else intending, as we do—are nevertheless not deliberative. Here, we as conscious agents effortlessly inhere into, or else with, the volition of our unconscious mind—resulting in a unified volition/will relative to the total mind concerned. This often acquired, i.e. learned, and habitual means of acting and reacting to stimuli then makes our typical behaviors quite functional in their efficacy: e.g., we don’t deliberate between alternatives on how to move our fingers, wrist, etc. when reflexively catching a ball that was thrown to us—but our so catching it will have nevertheless been freely willed/intended (hence, with disappointment resulting were our will/intention to catch the ball to not be fulfilled as willed/intended).

It is only when our unconscious mind is torn between different possible intents that we as conscious agents consciously experience alternatives (brought up to consciousness from our unconscious processes of mind), alternatives between which we as conscious agents then in one way or another choose via deliberation (this being the process of weighting two or more alternatives’ possible benefits and costs and then determining that one ought proceed with one alternative at expense of all others).

With the Buridan’s Ass thought experiment, one will typically in no way deliberate between which side to move toward but, instead, will effortlessly inhere into (or with) the subliminal volitions of one’s unconscious mind—whose reasonings for so determining to go either leftward or rightward (here granting that one’s unconscious mind is not of itself utterly irrational in its activities) will be beyond the purview of one’s conscious awareness.

Yet, were we to at any point actively deliberate between two alternatives which we at a conscious level appraise to be of equal value to our longer-term intent, I’ll venture that there will yet occur subliminal appraisals and reasons which the unconscious aspects of our total mind engages in that will tip the scale of the given deliberation. For example, maybe one side holds a background of sky and clouds (which we do not consciously appraise) that seems more inviting and hence auspicious than the other. In effect re-taking the choice from the conscious being (who finds no preference for either alternative being selected) back to the unconscious mind—whose volitions the conscious being once again effortlessly inheres with.

While clarifying and justifying all this would take a considerable amount of time and effort, I’ll simply affirm that in real life no human (or lesser animal for that matter) ever dies of hunger or thirst from an indecision between alternatives which seem to be of equal worth or import. And I find the perspective just offered to be reasonable enough as-is in providing an explanation for why this is.

Here, then, all reasoning—be it conscious or else unconscious—will yet be principled by, at the very least, the laws of thought: hence "following the rules/laws of thought". However,again, many if not most of our voluntary behaviors will not be deliberated upon at a conscious level of awareness. As regards at least some of these latter, our rational justifications for performing these, again, nondeliberative yet freely/unobstructed-ly willed behaviors will be both post hoc and ad hoc—which doesn’t necessitate that the explanations we then provide will be wrong but does allow for false conclusions to occur. E.g., a person is hypnotized to not sit down on a chair and, when asked why they don’t take a seat, provides a justification that seems rational but has nothing to do with the facts of the matter.

I acknowledge that the philosophy of mind is very complex and that this perspective only skims the surface. Still, to sum up this partial perspective in a few words: the vast majority of our voluntary behaviors—for which we yet typically hold direct responsibility for on grounds of being that which we willed/intended—are not deliberated upon at a conscious level, such that the selecting of one alternative between two alternatives that to us conscious agents appear of equal value will, most often, not be consciously made.

p.s. This, acknowledgedly incomplete, perspective in many ways accommodates what can be termed a bundle-theory of mind or, maybe more directly, of volition – taking into account both conscious and non-conscious aspects of a total mind. And this without in any way dismissing the possibility of metaphysical (i.e., libertarian) free will pertaining to us conscious agents whenever we do consciously deliberate between alternatives (hence, a free will wherein we as conscious agents solely determine the effect of the alternative which we choose, such that we as conscious agents are in practice metaphysically free to choose differently than what we will end up choosing ... but then this same libertarian free will could also be conceptually extended to the sometimes disparate volitions of one's unconscious mind, volitions with which one as conscious agent/will most often effortlessly unifies sans any conscious deliberations).

At any rate, all this being one way to address the paradox presented in the Buridan's Ass thought experiment.

Although on the whole the lyrics to this song are a bit too materialist for my tastes, I yet very much agree with its primary message: “the world, per se, is neither fair/just nor unfair/unjust, period”. (And I conclude this as someone who nevertheless upholds the reality of the Good as per Plato and Aristotle, etc – from where the very notions, or “eidoi”, of fairness (that aligned with the Good) and unfairness (that misaligned with the Good) reportedly emerge to begin with.)

At any rate, this pithy conclusion of “the world is neither fair nor unfair” as just worded might be somewhat too non-dualistic for many, but I find it in full keeping with previously mentioned notions of “the world can be fair only to the extent that we make it so”.

Thinking you might get a kick out of this song’s lyrics:

I'm not sure how helpful this is if the question is the adequacy of Aristotle's moral philosophy. The Ethics and Politics make it fairly clear what is meant by "happiness." — Count Timothy von Icarus


Right. The objection seems to be, "Someone could say that they do not desire happiness so long as they use the word 'happiness' in a way that is not in accord with what Aristotle means; therefore it is false that everyone desires happiness." This sort of objection would only make sense in a non-Aristotelian context. But this thread is literally about Aristotle and among other things Aristotle's approach to happiness and our final end. — Leontiskos

I second (or maybe, third) that. Brings to mind a poem that seems to me to illustrate the case:

A SAIL

White is the sail and lonely
On the misty infinite blue,
Flying from what in the homeland?
Seeking for what in the new?

The waves romp, and the winds whistle,
And the mast leans and creeks;
Alas! He flies not from fortune,
And no good fortune he seeks.

Beneath him the stream, luminous, azure,
Above him the sun’s golden breast;
But he, a rebel, invites the storms,
As though in the storms were rest. — Poem by Mikhail Lermontov - translation by Max Eastman

I find the poem to be fairly easy to emotively comprehend, despite the possible variations in interpretation. The personally held good aimed at here can then be said to be, to paraphrase, “the uncertainty of the storms, or of the strife, that calls out to one as though in them one finds one’s further development and, hence, one's possible future flourishing as a being, i.e. eudemonia, or being in accord with the highest virtue” - this rather than seeking a certain good fortune or the like. In the case as illustrated, one could then say that one’s intent is not that of obtaining happiness in the sense of easygoing joy or some such but, instead, the obtainment of one’s further possible flourishing despite the uncertain risks – such that were this actively held intent to pursue the uncertainty of the “storms” to become obstructed, only then would the individual addressed experience suffering. And, then, such that approaching such storms would then be in line with Aristotelian notions of happiness - this while shunning happiness in the sense of easygoing joy and so forth.

At any rate, I’m in agreement.

As is most always the case from you, words without content.

There, I've expressed.

You are making a confused argument. Anaximander posited the Apeiron as that from which a dichotomously structure ream of material complexity arises, but also then returns. Which rather nicely sums up the Big Bang with its trajectory from a quantum foam to a quantum void with right now being the Universe's high water mark of material complexity. — apokrisis

As facts go, we don't have much of Anaximander's perspectives but a few fragments of writing. And in these, we are told of a cyclical cosmology rather than the linear one which you here present and modern physics generally endorses - even though there are currently valid cyclical models of the universe. So this is not Anaximander's Apeiron - but apo's Apeiron which apo modifies from Anaximander's. Metaphysical justifications for presuming the Apeiron yet direly lacking - outside of because apo says so arguments. Till then, it might as well be magical thinking.

Likewise Peirce grounded his metaphysics in the tychism of firstness and its rational self-complexification that produces the cohesive equilibrium state of a synechic thirdness. But I would agree that he didn't offer a map of the downward unwinding that follows – the wave that builds, peaks and then disperses. He did reflect the knowledge of science and the Christian mysticism of his time in that regard. — apokrisis

What does any of this have to do with what I asked? Once again:

So from whence this metaphysical fixedness of thermodynamics as they currently are known (and as they occur) being an absolute and literally immovable/permanent grounding for absolutely everything - including notions of justice and fairness? — javra

To which I'll now add, if the Apeiron, why the emergence of thermodynamics to begin with? Other than due to magic, of course.

As you admit, you don't understand thermodynamics so how could you understand how it might or might not apply to some "ethical" question or other. — apokrisis

As my previous scoffy-ness alluded to, this type of reply pretty much parallels the authoritarian theist who knows God or else God's Word, telling me I don't understand God/God's Word so how could I understand the answer to whether or not something like the enslavement of a person is ethical?

I find no reason to uphold your interpretations of thermodynamics as sacrosanct science. I do find thermodynamics to be model(s) regarding what is that is very much open to questioning and revision, just as any other model of science is, irrespective of the maths involved. As I also find the very notion of entropy to be. In your replies you however implicitly address both of these as though they were infallible scientific knowledge of what is as they're presently interpreted. And where from this infallibility?

What don't I understand?: the maths. But wait, its not the maths that are important but the metaphysics behind them:

Only the mathematical principles of thermodynamics can possibly determine whether, or else the extents to which, fascism is more fair and just than is democracy - or else vice versa, if the two are not in fact equally so. — javra

That isn't my argument. My argument is that it is the metaphysical principles which matter. — apokrisis

Metaphysical principles which you do not justify much less address (see for example the question I've re-posted). And round and round we go.

So an impossible dilemma becomes a trivial historical example of how a deeper "mathematical" principal – scaling – is at work.

All that moral philosophy posturing and agonising and ... it turns out to be this simple. :grin: — apokrisis

Yea, no. Just words without meaning. Apropos, as to your example of opposites in this context, the opposite of women chattel for men would be not equality of worth (as is/was typical of hunter gather tribes) but that of men as chattel for women. Just as the opposite of polygamy is not monogamy but polyandry.

We can't blame things on some evil force that snuck in from outside. Demonise some elite. [...] — apokrisis

No, by any means we cannot blame others whatsoever for anything. So called (somehow always economic or else political - because cash and power-over is all that really matters in life) elites which are evidenced to either rape or else known to quite cordially mingle with those that pimp women for raping included. Not unless we introduce some Abrahamic notion of demons that somehow come from without. Poor innocent lambs that those elites are - especially when their greed succeeds in making them and their corporations too large to fail. But the poor, that's another matter altogether - the poor can be deemed biologically deranged in their misdeeds by the genes they've inherited, this as some have claimed of those incarcerated (who were obviously not "too big to fail' in their endeavors).

But just as long as it all assists entropy, hey, its all good.

( ... all this being indicative of faulty reasoning, to stupid old me at least.)

But again, I so far do not comprehend why a, in this case, global fascism ought be universally shunned on the rational grounds of the relative degrees of energy dissipation as compared to that of a global (I should add, "and earnest" rather than mere lip-service) democracy. — javra


Again, the question is does it scale? Is it a powerlaw structure with equilibrium balance that has the legs to persist and grow. Or at least persist and repair.

Is it mature rather than immature or senescent? Does it balance the resilience of youth with the wisdom of experience?

These are questions that ecologists know how to frame and to measure. — apokrisis

Ecologists as a group deal with the question of "Does it balance the resilience of youth with the wisdom of experience?" in addressing their field of research? We might be living in two disparate worlds.

And you provide no answer to my quoted question. Might as well claim only those in the thermodynamically-informed spheres of reality understand why murder is wrong ... this by mathematically addressing such questions as "did the killing of another human properly 'balance the resilience of youth with the wisdom of experience'". Which, if needs be said, is nonsensical reasoning.

Look, if my intelligence and/or sapience is beneath yours, you have two options: one is to freely choose to not talk to me - as any sane human ought to freely choose to not rationalize with a lesser animal on issues of metaphysics for example. The other is to address things at my comparatively reduced level of comprehension - this as might any sane parent explain things to their kinds. But to insist that so it is and that I should believe that it despite it making no rational sense to me is very much akin to the hallmark of authoritarianism. Your metaphysics are to me so far not rationally cogent. No math-understandings required. And your inability to make rational sense of ethics likewise follows.

As to your possibly lofty assumption that I am too far beneath you to warrant reply, don't worry. I don't name myself "javra" (i.e., "mongrel", to put it nicely) on this forum for nothing. But as mongrels go, that won't stop me from honestly expressing my views.

You have neither a model nor a measure to support any claim you might make. Thus you merely have opinions and anecdotes. — apokrisis

Let's see, I ground all my metaphysics in the reality that all presently occurring sentient beings necessarily occur as individual first-person points-of-view, or better worded "of awareness". Nothing new to the old-timers hereabouts. You claim this to be merely opinion and anecdote. And then you contrast this with the metaphysical foundation of Anaximander's Apeiron which, to be as charitable as possible, you reinterpret to suit your whims.

Stupid as I might be, I sill find far more confidence in the reality that I, as a first-person point-of-view, am than I do in the reality of the Apeiron, especially in the linear cosmology version which you endorse, from which, as you affirmed in other posts, we obtain the inference that "awareness" is a rather meaningless term.

LIke many, you understand metaphysics as applied idealism – the practical reason not to have to engage with the reality of dealing with life in some properly reasoned fashion ... — apokrisis

Oh mighty unquestionable authority of reality and knower of other peoples' deepest turths and perspectives, this is emblamatic of the bullshit I addressed in a previous post I made in this thread.

Notice how I so far have not explicitly engaged in the psychobabble of what your true intentions and perspectives are as a person ... be this lack of engagement stupidity on my part or, else, some semblance of wisdom and dignity.

That isn't my argument. My argument is that it is the metaphysical principles which matter. — apokrisis

Metaphysical principles which, from previous conversations with you, inexorably start with the assumption of the Apeiron as ultimate beginning ... while with the same assumptive position at the very same time decrying the notion of a literally absolute/complete/perfect limitless state of being as ultimate end to be absurdity. Otherwise, sophomoric interpretations of the Good (which is not of itself justice but is claimed to determine justice) such as those mentioned in this following quote would not be affirmed so easily:

So justice is not reducible to thermodynamics. — Banno

Just not your idealist framing of justice as transcendent truth independent of its material basis. — apokrisis

And I'll again point to Peircean metaphysics upholding the view that the "laws of thermodynamics" will themselves evolve as the (physical) cosmos progresses in it acquired habits.

So from whence this metaphysical fixedness of thermodynamics as they currently are known (and as they occur) being an absolute and literally immovable/permanent grounding for absolutely everything - including notions of justice and fairness?

(To not even address what metaphsycial justifications there might rationally or empirically then be for the Apeiron but not for the Good as the literally limitless ultimate end, else end-state, of being, this as per the Neo-Platonic notion of "the One" as one example.)

As to my scoffy-ness, it's intended to directly address posts such as this:

How does it make sense to ask which of these is closest to thermodynamic equilibrium? — Banno

Hah. That is the problem of argument by Hallmark card cutesiness. You would have to be thermodynamically-informed enough to tell the difference between a closed Gaussian equilbrium and an open powerlaw one.

So sadly, an F. — apokrisis

I do acknowledged in being one of these "F" receivers. I do not rationally understand how thermodynamics determines that while one man will deem the absolute obedience of their wife to be just and fair another man deem an equality of worth with their wife to be emblematic of justice and fairness - nor, if this must be added, how thermodynamics then determines that one such comprehension of justice and fairness is bad/wrong/incorrect while the contradicting understanding of justice and fairness is good/right/correct. And, if not yet apparent, belief/faith in certain matters though I might have, I'm not one to have blind faith in anything or anyone. Stupid me, I'm sure some would say.

As to the rest of your post in general, there's much there for me to agree with as to what ought to be the case.

In regards to global governance, we already are under an indirect form of this - not from the UN (almost laughable seeing how laws of war are nowadays addressed by some nations, this as one example) but from the current oligarchies of neo-liberal (might as well be "neo-capatilist") economy, which is global - and is indirectly governed by said oligarchy via, again as just one blatant example, lobbyists and candidate funding at both national levels and, where applicable, individual state levels.

No doubt we will have a formal global governance sooner rather than later. Irrespective of the gripes some may express at this. The only real question is that of whether this global official governance will be Orwellian and so in some way totalitarian or, else, be one of a global democracy-by-representation.

But again, I so far do not comprehend why a, in this case, global fascism ought be universally shunned on the rational grounds of the relative degrees of energy dissipation as compared to that of a global (I should add, "and earnest" rather than mere lip-service) democracy.

Coming from a different metaphysical vantage, I do endorse democracy over fascism on account of the optimal well-being of all the individual psyches concerned, this in both short- and long-term appraisals. But, here, the consciousness that holds awareness and which can both suffer and be content if not joyful is not appraised as some willy-nilly term that holds no true or real metaphysical importance to the grand picture of things.

So justice is not reducible to thermodynamics. — Banno

Of course it is! Only the mathematical principles of thermodynamics can possibly determine whether, or else the extents to which, fascism is more fair and just than is democracy - or else vice versa, if the two are not in fact equally so. All you need to do is put in the numbers of these two competing systems into the right mathematical equations and one will obtain the scientifically valid answer.

Now, while I'm myself quite ignorant of how our sacrosanct thermodynamic laws might determine what is and is not fair and just to us, just as we are told, in one's lack of any rational comprehension one must then stringently maintain a blind faith in the absolute and global authority of thermodynamics ... and of those who espouse preach it from their high tower of infallible and hence unquestionable knowledge. Else one won't do one's best to speed up the processes of entropy toward absolute equilibrium! As we all know, this being the ultimate bad.

Then again, if the aforementioned looks like, sounds like, and smells like bullshit, I see no reason why it in fact isn't unadulterated bullshit.



So does thermodynamics determine fascism to be any more, or else less, just and fair than is democracy? Or maybe these concepts/terms too are devoid of any meaning and importance when it comes to thermodynamics - as is the case with "good" and "bad/evil". Of course, I'm an acknowledged flunker when it comes to the "mathematically sound scientific truths" regarding whatever thermodynamics might infallibly determine. Just asking you the unquestionable erudite what system of governance one ought endorse on the basis of justice and fairness so as to maximize entropy in the long haul.

What distinguishes a mere experimentalist from a physicist [...] — substantivalism

In case this might come as a news flash: physics is not equivalent to the empirical sciences - but is instead only one subset of the latter among many.

Tell you what, I've repeatedly offered what I take valid empirical science to be. You, so far, have not offered any definition of what you take it to be - and examples of what "science says" do not come close to delineating what is and is not science. Such that I so far can validly presume you're in search of "scientifically" produced infallible truths as to what is "objective". (For the record, I'm a stringent fallibilist, so I find any such search ... utterly misguided. But this would concern issues of epistemology in general rather than a definition of the sceinces as an epistemic subset of the former.)

Again, you pout about modern science but give no effort in delineating what is science or else even what it's supposed to be.

I find no point in continuing without you providing a definition of the empirical sciences - one that I expect to contradict at least parts of what I so far defined the empirical sciences as being, this on account of your repeated hostility, at least in tonality, to what I've upheld.

Care to so provide?

In short, [...] how are you supposed to be a part of the same "demos" with these (distant to you) people? How is democracy supposed to work in such a scenario (that seems very plausible in many developed countries)? — Eros1982

Or, as the title asks, "is multiculturalism compatible with democracy?"

A very resounding "yes" to this question, but only when all the differing ethnicities involved all commonly share the same non-authoritarian values upon which the notion of "democracy" is contingent.

Otherwise, what results is a bunch of opposing authoritarian values voting and electing their way into which authoritarian click/group shall despotically dictate what everyone else should do and be. After all, Nazis were elected so as to produce a fascist governance within an otherwise functional democracy, as example of this. It would be nice if we'd learn from our past so as to not repeat its mistakes ... but, sometimes, we learn nothing from history.

I want to make the point that the intellectual methods used by both are similar; metaphysicians & theoretical scientists.

They both conduct semantical clarifications, language analysis, thought experiments, construct metaphorical stories, and give pictorial analogue explanations of the world to understand it better. — substantivalism

I can find myself agreeing with this, with some (maybe not very important) caveats:

Any person which engages in contemplation will to some extent engage in these same processes at least some of the time - such that these mental faculties are for the most part part and parcel of most any theorizing on the part of humans.

Maybe more to the point of interest, whereas metaphysicians will primarily interest themselves with those aspects of reality upon which the physical is contingent, theoretical scientists (by which I presume we're here talking about people such as Einstein and Darwin) will interest themselves with at least certain aspects of the physical world itself. But yes, when you get into self-professed scientists who then feel qualified to write papers or books on how everything emerged from out of nothing (as one example) and then claim these affirmations as scientifically evidenced, this otherwise clear differentiation becomes obfuscated - I often find to the detriment of both fields' credibility. That said, both theories of metaphysics and of science ought be fully conformant to observations if they seek any integrity of theory.

Take the fact that spacetime bends. . . oh I mean a strange interpretation that is held in varieties of competing positions of interpretation irrespective of the math under the heading of substantivalists. Then there are the relationists and emergentists who seek to say something different. . . about the same exact mathematics. — substantivalism

Not sure how to best interpret the sarcasm in the first sentence. That specetime bends is not fact, but theory. It is fact that this theory of relativity currently best accounts for all observables in the field - this to the best of our knowledge. But then it is also fact that this same theory of relativity has to date not been satisfactorily combined with our best theories regarding QM - thereby logically demonstrating that something is amiss in either one of the two theories just mentioned or else with both. To affirm that specetime bends is fact is then to deny what's just been here stated.

As to the mathematics, pure mathematics is notoriously indifferent to the observable world, conformant only to mathematical axioms and the logical implications of these. If the maths don't serve to best explain the observable world (or, as is the case with probability, as a tool for best appraising the validity of observable results) they are then worthless to the empirical sciences. Take Einstein's ToR for example; he had to invent an new mathematics to properly address the theory he held in mind - namely, the Einstein field equations. Here, the maths are not sacrosanct but, rather, part of the theorizing regarding the data so far accumulated.

I assume you'll let me know where you disagree, if you do disagree.

Different math, different interpretations, but exactly the same observable consequences. — substantivalism

Yes, I agree.

Sometimes, if not often, newly discerned observables will then make a difference as to which interpretations are to be culled from the list. At the very least narrowing down the valid possibilities as to what in fact is.

You bring up the variable speed of light hypothesis as if the conventionality of simultaneity/geometry doesn't already make that a moot point. — substantivalism

But again, the latter is not fact but theory.

If I came up with a falsifiable hypothesis about me being a brain in vat that is in fact falsified then that doesn't mean I'm not a brain in a vat. It only means that if I am a brain in a vat that it wouldn't function as I had previously thought.

The speed of light is just one of many other such examples of unfalsifiable proposals which is showcased as if its been proven or narrowed into the corner of truth. Even modern popularized scientific YouTube videos are now talking about the impossibility of measuring this speed let alone its 'constancy'. Poincare long before Einstein was already kicking around this idea of this impossibility over a hundred years ago! — substantivalism

I'll try to generalize again: if X, Y, and Z are predicted to produce observation A but observation A does not result from X, Y, and Z, then this just mentioned hypothesis is falsified. To address commonly known examples, Newton's X, Y, and Z did not account for Mercury's movements as observation A. Einstein's X, Y, and Z does. Because of this, we acknowledge the Newton's physics (theory of the physical) is wrong, despite yet being relatively accurate for all intended purposes most of the time. We don't yet know whether or not Einstein's physics is wrong - but in absence of an even better explanation we currently maintain this latter physics, tentatively assuming it to be right (rather than knowing it to be "fact").

As to BIVs and experiment, I'll say OK, but that one BIV model that was entertained and tested for would have nevertheless been proven false via falsification.

Same then would apply to VSL, acknowledging that there are multiple variants of the theory. But again, contrast this which MWI for example, which cannot be tested for in any respect whatsoever.

I regard science, at least the hard sciences, as plagued by irresolvable immense scientific holism (dependence on parts) and conventionalism. So much so that I find it maddening at this point but not something I feel I could easily give up given my fruitless internet searching for as long as I can remember. — substantivalism

It's in a way unfortunate.

But I'll reaffirm that science (empirical science proper) was never ever a means of obtaining infallible knowledge or truths regarding what is. One of its greatest strengths is in culling possible explanations regarding what physically is in definitive - yet still technically fallible - manners. Take for example theories of life: there is no scientific manner to reintroduce the theory of Young Earth Creationism into scientific models of how life emerges and behaves - this exactly because it directly contradicts data (fossils and such) - although this is yet still not infallibly known (e.g., one can always bring in something like a Last Thursday-ist explanation of the data, as extremely non-credible as this alternative will be to both anti-YECs and YECs alike - its very logical standing, or better lack of, here tentatively overlooked). That stated, not all variations of Lamarckian interpretations of biological evolution have been falsified - this although Lamarckianism proper has. The Neo-Darwininan model we currently endorse would go through a paradigm-shift were any one of these Lamarckian possibilities valid (via further enquiry into epigenetics and the like) such that the will on the part of parents can in any way whatsoever effect the phenotype of offspring. Yet nothing even remotely adequate has been proposed in terms of any such Lamarckian-like possibility to serve as any significant threat to the Neo-Darwininan model we currently hold and hold onto to as valid representation of what is. This, however, does not make Neo-Darwinianism an established fact, though. And any potential scientific proposal to contest the currently predominant view will need to be a) empirically falsifiable and b) not falsified via any test to stand any chance of evidencing the hypothesis proposed. But if falsified, then that one particular hypothesis will then be definitively evidenced wrong.

We obtain no infallible truths via the empirical sciences, but we do narrow down the possibilities of what might in fact be true. And, the more data collected, the more we can narrow down these ever developed possibilities. This is not to claim that the possibilities pertaining to the physical world has dwindled in quantity, but is to claim that without data collection we'd be both far more ignorant of what in fact physically is and have no reason do deny the validity of far more alternatives than we currently do. As I previously mentioned, science by its very nature cannot be a panacea regarding our knowledge of what is. But it remains our best known means of obtaining knowledge regarding the perceivable world.

So, going back to the OP, because science has by now evidenced the strictly mechanistic model of the world to be erroneous, we should not "go back" to a Newtonian-physics-like understanding of the world - this, for example, no more than we as a society should go back to a Young Earth Creationist understanding of the world in general and hence of biology in particular.

Fairness is not something you we come across in the world.

It's something you we do in the world.

(Edited for ↪javra
) — Banno

Thanks, but this still dismisses a crucial facet. The relative fairness, or lack thereof, of the world we're born into - as another example - is not a result of something we do, but is what we come across.

Fairness is not something you come across in the world.

It's something you do in the world. — Banno

A bit too laconic for accuracy's sake here. Since the world consists of multiple doers and not just oneself, one can and at time does come across fairness in world - for one example, by traveling to societies, communities, or else clicks that are far more just than one's own. (For a more concrete example, it's what at the very least once upon a time made the US a place where many a foreigner desired to reside as a national: the fairness aspect to life which certain foreigners did not encounter in their own home country. This before the American Dream became strictly that of becoming rich. Different can of worms though.)

Personally, I so far like the "only if we make it so" far better as an terse but precise answer.

---------------

How does it make sense to ask which of these is in thermodynamic equilibrium? — Banno

I'll wait for an answer with bated breath. Kinda

Thanks. Glad to see we're in agreement.

Myself, I do strongly take to heart this blatant aspect of current reality as we know it, which I'll here emphasize by restating:

And to the totalitarianisms at home and abroad that are fastly catching sway as a likewise detrimental counteraction to the post-modern ethical mindset just affirmed. — javra

I like the value structures of democracy and dislike the authoritarianism I see spreading in the USA and in many another country worldwide. And, in case this needs to be at least pragmatically addressed, the "no moral facts (of ethical rights and wrongs)" approach to ethics doesn't have a chance in withstanding the oncoming slippery-slopes toward what could well become a global fascism.

... a social system that is on average fair and just? — apokrisis

A post-scarcity, demarchic [democratic] social system is as "fair and just" as I can imagine. — 180 Proof

But, wait, such as system will not be an equilibrated balance between existential opposites - namely between that democratic system the quote affirms as an extreme, on the one hand, and the totalitarian extremes wherein scarcity proliferates because the totalitarian doesn't give a shit about the people, this as the existential/conceptual opposite of the former - so it can't be what we ought strive for. We must have moderate evil in order for the good to obtain - well, not good, since this is an extreme polar that is to be shunned, but that which is optimally beneficial to us without being itself good: an ideal balance in everything ... such that none are better in any capacity than any other. After all, good as the polar extreme of what is possible in the spectrum of good and bad is the enemy of what is good! (all this is sarcasm on my part, to those who are reading this a bit too literally).

A very pertinent satire regarding this whole notion of equality between opposite extremes (rather than equality in intrinsic value despite the differences which make some better than others in different attributes ... this latter being a completely different ball park as issue) can be found in Kurt Vonnegut's short story "Harrison Bergeron". I won't be quoting the entire summary, but to get the ball rolling:

In the year 2081, the Constitution dictates that all Americans are fully equal and not allowed to be smarter, better-looking, or more physically able than anyone else. The Handicapper General's agents enforce the equality laws, forcing citizens to wear "handicaps": masks for those who are too beautiful, earpiece radios for the intelligent that broadcast loud noises meant to disrupt thoughts, and heavy weights for the strong or athletic. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harrison_Bergeron

... hence delivering an equilibrated balance between the best and the worst as opposite extremes pertaining to possible human attributes. A dystopia indeed.

----

Edit: just to clarify the issue of demarchy (and why putting a strike-though in the quote above might possibly have been an error made in haste by me): on second musing, to have a functional and thereby persisting lottocracy one must have all the ideal values of a democracy thoroughly instilled in, not just some, but all of the populace. Imperfect thought it was, as can be partly illustrated by Ancient Athens.

Here, though, were such an ideal state of human society to ever be obtained not just for some but for all within a society, one would no longer be able to differentiate between the literal democracy (likely no longer in any way a valid republic), a governance of anarchy (here strictly specifying a lack of any separation between the state and the people themselves, this such that governance is under the full sway of all people's voluntary cooperation at all times, even when differences occur), and, thirdly, a non-hypocritical governance of communism (wherein - as can be more or less found in kibbutz society - all economy, and hence ownership of goods, from social to personal, is in some way cooperative; resulting in a fully voluntary (rather than in any way imposed) economic system of community-ism). Considering that this state of affairs might be a bit over the top for most as to what is considered a possible global society from today's standards - while I don't claim that such system of demarchy, i.e. lottocracy, is logically impossible to fathom as an extreme form of fairness and justice - I merely prefer to sponsor strict democratic values as they can be found in any system comprised of a republic (i.e., representative democracy as democracies function in today's world).

Long story short, a "post-scarcity demarchy" might well be imaginable by some as a possible future state of being to ideally progress toward, and, if so, then there wasn't much warrant for me to replace it with the notion of "democracy". Still, I find the more general notion of a "post-scarcity democracy" to be hard enough to achieve as it is. So I used this notion instead.

All of this tangential ado mainly oriented toward @180 Proof. Just in case it might in any way matter.

What I mean by fetishizing intent is the assumption that intent can be ethically incorrect, that one can want what one shouldn’t, in addition to success or failure at intelligible sense-making. — Joshs

So ... a mass-murdering and torturing rapist's intent to torture, rape and murder as many as possible cannot be ethically incorrect. He cannot thereby want what he shouldn't. (This irrespective of the success or failure that he might have in respect to this personal "intelligible sense-making" he engages in.)

Is this what you're claiming?

Because to me this kind'a speaks to that whole bemoaning of modern-day ethical standards as being in a state of decadence, demise, or however one ought best term this. And to the totalitarianisms at home and abroad that are fastly catching sway as a likewise detrimental counteraction to the post-modern ethical mindset just affirmed.

Although I'm quite surprised by this, in a pleasant manner I'll add, I here fully endorse Banno's laconic answer (thought doubtless we'll differ on the ontological details):

Only if we make it so. — Banno

Yup.

You're still not addressing how Aristotelianism fetishizes intent over sense-making. OK, then.